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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

19980616 106

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-88-050

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LaSSR CP CC Buro Examines Negative Elements of Popular Front Movement

18000061 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
1 Oct 88 p 2

[Editorial: "In the Central Committee of the LaSSR Communist Party"]

[Text] The regular session of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Buro examined letters and suggestions being received by party bodies from party organizations, labor collectives, and workers concerning the draft program and charter of the Latvian Popular Front being created. It was noted that as a result of the party policy being implemented to restructure all aspects of life of Soviet society in the republic, particularly after the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the public and political activeness of the republic's population had increased considerably and the processes of increasing national self-consciousness had intensified. At the current stage of intense practical work influenced by the openness, critical mood, and constructive spirit of the party forum, people are posing the questions bothering them much more boldly and sharply. They are assessing the activities of state and economic bodies of party organizations and republic committees in a more concerned and bold manner and striving to multiply the good labor traditions of our republic.

The creation of various independent social associations has become one of the manifestations of this growing civic activeness. The process of forming the Latvian Popular Front which supports perestroika is proceeding actively. Representatives of the most diverse social sections and groups of the population, non-party members and communists are involved in it. Representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia and leaders of independent associations comprise the majority of the direct sponsors of creating this movement. As we know, democratic movements of this type, which recognize the leading role of the party, are active in a number of socialist countries and have given a good showing of themselves in solving pressing economic and social problems.

The draft program and charter of the Latvian Popular Front and the verbal and printed statements of members of initiative-filled groups emphasize that the goal of those involved in the front is to restructure our society on the principles of democratic socialism and humanism, which was begun and is being carried out on the initiative of the party, and active involvement in implementing the decisions of the 19th Party Conference. Such a statement of the tasks and the efficient work to carry them out warrant assistance on the part of party organizations.

The Central Committee Buro views this social movement as one of the forms of citizens realistically exercising their rights to participate in managing state and social affairs, in discussing and passing laws and decisions of statewide and local importance. It calls upon

communists to promote in every way possible the positive initiatives of the Latvian Popular Front aimed at speeding up the resolution of pressing problems, and arousing and consolidating all healthy forces in the republic.

The draft program of the Latvian Popular Front has many constructive ideas which are filled with sincere concern for accelerating the socio-economic and cultural development of the republic. The organizers of the Popular Front have set for themselves urgent tasks for developing and strengthening the sovereignty of the Latvian SSR in the family of fraternal republics in our country, for rooting out extensive methods of economic management which are aggravating social and national problems, for improving the ecological situation, for ensuring real Latvian-Russian bilingualism, and for improving the instruction of languages and the history of the republic, and a number of other socio-economic and socio-political problems.

The vast majority of these questions are being examined and resolved in party and state bodies of the republic. In implementing these decisions, the participants in the movement will be able to and should provide much assistance in support of perestroika.

The Central Committee Buro will support in every way possible the constructive actions of the Latvian Popular Front aimed at developing and strengthening the Leninist principles of building socialism and the Leninist norms of national relations, developing culture, expanding the process of democratization, and strengthening the friendship, trust and mutual assistance of all peoples living in our republic, and will welcome the specific contribution of each person involved in the movement to accelerate perestroika.

At the same time, in the opinion of the buro, there are those aspects in the activities of a number of groups of the Latvian Popular Front which cause valid concern for the workers of the republic. People are bothered by the fact that despite the fact that the draft program and charter state that the Popular represents all residents of Latvia, in a number of places it has actually taken on a one-nationality nature. Certain groups are attempting to attach an ideology to the Latvian Popular Front, set it off against the party, or substitute it for the Councils of People's Deputies.

Among the organizers of the Latvian Popular Front there are also those people who by their thought and actions are not motivated by patriotic feelings, socialist values, or a desire to raise the people's standard of living to a qualitatively new level. Their guiding constellation is over-ambition, political arrogance, personal selfish interests, and instead of constructive criticism—a desire to discredit the party's political policy.

It is also obvious that some of the organizers of the Latvian Popular Front are making contact with various

extremists which maintain ties with Radio Free Europe and the hostile portion of Latvian emigres. Such unscrupulousness in choosing allies undermines many people's trust in the front. It is no secret to anyone that extremists are throwing out to the mass media their ideas which place in doubt the legitimacy of Soviet power in Latvia. In public speeches they spread propaganda about questionable historical concepts, make crude and insulting attacks on party and soviet workers, and strive to distort the real state of affairs in the republic, stir up passions in national relations, and cause a clash between people of different nationalities living in Latvia.

Influenced by these individuals and certain organizers of the so-called informal popular front which recently was included in the Latvian Popular Front being created, some of the meetings at times take on a provocative nature. Needless emotions prevail over common sense at the meetings; demagogic appeals and promises which have no real grounds take the place of businesslike and constructive discussion. Such a play on the emotions, on the social and everyday difficulties, and on the dramatic pages of the fates of people of the older generation is nothing more than an attempt to disguise the political and economic untenability of the uninvited "friends" of the people with loud talk which is able only to create an illusion of searching for new ways to solve complex problems.

The slowness in the actions of a number of soviet and party bodies for accelerating perestroika and their inability publicly to take a clear stand objectively plays into the hands of the extremists. Those workers who under conditions of democratization underestimate the positive role of new social formations and movements and who are skeptical about the idea of creating the Latvian Popular Front also deserve criticism. We have clearly had enough of their outdated concepts and criteria, and their habit of administrative-command methods. They must be eradicated more quickly.

The workers of the republic justly note in their letters that there are also questionable and insufficiently considered provisions in the draft program and charter of the Latvian Popular Front. It is necessary to discuss them calmly and weighing the pros and cons, both during the course of preparations for the founding congress by participants in the movement and at the congress itself, and see to it that they take into account the historical realities which have taken shape in the republic and contribute to the consolidation of the workers to accelerate perestroika.

The communists taking part in the movement must see to it that none of the provisions of the program of the Latvian Popular Front contradict the decisions of the 19th All-Union Congress and the LaSSR Constitution. It is necessary to show more tolerance of other views, patiently explain to their comrades in the movement their delusions, support all that is constructive and, at the same time, fundamentally rebuff any negative manifestations. The party must exercise its influence in this movement through the aggressive activities and prestige of the communists who belong to groups of the Popular Front.

We must strive to see that the composition of the movement is formed on a strictly voluntary basis and corresponds as much as possible to the social and national structure of the republic and that the interests of all workers are more fully taken into account. Ignoring this principle can entail the formation of parallel or alternative fronts and the separation of forces. And the people will not forgive anyone for this. The goal of the Latvian Popular Front is not to disunite, but to consolidate all healthy forces of the republic. No social movement or formation created according to nationality alone should be supported by communist, regardless of what it is called.

Communists will not support in any way those movements and associations whose activities voluntarily or not may harm the cause of socialism and democracy, deepen distrust between nationalities, or sow dissension and alienation among people of different nationalities. There are such groups in our republic, and the Latvian Popular Front in the future has to determine clearly and unequivocally its attitude towards them. The prestige and consciousness of the people must become factors which prompt various forces to search for common solutions and reject individual and group interests, personal ambitions, the inclination for cheap popularity, and the advancement of insufficiently considered, categorical demands.

The republic and local press, radio and television must better propagandize the positive aspects in the activities of the Latvian Popular Front being created. At the same time, they must criticize the actions of some of the participants in the movement, give better coverage of the discussion on the movement's draft program and charter, and support constructive approaches to these documents which set the basis for the activities of the front. Without any special evidence it is clear, the more correct this program is, the more beneficial the Latvian Popular Front will be. Criticism of this movement does not mean denying its role in social life. All that is healthy and beneficial which serves the interests of the people of Latvia will always find support in party bodies.

In the name of the future of the people, in the name of the future of every citizen of Soviet Latvia, we do need not confrontation but consolidation of the forces of communists and non-party members, workers and kolkhoz farmers, people of science and culture, people of all nationalities and different faiths.

In our republic, as in the country as a whole, many complex and unresolved problems have accumulated which are waiting to be resolved, particularly in increasing the people's standard of living and culture and in improving the ecological situation. Only when the participants of the Latvian Popular Front, together with party, soviet and economic bodies, together with all workers of the republic, concentrate their efforts on resolving them can we count on success.

Together we must struggle more actively to implement the priorities determined by the 19th All-Union Party Conference. They include: providing people with food; problems of ecology; increasing production of consumer goods; housing construction; improving health care; and educating the young generation. These tasks cannot be carried out by repeating loud slogans or by meetings. They require concrete, practical deeds, good organization, initiative, and unity of efforts of all working people.

The party considers the main tasks in the current political situation to be accomplishing economic reform, transforming the political system, and further expanding democracy, aimed at improving the society. They must be accomplished thoroughly, with a deep responsibility for the fate of perestroyka. The desire to live better must be confirmed by the desire to work better.

The buro discussed the question of interruptions in supplying drinking water to the population of Riga, strictly pointed out these shortcomings to the leaders of the Riga Gorispolkom, communists A.P. Rubiks and Ya.A. Kalagurskiy, and demanded that they take effective measures to provide a stable water supply to the residents of Riga as quickly as possible. It pointed out the slowness in implementing environmental protection decisions of the government aimed at improving the Daugava River basin and other water sources to the chairman of the State Agroindustrial Committee, V.-E. G. Bresis, the minister of health, V.V. Kanep, the minister of municipal services, V.G. Markot, and the chairman of the State Committee for the Protection of Nature, P.Z. Ziyedinsh, and ordered this work to be radically restructured.

The Riga Party Gorkom was instructed to call to account the communist-leaders who did not ensure a stable water supply in the city. The Rizhskiy Party Raykom should determine the degree of responsibility of the communists who allowed destruction of part of the green zone of Lake Baltezers and the authority for earmarking sections on its territory for building. Deputy chairmen of the republic's Council of Ministers Ya.A. Lantsers and L.L. Barkevich were tasked to take special control of the state of affairs with supplying the population with water and to strive for strict fulfillment by officials of decisions made on these matters.

Communist Ya.E. Dzenitis, the republic procurator, was advised to check the implementation of legislation for protecting waters and, if necessary, call to account those guilty of violating it.

The buro approved a list of instructions for fulfillment of criticisms and suggestions made at the August teachers conference.

The buro discussed a number of questions and made appropriate decisions on them.

UzSSR: Oblast Officials Scored for Poor Self-Immolation Prevention Efforts

*18300411a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
23 Jul 88 p 1*

[Article: "At the Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet met on 21 July. The session was conducted by P. Khabibullaev, chairman of the Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet.

The session examined the work of the Soviet of Peoples Deputies of Narynskiy Rayon of Namangan Oblast to develop the initiative and activism of the deputies elected in multi-seat districts. R. Kh. Khudayberdiyev, chairman of the Narynskiy rayispolkom, presented a report.

The Presidium noted the purposeful work of the rayon soviet to step up deputy activity under conditions of the experiment. It was suggested that local soviets continue their work toward practical realization of the main direction of democratizing society—re-establishing the full role and authority of the soviets as representative organs of the people.

The Presidium approved the activity of the soviets of peoples deputies of Sverdlovskiy Rayon in Bukhara Oblast to develop individual housing construction and recommended that it be disseminated. The soviets of peoples deputies were urged to adopt additional measures toward widespread development of individual housing construction, using all available reserves and capacities for this purpose; develop subsidiary enterprises at farms in the rural area; set up cooperatives to produce building materials; and enlist enterprise and organization capital to build housing and sociocultural facilities.

It was suggested that the boards of directors of Uzbekbriyash, the savings bank, and the appropriate ispolkoms of republic soviets of peoples deputies analyze practices in allocating building materials and money for the needs of individual builders and take concrete steps to distribute them correctly and use them more rationally.

The question of serious shortcomings in the work of the Soviet of Peoples Deputies of Kashka-Darya Oblast in carrying out the decree of the Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet entitled "Concerning The Article 'Dramatic Female Fates,'" which was published in the republic press [for a translation of this article, see pp 82-86 of the USSR REPORT: POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS, JPRS-UPA-88-012, dated 22 March 1988] was also examined. R. A. Ruzybayeva, chairwoman of the Kashka-Darya oblispolkom, gave a report on this question.

Recognizing the work of the oblast's soviets of peoples deputies in this area as unsatisfactory, the Presidium demanded that the Kashka-Darya oblispolkom take the

necessary steps to mobilize the forces and means of the ispolkoms of the soviets, their departments and administrations, the heads of the appropriate institutions and organizations, criminal law organs, women's councils, and other social organizations to improve the working and domestic conditions of women, draw them into public production, propagandize the socialist way of life, and eliminate the factors and conditions that lead women to immolate themselves. It was emphasized that each such case should be viewed as an exceptional event and be thoroughly investigated.

The Presidium found the work of the ministries of Health, Education, Justice, Internal Affairs and the State Committee for Vocational Education in carrying out the above-mentioned decree to be inadequate and ordered them to take additional measures to implement it unconditionally. The materials on discussion of this issue will be published in the press.

The session also reviewed other issues of state activities in the republic and adopted appropriate decrees.

Participants in discussion of the issues on the agenda included R. N. Nishanov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the UzSSR Communist Party; V. P. Anishchev, second secretary of the Central Committee of the UzSSR Communist Party; and Kh. A. Alimova, chairwoman of Uzsovprom and of the UzSSR Womens Council.

11176

Uzbek Central Committee Details Major Health Services Improvement Measures

18300411b Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
14 Jul 88 p 1

[Article: "At the Central Committee of the UzSSR Communist Party—On the State of Medical Service to the Population of the Republic and Urgent Measures To Improve It"]

[Text] The Central Committee of the UzSSR Communist Party has adopted a decree entitled "On the State of Medical Service to the Population of the Republic and Urgent Measures To Improve It." The decree notes that the decisions of the traveling collegium of the USSR Ministry of Health, the recommendations worked out by the meeting of the republic party-economic aktiv, and the materials of the 29 November 1987 program by Central Television entitled "Health," which reviewed the problems of low-quality medical service to the population of the republic, have been an object lesson for many party committees, ispolkoms of local soviets, and public health organs in the republic.

The extraordinary governmental commission which was set up was able to find ways to turn over 350 administrative buildings to medical treatment institutions and to allocate additional medical technology and equipment worth 3.5 million rubles, thereby easing the problem of

improving medical service in a number of areas. Sending medical specialists from the fraternal Union republics to Uzbekistan for the summer had a positive effect. But it still has not been possible to fundamentally change the state of medical service.

The levels of overall incidence of illness, first-time disability, and period of lost work capability because of illness continue to be high. Oncological, tubercular, and a number of infectious diseases are not declining noticeably. The protection of mothers and children is not improving. The indicators of infant illness and mortality are among the highest in the country: 46.1 per thousand births for the republic, 69.8 in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, 57.7 in Surkhan-Darya Oblast, and 52.6 in Fergana Oblast. And in rayons such as Bakhoristanskiy, Uchkudukskiy, Leninyulskiy, Nukusskiy, and Bozatauskiy the indicators of infant mortality range from 80 to 118 cases.

Many party committees are failing to assess these facts properly. The ispolkoms of local soviets do not see that many young medical specialists are not staying in their assigned locales, especially in remote regions, because of the lack of normal cultural-domestic conditions. The rural areas today are short 8,400 doctors, including 3,769 pediatricians and 2,830 obstetrician-gynecologists. More than half of the obstetrician-gynecologists have not mastered surgical techniques, and an even larger number of pediatricians have not mastered intensive treatment methods. At the same time plans for raising the qualifications of specialists in these fields are regularly unfulfilled. The administrators of medical schools and specialized scientific research institutes are not ensuring a high professional level of specialist training.

Because of the relaxation of monitoring by the ministry and local public health organs many cases of failure to perform duties by employees, carelessness, rudeness, extortion, and theft are permitted in medical treatment institutions, pharmacies, and administrative establishments. Year after year the total of illegal expenditures, shortages, waste, and theft for the sector is about 900,000 rubles. In the pharmacy system (head of the UzSSR Main Administration of Pharmacy is Comrade Sh. A. Sagatov) these violations are compounded by failure to observe price discipline and the rules of Soviet trade and writing off medicines for supposedly passing their effective dates and then using them for profit. And accumulation of above-norm stocks of medications in the system is causing enormous material loss to the state, totaling more than 5 million rubles in 1987.

Last year evidence of bribe-taking, extortion, failure to render medical care, and other legal offenses against dozens of medical workers were turned over to investigative organs. One-third of the complaints of unqualified medical care resulting in death were confirmed upon checking.

The sanitary state of many medical treatment institutions makes it impossible to give medical care on the proper level, and even promotes the spread of in-house

infectious diseases. Last year alone 122 infants became ill and 27 died from outbreaks of toxic-septic and kidney infections in the Termez and Nukus city and Kommunisticheskii and Dzhambayskii rayon maternity homes. More than 1,000 hospitals were temporarily closed for sanitary reasons, and 10,000 fines were imposed. These facts indicate the low level of professionalism and the low sanitary standards of the heads of many medical institutions and also the unprincipled work of employees of the sanitary service and of Comrade Sh. Sh. Shavakhov, deputy UzSSR minister of health, and Comrade V. A. Andrianov, chief physician of the republic Sanitary-Epidemiological Service, personally.

The collectives of such establishments as the Sokhskaia Zonal Hospital, the Yakkabag'skii Rayon Central Hospital, Maternity Home No 3 in Samarkand, the Yangier Sanitary Medicine Unit, the Kibray Sanitarium, and a number of others have become bogged down in quarrels and lawsuits which has had a very detrimental effect on the results of their professional activities, while their primary party organizations are showing a lack of principle and themselves often get involved in the conflicts.

The poor quality of medical care to the population is also to a significant degree a result of the extremely neglected level of material-technical supply. Only 20 percent of the treatment institutions are housed in standard buildings, and 8 percent of the buildings are damaged and dilapidated. More than two-thirds of them lack plumbing and fuel, and one-third do not even have running cold water. There is enormous overcrowding in practically all medical institutions. There are too few medical technicians per doctor, scarcely more than half the USSR average. Despite this situation, through the fault of the UzSSR State Committee for Industrial Construction (Comrade B. S. Khamidov), the UzSSR Ministry of Construction (Comrade A. G. Manannikov), Glavtashkentstroy (Comrade K. P. Dudin), and a number of other construction ministries 43.5 million rubles of state capital investment was not incorporated in the first 2 years of the five-year plan, including 31.7 million rubles for construction and installation work.

Most of the public health construction projects are turned over late and have major flaws. Because of the irresponsibility of former deputy chairman of the Bukhara oblgospolkom A. R. Radzhabov and former head of Construction Trust No 163 of the UzSSR Ministry of Construction U. M. Makhmudov the building for the oblast infectious disease hospital was built without seismic belts and as a result collapsed soon after it was opened, and the 100-bed city maternity home which was to be completed in 2 years is now in its fourth year of construction. The Kara-Kalpak party obkom (Comrade M. K. Aralbayev) and the autonomous republic Council of Ministers (Comrade B. A. Yusupov) are tolerating a situation where about 90 percent of the primary public health facilities are located in adapted buildings, some of them do not have their own quarters at all, and not a single standard maternity home has been built in the last 2 years.

Because of the poor performance discipline of the involved ministries and departments, poor monitoring, and lack of proper organizational work by the republic Council of Ministers, above all Comrade S. U. Sultanova, who is responsible for this work sector, the comprehensive "Health" program that was adopted is not being carried out satisfactorily. Five months were spent completing and touching up the program. Taking advantage of this, the heads of the republic ministries of Light Industry (Comrade E. A. Taymazov), Local Industry (Comrade U. K. Ismailov), and Building Materials Industry (Comrade G. G. Isayev) as well as a number of enterprises of USSR ministries are violating plans for construction of medical treatment facilities for their own workers and employees. The Mashkhlopok State Production Association (Comrade Kh. Kh. Gulyamov) has five enterprises with a total of 85,000 employees in the city of Tashkent, but the question of building a medical-sanitary unit for them still has not been resolved.

Many farm directors of UzSSR Gosagroprom show a similar attitude toward the health of their employees. For example, the Moskva Sovkhoz in Ulyanovskii Rayon of Kashka-Darya Oblast (director Comrade K. Usmanov) still has not built a rural medical dispensary and all their medical assistant and midwife posts operate under abnormal conditions. At the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin in Syr-Darya Oblast where Comrade N. Yuldasheva has been chairwoman for 35 years they have discussed the question of building a medical assistant-midwife post for 7 years now without coming to a decision. Many farms of UzSSR Gosagroprom and industrial, construction, and transportation enterprises systematically fail to fulfill the planned volume of environmental protection work.

The serious shortcomings in medical care to the population are also made possible by the fact that many party committees and local soviets do not systematically analyze the state of affairs in public health. The Arnasayskii and Uchkuduk'skii party raykoms, the Andizhan city ispolkom, and the Pskentskii rayispolkom take a superficial and formalistic approach to public health problems and issue general orders for show instead of doing concrete organizational work.

The Central Committee of the UzSSR Communist Party decrees as follows:

Note that the Ministry of Health and Minister Comrade S. M. Bakhramov and his deputies comrades D. A. Asadov, K. N. Kabulova, Sh. Sh. Khamrayev, Sh. Sh. Shavakhov, and Ye. F. Zabkov personally are not ensuring the necessary level of management of medical service to the republic population, handle questions of protecting the health of the working people without a sense of political urgency and responsibility, and assess the alarming situation in public health in an uncritical manner. In their style and methods of work one can see sluggishness, lack of initiative, and contentment with insignificant work results.

Warn the ministry executives—communists S. M. Bakhramov, D. A. Asadov, D. N. Kabulova, Sh. Sh. Khamrayev, Sh. Sh. Shavakhabov, and Ye. F. Zabkov that if they do not achieve a radical improvement in medical service to the population in a very short time and do not straighten out work in the sector, stricter measures of party and administrative discipline will be applied to them, including discharge from their posts.

Reprimand Comrade V. A. Andrianov, chief physician of the Republic Sanitary-Epidemiological Station, for relaxation of control in carrying out sanitary-epidemiological supervision and low standards demanded of employees of the service.

Commission the collegium of the UzSSR Ministry of Health to review the wisdom of continuing to employ Comrade Sh. A. Sagatov, who has permitted serious shortcomings in pharmacy service to the population of the republic and has not taken appropriate steps to stop negative phenomena in the system, as chief of the Main Pharmacy Administration.

Ratify the measures worked out jointly with the UzSSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Ministry of Health to implement the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers entitled "Basic Directions of Development to Protect the Health of the Population and Restructure USSR Public Health in the 12th Five-Year Plan and the Period until the Year 2000."

Order party obkoms, the UzSSR Ministry of Health, Uzsovmprof, the heads of ministries and departments, the Council of Ministers of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, oblsolkoms, and the Tashkent gorispolkom to ensure fulfillment of these measures aimed at a radical improvement in protection of public health, intensified disease prevention, raising the level of work of all medical treatment facilities, and molding a healthy way of life.

Commission the UzSSR Council of Ministers, together with the appropriate ministries and departments and within 2 months, to work out a program to bolster and further develop the material-technical base of the republic public health system. Enlist departmental planning and contract organizations for the needs of public health and broaden their own repair and construction base. Ensure that planning and supply organs fill the orders of the UzSSR Ministry of Health on a priority basis and solve the problems of financing local facilities to raise the qualifications of medical workers and work on reconstruction and staffing of the administrative buildings being transferred for use as health facilities.

Submit to the USSR Ministry of Health the question of expanding the Tashkent Institute for Advanced Study by Physicians and building a clinic and branches for it, and request a significant increase in the special admission of students to the country's central medical VUZes.

Note that Comrade S. U. Sultanova, deputy chairwoman of the UzSSR Council of Ministers, is not working satisfactorily on solving the problems of medical care to the population. Warn her that she is personally responsible for this sector of work.

Order party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms to discuss the state of and prospects for improving medical care to the population at plenums or meetings of party and economic activists in 1988. Review the party responsibility of leaders who have permitted lagging in building and introducing public health projects, in material-technical supply to medical facilities, and in carrying out environmental protection measures. Establish rigorous control over the shaping of national economic plans and their fulfillment for the health sector. Together with the ispolkoms of local soviets review the question of meeting the needs of medical institutions for decontamination facilities and installations and also for water decontamination and desalinization equipment. Ensure that by the end of the current five-year plan all infant and mother facilities and infectious disease hospitals and departments have plumbing and hot and cold running water. Demand that the heads of soviet, trade union, and economic organs create all necessary cultural-domestic conditions for normal work by medical personnel, especially young people, and categorically prohibit enlisting them for agricultural work and other jobs not related to medical care.

Order the ministries and departments of the UzSSR and enterprises of USSR subordination in 1988-1989 to provide workers and employees of subordinate systems with medical and health facilities in conformity with existing norms. Prohibit the launching of national economic projects without proper decontamination facilities and take urgent steps to eliminate the lagging that has been allowed in carrying out environmental protection measures. Order departments of the Central Committee to regularly review progress in handling these matters and where necessary submit them to the Central Committee of the UzSSR Communist Party.

Commission the Bukhara party obkom (Comrade I. Dzhabbarov) to review the accountability of the persons who permitted poor-quality construction of the oblast infectious disease hospital and did not fulfill construction plans for the maternity home and other health facilities.

Review progress in fulfilling this decree at the Bureau of the Central Committee of the UzSSR Communist Party and the republic Council of Ministers based on the results of work in 1988.

Assign monitoring of performance of this decree to departments of the Central Committee of the UzSSR Communist Party.

IZVESTIYA Recalls Brezhnev Era Corruption Case

18000030a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23, 24 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by Arkadiy Sakhnin: "And This Was Just the Beginning...."]

[23 Sep 88, p 3]

[Text] Once, late in the evening, someone was knocking loudly at my room in the Odessa Krasnaya Hotel. Six stalwart young fellows came in.

"Are you a writer?"

"Yes."

"Do you have a party card?"

"I do."

"Does Soviet power still exist in our country? Is there still a party?"

I became indignant.

"We got the right place," noted one of them with satisfaction.

"We are whalers. There are more than 2,000 of us and we are being wiped out. Wherever we write the letters don't reach, our letters are intercepted. We beseech you to hear us out. New men are being sent to replace those who have fallen by the wayside. Here is the most recent case."

The whaler I. Avramenko was among those newly arrived. The ship's physician established that his blood pressure was 210/100 and he ordered that he be immediately sent back. The General Captain-Director Solyanik summoned the physician:

"Why do you send men back when we are so short of hands?"

"He has hypertension. Strong sun is absolutely contraindicated."

"No matter, we will give him an easy job cutting liver."

Liver has to be cut on the deck. And Avramenko was put here. Several days later, Solyanik ordered one of the catcher boats: "Come up on my starboard, there is a valuable package there, deliver it to Odessa and then come back to the fleet." The catcher boat came up. A coffin was lowered from the flagship. A coffin with Avramenko's body.

The whalers gave other facts which were impossible to believe. In Odessa I was busy with important work for myself and there was no time to be concerned with the

whalers. I went to see the First Secretary of the Zhovtnevy Party Raykom Z. Nazarenko and described all of this to him. His words were amazing:

"That is only a small part of Solyanik's crimes, he behaves like a colonizer. It is possible, as you see, with the unlimited support from above, both in Kiev and in Moscow."

I approached the secretary of the party obkom who was in charge of the fleet. I began to describe what had happened. In listening, he frequently smiled. Then he interrupted me:

"So that's it! Let me show you," and he pulled out a file of foreign newspapers where a young woman had been prominently photographed in various poses in a scarcely discernible bathing suit.

"Solyanik," he continued, "is 54 and she is 27. He takes her with him and has set a fictitious position for her with an enormous salary."

He ended:

"Don't worry, we are taking serious measures and everything will be in order."

However, it became clear that order was not to be established. I decided to travel to Moscow, to see Minister Ishkov. He also assured me that the most decisive measures would be taken but from this conversation it was also clear that everything was just empty words.

Then I went to see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Having heard me out, the Editor-in-Chief, Yuriy Voronov, said to his colleagues:

"The fleet numbers 2,000 men, all of them are young, in their majority they are Komsomol members and we simply do not have the right to remain silent."

I went back to Odessa. A portion of the fleet headed by the "Slava" had been there for about 2 weeks, while the flagship "Sovetskaya Ukraina" headed by Solyanik and the remaining catcher ships were on their way back. On a small vessel, a group of workers from the Administration of the Whaling Fleet headed out to meet the "Sovetskaya Ukraina" to check the results of the trip. I went along. We went on board the flagship some 4 hours before it arrived in port.

Having presented my identification card, I told Solyanik that I wanted to have a talk.

"It is too early, you understand, too early," he said, making a wry face. "We are getting to the outer roads and I will hold a press conference there for Soviet and foreign journalists and there I will answer your questions."

"That would hardly be the place. My questions concern the bad situation in the fleet."

How can I describe how he looked at me. Like I was some insect which you do not want to get dirty with but there is nothing to be done, it must be squashed. He took a microphone from the hook and his commander's voice rang out over the entire vessel:

"Editor of the large-run paper to the bridge!"

And as if he were standing behind the bulkhead, a completely undistinguished man suddenly appeared.

"Your colleague has arrived," said Solyanik, nodding in my direction. "Show him the file of our newspaper, talk to him and, uh...entertain him." And he turned and went out.

Our conversation was held just 2 days later. Without bragging and without importuning, he described what enormous successes the fleet had achieved year after year. Not specially, without emphasizing and almost naturally, in passing, he informed me on what good terms he was with prominent state and party leaders, and among others commented how his namesake Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin doted on him, how Mikoyan's grandchildren do not leave his side when he is visiting at the dacha, he listed in this same group several members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

And I, in choosing my expressions more gently, spoke about the abuse of power, about the inadmissible dictatorial approach which at times led to tragedies. At the time, I let it be known to him that I intended to voice my viewpoint in the press.

"You are a person who likes to take risks," he said shaking his head. This had the ring of a threat to it.

I described my conversation to Voronov in detail.

"We will still go to print."

Along the sides the mouths of the boilers concealed below in the blubber plant protrude slightly over the deck. On the flensing deck, they remove and cut up the whale meat, they dress the liver, the ambergris, if it exists, they saw up the head, backbone, ribs and cartilage. Everything goes into the boilers. And everything goes to its proper place: meat to a freezer, blubber into tanks, meal into sacks. The tons of whale innards, intestines and membranes decompose under the tropical sun. The torrid air is saturated with noxious fumes.

The sailors in the blubber plant envy the deck. There, up above, on the deck, it is easier. There the temperature does not rise over 45 degrees. But below, in the blubber plant, it is up to 65. On deck the fumes do not remain but down below the poisoned air has nowhere to go.

On the 10th day of the stay in the tropics, the cooker-operator Ivan Bakhrov came on the night shift. He had three cookers to tend. He had scarcely gotten out below when a sharp bell began ringing and a red light went on. This was the signal from the deck that the first cooker had been loaded and he should start the cooking.

Several turns of a valve and the steam heated to 150 degrees, poured into the cooker with a whistle. Ivan rushed to the third cooker where the processing was already complete. With the entire weight of his body he leaned on the heavy lever of the plug of the release line through which the thick substance was to flow into the fat separator. He was in a rush because the telephone was ringing by the second cooker and the light was flashing urgently as the cooker was full and he had to start processing quickly. In the first cooker, the pressure had risen to the limit and he had immediately to shut off the steam. On the way, he saw that dirt had gotten into the mesh of the separator and it had to be cleaned out, otherwise it would get into the settler with the fat.

Ivan rushed between the hot cookers, the separator, the settlers, opening and closing valves, taps and caps. Fat and hot water were dripping from somewhere and a flange was whistling.

At the next station a noise was heard. It turned out that the renderer Vitaliy Bystryukov, a former diver and rated athlete had lost consciousness and fallen. They pulled him up along a steep stair where he came to. His blood pressure was 100/55, his pulse 140. Everyone was in such a state by the end of the workday, but this was the first hour of Vitaliy's shift.

The accident was reported to Solyanik.

"That could happen to anyone," he said, distractedly.

It all started that day. Onishko lost consciousness on his watch, Skoromokhov did on the following day and then Pokotilov, Fatykhov and Panchenko....

Ivan held out. He scarcely made it until the morning shift came on. He went off to his cabin to sleep. There was the heat and no fan. He tossed about in his bed for a long time, his eyes smarted, he could hardly keep his eyes open but he could not fall asleep. He got up, pulled his mattress off the berth and made his way to the deck. The tropical sun was rising in the sky. The flensing deck was busy. Wet and covered in whale slim, the men were cutting, sawing, pulling away the dismembered parts of the carcass with hooks and loading the cookers. Near the superstructure, back and forward, swaying, moved men with their mattresses. It was the night shift.

Ivan searched for a place in the shade. Both those at work and those with their mattresses were glancing threateningly at the same place. Ivan knew where they were looking. He did not want to look there but he raised his tired eyes and saw Svetlana and Solyanik romping, chasing each other

and jumping into the swimming pool which had been built on the emergency bridge. The swimming pool had been a surprise for Svetlana and had been built upon Solyanik's orders and under his leadership. In order not to insult the chief of the hunter vessel, his son Gennadiy who was directly subordinate to his father, he had organized a large salary for Gennadiy's wife. She was also called Svetlana and she was also 27 years old. She was a film actress. She had already had parts in three films. She had a good laugh when they appointed her top sailor and issued a real identity card to her....

Soon Dmitriy Chegorskiy was climbing a ladder to clean the blades in the blubber plant.... Several minutes later, he fell. They rushed to him, but Chegorskiy had not lost consciousness but had died from heat stroke. In truth, the commission set up by Solyanik wrote that the temperature above decks was just 56 degrees but none of the whalers believed this. They showed me the platform where Chegorskiy had died. It was about 3 m above the work area of the renderers and for them in that cool night it was 52 degrees. But there, as in a hothouse, the higher you go the higher the temperature.

The article was discussed at a session of the Zhovtnevy Party Raykom Buro which took the decision:

"For facts of clamping down on criticism, coarseness, for haughtiness, a neglectful attitude toward the sailors, for arbitrariness, the flagrant violation of labor safety, for leading the fleet on a whaling trip without proper preparations and for the committed nepotism, the Fleet General Captain-Director, Comrade Solyanik merits the strictest party punishment. But, considering that upon a decision of the obkom buro, a party commission has been organized and is at work to verify the facts set out in the article 'On the Trip and After' to submit the opinion of the raykom buro to the Odessa Obkom Buro of the Ukrainian Communist Party."

Having received this decision, the First Secretary of the Party Obkom, M. Sinitsa, summoned Solyanik and his deputy for political affairs, Baranov.

"Summon the party-economic aktiv. Don't wait. Provide persuasive material for the obkom buro and shut the raykom's mouth."

Since Sinitsa played an important role in all this story, I would like to describe him in somewhat greater detail. The entire city was under his merciless dictatorship. And not only Solyanik. One whaler said: "Solyanik opens the door into Sinitsa's office with his foot because his hands are full of suitcases with souvenirs."

The two "Governors General" were the equal of one another. The only difference was that Solyanik did not drink and Sinitsa did until he lost consciousness. He had repeatedly to be picked up on the street. Once they sent

him to a sobering up station since his face was dirty and they did not recognize him. In truth, they soon realized it and, having carefully put him in his car, sent him home.

He had an assistant, Petr Stryapkin, a charming fellow, intelligent, honest, an efficient worker and a wounded veteran. Regardless of all the benefits given to him, in seeing Sinitsa's behavior, he did not want to remain in this job and submitted a request to leave. Sinitsa rounded on him and tore the request up. Several months later, Stryapkin again went to see him with the same request.

"If you come a third time," said Sinitsa, ripping up the paper, "at the same time make a call for a conveyance to come for you for you won't make it home."

Stryapkin realized that this was no joke.

Once on Saturday, Sinitsa, with a whole suite, went off hunting. He flushed a wild goat which he killed. Later the drinking lasted long into the night, after which Sinitsa decided to drive off to the obkom.

"Make a call, Petya, to the slaughterhouse and let them put the goat up in the refrigerator."

Soon thereafter, Stryapkin reported:

"The night duty person has said that he cannot do this as there are two locks: he has one key and the other is with the shift chief who is at home asleep.

"Well, let them wake him up!" said Sinitsa, angrily.

The chief of the shift stated that they did not have coolers but only refrigerators with sausage and meat where the unskinned goat could not be put. Sinitsa flew into a fury. It ended when the products were taken out of the refrigerator and in the morning distributed to the stores, with the goat taking their place.

Some 2 weeks later, also on a Sunday, Sinitsa drove off to a fishing farm. This is what the place was called. Actually, it was an exotic spot on the seaside and a small structure with furnishings from Karelian birch.

When they were discussing the menu, Mikhail Sofronovich [Sinitsa] suddenly recalled:

"But we have that goat! Let them make shashlik." The goat was quickly delivered. The chef said:

"Mikhail Sofronovich! We can't do anything. It will take 5 hours to thaw."

"That is how they work!" said Sinitsa, shaking his head in dejection. "If they can't store the products for the obkom first secretary, how can they feed the workers? And get rid of the slaughterhouse director."

And they did get rid of him. They found the proper phrases and dumped him.

The auditorium of the Palace of Culture imeni Lesi Ukrainki where the activists were meeting was full, some 50 people. The presidium was correspondingly large: the Second Secretary of the Party Obkom P. Voronin, A. Solyanik, the Chief of the Main Administration Denisenko, the Chief of the Whaling Fleet Administration Khirnykh, as well as leading workers from the city and fleet. There also was the Chief Inspector of the KPK under the CPSU Central Committee, S. Vologzhanin. The meeting was run by Barabanov. Having announced the agenda, he solemnly turned the floor over to Solyanik.

For several minutes, he spoke about the fleet's successes on the last trip and on the tasks for the next trip. But basically he devoted the report to attempts to refute the article, calling it slanderous. Then the debate began.

"The floor is to be given first," said Barabanov, "to the best fleet harpooner, the winner of the Order of Lenin and the victor in the socialist competition...." and then giving his name.

"With great indignation," began the speaker, "we have read the article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. There is no truth in this article. Some Sakhnin whom we have never seen has whipped up some liable but the newspaper, without deigning to check the facts, irresponsibly published it. But it is not a question here of Solyanik, as the entire nation knows this best arctic captain, and he has been made only a cover in order to slander us, the entire Antarctic fleet. It is hard for us to understand why the editors had to so slander and belittle the 2,000-strong collective of communist labor."

The second speaker, although in his different words, said essentially the same thing. Then a third, a fourth and all spoke about Solyanik as a true communist, a fine leader, an unsurpassed whaling expert, indecisively denying the facts given in the article. Then, as a "point of order" the floor was requested by the secretary of the shop party organization on the "Sovetskaya Ukraina," V. Shevchenko:

"Before the start of the session I approached the presidium," he said. "I registered for the debates. I should have been the first to give...."

The auditorium began to buzz: "And I also have requested for a long time...." "and I....," "and I have not been allowed...." There was whispering in the presidium and ultimately the floor was given to Shevchenko. Having completely confirmed what was set out in the article, he ended:

"Comrade Solyanik has said that we want to cover him in dirt, but we would like to wash the dirt from him. But now it has sunk so deeply into his pores that it would

take surgery to get it out. Why have such abuses of power become possible? Because he stands behind the broad back of the First Secretary of the Obkom, Comrade Sinitsa...."

"Watch your words!" shouted Voronin from the presidium.

"...And the even broader back of the minister Ishkov," continued Shevchenko.

Then Voronin jumped up:

"Learn to behave, you are in a party activist meeting and not a street brawl."

Vologzhanin got up:

"If the speaker is saying something that does not seem correct to one of us, he stands to be corrected. But here it actually is a meeting of the party and economic aktiv, where shouting is not only out of place but inadmissible."

This was the turning point. One of the other whalers who spoke, in bringing out the true life in the fleet and confirming the correctness of the newspaper article, gave constantly new facts of Solyanik's abuses and haughtiness.

By this time, the work had been completed by the commission of the party obkom on verifying the article; this had been headed by the obkom secretary, Soldatov. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, D. Korotchenko, who was in Odessa stated to the commission: "The article is false and we will stand up for Solyanik. Start from this."

And that is what the commission did. The report given by it at the obkom buro was based on a distorting of facts and attempts to completely repudiate the article.

Solyanik was the first to have the floor in the debates. He started with the fleet's achievements. In particular, he said: "Conditions in the tropics were actually very harsh. But in the tropics, I killed 3,000 blue whales and this, as you know, is a particularly valuable and precious type. And what would you, members of the obkom buro, say to me if I left this treasure to the whalers of the capitalist countries?..."

Frankly speaking, his arguments seemed valid to me. Only significantly later on did I learn that they had not killed 3,000, but 26 units.

The buro members who spoke were indignant over the fact that the newspaper had slandered not only the collective of 2,000, but also the entire oblast and the entire life in our country.

The buro member and chief of the navigation company Danchenko was particularly abusive. Sinitsa had always supported him and the chief of the navigation company

had a good understanding of the value of this support. For instance, on the day of Sinitsa's 50th birthday, the 360 vessels on overseas voyages received a coded message from Danchenko in which it was proposed that they bring back gifts for the obkom secretary.

This "bond" was not only tight between Sinitsa and Danchenko. The mutual protection scheme operated mercilessly. Around 15 leaders of the party, soviet and economic organizations enriched themselves, in being squeamish about nothing and morally destroying and driving out of jobs anyone who was so bold to make a critical comment or disobey. This "caste" also included the Chief of the UVD, police Lt Gen T. Gaydamak, a.k.a. "Uryadnik."

A boon companion of Sinitsa, he put the bite on a number of trade points and this was tolerated for they knew what punishment would follow if they did not carry out his demands.

Vologzhanin also spoke at the session of the obkom buro. He said:

"It is up to you, comrades, to take the decision. Here, however, they are proposing that the newspaper be obliged to publish a repudiation. You cannot adopt such a decision formally, for the editors are not subordinate to you and you cannot in essence, as the facts have been confirmed. And, finally, one last thing. They are demanding a repudiation in insisting that Comrade Solyanik remain in his post; otherwise, supposedly, we will compromise ourselves overseas. We must also give some thought to how we will appear in Soviet eyes if everything remains unchanged."

Sinitsa was the last to speak. Even more insultingly than the other buro members, he rebuked the newspaper and the author and only in passing pointed to "individual shortcomings" in Solyanik's work.

The obkom's decision sent to the CPSU Central Committee stated: "A whole series of facts in the designated article has been set out in an unobjective manner, and in individual instances was designed for the sentimental tearfulness of a Philistine. The heroic labor of the collective of communist labor has been assessed as the slave labor of captive peoples. Comrade Solyanik merits severe criticism, but it is not necessary and indeed harmful to do this at such a price as the newspaper has done. This has led to the misinforming of public opinion, both in our country and abroad. And this has also caused serious moral harm to the fleet collective."

A similar assessment was given to the article in the conclusions of the obkom commission with the addition: "The publication has caused political harm to our motherland."

The battle over Solyanik went on. After the obkom buro, the article was discussed by the collegium of the State Fisheries Committee and this was conducted by the minister, A. Ishkov. The collegium members were familiarized with the decision of the Odessa Obkom Buro and this determined the entire course of the discussion. Rytov, Ishkov's deputy, attacked the newspaper with particular fierceness. They even rejected the facts which had been recognized by the obkom. In accord with this a note was sent off to the CPSU Central Committee. The struggle now went on at a higher level.

S. Vologzhanin: "Yes, I will never forget this discussion. The pro tem Chairman of the KPK under the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Serdyuk, told me: 'Comrade Podgornyy expressed dissatisfaction with your work. He stated that you behaved incorrectly at the meeting of the party-economic aktiv of whalers in Odessa, in endeavoring to direct it, but most importantly you intolerably exceeded your powers at the session of the Odessa Party Obkom Buro. You hectorred, imposed your viewpoint and asserted that the article which distorted the truth and had caused harm was correct. The same viewpoint was supported by Comrade Suslov'."

Serdyuk fell silent and then took out of his desk my conclusions and the draft decision of the KPK, pushing them over to me: "This must be redone...."

I endeavored to prove that Podgornyy and Suslov has been misled, that my conclusions were based on irrefutable facts but he interrupted me: "You understand that this is an instruction from the Central Committee?"

[24 Sep 88, p 3]

[Text] The battle over Solyanik went on. Vologzhanin refused to redo his note upon the request of Serdyuk. "I have informed the Deputy Chairman of the KPK, S. Mogilat," he said, "about our talk with him and Mogilat has great authority in our system. Serdyuk has also taken his viewpoint into account. Mogilat went to him and said: 'We have been instructed to provide the Central Committee with an objective assessment of the Solyanik affair. As the superior party control body, we do not have the right to deviate an iota from the truth no matter who would try to make us do this.'"

"You realize what this might mean?" asked Serdyuk.

"I do but we cannot be guilty of a conscious deception of the Central Committee."

On the following day there was a meeting of the KPK on this question. The Central Committee member and member of the committee Karavayev said:

"Why are we spending so much time on this strange hullabaloo over this case? The facts submitted to us are persuasive and we must take a decision."

Nevertheless, there were hesitations and it was impossible to achieve unanimity. A day later we again went to see Serdyuk. From the conversation it became clear that he did not doubt Solyanik's guilt but had been literally murdered by the position of Podgornyy and Suslov. He could not understand anything. The most prominent party leaders and the secretaries of its Central Committee—he had total trust in them. But certainly they knew the truth. But what about Shelest, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party? He more than knew. How could one go on if such a thing were possible?

The draft of the KPK conclusions which confirmed the correctness of the published facts lay in front of him.

"It is either me or Solyanik," he said and signed the paper. He immediately fell sick. We placed him on a sofa and gave him a Validol. We realized his state as ours was the same.

Since it was a question that the article had caused political harm to the motherland, it was taken up also by the Propaganda Section of the CPSU Central Committee (at that time it was called the Propaganda and Agitation Section). Here they brought together the reports on this question of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, the Odessa Party Obkom, the State Fisheries Committee, the Trade Union Central Committee and other documents. The editors realized this for, as the documents were received and studied, the section demanded explanations from them on various refutations.

Incidentally, this was not concealed from us. Once I was also summoned to the section and acquainted with the note from P. Shelest, and offered to provide an explanation. The note contained a number of serious accusations against me. Here it had been pointed out that Vologzhanin had made his conclusions on the basis of false assertions by the article's author. In practical terms, the note came down to demanding that both of us be expelled from the party.

An enormous and very difficult burden rested on the Central Committee Propaganda and Agitation Section. The positions of certain highly placed leaders of the party Central Committee of course were known to it and these positions coincided completely with Shelest's position....

The Note of the Propaganda and Agitation Section which was signed by the deputy section head and presently member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, A. Yakovlev, and the sector head, T. Kuprikov (unfortunately now deceased), stated:

"The Propaganda and Agitation Section of the CPSU Central Committee feels that the editors of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA have taken action against a high-handed leader who has lost his feeling of party responsibility and who by his actions has caused

enormous harm to the question of indoctrinating the fleet. The criticism of the major shortcomings has caused great public stir. It has served as an instructive lesson for those who lose their sense of responsibility for the assigned job and have set out on the path of abusing power. It must be emphasized that the newspaper's actions were a result of the fact that the local party and economic bodies as well as the Fisheries Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers for an extended period of time did not take effective measures to correct Solyanik and improve the situation on the fleet, although these organizations possessed numerous alerts about the bad state of affairs in this fleet and the incorrect conduct by Solyanik. It was no accident, hence, that there were comments in the party and economic aktiv of the fleet that Solyanik was under the special patronage of the Secretary of the Odessa Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Sinita, the Chairman of the Fisheries Committee, Ishkov, as well as certain other responsible workers."

A week before the fleet set off on its voyage, a meeting was held of the whalers and this was addressed by Sinita. He called upon them to honorably justify the motherland's trust. He said how proud the party was of such sailors, how it had confidence in them, was relying on them and how this trust was reinforced by the fact that the glorious fleet of communist labor would be headed by such a well-tested captain as Solyanik who was now to lead them on their 20th, jubilee trip.

And the men understood him. They understood that there was no force which could halt the arbitrariness. They were morally crushed.

Solyanik also benefited from this. He began to call in one by one those whalers who had lost consciousness on the trip from overheating and about which the newspaper had written. I do not know what he said to them but they now realized that they could not get away from Solyanik. They had no other job, the fleet was about to leave on a trip and there was no other way out: either agree to his demands or he would drive them out. And they agreed. Each individually wrote approximately the same thing "I did not lose consciousness on the trip, I did not faint, I did not see Sakhnin and I did not talk with him."

I did not even take offense from what these men did. For instance, is it possible to condemn a thousand innocent persons who during the repressions "admitted" their "guilt" under the influence of the monstrous conditions under which they were?

Now, Solyanik had in his hands documents which persuasively confirmed the conclusions of the party obkom that the article was slanderous.

Just a few days remained until the fleet set to sea and when editorial representatives were summoned to a session of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee.

It began behind closed doors and those invited waited more than an hour in a reception room, split up into groups. In one corner was Ishkov, Sinitsa, Solyanik, Denisenko and Khirnykh. In another was Voronov, the executive secretary in charge of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Kostenko, and myself. Sitting separately in different places were Vologzhanin, the first secretary of the Zhovtnevy Party Raykom, Nazarenko, and someone whom I did not know. Incidentally, few remained seated. The men walked up and down the reception area, obviously nervous and smoking.

Finally, we were invited into the auditorium. Behind a long, broad desk sat N. Podgornyy, S. Suslov, A. Shelepin, P. Demichev, Yu. Andropov, B. Ponomarev, F. Kulakov, D. Ustinov and A. Rudakov. At the end was L. Brezhnev. Along the wall was a row of chairs for the invited guests.

"We feel that on this question," commenced Brezhnev, "there is no need to reinvestigate the numerous facts which have been described in the documents. We have studied them previously. We twice have sought advice on this question and have reached an unanimous opinion. For this reason, we feel that at present we have merely to set out our viewpoint on this question. We want to tell you, Comrade Solyanik, that we do not want to obviate what you have done in the past. Much has been done...in the interests of the common undertaking and in the interests of increasing the prestige of our fleet we have always supported you as a leader. And we will support you in the future."

My heart skipped a beat: "We will support you in the future."

In his long speech, Brezhnev spoke as if excusing himself before Solyanik and in every possible way mitigating his guilt. This speech made a strange impression. He glanced at Podgornyy and spoke about the accomplishments of Solyanik, he switched his glance to Shelepin and began listing Solyanik's crimes, incidentally, calling them errors.

"All conditions have been created for you," continued Brezhnev, "so that you could successfully direct the collective and win its authority. We have surrounded you with honor and have awarded you the title of Hero of Socialist Labor."

Brezhnev said this as if addressing not Solyanik, but Podgornyy, looking at him, although he did not say a word.

"But at the same time, a real leader," he continued, "should be courteous, simple in his dealings with others. You have not reconciled all of this in a correct and equal manner.... We are not inclined to ascribe all the shortcomings to Comrade Solyanik personally."

It was difficult to hear this. What sort of courtesy was this? Brezhnev knew well enough what crimes Solyanik had committed, but he continued in the same vein,

taking the opportunity to move to his own biography: "I, myself, when a juvenile, worked on an open hearth furnace with my father. You could stand by a blistering furnace, you could not breathe and then one of the workers would direct a hose at you and douse you with cold water and things would be a little easier. Your father would come up and ask: 'How are you breathing, my boy?' and I would answer 'Yes, I am breathing.' For this work we received 70 kopecks.... In certain of the documents here it states that you intentionally went into the tropics. I do not think that this was done intentionally. But generally here in the papers there are all sorts of dubious accusations. But that may not be the point here.... We are reviewing this question at a difficult time. The fleet is about to set to sea and hundreds of people are already to depart. What about you, Comrade Solyanik?"

Solyanik stood up. In one phrase he pointed out that he had made many errors and complained that recently whaling had become significantly more difficult. Then he went on to say:

"We were on our ordinary trip and suddenly in the tropics came upon a large herd with thousands of blue whales. This is the most valuable food whale. I sought the advice of the party and trade union organizations and all the ships and we decided to remain and hunt in the tropics...."

A skillful lie! We already knew about the thousands of blue whales. This was a common expression in Odessa. If someone wanted to expose a lie, they said: "That is blue whales."

As for the interrogation, it was "blue whales."

The question from the desk: "And the birthday?..."

Here a digression is required.

At one time, all the vessels had been informed by radio that in honor of the birthday of the General Captain-Director Aleksey Nikolayevich Solyanik, upon his orders, each whaler would be issued 100 gm of vodka for dinner. And in actuality, the alcohol was put out on the tables. The men drank to an original toast: "Be damned." What their indignation had been when they learned that for what they had drunk they would be charged at the restaurant price.

Listening to the question, Brezhnev picked up:

"Yes, that noble glass of vodka...well and good. But then how could you collect money for it?"

Solyanik stood up:

"They are trying to confuse you, Leonid Ilich. That is false, that did not happen."

What was Solyanik hoping for, in making such a statement? It was a simple stratagem as although Brezhnev knew everything he would not give Solyanik away. And that is what happened. In reply Brezhnev said:

"Well, possibly, that is untrue and we will not go into details now," and turned to Ishkov:

"Is the fleet now ready for its next trip?"

Ishkov began by describing how carefully and thoughtfully the next trip was being prepared for and which the fleet would leave on shortly, how much had been done on this level by Solyanik and how important it was that precisely he led it to the whaling grounds.

"It must be said, Leonid Ilich," he said with sadness, "that the article has not described everything as it was in reality."

And here he played his trump card:

"The point is that no one fainted, no one lost consciousness...."

To this Brezhnev replied:

"We do not need to discuss now what is being said against Solyanik by some under their breath. We can find an opportunity to investigate this separately...sit down, Comrade Ishkov, Comrade Sinitsa, what did you have to say?"

Sinitsa began to admit the serious errors of the obkom, but the point of the comments came down to praising Solyanik and how much he was now doing to prepare for the new trip.

"For the obkom buro," said Sinitsa, "Comrade Solyanik provided a thorough analysis of his errors and we saw how profoundly he condemned them. This instilled confidence that they would not be repeated."

How did this sound to us who had been present at the obkom buro where Solyanik, without recognizing a single "error" merely praised himself immeasurably! Now the fleet personnel, continued Sinitsa, had become a united collective capable of carrying out any task. This was Solyanik's accomplishment. This is why the party obkom considered it possible to leave Comrade Solyanik in the post of general captain-director. This is why we request that our decision be supported. One of the obkom secretaries will go on this trip and we are giving special importance to it. This is not simply a trip but it is the 20th anniversary of Soviet whaling. To our shame, we have not prepared a replacement for Comrade Solyanik and now there is no one to replace him.

"Yes, we are taking a difficult decision," concluded Brezhnev. "But, having weighed all questions of the matter, in the aims of indoctrination the Secretariat of

the CPSU Central Committee has resolved to relieve you, Comrade Solyanik, from the position held. Otherwise, people will not understand us."

Solyanik stood up.

"Leonid Ilich, Comrade Secretaries of the Central Committee! I have thought over everything thoroughly and I am in full agreement. I would merely like one thing: permit me to go on the voyage. I have been at sea since the age of 14 and it would be very difficult for me to give up this work."

"As for future work," said Brezhnev, "let the oblast party committee give some thought to this. Of course, Solyanik should not be unemployed for a single day."

It was clear that as the question was to be settled by the obkom, he would be removed from the Central Committee nomenklatura. Podgornyy did not support this. In endeavoring to support Solyanik, possibly, hoping to somehow keep him in the Central Committee nomenklatura, he said:

"I feel that, of course, we must permit Comrade Solyanik to go on the voyage. Possibly he could be given a catcher boat and even command it."

Podgornyy could scarcely have guessed that in a catcher boat there was a crew of just 15-17 men and this was in no way a nomenklatura position.

The session of the Secretariat ended with this.

Of course, Sinitsa did not give Solyanik a catcher boat but rather a new, large-tonnage Dutch-built vessel for catching and processing shrimp named the "Van Gogh." Someone in Odessa said: "Solyanik will make whales out of shrimp." However, the prophecy did not come true. He did not draw any lessons from what had happened and continued to act as before, violating all laws. He was picked up for fishing in foreign territorial waters. He refused to pay a penalty in spite of the law and logic. The case went to the International Court in the Hague and a much larger amount had to be paid, including large court costs.

Both Sinitsa and Ishkov tolerated all of this. And all of this encouraged Solyanik's rashness. He continued to create an uproar as if he had gone out of his mind. He collided with a foreign vessel, causing it serious damage, he did not admit his blame and refused to pay for the repairs. It is not difficult to guess how this all ended: the Hague and the same result. Solyanik's career at sea ended with this if one does not consider that for some time thereafter he was in command of a barge. Then he worked in building maintenance. Not long before his death he proposed building at his own expense (!) a trawler which would be named "Aleksey Solyanik." This proposal was turned down.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was prohibited from announcing that Solyanik had been released from his held position. This was assigned to the newspaper IZVESTIYA. And it was not only to announce the fact but also provide a full description of the chaos which had reigned in the fleet before leaving on the trip and the indignation of the whalers who were dissatisfied with the impotence of the new Capt Boris Makarovich Morgun. In essence, this was an assignment of compromising the person who was forced to take over for Solyanik. The material was assigned to the experienced special correspondent for the newspaper Savva Morozov. In the farewell they said: "Realize that this is not merely an assignment of the editors but is the instructions of the party Central Committee."

He left for Odessa, he studied the state of affairs and, upon returning, reported: "In many years of working in the press, for the first time I have not carried out an assignment. I am unable to write the story which you are expecting from me." Another correspondent was sent to Odessa, but it was too late as the fleet had already cast off. Thus, in IZVESTIYA there was not to be any "Follow-Up on the Article of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA."

Some 12 years younger than Solyanik, the conscientious and calm Morgun had as much experience as Solyanik. He had spent his entire life at sea. During the war, he had been wounded as a young man in an amphibious landing and later had suffered a concussion under similar circumstances. He knew the Arctic like his home.

But the jubilee voyage was difficult. Someone on shore was doing everything to thwart it. They did not send the transport for the whaling products. All the freezers were full of meat, the decks were stacked with sacks of whale meal, there was no place to put the tallow, and on some days up to a thousand tons were added. The fuel did not arrive. When 2 days worth remained, they informed the fleet that a tanker would arrive in 22 days. This meant they had to drift for 20 days and stop whaling for 20 days. And then storms of unprecedented force descended, and it seemed as though the Antarctic had exploded. The catcher boats were blanketed in the fog.

However, the enthusiasm of the whalers was so great that they were able to surmount everything. The plan was significantly overfulfilled. With an enormous moral and labor victory the whalers returned home. The following trip was made just as successfully.

On the third trip a radiogram arrived that Morgun had fallen into a hold. The depth of the hold was 13 m. It was welded and riveted from thick ship steel.

A special commission was immediately dispatched to the fleet. It concluded that it had been an accident.

The whalers did not believe this. In the area of the hold the captain had no business and there was no reason for him to go there. But if he had been called there by someone, he would not have lost his footing. And not only because he was an experienced sailor as there was an iron railing protecting the hold which was more than a meter high. Even if he was lost in thought, he could not have fallen. The whalers believed that Morgun had been murdered. But this was only one version. Like they, I cannot prove anything.

In practical terms the case of Solyanik was settled not by the Secretariat but by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee; participating in the decision were six members, two candidate members of the Presidium and two secretaries of the Central Committee. According to the irrefutable facts and documents, everyone could see that Solyanik had to be expelled from the party and turned over to the court. But two forces worked against this: on the one hand, the KPK of the CPSU Central Committee, the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Central Committee and the editors supported, obviously, by certain members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and, on the other hand, Shelest, Podgornyy, Korotchenko and Suslov with a second echelon of Sinitsa, Ishkov, Rytov and Denisenko.

And Brezhnev made a compromise as he had done hundreds of times.

Those were different times, and even such a decision by the Central Committee Secretariat concerning Solyanik was perceived as a major victory. Those who had suffered a defeat were not reconciled. They wanted vengeance. The first to feel this was Z. Serdyuk and he was retired on a pension.

After the publication of the article and this entire story, Yu. Voronov was removed from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. He was appointed the executive secretary of PRAVDA. This is an important post and seemingly could not be considered a demotion but this was only the first step.

When the passions had died down, it was proposed that PRAVDA send Voronov as a correspondent to the GDR, where he stayed for 14 years. During these years he, an experienced editor, a talented poet, a member of the USSR Writers' Union, was proposed repeatedly by the sections of the Central Committee and the USSR Writers' Union for various positions in the sphere of literature and for such major posts, for example, as editor of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA or deputy editor of a "thick" journal, but each time his path was blocked by Podgornyy. When Podgornyy had died, Suslov continued to block Voronov. And only after Suslov had died was Voronov elected one of the secretaries of the USSR Writers' Union. He now heads the Culture Section of the CPSU Central Committee.

I feel that the action by the newspaper will be recalled by all who participated in verifying the published facts and who at that time assumed an honest, principled position.

What subsequently happened to the people who defended Solyanik?

Sinita was released from his job. But he did not remain idle for long as he was appointed the chief of the Ukrainian River Navigation Company. Ishkov because of the noisy "Okean" affair was quietly allowed to retire as soon as he had paid 27,000 rubles for the "gifts" from the Mafia.

His deputy, Rytov, the most active and inventive defender of Solyanik, also because of the "Okean" affair, was sentenced to execution. The chief of the Main Administration of the Whaling Fleet, Denisenko, was condemned to prison for 8 years on another criminal case. Lt Gen Gaydamak was expelled from the party.

Complex feelings took possession of us when we walked out of the Central Committee building. On the one hand, it seemed like a victory. The real threat was over that the newspaper's actions would be judged slanderous and Solyanik would not be expelled from the party but removed from his job. But the feeling of perplexity did not leave me. High ranking leaders, the first secretary of the party obkom and a minister had reported a clear lie to the Central Committee, realizing that those who would be listening to them knew this. How could that be? It was terrible to think, but a person does not always control his thoughts and they constantly come to mind: how could Brezhnev and the other Central Committee secretaries sit there in silence and support a lie and sacrifice the undertaking, honesty, justice and truth for the sake of some unknown and incomprehensible interests and goals for us? But this was just the beginning.

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Historian Calls for Truth Regarding Khrushchev, Political Figures

18300013 Moscow *OGONEK* in Russian No 33,
13-20 Aug 88 pp 26-27

[Article by Georgiy Fedorov, Ph.D., History: "Memorial Service..."; first paragraph is a boldface epigraph from V.I.Lenin]

[Text] The proletariat should know the truth about deceased politicians as well as living ones, for those who truly deserve to be called statesmen do not die for politics when their physical death comes.

The official announcement of the death of N.S.Khrushchev, personal pensioner of All-Union importance, former First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, appeared in the newspapers only on the day of the funeral.

On that September morning in 1971, my wife and I set off for the Novodevichye cemetery to attend Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev's funeral. There had been no official announcement of the date, the place or the time of the funeral, but we found out when and where it was to be held. On the way to the Novodevichye cemetery, long before actually reaching it, we were struck by the heavy presence of troops. A dozen of trucks with canvas tops stood around the Novodevichye; they were filled with soldiers who could be seen through the open back. Officers were running around, and two-way radios were blaring: "Thirteen, d'you read me? This is One. Reply," and so on. It seemed as though that district of Moscow were occupied by some military units, or else some troops were getting ready to march. Nearer the cemetery, encircling it, were several cordons of sorts. There were policemen of various ranks, and in front of the cemetery proper stood plainclothesmen. Among them, there were a number of officers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs uniform, with light blue diamonds on the lapels. Small groups of people were huddling along the outside rim of the police line; they were kept away from the cemetery. Once in a while one of those people would make a desperate attempt to pass, only to be turned back rather rudely. I came up to that line and asked the nearest police officer: "Who is in charge here?" He pointed to a middle-aged police colonel. I came up to the colonel and told him: "Comrade, my wife and I are acquainted with the daughter of the deceased, Rada Nikitichna; it would be strange if on this day we were not there, by her side. Please let us through." "Do you really know her?" he asked. "Yes, we do," I replied. With a wave of hand he told us: "Alright, go on." We went and—an unexpected stroke of good fortune—managed to pass several lines at once. I decided to use the same successful tactic at the final checkpoint as well. I came up to the nearest man in the line. He wore a light plastic raincoat and was about 30 years old; "Would you let me through please,..." I began. "No I won't," he cut in sharply. I was angry. "How do you know who I am and why I have to

get through. You didn't even let me finish," I said. To this, he replied: "I don't care. I won't let you through no matter what." "You see, you don't know who I am, whereas I have a pretty clear idea about you," I said. To my surprise, he smiled and grumbled: "Alright, go ahead." We passed and found ourselves in front of the iron gate of the cemetery; not only the gate itself was shut, but a small door next to it was, as well. It turned out that even there there was a checkpoint. To the right of the gate, on the wall, there was a red pencil sign which read: "Cemetery Closed for Scheduled Cleaning." Once in a while a foreign correspondent would knock on the iron door and shout the name of his newspaper or magazine. The door would open to let him in and shut once again. A group of 15 or so people had gathered in front of the gate; just like my wife and I, they managed to pass all other cordons. At this one, the guards were on the other side of the gate. "Let's keep these correspondents from getting in," I proposed. "Why is their need to get in greater than ours?" And indeed, we stopped letting them in, or even letting them near the door. They yelled and screamed, but we kept them off. All of a sudden, a general came running toward us, asking what the problem was and what the noise was all about. One of us replied: "What do you mean, what's the problem? We've come for the funeral and they would not let us in." The general knocked on the door and announced himself. The door opened and he ordered: "Let everyone in immediately."

We went in. The crowd was not large. There were some 60 reporters, apparently just foreign ones. Like all reporters everywhere, they were concerned only with getting more information, filming more by their television cameras, taking more photographs and taping more with their tape recorders. Television cameras hummed, cameras clicked and there was a multilingual din of many voices that was strange to hear at a cemetery. In addition, there were two hundred other people, and many of them had grey hair. Several of our friends and acquaintances were also in the crowd. There were also many people whose faces bore signs of severe hardship. I think that those were former prisoners. For example, we saw among them Army Commander Yakir's sister Bella Emmanuilovna.

The body of 70-year old Nikita Sergeevich lay in an upraised coffin surrounded by wreaths and flowers. At its feet were little red pillows with three Hero of Socialist Labor stars and other medals. His face was somber, so somber and calm as I had never seen it on photographs in newspapers and magazines or on movie and television screens. A high, powerful forehead, cheekbones indicative of inner strength. It seemed that the face reflected some important thought that was destined to remain secret. Family members and Khrushchev's wife Nina Petrovna stood next to the coffin. She wore a grey overcoat and a black lace shawl. Her face—very plain, open and guileless and in some ways very attractive—was bathed with tears. Rada Nikitichna stood nearby, with a somewhat vacant look in her eyes. She appeared

to be chilled. Next stood a tall man. He bore a close resemblance to both his father and to his mother and it was clear that it was Sergey Nikitovich Khrushchev. Aleksey Adzhubey was also present; he had a handsome, somewhat swollen and reserved face.

Someone spoke. I could not hear the words over the noise of the television cameras that the reporters held high over their heads and their disrespectful chatter, and I tried to get closer; I was able to do so, to a certain extent. Next spoke Sergey Nikitovich. Thanks to the general noise, I was able to hear his speech only partially (he spoke without a microphone). He said that for a long period of time his father held responsible party and state positions. History would judge his actions. He could only say that Nikita Sergeevich was a well-meaning man and a good, loving husband and father. Then spoke an elderly woman; she spoke very softly but for some reason she could be heard very clearly. She said: "I worked with Nikita Sergeevich since 1926 and it was a great pleasure to work with him. In 1937 I was arrested and sent first to prison and then a labor camp, and only after the 20th congress was I freed and rehabilitated. In the name of the millions of innocent people killed in prisons and labor camps whose good name you, Nikita Sergeevich, have restored to them, of their family members and friends and of the hundreds of thousands whom you freed from the horrible jails, allow me to express our gratitude and our deep reverence for you. I know that it took much courage, rectitude and desire to restore justice. We will remember it to the end of our days and will pass it on to our children and grandchildren." After this, the man who was in charge of the ceremony—he wore civilian clothes but had an obviously military bearing—announced: "And now please pay your last respect to the deceased. Quickly, comrades, no lingering." People passed by the coffin, spurred on by plainclothes guardians of public order standing around it. Among wreaths and flowers I spotted a wreath which bore an inscription "To Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev from A.I.Mikoyan." At that point, the reporters once again pushed us back. After a short while, however, I caught a glimpse of the coffin being hastily lowered into the grave that had been prepared in advance and toppled with soil. Even before the grave was completely filled, the orchestra finished playing the USSR national anthem and the master of ceremonies half-proposed, half-ordered: "And now, comrades, please disperse."

Yet, no one left.

We continued to stand under a drizzling rain. After a while, Nina Petrovna apparently fainted. She started to fall and Sergey caught her. The car was called, and it drove up almost to the grave. Nina Petrovna was helped into the car and she and Sergey drove off. We came up to Rada Nikitichna. We expressed our deep condolences and I kissed her hand. She thanked us a little absently and left all alone.

After Nina Petrovna left, the tension that gripped those who came to the cemetery eased. We headed for the exit.

When we passed the gate, we saw that all the barriers and cordons were still in place and that the crowd at the outside ring had grown larger. Trucks with soldiers were also still there. Apparently, someone feared some kind of disturbances, extremist actions or I don't know what in connection with the funeral of a personal pensioner of All-Union importance.

In view of his former government posts, N.S.Khrushchev should have been interred in the Kremlin wall or next to it. Yet, those who continued to manage his fate even in death decided that he was not worthy of that honor. This fact had to be made clear to all and therefore he would be buried at a city cemetery, albeit a more prestigious one. The outcome, however, was the exact opposite of what was intended. Few people visit the Kremlin wall, which is closely guarded and therefore quite official; Khrushchev's grave was left to the people, for whom he had done so much. People would come there to argue and to reminisce. At times, mild abuse would be directed at him, but most memories were tinged with gratitude. At Easter, people would bring painted eggs and other traditional Easter dishes to the grave.

Later, a monument was erected over the grave, which was designed by Ernst Neizvestnyy. At the time, all kinds of praise were being sung to L.I.Brezhnev, exalting him shamelessly to high heaven, whereas the rare mentions of Khrushchev were larded with negatives and abuse. E.Neizvestnyy, with whom N.S.Khrushchev had once had a confrontation at the exhibition in the Manezh, was given the commission for the monument by Nikita Sergeevich's family, since the two men reconciled a long time ago. Ernst told me while working on the monument: "The man, while still alive, poisoned a few years of my life, and now he'll do the same after his death; yet, I will finish this commission, as I myself want to do it. He is worth it."

Very soon, the new rulers realized that they had blundered burying N.S.Khrushchev at a place accessible to the people. I think that this was an important factor in that typical for the stagnation period decision to close the cemetery to visitors; to everyone except those who had a special pass.

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Historian Afanasyev Defends Authenticity of Molotov-Ribbentrop Protocol

18000076 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 29 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by Yu. Afanasyev, doctor of historical sciences: "To Act Worthily of Our Times"]

[Text] Recently, a sharp debate has unfolded on the pages of the republic and central press about the possibility of preventing World War II and the Soviet government's role in this.

At the center of the controversy is the non-aggression pact concluded between the USSR and Germany in 1939, the so-called "Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty."

One point of view on these events has been stated at a press conference at the Novosti Press Agency [APN] by Doctor of Historical Sciences V.M. Falin (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No 36, 4 Sep 88) and also in the article "This Is How the War Started" by F. Kovalev and O. Rzhevskiy (PRAVDA, 1 Sep 88; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 6 Sep 88). Its authors view the above-mentioned treaty as a necessity, dictated by the circumstances which had objectively taken shape; they explain the introduction of Soviet troops into the territories of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland by the interests of USSR security under the threat of a German invasion.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. Afanasyev, rector of the Moscow Historical Archival Institute, stated an opposite opinion at meetings held recently in Tallinn of ideological activists of the city with historians and sociologists. Readers of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA could familiarize themselves with this point of view by reading the reporting on these meetings in the 25 August issue as well as today's material. Yu. Afanasyev calls the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty" an outright conspiracy with all ensuing consequences for the fate of the world and individual states.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Kh. Arumyaev also expressed a similar opinion (RAKHVA KHYAGEL, 10 and 11 Aug 88; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 17, 18 Aug 88).

This debate also touches upon questions of the revolutionary events in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and their becoming a part of the USSR. In doing so, those involved in the debate, as a rule, examine the role of only the external factor in these events—the introduction of Soviet troops—without analyzing the correlation of forces and public interests in these states themselves. In the near future we also hope to familiarize our readers with the opinions of other Estonian historians on these questions.

It was noted at an APN press conference on 16 August of this year that the authenticity of the text of the protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact has not been proven. The situation is not such that one can unceremoniously say—I do not believe it, this is forged document, this cannot be.

In 1948, the State Department published the German text discovered in the archives of Ribbentrop's ministry and its English translation. In 40 years this and other texts of treaties of 1939 and their annexes have been studied by hundreds, if not thousands of experts. The scientific world recognized them as being absolutely authentic. Not a single scientist in the West, as well as many in our country, have the slightest doubt as to the authenticity of these texts.

Today, modern source study is able to distinguish accurately between a forgery and a genuine document, and there are sufficient examples of that. The most vivid and appropriate example in this context is the story with Hitler's "diaries." Just 2 weeks after they were published in the FRG the whole world knew that they did not pass scientific examination. So, we must proceed from the fact that the texts of the annexes are authentic. If V.M. Falin or someone else has doubts, they must prove them in accordance with modern source study situation.

How to assess the content of the published document? The assessment is prompted by the further course of historical events itself. The protocol in question was signed on 23 August, and Hitler attacked Poland on 2 September; that is to say, Hitler needed the treaty and its protocol as foreign policy "double insurance" for implementing his military plans. To consider this document otherwise, as a conspiracy between Hitler and Stalin at the expense of Poland and the Baltic countries, is impossible. The usual arguments—that it could not have been any other way, such was the international situation of that time, and so forth—do not hold up to criticism, since the pact itself and the protocols to it were a most effective event which helped form this international situation.

I would like to emphasize that the events of August 1939-June 1940 cannot be considered outside the context of the history of Soviet-Baltic relations and international relations as a whole between 1919 and 1940 in Europe.

Otherwise, the conclusion is clear—a conspiracy between Hitler and Stalin in 1939.

A conspiracy, but why? What influenced its accomplishment, what facilitated it?

The system of international relations in Europe after World War I were determined by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919—the "Versailles system." The USSR was not invited to the conference where this treaty was signed. Questions concerning borders in Europe were decided without the USSR. The essence of the "Versailles system" was the humiliation of Germany and "Balkanization" of Europe, setting the principle of "world nationalism" in opposition to the idea of world communism—let us recall the decision of the First and Second Congresses of the Communist International on creating a "World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"—that is, creating a "sanitary nationalist cordon" out of the small nation states of Eastern Europe against Soviet Russia.

For the sake of this, the creators of the "Versailles system" (W. Wilson and D. Lloyd George) took an unprecedented step—they sanctioned the break-up of

two of the oldest multinational empires, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman, believing that this would also serve as a stimulant for a flare-up of nationalism in the former Russian Empire, in the "prison of peoples."

The reliance on nationalism was confirmed in Comintern's attempt with the aid of the Red Army to break through into Germany via Poland to stimulate a world revolution in Western Europe, since the revolutionary movement there had begun to decline after the end of the world war in 1919. But the attempt was unsuccessful. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army [RKKA] suffered a crushing defeat in the suburbs of Warsaw and was rolled back 650 km to the east, beyond Minsk, and 60 percent of the Army fell prisoner to the Poles.

The participation of the Polish workers in opposing the RKKA dealt a terrible blow to the hopes of Comintern for a world revolution (see, for example, the perplexed speeches by leaders of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and Comintern—Trotskiy, Kamenev, Dzerzhinskiy, Bukharin, and others—at the 9th RKP(b) Party Conference in Moscow in September 1920).

At this conference Lenin drew the fundamental conclusion that a world revolution would not take place in the near future. It was necessary to build socialism in one country. True, this country was still considered the bridgehead of a future world revolution. Hence, the New Economic Policy [NEP] and "peaceful coexistence" with capitalist encirclement, primarily with neighbors in the west—Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and Romania—and in the south—Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and China. For Lenin, who was orienting himself extremely clearly in the real situation and thinking dialectically, from that time on the world revolution would not be an attack but a process (see: Bukharin, "Lenin's Political Will" in *KOMMUNIST*, No 2, 1988).

Peaceful coexistence with neighbors was expressed in the final mutual recognition "de jure" of the former parts of the Russian Empire. Peace treaties were concluded: with Estonia on 2 February 1920; with Latvia on 2 August 1920; with Poland on 18 March 1921; and with Turkey on 16 March 1921.

At a conference in Moscow on 30 March 1922, Churchill signed with Poland, Estonia, and Latvia a guarantee agreement on the "sincere desire for universal peace" and diplomacy obligations of these states to support the USSR at the Genoa Conference in April 1922 in his desire to win from the Entente recognition of Soviet Russia by the West "de jure."

However, due to a dispute over the debts of Tsarist Russia, the Genoa Conference ended in failure. The only benefit for the USSR was the signing of a separate treaty with defeated Germany in Rapallo, which was supplemented by the 1926 trade and economic agreement in Berlin. German-Soviet economic relations developed very successfully between 1922 and 1932.

The relations between the Baltic states and the USSR during the period between wars were constantly influenced by three main factors:

- the interest in economic ties, which were affected by the 200 years of being part of the Russian Empire, where Riga and Tallinn were centers of machinebuilding and shipbuilding up to 1917;
- the role of the "sanitary cordon;"
- the constant suspiciousness and hostility towards the USSR on the part of governments which gave asylum to White emigre organizations and which financially subsidized anti-Soviet activities of the League of Baltic States.

It must be noted that Estonia, unlike Poland or Finland, sought to have normal good-neighborly relations with the USSR in the 1920's. In particular, it acted as an intermediary in the dispute between Finland and the USSR over Karelia and help return from Finland the icebreaker "Volynets," which was later turned over to Estonia by the USSR under the Estonia-USSR treaty of 1920. Under an agreement of 5 October 1921, Estonia, before the other Baltic states, exchanged captured Red Army soldiers and Estonian communists between 1917 and 1919 for Estonian criminals from Soviet prisoners, including those who were imprisoned back under the tsar.

The "sanitary cordon" and the entire Wilson system of "Balkanization" of Eastern Europe, as long as France and England together controlled it, were also effective against both Germany and the USSR. But old Anglo-French antagonisms increased (in the colonies of Asia and Africa, in the Near East—dividing the legacy of the Ottoman Empire—Syria, Egypt and so forth), and the United States began interfering in the affairs of Europe (the Dawes Plan for economic aid to Germany in the 1920's), and the economic crisis of 1929-1933 broke out. All this led to instability in the relations between these "Balkanized" states, an armed conflicts began between Poland and Lithuania over Vilnius, which was annexed by Poland, between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania, and so forth. Semi-fascist regimes were established within these countries: in Hungary in 1919; in Bulgaria in 1923; in Poland in 1926.

Hitler's coming to power in 1933 coincided with the consolidation of Stalin's individual power in the USSR. "Balkanized" Eastern Europe ended up squeezed between two totalitarian states.

One must point out the dualism of USSR foreign policy as an important factor of international relations: The policy of the Comintern, which was expressed in anti-fascism, assistance to Spain in 1936-1938, the non-aggression pact with France in 1932, the mutual assistance with France and with Czechoslovakia in 1935, joining the League of Nations in September 1934, and the struggle for collective security, that is, actually for an

alliance with France and England against Germany. And at the same time, in April 1931 Comintern proclaimed there was a military threat on the part of France and England, that antifascism and "Russia's policy" were purely state interests without a hint of any internationalism whatsoever: it was simultaneously sounding out the sentiments of both Germany and France with England. Stalin fluctuated between these two policies for a long time (from 1933 to 1939).

These fluctuations were very accurately noted by F.F. Raskolnikov in his famous "Open Letter to Stalin," written 5 days before the conclusion of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact on 23 August 1939: "You fluctuate, wait, and swing like a pendulum between two 'axes.'" (NEDELYA, No 26, 1988, p 7). Raskolnikov also prophetically predicted the correct way out which Stalin was forced to come to after 22 June 1941: "...the only possibility of preventing war is for the Soviet Union to join the international block of democratic states and conclude a military and political alliance with England and France..." (Ibid.)

True, Raskolnikov would have been 100 percent correct if not for Munich... Munich—a very fortunate move by Hitler—completely split the anti-Hitler coalition, which had been quite real before September 1938. After that, everyone, including the USSR, acted according to the principle: "Save yourself, whoever can..." and however you can.

But why did he prevail? First of all, a 19th century principle proved to be firm, the principle of separate alliances (Russia and France against Germany—the 1935 treaty; France and England against Russia with neutralization of Germany—Munich). Secondly, the Versailles "principle of nationalities" itself was fraught with the threat of disputes and discord among small states (prior to World War I, the Balkans were a constant hot spot of small wars through almost all of the 19th and the early 20th centuries).

The idea of uniting Europe (the plan of French Foreign Minister Briand and U.S. Secretary of State Kellogg 1926-1928) was not supported, including in the Baltic: all wanted to have national independence, even though illusory, under the threat of being swallowed up by stronger neighbors—Germany or the USSR.

That is why France decided to build the Maginot Line in December 1929 on the border with Germany. Finland built the Mannerheim Line which, incidentally, proved useful for it in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Czechoslovakia consolidated in Sudetenland on the border with Germany. Up until 1939, the USSR consolidated on the old western border 32 km from Minsk (so-called fortified areas).

Before the Baltic region became part of the USSR, France and England had already rejected the basic principle of the "Versailles system" of protecting small

states: In the spring of 1938, they refused to protect Austria (the Anschluss with Germany), in September 1938 betrayed Czechoslovakia (gave up Sudetenland), and in March 1939 Hitler occupied all of Czechoslovakia, creating a puppet "state" in Slovakia. In other words, the very principle of "taking away" Europe bit by bit was already tacitly approved. The Soviet-German pact of 1939 merely applied the Munich principle to the Baltic region. It is significant, as was noted at a conference of scientists of the Baltic region in Moscow at APN, that in 1940 all the Western powers recognized the inclusion of the three Baltic republics in the USSR. The United States of America was the exception.

The "Versailles system" had collapsed.

As regards the arguments over the so-called revolutionary situations and socialist revolutions in the countries of the Baltic region, there are diametrically opposed opinions here. Many historians—Estonian, Latvian and others—as well as participants of the events at that time call into question the classic viewpoint for Soviet historiography on this matter and maintain: The Soviet Union introduced its military units in accordance with a treaty, and there was nothing left for the Baltic republics to do other than agree to it. Soon, new troops were added to the limited contingent at stipulated bases, now without any authorization. As we know, Finland did not agree to the stationing of even a limited contingent of Soviet troops. The shameful Finnish War began.

In my view, there is no need to talk about a peaceful socialist revolution under conditions of a presence of Soviet troops. As far as the entire voting mechanism, voluntary concurrence and so forth are concerned, we must not forget that this all took place in 1940, and we know just what our country was at that time and how the elections, voting and so forth were taking place. You see, deportations began in the Baltic region after the voting. So, we must at least be cautious when we talk about voluntary participation. Therefore, you can try as much as you want to justify the course of events by referring to the dilemma of "either Hitler or Stalin." One can agree in principle with such a statement of the question, but from the fact that Hitler was a real alternative for the Baltic region it still does not follow that Stalin would be the only good for it. Consequently, it is time to recognize that this was a Stalinist action, that troops were introduced, that everything that followed under conditions of real occupation—joining the USSR and so forth—was all a matter of technique.

Recognizing these realities of the 1930's and 1940's is by no means a signal to cancel out all subsequent decades or, let us assume, to raise the question of today's estrangement of the Baltic republics and their leaving the Soviet Union. We are discussing historical injustices—this is indisputable. But we are discussing them within the framework of an irreversible process. This is sometimes hard to realize, but necessary. We live in a world in which solving problems by force means destroying life.

The point is, half a century has passed, and the republics have found themselves to be economically, geopolitically, and culturally linked to the USSR. Those who raise the question of withdrawing from the USSR are arguing, I am convinced, unrealistically because posing such a question—let us digress from legal, moral-ethical, and such aspects—would mean a sharp conflict and tragedy.

The practical demands for “detaching” are simply irresponsible. This does not mean that we must deliberately rule out altogether the possibility of one or another republic withdrawing from the USSR. But in order to talk seriously about such problems, the question must be put in this way: Let all our republics enjoy true sovereignty within the framework of the USSR, that is, one must not faint away at the idea that Estonia can become an independent socialist country like Poland, or that Lithuania may become separate from the USSR like Mongolia or Hungary.

Theoretically or in some distant future this cannot be ruled out. But to pose the question this way now means to embark on shady enterprises contrary to the interests of the Baltic peoples above all.

It seems to me that the goal should be different. The republic must be ensured true sovereignty within the framework of the USSR, which should be an alliance of states. Now it is not. Our republics have become formations enjoying a fairly varied but not always conventional autonomy; they have virtually become simply regions of a single centralized state. As we know, that was not Lenin's plan. He saw the future as a single “Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia,” as a federation of independent socialist republics. Indeed, a political goal worthy of our times is to realize the complete sovereignty and the opportunity to be one's own master. In short, it is that which they are thinking about now, that which the Communist Party and Popular Front are concerned about in Estonia. This sovereignty, naturally within judicious limits, must conform to the rights of the federal government—a common army, a common foreign policy, a single monetary system, and so forth. We must return to Lenin's structure of the USSR.

Only by returning to Lenin's structure of the USSR does the national vector of perestroika coincide with the vector of perestroika as a whole, and the national movement will not impair the situation, but will strengthen it and develop it in the necessary direction.

This can be achieved only through common efforts. That is to say, Estonia, like Belorussia, Armenia, and the RSFSR must be equally interested in the struggle for democratization in all respects, including the state structure, improving the electoral system, and economic improvement. If the whole entity, called the USSR, wins, Estonia also will gain real sovereignty. You see, it is not a matter of Estonia being a separate state, as some call for. It is naive from the standpoint of world history to believe that it can solve all its problems by becoming a

small state. For example, look at Switzerland. During the last approximately 600 years, the Swiss cantons have not once raised the question of leaving. They simply do not need this. You see, there are people living there who are of different nationalities, speaking French, German and so forth. But this unity suits them quite well. Or take Canada, for example, where the population is English-speaking and French-speaking. They had their own considerable complexities. But it did not reach the point of the state breaking up and hardly will, since these peoples are already historically interlinked; they are interested only in harmony, in just the measure of relations they have found. We must find this measure of correlation—national, local and all-union. Then all and each individually will immediately be the winner. I see this as being the only realistic approach. Here it is very important that Estonians, thinking about their own infringed interests, understand that the grounds for this infringement are the same as what infringed upon the interests of, say, Russia. In short, each must think not only in terms of itself, but also certainly in terms of the USSR. The entire Union must think about Estonia and consider its interests. Primacy must be given to a political resolution—realization of all-union restructuring, real, complete, and consistent.

As paradoxical as this may seem, the fate of Estonia in this sense is being decided beyond its borders, in Yerevan, in Yakutsk, everywhere. If Estonia does not desire to remain a provincial procurement office of some agencies, then its desire inevitably rests on the principle of independence for all and democracy for each.

Provincialism must be avoided.

Some fear that if they talk honestly about what was—what was bad in the interrelations between peoples, nations and republics of the USSR and about what has still not been resolved today—then a breakdown may begin. This is a very superficial point of view. I believe differently: constructive reconstruction of the socialist federation will begin only after this.

This thought is also confirmed in an analysis of the integration processes of the present-day West. Many countries willingly give up some elements of their sovereignty in favor of the Common Market. Owing to the historical processes, regardless of what they are or how they apply, Estonia has found itself within a certain system which today is falsely integrated. This false integration must be replaced by a real, free, democratic integration. We must relive our history; it must be understood and overcome just as we, I sincerely hope, will step over Katyn and everything that was between us and Poland. You see, these complexities do not affect just the Soviet Union. They affect many socialist countries. This involves working out principles of community life for all this huge part of Europe. Therefore, the example of Estonia, which has created the Popular Front in order better to express the local specific conditions

and interests for more complete realization of the socialist idea, is a splendid example. Let each republic go its own way, but toward a common goal. Socialism must be multistructure, if by structures we mean not only methods of production, as is customary, but also ways of life.

In this regard, it seems to me that there has been sufficient loud talk about international education. Children can be educated; peoples cannot. Marxism requires not "education by slogan," but formation of those economic, political and cultural relations, that structure of society which would educate itself. In other words, we must remove the causes of irritation of, let us say, the Estonians with respect to the Russians and the like; we must learn to overcome the friction which arises through a common democratic structure on a healthy economic and political basis. I heard that the Estonians are quite justly offended by the Russian-speaking people living in the republic because many of them do not learn Estonian. But you see, it is not ruled out that they virtually do not need it. But they must not be offended, but must create in the republic conditions in which studying the language of the native nationality would become a natural necessity and would be accessible.

In general, when we talk about the nationality question, we must take many things into account. Not to mention the neglect here, or the fact that Stalin's legacy is deepest here and that the lack of clarity of relations which has built up over centuries here, which is now beginning to clear up thanks to glasnost, but there is also another circumstance here.

It may be more apparent to us historians, sociologists and psychologists: When people experience difficulties and adversities which they sometimes cannot express aloud, they often translate all their bitterness to the language of the ethnic group, although it is possible that this bitterness does not result directly from the nationality question. We must take this into account. People may fall ill to the disease of the ethnic group.

It is quite obvious that both the acuteness of these questions and their intensification rest on the need for a comprehensively thought-out constitutional reform. The reform, as was stated at the 19th Conference, is needed for a number of other reasons concerning state structure and democratization; but perhaps it is also needed because of the complex and increasingly aggravated nationality relations. It is necessary for all nations and nationalities to become true sovereigns. This is the starting point. After becoming true sovereigns, they will be true masters of their land and waters, their own resources, and the results of their labor. But this is just one part of the problem. The second part is that as sovereigns they must begin examining their equitable relations with other nations and nationalities—the same sovereigns. These relations, or at least not all of them, must go through Moscow.

Finally, we must take into account that the idea of economic independence and republic cost-accounting cannot come down to a plain and simple thought: We must not export something that is ours, what we earned is ours. Therefore, work on a national economic model must also be accompanied with work on a general model. A cost-accounting region earns if all the rest are also cost-accounting regions. In order to live normally, we must have normal economic contracting parties both in Moscow and Minsk. In this sense, when talking about the Estonian initiative and the possibility of implementing it, it is necessary that "everywhere be Estonia." There cannot be a small island of cost-accounting in a non-cost-accounting world. There cannot be a small island of national sovereignty in a system for which sovereignty is not organic. Taking this into account, we can hope that the general norm will not be a centrifugal process but a centripetal one, but one of a completely different nature. Up to the present, we have had a centrally forced, centrally prohibitive, centrally averaged process, that is, the center drew the outlying areas into itself. But the norm must be for the outlying areas to strive the center, which they need.

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Roundtable Reviews 'Blank Spots' in Moldavian History

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[Report by I. Stich and Ye. Podgornov: "'Blank Spots' in the Republic's History: A Round-Table Discussion Conducted by the Editors of the Newspapers MOLDOVA SOCHIALISTE and SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA at the Party History Institute of the Moldavian Communist Party CC"]

[Text] The round-table discussion was opened by Candidate of Historical Sciences V.D. Isak, director of the Party History Institute of Moldavia's Communist Party CC, a branch of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The following took part in the discussion: deputy directors of the Party History Institute of Moldavia's Communist Party CC Candidate of Historical Sciences N.F. Movilyanu and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor A.G. Morar, scientific secretary for the institute; Candidate of Historical Sciences V.I. Kirmikchi; institute section heads Doctor of Historical Sciences P.L. Rybalko and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A.N. Chekirlan; senior scientific associates I.M. Bobeyko, M.M. Gitsiu, S.A. Gratinich, V.I. Pasat and M.I. Chernenko. Also taking part in the discussion were Candidate of Historical Sciences A.T. Roman, department head in the Propaganda and Agitation Section of Moldavia's Communist Party CC, and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor M.F. Rotaru, head of the Department of CPSU History at the Kishinev Pedagogical Institute imeni I. Kryange.

The participants discussed the most urgent questions pertaining to the history of the Moldavian Communist Party, some of which are mentioned in this article.

V. Isak: The recent All-Union party conference demonstrated once again that the course outlined by the party in April 1985 is the only correct one for accomplishing the vitally important tasks facing the people and the nation. The forum of Soviet Communists, which discussed current problems in a spirit of candor and Bolshevik frankness, verified the course on the basis of experience acquired in the process of fulfilling decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress and provided precise guidelines for making the revolutionary restructuring irreversible, enhancing the role of the party, the society's political vanguard, and increasing the creative activeness of the masses in the process of renewal. Therein lies the lasting significance of the conference.

We are going to have to work persistently toward the practical implementation of the tasks outlined. Historical science and social science as a whole must play a more significant role in this matter. The revolutionary renewal involves all aspects of our life, after all. Not just our present life but also our "yesterday," our history, because the renewal involves both the improvement of the society's moral health and the purging of the conscience of socialism itself of the harmful extraneous features and distortions of the past.

A deviation from Marxist-Leninist methodological principles of investigation has produced numerous "blank spots" in our history. Various factors led to a situation in which certain problems and events of the past were studied little or were interpreted in a simplistic manner and were sometimes distorted, while others were passed over entirely. This imposes a great responsibility upon us. The main task is one of restoring the truth, of depicting the historical process objectively, in all its diversity, with all its contradictions....

M. Gitsiu: The republic's historians are going to have to return to questions pertaining to the Bolsheviks' directing role in the struggle by Moldavia's workers for soviet power. We know from the published literature that local Bolsheviks had to operate in a unique and extremely complex situation.

Relative to this, it is important for the reader to know that the local Bolsheviks did not have successes alone, that they frequently encountered numerous obstacles, both objective and subjective. In short, the Bolsheviks need to be depicted as they were, without any embellishment, both during the triumph of the socialist revolution and on the thorny path leading to it.

One cannot say that all of this is absent in modern historical literature. No, some of the Bolsheviks' difficulties and errors are discussed, but they are given

mainly as statements of fact. A different approach is needed. The reader needs to know why, for what reasons, a historical personality acted in one way and not another.

M. Chernenko: I agree with you that the treatment of this subject has up to now consisted primarily in answering the question: What did the specific individual accomplish? Furthermore, unfortunately, the deeds of the past are frequently analyzed from today's standpoint, even though we know that many leaders of and participants in Bessarabia's revolutionary underground and in the building of socialism in the Moldavian ASSR came to the Bolshevik party by their own route, very complex and full of conflicts. For example, G.I. Staryy was a member of the Mensheviks from 1900 to 1918, before joining the Bolshevik party. I.I. Badeyev was a member of the Bund from 1903 to 1916. I.V. Shapovalov (Shatov), member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party during the period 1905-1917, traveled a different path to join the Bolsheviks.

M. Gitsiu: That is true, and there is therefore a need for serious investigation of the matters of party development and the intra-party struggle in the joint social democratic organizations established—and in some places, reestablished—following the February revolution. Skipping ahead, we can say that in addition to the Bolsheviks' influence on the Mensheviks and Bund members, the possibility of a reverse process is not ruled out.

Also unconvincing is the theory of the Bolsheviks' independent line in the joint organizations and of the formation and functioning of factions and groups of the RSDRP(b) within those organizations. If they existed, this must be documented, and we still not only do not know the number of members in each Bolshevik faction but cannot even name their leaders.

A. Roman: I would like briefly to discuss a number of questions pertaining to national state development in the Moldavian ASSR from the standpoint of decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. Today we need a complete analysis of the establishment of the Moldavian people's Soviet statehood. I would like to direct attention to the fact that along with the external factor (foreign occupation), there were also internal difficulties in the process of establishing the Moldavian ASSR. The preparatory work proceeded slowly, since there were numerous forces opposing the party's general line in the national question. Certain leaders in Odessa Guberniya, particularly F.D. Gornyushin, secretary of the guberniya party committee, clearly dragged his feet in the resolution of this matter, one of vital importance to the entire Moldavian people. There was clearly also distrust in the work of G.I. Kotovskiy's commission, with members from the 2nd Cavalry Corps, which was entrusted to him and which included fighting men and commanders of Moldavian nationality.

In the extremely complex situation G.I. Petrovskiy, chairman of the Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, wrote the Odessa Guberniya party committee on 13 August 1924 that "it is now time to begin discussing our national tasks specifically and firmly" and that "we need to begin organizing the Moldavian Republic immediately."

The establishment of Moldavian Soviet national statehood was discussed four times also in the RKP(b) Central Committee. M.V. Frunze, Kh.G. Rakovskiy, G.V. Chicherin, V.P. Zatonskiy, I.I. Dik-Dichesku and G.I. Staryy fervently supported the adoption of the decree "On the Moldavian SSR" passed by the Politburo of the party Central Committee. The practical implementation of this decision led to the establishment of the Moldavian ASSR as part of the Ukrainian SSR on 12 October 1924.

"It is our political and moral duty to restore justice for the victims of lawlessness," M.S. Gorbachev said at the opening of the 19th All-Union party conference. To what degree did the diabolical machinery of repression engulf Moldavia?

N. Movilyanu: Nor can the historians ignore the manifestations of the cult of the personality in the local situations in which workers of the party-and-soviet and management agencies, Communists and nonparty workers of the Moldavian ASSR devoted to the cause of socialism were the victims of Stalinist terror during the spread of the zone of repression. They were accused of particularly dangerous state crimes: betrayal of the homeland, membership in nonexistent nationalistic rebel organizations, espionage for imperial Romania. The situation of universal suspicion and fear deliberately created by Stalin by means of the machinery of violence established a fertile medium for political viciousness and immorality. Denunciations, slander and political imputations became common in public life and a part of everyday existence. The Moldavian oblast party organization suffered greatly as a result. Its membership dropped from 5,715 Communists in 1933 to 3,097 in 1938. Of the nine members of the Bureau of the Moldavian oblast committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) elected at the 10th oblast party conference in May of 1937, only one remained in September of that year: Seven had been declared "enemies of the people" and one had left Moldavia. In addition, the masses of Komsomol members and nonparty people were affected.

The historians are faced with the task of accurately recreating the drama of the '30s, of revealing the origins of the machinery of repression and restoring to the pages of history the names which were deleted from it of those who suffered innocently, the victims of Stalin's despotism.

The press has brought up the fate of the Bessarabian party organization and its members after the area was reunited with the Soviet homeland in 1940. What can the scholars tell us about that period?

I. Bobeyko: To our common misfortune, following the emergence from the underground of the Bessarabian party organization during those remarkable days in June 1940, its fate was always a "forbidden zone" for the historians. This is precisely why I.I. Bodyul's article "Preserve and Add to the Revolutionary Traditions" (PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN, No. 18, 1968) set forth what was, to put it mildly, a free interpretation of the decree passed by the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee on 14 August 1940, whereby the Moldavian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) was ostensibly formed out of two oblast party organizations: those of the Moldavian ASSR and Bessarabia. Certain historians immediately seized upon this "innovative" idea as the basis for proceeding further along the incorrect path in their works—extremely prominent works, by the way—and for trying in every possible way to demonstrate that the chronology of the Moldavian Communist Party should be dated from February 1919, when the Communist organization of Bessarabia was established at an illegal party conference in Kishinev, operating within the ranks of the RKP(b) until August 1922 and then, temporarily, as part of the Romanian Communist Party.

However, the second item in the aforementioned decree of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee states: "Change the Moldavian oblast organization of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) to the Moldavian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)." This decision on such an important political matter was due to the fact that, contrary to the objective course of historical events, the Bessarabian party organization did not return to the fold of the Leninist party in 1940. There was one reason for this. It was not acknowledged as a party unit in the situation of universal distrust and extreme suspicion generated by the cult of Stalin's personality. Those primarily to blame were the former party and soviet leaders of the Moldavian ASSR, as well as N.S. Khrushchev, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee, who had an obligation as a member of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee to get to the bottom of and justly resolve both this and other matters on his trip to Kishinev at that time.

As a result the transfer of the Bessarabian Communists to the VKP(b) was never actually completed. A special commission of the Komintern Ispolkom and the Romanian Communist Party CC, headed by Georgiy Dmitrov, general secretary of the IKKI, was set up in 1940 and performed a great deal of work, to be sure. Based on documents prepared by it for more than 400 Bessarabian and Bukovina Communists the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee passed a decree on 7 May 1941, "On the Procedure for Transferring Members of the Romanian Communist Party Remaining in the Ukrainian and

Moldavian SSRs to the VKP(b)," in accordance with which the Buro of the Moldavian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee adopted a decision on 31 May to transfer the first group of 10 individuals to the ranks of the VKP(b).

This important work was carried on even during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War, although it was not completed at that time and practically came to a halt after the war. Furthermore, the same requirements were unfairly imposed upon the Bessarabian and Bukovina Communists for acceptance as candidate members of the VKP(b) as were made of people coming from other, primarily bourgeois, parties. That is, they were required to submit five recommendations, two of them from people with prerevolutionary status. Not until after the 20th CPSU Congress did the former Bessarabian Communists begin to be accepted into the party under the general terms. Length of party membership then began to be restored for some of them on an individual basis from the time of their entry into the Romanian Communist Party, and their party records began to indicate the length of their membership in the Romanian Communist Party.

V. Pasat: The time has come to determine also who carried out the "leader's" will locally, who was the agent of that terrible "virus." The period just prior to the Great Patriotic War, when innocent people suffered and were deported from Moldavia along with anti-Soviet elements, is an unstudied page. A great deal of the responsibility for these deviations is borne also by S. Goglidze, who worked during the period 1940-1941 as agent for Moldavia of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR Council of People's Commissars and subsequently "worked his way" up to the position of chief of one of the directorates in Beriya's department and "shared the lot" of his boss in December of 1953.

What can one say about the period of the Great Patriotic War? Does it contain problems, "blank spots" and distortions of historical facts for Moldavia's historians?

S. Gratinich: Until recently the history of the Great Patriotic War was presented in the literature as a "victorious march," while all of the tragedies, the errors and failures were ignored. There are numerous "blank spots" also in the description of the Moldavian people's contribution to the battle with the fascist invaders. The published works have not depicted the republic's specific situation or the specific features of the underground and partisan movement in the Right-Bank areas, and have remained silent about the deficiencies and errors. The Stalinist attitude toward the war was defined by the fact that the people were not prepared for prolonged underground work but were oriented to expect the Red Army to return in a few weeks. Another big mistake was the fact that mainly active workers in Bessarabia's Communist underground, well known to the Siguranta, were

included on the staff of the underground party center, which was moved to the enemy's rear area soon after Moldavia was occupied. They all died.

Letters and individual public and publicistic statements frequently mention the drought and famine which struck the republic in the postwar years of 1945-1947. The historians are frequently accused of hushing up these dramatic events....

V. Isak: It would be incorrect to say that they have not been mentioned in the historical literature at all. It is also true that this is one of those subjects which were not ordinarily elaborated, since the dramatic nature of those events apparently fit poorly into the context of socialist development. One cannot drop a word from a song, as they say, however. The people's social memory is alive....

We have already written about the situation in the republic's agriculture during the first postwar years, about the drought and the effort to overcome its effects. Today, with the accumulation of additional information, we can speak more specifically about the main consequence of the drought: famine, which took thousands of human lives. The famine, malnutrition and illnesses resulting from it were a real tragedy for many villages in the republic's central and southern regions in the fall of 1946-47. From 120 to 180 people died each month in individual villages in Kotovski, Vulkaneshtskiy, Kongazskiy and other rayons. More than 200,000 people suffered from dystrophy in February and March of 1947, more than half of them children. Most of them needed hospitalization....

The aid provided the republic by the VKP(b) Central Committee, the Union government and fraternal peoples of the nation played a crucial role in rescuing the republic's population from catastrophe, of course, and the Moldavian people will never forget this.

A study of the information, however, shows that the drought was not the only cause of the difficult situation created in the republic. Other causes were the fact that the republic leadership was unable to objectively assess the situation and did not promptly provide the VKP(b) Central Committee and the Union government with a full picture of the extent of the drought and its effects. In all likelihood, this resulted in the inadequately balanced grain delivery assignments. Judging from all the information, many rayons were objectively in no condition to handle the assignments, a fact reported from the sites. In addition, pressure from above frequently caused the agents for grain deliveries to confiscate excess grain not just from the farms of kulaks and peasants of average means but also what was left on the poor farms. This was despite the fact that the latter had been exempted from the grain delivery obligations by a special decree of the Union government.

There were also serious infractions in the distribution and provision of food subsidies. Lack of control gave birth to various abuses on the part of the authorities. There were unquestionably many objective difficulties: a shortage of transport equipment, snowdrifts and extreme cold. There was also a criminally insensitive disregard for the peasant's bitter plight, however. Through the fault of the leadership of Kishinev Uyezd the food subsidy allocated for Leovskiy Rayon in August 1946 was not delivered until February 1947. At the same time, this rayon was severely and repeatedly criticized in November 1946 for failure to fulfill the grain procurement plans. Unfortunately, there were more than just isolated cases of the accumulation of food subsidies at the rayon centers, from which they were delivered to the villages after long delays. Individual instances of this were exposed and properly assessed by the Moldavian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee. Unfortunately, however, there were many....

We can see that many aspects of events of the '40s require in-depth study. It can be concluded from what has been stated, however, that extensive shortcomings and errors exacerbated the situation, that if these had not occurred there might also have been far fewer losses.

A focused and efficient effort to organize effective assistance for the peasantry was not launched until the VKB(b) Central Committee intervened and A.N. Kosygin arrived in Moldavia in February of 1947 and revealed serious omissions in the performance of the republic's party and soviet organs.

The retention of the system of party and state direction of the nation by administrative order and the cult of Stalin's personality left its negative stamp also on the Moldavian Communist Party's implementation of agricultural collectivization in the republic's Right-Bank areas. What are the most important problems of that period in need of elaboration? What should be given priority attention?

N. Movilyanu: First of all, we need to study the degree to which the peasantry in Moldavia's Right-Bank regions went through the simple forms of cooperation and determine whether they had exhausted all possibilities for growth and whether it was correct for their development to be artificially halted. The acceleration of collectivization was begun, particularly in the concluding stage, instead of a gradual transition from lower to higher forms of cooperation.

We are also going to have to take a new look at the elimination of the kulaks as a class. "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Moldavii" [Outlines of the History of Moldavia's Communist Party], published in 1964, establishes the fact that there were distortions in the process of combatting the kulaks. The kulak was eliminated as a class. But was it just the kulak? The documents show that deviations were committed in the determination and compilation of the lists of kulak farms. Peasants of average means and poor peasants

were listed as kulaks. In 1947 a review of complaints resulted in the removal of 452 farms from the lists in just 29 rayons. There were infractions in the identification of kulak farms also in subsequent years. Far from complete statistics show that around 5,000 kulak families, or 67.3 percent of the total number, were exiled in July 1949. The dispossession of the kulaks affected a far greater portion of the rural population than could have been identified as kulaks by any measure.

This brings up a fundamental question: Was there any alternative for eliminating the kulaks as a class, was a method actually found at that time, or could the action have been less painful? The position taken by Historian A.I. Medvedev would seem worthy of consideration. He denied that it was necessary to eliminate the kulaks in Right-Bank Moldavia by dispossessing and resettling a certain portion of them outside the republic. We know that the universal dispossession of kulaks did not take place in other socialist nations.

Paradoxical as it seems, a later period in history was also a "bottleneck," when, along with certain advances, conflicts developed and accumulated in the economy, culture and the social area, giving rise to a situation conducive to crisis for the society. What caused the stagnation and negative developments which occurred at the juncture of the '70s and '80s?

P. Rybalko: Our republic made certain advances in the development of its industry and the working class, with which the reader is familiar. Not everything went as smoothly in this area at the juncture of the '70s and '80s as our party-history literature made it appear, however. It was pointed out at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference that the stagnation did not skip our republic—in the area of agriculture, among others. The construction of new enterprises was dragged out, and the modernization of existing ones was put aside. The manufactured products did not measure up to contemporary demands. Republic industry began to slow down in the mid-'70s. Extensive-development trends became more and more perceptible. Difficulties arose in the development of the working class. The problem of its quality became more and more acute.

V. Kirmikchi: When we discuss the efforts of the party organizations to develop industry, we must seek the underlying causes of the crisis-producing state of the national economy. Take scientific and technological progress. Decrees passed by the party and the government on this matter were extremely alarming and were essentially all the same. There is not even a hint in the scientific works that many party and state decisions were not fully implemented, however. The concepts of many party and government decrees were altered and distorted at the implementation stage.

M. Rotaru: Most scientific publications are still not providing an objective analysis of the historical experience and have not assessed the processes occurring in

republic agriculture from the '60s to the beginning of the '80s. There is not even a mention of the freewheeling action and subjectivism which were widespread in both theory and praxis in the republic during that period, of the abuse of power, the padding of figures and deceit. One of the causes of the situation was dogmatism with respect to party documents as historical sources. The scholars regard them as the ultimate truth. We know, however, that many archival documents deliberately distort the situation in the republic from the '60s to the beginning of the '80s. They therefore need to be regarded with skepticism.

For a long time the republic served as a testing ground for various agricultural experiments. These included the large-scale conversion of kolkhozes into sovkhozes, the kolkhoz councils and the establishment of associations for mechanization and electrification. The literature is still not providing a fundamental assessment of these innovations.

A. Chekirlan: During the years of the cult of the personality and stagnation we see a departure from Leninist doctrine on the party and serious distortions in the Leninist principles, work style and methods. More accurately, it was these distortions, becoming extreme at times, which were the main cause of the exacerbation of social relations and which resulted in stagnation.

Moldavia was in all fairness criticized at the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee for the fact that negative processes stemming from a degeneration of the cadres and violations of socialist legality have occurred in extremely ugly forms here.

A study of the party documents shows that for too long the republic party organization and its leaders, led by former CC First Secretary I.I. Bodyul, failed to render account at meetings of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee. They were actually shielded from criticism by certain highly placed officials—primarily L.I. Brezhnev, K.U. Chernenko and N.A. Shchelokov, who had served in Moldavia at one time. The comments of the party control committee under the CPSU CC about extensive shortcomings in the republic were delayed, and its decision to expel G.A. Stepanov, former deputy chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers, from the party for large-scale padding of figures on agricultural output was reversed in 1981.

It should be pointed out, however, that despite all of this our republic always received an enormous amount of assistance from the party and the entire Soviet people. This has been particularly apparent in recent years. The CPSU Central Committee specially considered important matters pertaining to Moldavia three times during the period 1983-1986.

The study and clarification of the efforts of the Moldavian Communist Party to implement the Leninist national policy in the Moldavian SSR and the patriotic and international indoctrination of the workers has a special place among the very important tasks of party-history science in the situation of the revolutionary restructuring. What is the situation in this area?

A. Morar: Many problems of national relations have been viewed through rose-colored glasses until now, and acute problems of relations among the nations have been avoided. The time has come for a fair and objective assessment of the Moldavian Communist Party's efforts to implement the national policy of the CPSU.

It is highly important to view the problem of understanding national relations from the standpoint of the economic development of the Union republics. We are still writing about the economy and national policy as separate entities, even though national relations actually permeate the entire economy, the entire foundation of the socialist society. More than 60 percent of the industrial enterprises in the USSR, including enterprises in our republic, have switched to economic accountability and self-financing since 1 January 1988. Relations among enterprises of various republics are changing as a result.

There has been little study of the problem of further developing the Soviet federation, strengthening the multinational Soviet state, decentralizing and transferring many administrative functions to local authorities.

The efforts of the Moldavian Communist Party to indoctrinate the workers in the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions, the party's policy in the area of migration and dispersal of the population in the Moldavian SSR, and the processes of merging and assimilation have been forgotten entirely. The language policy of the Moldavian Communist Party has been studied very little. The republic party organization adopted more than 170 decisions, documents and decrees on language policy in the Moldavian SSR during the period 1924-1988. During the period of stagnation, however, many decisions were made for show and were unfortunately not implemented.

V. Pasat: The 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union party conference set new tasks in the area of patriotic and international indoctrination of the workers. A great deal will have to be revised and redone in this area, since the problem has received one-sided treatment in our historical literature. The works of Moldavian—and not just Moldavian—historians have dealt mostly with the international aspect. Frequently, when the stress has been on the international alone, it has all resulted in national depersonalization, in cosmopolitanism.

The youth have recently shown increased interest in filling in the "blank spots" in Moldavia's history. And this is only natural. This trend is frequently manifested in a desire to interpret international relations in our republic in a one-sided way, however, ignoring the dialectical picture of our achievements and failures, our difficult trials and unquestioned gains on the path of socialist development, its heroism and democratism.

Manifestations of the cult of the personality are sometimes presented merely as evidence of unequal relations between the Russian and Moldavian peoples, as the implementation of a course involving the constraint of national feelings and the establishment of a system of repression, coercion and suppression of the Moldavian people. Explaining the historical past of the Moldavian SSR only with respect to the difficulties and errors can lead to distortions in the mind of the youth, to the possible emergence of nationalism and chauvinism and to the development of incorrect ideological reference points. It is therefore very important today to develop in the youth a historical memory and respect for the historical milieu in which they reside.

V. Isak: We have succeeded to one degree or another in designating a number of problems of concern both to the historians and to all those interested in our past. There are obviously far more questions than answers, however, and they all require detailed study, a critical attitude toward the historians, comparison of the latter and the achievement of the truth. This is necessary in order once and for all to dissociate ourselves from everything uncharacteristic of and alien to the ideals and the gains of socialism, in order to produce honest and outstanding works on the history of the republic's Communist Party.

We have a rich source to work with. A study is underway of the matter of expanding the access of the scholars to such documents in the party archives as decisions of the Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party CC and plenums of the republic's Communist Party CC, and to other information. Several collections of documents being readied for publication will be a great help to the scholars. Specifically, a collection of documents entitled "Kompartiya Moldavii v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The Moldavian Communist Party in Resolutions and Decisions of CC Congresses, Conferences and Plenums], and it is planned in the future to begin work on the publication of the minutes of congresses and conferences of the Moldavian Communist Party.

I believe that in our work on the next edition of "Ocherki istorii Kompartii Moldavii" [Outlines of the History of the Moldavian Communist Party] and other party-history works we must cooperate more closely not only with our social science colleagues but also with party and labor veterans, party, soviet and Komsomol workers, writers, journalists....

KiSSR: Western Interpretations of Basmachi Movement Faulted

18300385a Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 4 Jun 88 p 3

[Article by K. Toktomushev, junior research assistant at the KiSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History: "Basmachism: Reality and Fantasy"; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA introduction]

[Text] Interest on the part of scholars, including bourgeois Sovietologists, in the subject of Basmachism has grown especially strong in recent years. We must look for an explanation of this, apparently, in the fact that events are taking place today on the Asian continent which are analogous to the history of Turkestan in the 1920's—primarily with regard to Afghan dushman activity. But in "restoring history," these Sovietologists fail to mention the atrocities of the Basmachis as well as the true reasons behind the rise of Basmachism.

V. I. Lenin warned that "revolution does not—and cannot—occur without counterrevolution." The truth of this is confirmed in graphic terms by the history of the civil war in Russia in general and in Turkestan in particular. During the first days following the victory of the socialist revolution in Petrograd and Tashkent, the overthrown classes of Turkestan undertook desperate attempts to restore the positions they had lost.

Uniting in the "Shuro-i-Islamiya" and "Ulema" organizations, counterrevolutionary nationalists established a provisional Mussulman government in Kokand which declared autonomy for Mussulman Turkestan.

Attempting to endow the Kokand autonomists with the authority of true representatives of the interests of the working population, bourgeois Sovietologists have promoted the concept of the "popular nature" of the autonomous government. Concealing the actual reasons for the rise of the "autonomy" and the true aims of its adherents, French Sovietologist E. Karrer d'Ankoss asserts that "the Mussulmans wanted to end colonization and restore possession of their lands and ownership of their property." It is a characteristic approach of bourgeois ideologists to represent the entire population of the Turkestan region using a single term—either "Mussulmans" or "Turkestanis." On the one hand, this enables them to treat Mussulman society as classless; on the other, to be able to contrast the entire indigenous population of this region of Soviet rule.

Subject to a double oppression by the Tsarist bureaucracy and an exploiting national leadership, the Mussulman working class did not only "want to end" colonization—they did so, achieving a socialist revolution along with all the peoples of Russia. But how can you talk about "restoring possession of lands and property" if about 90 percent of the dekhkan—and this is even acknowledged by the American historian M. Shorish—had no land, and 90 percent of the land was concentrated

in the hands of less than three percent of the population?! Actual history relating to the establishment and development of the Soviet Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan has shown that Turkestan's indigenous working people have decided the future of their land and they have been afforded the invaluable, fraternal and unselfish assistance of all the peoples of our country, primarily the Russian people.

Counterrevolutionary claims of the autonomists have aroused deep indignation and rebuff on the part of the working people. Broad masses of the indigenous population have expressed their views against the nationalists throughout the region—in Tashkent, Samarkand, in Kokand itself, in the villages and towns. Kyzyl-Kiya workers headed by Bolshevik I. I. Yedrenkin participated actively in defeating the autonomists. Workers and laborers of Kokand angrily expressed the relationship in general of the working class of the region to the various counterrevolutionary groups and governments through a resolution they adopted at a meeting conducted 3 March 1918. The resolution states: "We, working and laboring Mussulmans, curse all autonomist adventurists, acknowledge the Russian Workers' and Peasants' Socialist Republic, and subordinate ourselves to the authority of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies."

Some bourgeois authors acknowledge the unpopularity of the autonomists. According to a vivid description rendered by Canadian researcher T. Rakowska-Harmstone, the autonomous government was "a head without a body." But on the whole Sovietologists cling to the version of "the popular nature" of the government with an aim towards proving that the true aspirations of the peoples of Turkestan towards autonomy and the establishment of national states were scattered by the Soviets. The collapse of the Kokand "autonomists" proved the fallacy in claims of bourgeois nationalists to be representatives and defenders of the interests of the working masses.

One of the most important elements of this structure was Basmachism, to which bourgeois Sovietologists never hesitated to attribute the status of a national liberation movement.

What do the bourgeois Sovietologists use to argue the point of the "popular nature" and progressiveness of the Basmachi movement? Well, for example, they relate it to the collapse of the Kokand autonomy and enumerate a number of reasons leading to emergence of the movement without mentioning the most important of these. Thus, French Sovietologist M. Broksap points to the following reasons: decline of the national economy due to competition from Russian industrial production, suppression of the 1916 uprising, devastation inflicted by Russian troops on the Kokand autonomy. The fact that it was the Basmachi mission to overthrow Soviet authority and preserve bourgeois-feudal relations providing for

political and economic domination by the national bourgeoisie and feudal lords in the region remains "beyond the limits of research." The "objective" Sovietologists do not recall that during those years Turkestan was regarded by the imperialists as a platform for the destruction of Soviet Russia. The capture of Turkestan would also be beneficial to them in that the region was rich in natural resources, bordered on China, and was located close to India and Afghanistan, where the imperialists floated their capital.

The participation of poor people in Basmachi bands, widely exploited by Western scholars to show a popular movement, can be explained by a number of factors—primarily through their lack of education and backwardness, their poverty and total dependence on the rich landowners and feudal aristocrats. The Mussulman clergy exerted a very strong influence on the peasants, playing on their religious fanaticism. This was especially felt in the southern regions of Kirghizia, where peasant dependence on the landowners and aristocrats was great. Poor people were often deceived into joining the bands—sometimes they were simply forced, under threat of death. But as a rule the extent of their participation was not great.

In presenting Turkestan society as a uniform entity, where every individual—aristocrat, mullah or poor person—defined himself primarily as a "Turkestani" or "Mussulman," bourgeois ideologists are attempting to draw a picture of social equality and the absence of class contradictions. Openly presenting the social make-up of Basmachis, therefore, bourgeois authors endow them with the authority of "liberators of the people."

The "popular" nature of Basmachism is refuted by its social make-up. We can even use the data of bourgeois authors to show this. Thus, according to M. Broksap, tribal leaders, communal elders, Sufi shaykhs, former criminals, jadidists, and a few Turkish officers led the movement. M. Olkot adds to the list: "...traditional power figures (feudal aristocrats, clergymen, merchants, large and medium-size landowners) and rural inhabitants. Pan-Turkists and Turkestani nationalists joined the Basmachis during the revolt."

The above-mentioned M. Broksap accuses Soviet historians of seriously exaggerating the level of assistance provided the Basmachis by foreign powers, but considers the idea of England's assistance in arms and ammunition absurd. But she qualifies herself, saying that if such arms were in fact delivered, they were delivered mainly from Afghanistan and consisted of not more than a few crates of rifles. Now that is definitely absurd! International imperialism, headed by the United States and England, has played the most direct role in organizing, financing, instructing and supporting Basmachism. The British government sent a military-diplomatic mission to Tashkent which immediately began conducting underground activity against the Soviet state. The aims and intentions of this mission were expressed candidly by White Guard

I. M. Zaytsev, who has British ties and could hardly be accused of having sympathies with the Soviet Union, no matter how pleasing this would be to the Sovietologists. They consisted of the following: "To prepare and organize an armed revolt in Turkestan against Soviet rule, to provide money and arms to rebel detachments from British bases nearest to Turkestan (Meshkher and Kashgar, Afghanistan). The mission had broad powers and the authority to accomplish these tasks."

The Basmachis were assured of London's total support—unlimited arms deliveries and funds. It is indeed somehow absurd to mention "several crates of rifles," to say, moreover, that "nobody showed any concern about Basmachis abroad," and imply that their existence was unknown. How could it come about that one of the fiercest Basmachi ringleaders, Kurshirmat, appeared all decked out in the uniform of a British army colonel?

Western authors make a characteristic admission with respect to the source materials which fully define their Sovietology concepts in this problem area. M. Broksap is an editor of the Sovietology journal "Central Asian Review," published in London since 1982. In an article entitled "Basmachi" she analyzes source materials as a topic of research. She certifies with regret that "Basmachi leaders did not write their memoirs." But "certain nationalistic figures who joined in their struggle, like Zeki Validi Togan and Mustafa Chokay, did." Ali Badensee collected and published the personal accounts of Basmachi leaders still alive and M. Broksap cites several works by bourgeois authors.

It is not difficult to reach a conclusion as to the "objectivity" of the Sovietologists' judgments and evaluations when you take into account the fact that more than one generation of bourgeois authors has used these sources to conduct research. M. Broksap stresses that "Soviet studies recorded in the 1920's were fairly objective, in spite of a tendency to underestimate the scope of Basmachi resistance." Here the author is referring to works by White emigres, Trotskyites, and primarily the work of G. Safarov entitled "Colonial Revolution—the Turkestan Experience," published in 1921 and widely criticized by Soviet historians. Then the author accuses present-day Soviet researchers of "exaggerating Basmachism as a force, as well as the difficulties...faced by the Red Army."

The Basmachi movement is a characteristic form of counterrevolutionary struggle waged by classes overthrown in those countries and among those peoples where socialist or democratic revolution has occurred during the stage of feudal-patriarchal or tribal-clan development. As previously mentioned, it constitutes an integral part of the overall counterrevolutionary plan to overthrow the authority of a victorious people. This may be confirmed with complete confidence through historical analysis of Basmachism in Turkestan and a study of the present-day situation in Afghanistan.

Atrocities committed by the Basmachis have evoked a hatred towards them on the part of the indigenous population and Russian poor people, and a striving to effect destruction of the counterrevolution as swiftly as possible. Inhabitants of Kuly-Khodzhi village, for example, in the Babadarkhan administrative district of Namangansk sector, appealed for assistance to the Turkestan Central Executive Committee in December 1918, stating in a declaration that "...pillage, arson and murder being committed by the Irgash shaykhs have reached such tremendous proportions that the population...does not have the strength to endure this fate any longer." Upon requesting help, they in turn assured the Turkestan Central Executive Committee they would provide every possible means of support in crushing the bandits.

It was reported in an operational staff summary from the Fergana Front that "the peaceful population of Kyshtaks is fleeing to the city and seeking help from authorities to eliminate the robbers..." They also promised total support. Another summary mentioned that Madaminbek bands were taking away all the bare necessities from poor people and committing outrages not only against Russians, but against the Mussulman poor as well.

Understandably, one will not find such instances in the bourgeois publications since they reveal the true, anti-popular nature of Basmachism and the irreconcilable attitude held towards it by the working class population of Turkestan.

Basmachism is a form of counterrevolution which no mask will succeed in concealing.

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Newly Elected Institute Director on Kirghiz History, Nationalities Issues
18300385b Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 26 Jun 88 p 3

[Interview with Salmorbek Tabyshaliyevich Tabyshaliyev, associate member of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences, by journalist V. Yurlov: "History Long Ago and Recent—Conversation with a Qualified Individual"; date and place not specified; first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA introduction]

[Text] "The party will consistently conduct a policy of openness and glasnost, of free discussion of issues past and present, for only such a policy will improve the moral health of Soviet society, liberating it from everything alien to its human nature (from the CC CPSU Theses to the 19th All-Union Party Conference)."

The winds of renewal are bursting, it seems, into the formidable historical science building in Kirghizia. For the first time in the entire period of existence of the Kirghiz Historical Institute, elections have taken place here for the leadership posts. The candidacy of each of four individuals applying for the position of director has

been the subject of broad discussion in the collective, the party organization and the general assembly of the Department of Social Sciences of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences. The assembly made its final decision based on the results of a secret voting procedure. An overwhelming majority of votes resulted in the election of prominent scholar Salmorbek Tabyshaliyevich Tabyshaliyev, associate member of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences, to the post of institute director. Journalist V. Yurlov conducts this interview.

[Tabyshaliyev] We intend in the future as well to make widespread use of democratic elective principles with respect to all positions. Quite recently a new academic council was elected by secret ballot, and this council elected (also by secret ballot) the deputy director for scientific endeavor and academic secretary. Elections were held in turn for section managers, chief and secondary research assistants.

[Yurlov] Today many publishers, writers and scholars speak with alarm about a tremendous historical semi-literacy among the population which engenders at times a spiritual confusion. How does this concept relate to the development of historical science in our republic?

[Tabyshaliyev] Historical science in Kirghizia is relatively young. It was engendered, formed and developed under Soviet rule. The primary source of historical information prior to the revolution was folk genealogy and legend handed down by word of mouth called "Sanzhyra." This provided information about the past through genealogy, i.e., the historical origins of identities, family names, families and tribes. Each Kirghiz had to know the history of his predecessors through seven generations back (to "zheti ata"). Thus, from mouth to mouth, from generation to generation, a tremendous amount of information was passed down encompassing an extended living history. Creative popular works and epics of various genres also comprise an important source.

All of these forms were limited, however, in that they comprised separate, individual reproductions of facts and events, and therefore provided no opportunity for systematic knowledge acquisition of reality. Historical knowledge as a true science came into being only under Soviet rule.

Today we have a systematized scientific history not only of the Kirghiz people, but also of those ethnic groups and peoples who live in the territory of modern Kirghizia. A great many monographic works have been published and a tremendous supply of materials collected (historical, archeological, ethnographic, materials translated from Arabic, Persian, Chinese and other languages, documents from many periods of history).

The historiography of Kirghizia is developing successfully. A scientific concept has presently been developed with respect to many problems. Historical science has

become the most predominant among all the social sciences and plays an important role in forming the people's world outlook. Moreover, a great reserve of historians has been trained in the republic and young cadre are being cultivated. This is the major result achieved after 70 years of Soviet rule.

[Yurlov] We are today looking into our history—recent and of long ago—with heightened attentiveness and are attempting to fill artificially created gaps. Would you agree that not everything is looking so favorable in Kirghiz historical science?

[Tabyshaliyev] When I spoke about successes achieved, in no way did I have in mind that the development of historical thought always went along smoothly. It is commonly known that the prestige of historical science in the country has fallen noticeably. The consequences of a cult of personality, subjectivism, voluntarism and stagnation phenomena have had a negative, disastrous influence on historical thought.

In the 1930's the theory that history is "politics thrown into the past" was severely criticized. This principle continued to govern in practice, nonetheless and we all know the results. The main error was a departure from Leninist requirements to study history "as a unified process governed by natural laws throughout its multifaceted, contradictory course."

The path of development taken by historical science in Kirghizia has been difficult and complex. At the beginning of the 1960's, when the republic basically had its share of qualified specialists with a sound knowledge of Leninist methodology and the ability to resolve major problems, unforeseen obstacles arose. Historical science was monopolized and came under control of a small circle of incompetent leaders in the republic, who assumed for themselves the role of sole interpreters of national history and at times issued their erroneous views as the final word of truth. Professional historians were even excluded from active participation. Historical science was subordinated to the concerns of the moment, became politicized and used as a prestige factor for self-popularization.

Scientific ethics were violated shamelessly. There even were instances where unfinished, unpublished manuscripts of certain scholars were subject to destructive criticism from party platforms and on the pages of the republic press. The criticism conveyed a one-sided, condemning message. All this had a negative impact on the situation of historians. Nor was their voice heard in the socio-political life of the republic. Administrative management, protectionism and coarse violations of competitive procedures prevailed over common sense.

[Yurlov] Could you be more specific in your answer?

[Tabyshaliyev] Certainly. Let me just call your attention to a pamphlet by T. Usubaliyev entitled "International Education of the Working Class" (Moscow, Politizdat, 1974) which contains quite a few erroneous judgments and precepts. And here I stress the word "precepts." The fact of the matter is that the pamphlet was written based on a speech the author delivered to the Kirghiz active party membership, and was therefore officially recommended for inclusion as required reading within the political enlightenment system for mid- and high-level education as well as for other readers. This brochure and other works of the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia were propagated by party committees and carried a message preceptual in character. Let us look at three aspects.

First of all, the academician V. V. Bartold, that most renowned Eastern studies expert with worldwide reputation, wrote a special work, "The Kirghiz People," based on a thorough study of Russian, Arabic, Persian, Chinese, Tibetan and other sources, in which he described the existence in the second half of the 9th and beginning of the 10th centuries of a strong, unified state of Kirghiz people. This point of view was acknowledged by Soviet historiography and entered into the multi-volume "World History" (vol 3), and is shared specifically by academician Okladnikov and other prominent experts—Potapov, Kyzlasov, Kiselev, Khudyakov and others. Usubaliyev refuted it, however, without any reasoned line of argument and came to the strange conclusion that "in the first place, the propagandizing of this theory, both intentional and unintentional, does not correlate with historical reality; in the second place, it belittles the socialist gains of the Kirghiz people and in no way facilitates education in the spirit of patriotic pride."

Here we may ask—when is it that the historical past came to interfere with the patriotic education of the people and belittle their achievements?

Second point—prominent Soviet ethnographer S. M. Abramzon has devoted fifty years of his life to the study of Kirghizia. Having thoroughly studied the ethnic history and structure of the Kirghiz people in the pre-revolutionary period, he reached the conclusion that certain patriarchal traditions, customs and vestiges have been and continue to be preserved right up to this time. We see among the vestiges of old such aspects as division into ancestral and familial-tribal groups ("children of one father") and consequent collective responsibility, etc., which continue to play a negative role in certain places. Uncovering the reasons for these phenomena, the scholar introduced proposals on ways to overcome them.

However, Abramzon was publicly accused of ignoring colossal changes in the ethnographic make-up of the Kirghiz, making methodological and ideological-theoretical errors, pursuing a fallacious path, and engaging in fragmentation of the Kirghiz people into numerous branches of the most diverse families and tribes. Such could be the claim only of a dilettante who had no

knowledge of ethnographic science. Instead of receiving gratitude and recognition, Abramzon became the object of destructive criticism and persecution. The venerable and frail scholar passed away after a heart attack, unable to withstand the turbulent blow.

Here is what was going on. Having "shut down" the theoretical assertions of scholars, T. Usubaliyev turned the attention of the Kirghiz active party membership to an existing situation which was not a remnant of the past, as it were. In practical terms he created all the conditions for the engenderment of clanism, order of precedence usage and selection of cadre according to familial-tribal corruption indicators. The cadre of certain regions were subject to persecution. The party principle of selecting personnel for their professional and moral qualities was discarded. It is no coincidence that the aphorism was circulating at that time—cadre promotion goes by geography, not biography. All of this "work" was headed by Usubaliyev himself, and has been discussed at the 18th Communist Party of Kirghizia Congress as well as at subsequent central committee plenums.

A third instance—in the previously mentioned work and others as well, Usubaliyev loudly declares the Russian language to be the second native language of the Kirghiz people. Unquestionably, the language of the Russian people is acknowledged in our state as the means of communicating among peoples. Representatives of all nationalities in the country can and want to fully master it. But the problem is that instruction of Russian in our republic has been handled miserably. The rhetorical proclamation of Russian as the second native language of the Kirghiz people was, in our opinion, a premature jump forward. For a second native language can only be one which the people speak as fluently as their first, in which they are able to think. Up until now our young men and women who have completed Kirghiz schooling, especially in the rural areas, have not mastered Russian well.

At the same time, sycophants occupying key positions in the education field have curtailed instruction of the Kirghiz language in schools and lowered the program to a minimal level, a circumstance which has offended national feelings in the indigenous population. Thus, the striving to report and convey a desired state of affairs instead of the existing one and the failure to introduce constructive changes into the teaching of both Kirghiz and Russian have negatively influenced the language situation in the republic and have complicated resolution of the two-language problem and, as a result—the international education issue.

One more fact—historical science has for certain careerists become a vehicle for acquiring fortune, rank and awards. A. Karypkulov, for example, while central committee secretary of the Communist Party of Kirghizia, removed academician K. Karakeyev from his position as editorial board chairman of the multi-volume "History

of the Kirghiz SSR from Ancient Times to Current Day," and took the position himself, although he did not even have an education in history. Erroneous assertions in his several articles and in the first volume of the history of Kirghizia, published under his chairmanship, have evoked the justifiable objections and censure of readers. And here we are racking our brains trying to correct them. Unfortunately, there are many such instances.

[Yurlov] Reconstruction of a full and accurate picture of the history of the republic is, of course, a task which will not be accomplished in a single day. But we must not delay—especially since there are quite a number of blank spaces and unknowns to be filled in.

[Tabyshaliyev] If we start from Marxist-Leninist principles, then historical science is intended primarily to show man's role in life. Our science has departed from this, however. Quite frankly, when you read the histories of other union republics and compare them with ours, especially during the Soviet period, you cannot help but notice that, like our new construction projects, they are similar to one another. You get no feeling of distinctiveness or national color. Everything is done under one stamp. But in fact every people has its own, specifically developed, individual tenor.

Personalities are also stereotyped. This invites comparison with black-and-white movies or television. You either have an ideal hero or a scoundrel. The entire gamut of colors in history, not to mention the nuances, is unrecognized. As in life, this is not the way it happens in history. How should this be, we ask, if personalities are contradictory, as with Sholokhov heroes? It should be exposed in all its vital contradiction, in its heroism and its tragedy. Historians have someone to learn from here—our authors are far out in front and can provide sound example. But the mission of the historian is to endow his hero based on heavily documented facts—as opposed to the writer, who can fantasize.

The problem is that at various times there have been various approaches to evaluating personalities, and this applies to the history of Kirghizia. Such characters with complex destinies as, for example, Kurmandzhan-Datkhi, Shabdan, Skobelev, Baytik, Pulatkhan, Taylak; contradictory cultural figures such as Moldo Kylych, Moldo Niyaz; and builders of socialism who shared a tragic destiny, like Orozbekov, Isakeyev, Amosov, Tynystanov, and a whole list of others. Simply put, the time has come to state honestly who is who.

These personality figures, historical heroes ("negative" as well as "positive") will be entered in our works. Books will be filled with interesting content and read enthusiastically by people. The "blank spaces" will disappear too. But today there is not one major monograph, not even a pamphlet, on the pre-war period of Kirghiz

history (1938-1941). Yet this is the most tragic page in our history, deserving of its own Tarle and its own Shakespeare.

[Yurlov] Salmorbek Tabyshaliyevich, you haven't said anything about the textbooks which today comprise the historical consciousness of the growing generation. Several of these contain no clear-cut demarcation from the tsarist government's book dealing with the non-Russian peoples and the relationship of the Russian people themselves to non-Russians. But, in fact, aspects of today's relations between nations depend on how this issue is treated.

[Tabyshaliyev] Let me defer to the authority of academician S. L. Tikhvinskiy who spoke with alarm about this error spread across the country. He noted specifically that the ninth- and tenth-grade textbook on the history of the Kirghiz SSR places excessive emphasis on negative consequences of tsarist government policies in Kirghizia. Authors show a preference for writing exclusively about "tsarist bureaucrats" and "local organs of tsarist authority" engaged in exploitation. They forget that oppression by the local feudal aristocracy in remote regions was strong and that representatives of this aristocracy in fact comprised a lower and middle layer of tsarist administration in Kirghizia. Nothing is said about the political influence of democratic elements among the Russian population upon the economic and cultural life of Russia's outlying regions. References to the Russian state substitute for social appraisal; class and national criteria are confused.

This textbook tangibly traces the trend towards idealization of the role of the Mussulman at the beginning of the 20th century. Expressing a generally negative attitude towards so-called "Russian-indigenous schools," the authors contrast these with the Mussulman medrese, terming the latter "a progressive phenomenon in the cultural life of the Central Asian peoples."

There is a striving to embellish certain facts and phenomena of the past, and this is to the detriment of historical truth. The degree of development of capitalism is sharply exaggerated, for example.

Historians are also responsible for the historical consciousness of the people. The scholar must, therefore, reach a wide circle of readership and expend efforts to disseminate historical knowledge. Unfortunately, many scholarly works are exclusively academic in their nature and inaccessible to the general readership. In these times of restructuring and glasnost, historians lag significantly behind writers, who have effectively responded to the summons of the day.

A group of scholars is presently working on the single-volume "Short History of Kirghizstan from Ancient Times to Present Day," intended for the mass readership. The work is scientific yet easy to understand and

will be completed this year for publication in the Russian and Kirghiz languages. In addition, plans are being made to prepare a collection of articles which will provide detailed features to the portraits of repressed or undeservedly forgotten individuals. I believe this will be a significant step in the rehabilitation of our compatriots who have done a great deal for the development of the republic.

Collective efforts are currently being directed towards completing in this five-year plan period the five-volume edition of "History of the Kirghiz SSR from Ancient Times to Present Day" and the four-volume "Directory of Historical and Cultural Monuments." Efforts are underway to publish a multi-volume work dealing with cooperation and ties between the Kirghiz people and the peoples of the Russian Federation, Central Asia and Kazakhstan both prior to the revolution and during the Soviet period. It will depict the origins of mutual bonds as well as the establishment and strengthening of friendship among the peoples. Ethno-cultural processes among peoples living in the territory of Kirghizia are being studied and archeological research is being conducted. The matter here is complicated by the fact that many questions of history require a new approach, a new interpretation and additional studies with respect to the issues. Historians are significantly hindered in this regard because they do not have access to all documents and materials.

[Yurlov] But, certainly, someone should be working on all of this...

[Tabyshaliyev] Yes, we are relying on that. On the whole our republic is fairly well endowed with historians. Presently there are about 40 doctors and more than 200 doctoral candidates of the historical sciences working in academic and scientific institutions, institutes of higher learning and social organizations. Within the walls of the historical institute are four academicians and associate members, over 10 doctors and 30 candidates of science.

It would be a mistake to assume, however, that we are fully staffed with cadre. Noticeable difficulties and disproportions exist as a result of prior errors and miscalculations in their training.

Today like never before we need personnel replacements from among our young people and solid preparation of our young scholars, scholars of a new variety—highly educated and capable of thinking on a grand scale. This is a very complex and crucial task which will require a great deal of time. Nonetheless, we have to get to it.

As you can see, there is a great deal to be done.

Historian Medvedev on Brezhnev's Mediocrity
18120002 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 37
18-25 Sep 88 pp 8-9

[Article by Roy Alexandrovich Medvedev, Cand Sc (Pedagogics), historian and publicist. This essay is published in abridged form. The complete text has been offered to the magazine "Rabochy Klass i Sovremennyy Mir" (The Working Class and the Contemporary World).]

[Text]

End of Earthly Life

Brezhnev started to have serious problems with his health in 1969-1970. At one point in early 1976, he was clinically dead and, after being revived, had to wait for three months for his thinking and speech to normalize, during which time he couldn't work. From that day, doctors stayed permanently with Brezhnev, keeping with them all the necessary equipment. There were fully equipped medical rooms in the places where he lived. Although our leaders' state of health is among the most carefully guarded state secrets, Brezhnev's progressing infirmity was evident to everyone who saw him on TV.

Needless to say, Brezhnev's sickly start came to tell on his ability to control the country. He was often forced to postpone carrying out his duties, or to delegate them to his ever-growing staff of personal aides. Brezhnev's working day was cut to a few hours, and he started going on holiday not only in summer, but in spring as well. It became increasingly difficult for him to perform even the simplest protocol duties, and he ceased to understand what was going on around him. However, there were many influential, immoral and corrupt people among his entourage interested in him appearing from time to time in public, at least as formal head of state. They literally supported him on their arms. The Soviet leader's senility, infirmity and sickness became a subject not so much of compassion and pity on the part of Soviet citizens, but rather of irritation and mockery, expressed ever more openly.

In 1982, during the early hours of the November 7 parade, Brezhnev stood for several hours on the rostrum of the Mausoleum despite bad weather, and foreign newspapers wrote that he looked better than usual. The end came three days later. During breakfast, Brezhnev got up and went to his study to get something and did not return. His worried wife went after him and found him lying on a carpet near the writing desk. This time the doctors could do nothing.

Hallmarks of His Political Career

Brezhnev was neither a great nor even a distinguished personality. Frankly, I would describe him as weak in practically every respect. He lacked Lenin's intellectual power and political genius. He had none of Stalin's

superhuman will and wicked craving for power. He was minus Khrushchev's exceptional independence, immense zeal for reform and capacity for work.

In November 1982, Chernenko spoke about Brezhnev's outstanding abilities, acute wit and exceptional courage, about his resourcefulness, exactingness towards subordinates, intolerance of every sign of red tape, etc. With equal success he could have spoken about the deceased's outstanding literary gift (after all, he had received the Lenin Prize for literature), about his profound scientific erudition (after all, he has been awarded the Karl Marx Gold Medal) or his outstanding abilities as a military leader and a speaker. Many Western press reports described Brezhnev as a strong personality. All these assessments were far from the truth. Brezhnev was never a "strong man." He had a weak will and a weak character.

Brezhnev was promoted to his first position of responsibility at the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee in 1938 at the age of about 32. By the standards then, Brezhnev did not rise quickly. He wasn't a climber who elbowed his way to the top or betrayed his friends. He was calm, loyal to colleagues and higher-ups. He didn't so much move ahead himself as he was moved ahead by others. Brezhnev was first moved forward by his friend from the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute, K. S. Grushevoi, then First Secretary of the Dneprodzerzhinsk City Party Committee. After the war Grushevoi remained on political work in the army. He died in 1982, a colonel-general. At the funeral, Brezhnev suddenly knelt before his friend's coffin and started to sob.

Brezhnev had no strong protection and made little headway during the war: he was promoted from colonel to major-general, one rank. Nor was he showered with awards. During the Victory Parade in Red Square, Major-General Brezhnev marched with the commander at the head of his front's composite column. There were many fewer decorations on Brezhnev's breast than on other generals'.

On Khrushchev's recommendation Brezhnev was promoted to First Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee and, in 1950, to First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Moldavia. At the 19th Party Congress in the fall of 1952 Brezhnev was elected to the CPSU Central Committee as leader of Moldavian Communists. He was even briefly included in the Presidium (as an Alternate Member) and Secretariat of the Central Committee, which had been considerably enlarged on Stalin's proposal. Stalin first saw Brezhnev at the Congress. The old and sick dictator noticed the robust and smartly dressed Brezhnev, then 46. Stalin was told that he was the Party leader of the Moldavian SSR. "What a handsome Moldavian," said Stalin. On November 7, 1952, Brezhnev ascended the Mausoleum for the first time.

In early 1954, Khrushchev sent Brezhnev to Kazakhstan to direct the virgin lands reclamation campaign. He returned to Moscow in 1956, and after the 20th CPSU Congress, again became one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee and Alternate Member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Brezhnev was in charge of the development of heavy industry, and later the defence and aerospace industries, but all the principal questions were decided by Khrushchev personally. Brezhnev was the calm and dedicated aide. After the June 1957 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Brezhnev became a full member of its Presidium. Khrushchev appreciated his loyalty, but did not consider him a sufficiently strong worker.

When Klement Voroshilov retired, Brezhnev succeeded him as President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. As early as 1956-1957, Brezhnev managed to transfer some of the people he had worked with in Moldavia and the Ukraine to Moscow. Among the first were Trapeznikov and Chernenko who worked in Brezhnev's personal secretariat. At the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Chernenko became head of Brezhnev's chancellor (chief of staff).

In 1963, when Frol Kozlov lost Khrushchev's favour and suffered a stroke, Khrushchev hesitated for a long time before choosing his new favourite. He finally selected Brezhnev who was then elected Second Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Brezhnev did not mastermind Khrushchev's removal though presumably he knew of the plan. The masterminds were divided on many issues. So as not to deepen the discord and foil the affair, they decided to elect Brezhnev thinking this would be a temporary decision.

Sometimes Weak Leaders Are Needed

Most of the people in Lenin's Party guard were exterminated by Stalin in the second half of the 1930s. Stalin replaced them with younger, more docile men. Many of the "Stalin generation" leaders were good administrators, but most harboured a great fear of Stalin. Stalin's men were tired not so much from work as from permanent fear for their lives. They later supported Khrushchev because he took a strong stand against continuing the terror and reprisals.

But even Khrushchev could not satisfy the established Party-state elite. It was not so much that Khrushchev's administrators all worked under strain. Khrushchev disliked the bureaucracy and fought it, though without resorting to terror; he was forever carrying out various reforms, changing leaders and cutting the privileges of top administrators.

The Party and state leadership was tired of these reforms, of the fear of losing if not their heads, then their posts, of the continual reshuffles and insecurity. After Khrushchev's removal the top Party-state apparatus didn't want an overly strong leader. They wanted a

quieter life and quieter work. Brezhnev's victory was thus based on weakness and the absence of obvious ambition and craving for power.

An acquaintance of mine, who often accompanied both Khrushchev and Brezhnev on their tours round the Soviet Union, told me that various Party activists greeted Brezhnev much more cordially than Khrushchev, whose visits were usually taken as strict inspections. Brezhnev's visits amounted to distinctive demonstrations of unity between him and the local Party-state bureaucracy. Drawing on this bureaucracy for support, Brezhnev gradually removed politically ambitious people from the Politbureau.

Vanity

Various myths were created, especially about Brezhnev's military record. He took no part in the decisive battles of the Patriotic War. One of the 18th Army's more significant episodes was the 1943 capture of a bridgehead south of Novorossiisk known as Malaya Zemlya (Little Land) which it held for 225 days. The Army HQ and its Political Department were stationed in relative security in Bolshaya Zemlya (Big Land). Brezhnev visited Little Land on two occasions: once with a team from the Party's Central Committee and once for a ceremonial presentation of Party membership cards and battle awards to officers and men. But beginning in the mid-1970s that heroic episode of little significance vis-a-vis the general scope of the war was exaggerated—more was written and said about it than about other truly great engagements in the war.

Solemn ceremonies, the award of the title of Hero-City to Novorossiisk, the inauguration of a huge memorial complex, the organization of museums devoted to the 18th Army's battle record—all of this exceeded rational bounds and fueled many nasty jokes. The place near Moscow, where Brezhnev, his daughter, son and granddaughter had neighbouring dachas was nicknamed "Malaya Zemlya" by local.

Brezhnev's surprising inclination for glittering honours and awards also provoked sneers. After the war Major-General Brezhnev's breast was decorated with four Orders and two medals. After Brezhnev took over the country's leadership, awards came cascading down upon him as if from a horn of plenty. Towards the end of his life he had many more Orders and medals than Stalin and Khrushchev together. On four occasions he was honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He was decorated with the Order of Victory which, under its statute, can be presented only to outstanding military leaders for major victories at fronts or groups of fronts. In 1976, Brezhnev was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union. Later, at a regular meeting with 18th Army veterans, Brezhnev arrived in an overcoat and commanded: "Attention! The Marshal is coming!" Removing his overcoat, he appeared

before the veterans in a new marshal uniform. Pointing to the marshal stars on the shoulder straps, Brezhnev said proudly: "I've earned this."

Not a talented orator, Brezhnev gave new speeches and reports almost weekly which were telecast nationally and included in special documentary film releases. He was a mere reader of the speeches and reports prepared for him. But even reading caused him much difficulty. He often mispronounced words, long words being the hardest for him. His speech writers were strictly instructed not to include long words in prepared texts.

In a Narrower Circle

Brezhnev felt ill at ease at various official ceremonies. But in smaller circles, private meetings and on days off Brezhnev could be a totally different person—more independent, quick-witted, and with a sense of humour, though not too subtle.

Former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who met Brezhnev on more than one occasion, wrote in his memoirs:

"Unlike Kosygin, my immediate partner in the 1970 talks, who was mainly cool and calm, Brezhnev could be impulsive, even wrathful. Changes in mood, the Russian soul, sudden tears were possible.... It was obvious that Brezhnev cared about his appearance. In person he was other than official photographs suggested. He was by no means an imposing personality and, despite his bulky frame, he produced the impression of a graceful, quick, vigorous and cheerful person. His mimicry and gestures betrayed a southerner, especially if he felt relaxed. He came from an industrial region in the Ukraine where different national influences were mixed up. World War II profoundly affected Brezhnev. He spoke with great and somewhat naive emotion of how Hitler managed to dupe Stalin...."

When then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger came to Moscow in 1973 to make arrangements for Brezhnev's visit to the United States, most of the five days of talks were conducted at the Zavidovo hunting estate during strolls, hunts, dinners and suppers. Brezhnev demonstrated his driving. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs:

"Once he showed me to a black Cadillac Nixon had presented him the year before at Dobrynin's suggestion. With Brezhnev at the wheel we sped along the narrow, crooked country roads. I could only pray that some policeman would appear at the next crossroads and put an end to this risky game. But this was too improbable, for even if there had been a traffic officer here, outside the city, he would hardly have dared stop the car of the Party's General Secretary. The fast driving ended at a mooring. Brezhnev put me on a hydrofoil which, fortunately, he didn't drive himself."

Soviet people never saw or knew such a cheerful and immediate Brezhnev. The younger Brezhnev, who was then not often shown on TV, was supplanted in people's minds by the gravely ill, sedentary and inarticulate person he became.

Kindliness and Sentimentality

Brezhnev resented complications and conflicts in politics and personal relations. When conflicts did arise, Brezhnev tried to avoid extreme solutions. When conflicts arose within the leadership, few were retired. Most of the disgraced leaders remained in the "nomenclature," two or three rungs down.

This kindliness often became indulgence, which dishonest people profitted by. Brezhnev often left guilty and corrupt officials in their posts. It took a lot of time and effort, for instance, to remove Georgia's longstanding Party leader, Mzhavanadze, though the Republic was rife with stories of his greed and corruption. He was retired and his case was never tried. No penalty was in effect meted out to USSR Minister of Fisheries Ishkov, whose department was involved in fraud for years. Dozens of the Ministry's leading officials were arrested and one Deputy Minister was sentenced to be shot. First Secretary of the Krasnodar Regional Party Committee Medunov was easy while his abuses were repeatedly discussed at various levels, including the USSR Procurator's Office.

Concerning Brandt's reference to Brezhnev's "sudden tears," this sentimentality, so rare in politicians, occasionally benefitted art. "Byelorussian Railway Station," made in the early 1970s, was a good film but the censors kept it from being released. The film's advocates insisted that it be shown to Politburo members. There is an episode in which former soldiers meet again and sing a song about their paratroop battalion. This song by Bulat Okudzhava moved Brezhnev to tears. The film was immediately released and the song nearly always included in concerts Brezhnev attended.

Nepotism

Brezhnev understood that he could strengthen his power by promoting not just suitable people, but his close friends, colleagues at the institute and at work in Dnepropetrovsk and Moldavia, fellow army veterans, his relatives and those of his wife. The social Brezhnev always had many friends and acquaintances. This group was often called the "Dnepropetrovsk squad," though it included many who had never worked in Dnepropetrovsk. "Brezhnev's team" would be more accurate.

Probably, every politician forms his own "team" from among especially trustworthy people. But Brezhnev's team ballooned. There were few talented people; many were poor leaders who retained their posts solely because of Brezhnev's patronage. Looking through the biographies of many CPSU Central Committee members, it

looks as if the metallurgical institutes in Dnepropetrovsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk didn't train engineers and metallurgists so much as they trained politicians. Graduates included the future Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. A. Tikhonov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee G. E. Tsukanov, General of the Army G. K. Tsinev, First Vice-Chairman of the USSR State Security Committee, Vice Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I. T. Novikov, Business Manager of the CPSU Central Committee G. S. Pavlov, and diplomat N. P. Tolubeyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee. Dnepropetrovsk launched the political careers of N. A. Shchelokov, K. S. Grushchev, V. I. Drozdenko and other CPSU Central Committee members. In Kishinev Brezhnev worked shoulder to shoulder with future members of his "team"—K. U. Chernenko, S. P. Tapeznikov and S. K. Tsvigun. Brezhnev's one-time personal pilot B. P. Bugayev, who held an insignificant post in 1964, became the Minister of Civil Aviation in 1970 and later a member of the CPSU Central Committee and Chief Marshal of the Air Force. The more Brezhnev's health deteriorated, the more people from his "team" were promoted. At the 26th Party Congress Brezhnev's son, Yu. L. Brezhnev, and his son-in-law, Yu. M. Churbanov, were elected Alternate Members of the CPSU Central Committee. The latter rose quickly in the Interior Ministry.

I won't list here all the prominent members of Brezhnev's "team"; some died before he did. Let us note that he failed to advance many people from his team to leading posts. This is why the country and the Party's leadership has now passed into the hands of those whose political careers did not depend on him. Yet Brezhnev's "team" still exists, and this is evidently not the best component of his legacy to the Party.

For nearly 15 years all of our propaganda strove to create Brezhnev as a "great fighter for peace," a "great Leninist," a "great theoretician," etc. But this costly propaganda machine was idling. The Brezhnev cult never entered the consciousness or subconsciousnesses of Soviet people, who treated him with indifference and, towards the end of Brezhnev's life, poorly disguised scorn.

But was everything so bad under Brezhnev? Didn't we call the 1970s the quietest decade in the USSR's history? Yes, but that was the tranquillity of stagnation, when problems were not solved but put off, while the clouds continued to gather. The Soviet Union had recovered from the horrors of Stalin's terror. But, on a lesser scale, unlawful repressions were carried out under Brezhnev. This preserved an atmosphere of "moderate" fear in society, which was reinforced by constant attempts to rehabilitate Stalin. There was no triumph of legality; there wasn't even elementary order in the country. Mismanagement, irresponsibility and the feeling that everything was possible took hold everywhere. The corruption eroding society became more unabashed and insolent, the abuses of power, the embezzling on large

and small scales became the norm. Factionalism, mutual guarantee, nepotism and mafia practices were inculcated in every sphere of social and state activity from the national and regional Party leaderships to the editorial offices of literary magazines and the leadership of professional unions.

The reluctance and inability to work well, political passivity and apathy, indifference towards socialism's moral and political values, the moral degradation of millions of people, the reign of mediocrity from one end of the country to the other, the rift between words and deeds, and the promotion of a universal lie—this crippled the consciousness of an entire generation which we call, sometimes not without a reason, the "lost generation." From this point of view, "Brezhnevism's" overall consequences have proved as serious as those of Stalinism.

Brezhnev's regime scared everyone with its irrationality. Brezhnev spoke a lot about peace, but it was very difficult to trust a political group which ran a great nation on the principle "after us, the deluge." Brezhnev's physical death took a long and painful turn before the eyes of the whole world. His political death was much swifter. But to be done with Brezhnevism for all time, it is not enough to just take down the signs with his name from the city streets, squares and districts.

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**Adzhubey's Memoirs of Khrushchev Era
Published**

18000567 Moscow ZNAMYA in Russian No 6, Jun 88
pp 81-123, No 7, Jul 88 pp 80-133

[Memoirs of Aleksey Adzhubey: "That Decade"]

[No 6, Jun 88, pp 81-123]

[Text] My wife and I welcomed in the new year 1966 in the home of close friends. Their apartment overlooks the Frunzenskaya Embankment, and the view was one of the snow-covered river and the icy paths of Gorkiy Park, along which we could see the skaters. Strings of multi-colored lights illuminated the "devil's circle...." All this abundance of beauty and light framed the unusually dark Neskuchnyy Gardens. Both—the light and the darkness—reminding of a tale of good and evil, perfectly matched our mood as we waited for the 12th stroke of the bells.

Dark echelons were rumbling over the steel spans of Okruzhnyy Bridge. I have always sympathized with people who have to work during holidays. Newsmen also have such shifts. That evening, my colleagues at IZVESTIYA were submitting their materials to another editor. I no longer had to work holiday evenings and nights.

Belated guests appeared when it was almost dawn: a noted actor with his wife and a high-ranking military man. The women counted the stars on his shoulder straps and, with the help of the men, established that he was a colonel general.

"We just now met the general, but it is already last year, at the New Year's reception in the Kremlin. I asked him to join us." The actor gave the name of the military man and, most likely, that was the only information he had about him.

One must give the general his due for accepting the invitation "to revel throughout the night." Clearly, he was not particularly intimidated by being in an unfamiliar house. On New Year's Day all people seem good, intelligent and like friends. The host immediately liked the guest for his tall size, deep voice, and good-natured ability to behave properly at the table, maintaining the spirit and excitement of the tired group, like an experienced stoker who keeps the fire burning....

How many such evenings have I had in my life, how many words have been wasted in significant discussions behind which, frequently, there was nothing other than unrealistic wishes, which sunk to the bottom under the weight of the realities of life! Yet we keep talking and talking, like Chekhov's characters, unable to stop although realizing that a waterfall of words and the Niagara are two different things.

That New Year's "night of words" might have been forgotten but for that general. I do not remember at what point his conversation with the host became louder. Fragments of it revealed that it was a question of replacing Khrushchev and what would be the consequences.

"And I am telling you that this has been a loss, a damned decade in our history," the general almost shouted. "And you better forget it sooner, otherwise you will start apologizing and no one would believe you!"

The host spoke back, the guest became angry, started to button up his jacket and shook the actor's shoulder: "Let us go! I too know of a good party...."

The actor seemed to be dozing. He had covered his eyes with the palms of his fine hands but I could see the way he was clenching his teeth. I knew him. He could explode and speak sharply. We had attended the studio-school of the Arts Theater together, and I was expecting that he would all of a sudden explode, at which point anything could happen.

To my amazement, standing up quite calmly and politely, "by the book," he said: "And I, general, consider this decade great. You and I differ in our assessments. Every person has the right to have his own viewpoint and, for some reason, you are not allowing even our host to have his own...."

What kind of a decade was this, a virtually unmentionable one, in our life, between 1954 and 1964? These were 10 years of work and life of a huge country, millions of human destinies in billions of different clashes and situations. For what reason was someone trying, with amazing persistence, to erase it from our memory, as though these years were marked by some kind of guilt? For it is not simply by the will of one or two people, even most powerful ones, that names, facts, figures and comparisons were cut out of books and motion pictures.

The silence surrounding the name of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was not only total but, I would say, malicious. The naive assumed that it was based on a negative assessment of Khrushchev's party and state activities. The main feature, however, was elsewhere. It was the administrative bureaucratic system which he had dared to alarm that had "forgiven him nothing." It was that system that displayed a characteristic "show of force" and issued a warning for the future: "Do not touch us!"

Not even the most advanced computer could provide an inarguable assessment of those not all that calm or simple years. The very wish to depict them either in black or rosy coloring would be stupid in recreating not only those 10 but the entire 70 years of our history.

The sensible hour of sensible thoughts has come so close to us that it would be sinful not to meet the natural desire of all sensibly thinking people without exception to give back to the people their history. And that is what will happen through the efforts of many people—historians, economists, statisticians, social scientists and eyewitnesses and participants in the events. In this process of self-awareness, let us hope, a place will be found for the objective analysis of the "Khrushchev decade."

It is dangerous to forget the past. We have realized that "forgetting" and "stagnation" are words of the same magnitude and that breaking what they represent is absolutely possible and necessary. In this case we shall not avoid the heating up passions, a feeling of loss and pain. However, there will be gains as well. Joy and concern are neighbors today in the same way that they were in the long gone years after the 20th Party Congress. A great deal in the life of my generation is linked to the resolutions passed at that congress, and most of my friends have not changed their views. Let me name among them Natella Georgiyevna Lordkipanidze and Viktor Vasilyevich Sazhin. I know that Oleg Nikolayevich Yefremov, that same actor who had brought to Natella and Viktor this "toy" general from the Kremlin reception, remained loyal to the days of his youth.

As in the past, our friends live on the Frunzenskaya Embankment. Their daughter Natasha grew up, and married. Our three sons as well are now adults. On that New Year's Eve they were sleeping peacefully, unaware of the argument among the adults. They frequently ask what it is that happened in the country, both recently and not so recently. It is up to us to tell them about it.

As I think back about the past I do not blame myself for my failure not to take detailed notes or keep diaries. The readers are not being offered memoirs with spicy intimate details. These are notes of a journalist whose career, which began in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and then moved to IZVESTIYA at a period about which, for a long time, it was not accepted to write.

My "diaries" are my memory and the bound volumes of newspapers and journals. They encompass the range of my views and interests. It would be naive to claim that I have been able to avoid subjective evaluations. In any case, I shall try to proceed on the basis of facts.

"The fact must become part of the flesh of the newsman, like coal dust of that of a miner," was the way Boris Nikolayevich Polevoy taught the young journalists writing for KOMSOMOLKA. "During the first elections for the USSR Supreme Soviet," he said, "I was assigned to write about a Leningrad worker, who was a candidate for deputy. I went to Peter and had a long and extensive conversation with the man. I drank tea in his home, I met with his family, and when the essay came out in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA I sent him a complimentary copy. The answer I received was the following: 'Comrade journalist, you have described everything accurately but why did you describe me combing my hair in front of the mirror. Did you fail to notice that I am bald?' Brothers," pathetically exclaimed Boris Nikolayevich, "do not turn combing the hair into the trenching tool of our profession!"

I consider the observance of yet another rule important. We must not judge of the past with the yardstick of our present-day concerns, forgetting that the events which took place were then and there and not here and now and that there is nothing more futile than dreamy sighs of "Ah, if only...." When many of us felt that the explosive power of the 20th Congress was abating and that eventually marking time would take us back, we could have guessed the reasons. An entire chain of interconnections was visible. Should we blame ourselves, i.e., those who firmly supported the cause of the 20th Congress, or honestly say that we lacked the strength to defend our views? Should we blame other circumstances for the damned habit of conformism and the liking of comfort? Or, perhaps, blame everything on the "voluntarism and subjectivism" of N.S. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Central Committee? This would be the simplest choice, convenient in the sense that everyone would be able significantly to shrug his shoulders.

Let us avoid such means. Now, when glasnost has sharply increased not only the significance and responsibility but also the flood of words which are, alas, thoughtless and hasty in the proclamation of the truth, this is done most frequently by those who at no time had to suffer major losses.

To my sons I say: Yes, we are guilty. We are guilty, for we were isolated and, by the force of intellectual self-restrictions, did not act as did the Jesuitically put together bureaucratic stratum. I frequently remind them of the following sentence: "Do not blame those who failed or were unable to accomplish something, do not hinder those who are completing their project but, above all, be able to accomplish that which you alone must do."

In the spring of 1987, on the day IZVESTIYA was celebrating its 70th anniversary, I was invited to attend a ceremonious meeting and even to be a member of its presidium. A 20-year hiatus had made this event a holiday to me. That evening I once again saw my fellow workers. Brief notes by former contributors to the newspaper, including myself, were published in the house organ IZVESTINETS. Here is what I wrote:

"The newsmen know today what the readers will learn tomorrow. Their lives consist of constant anticipation, for which reason it is spent much faster than one would like. At this anniversary for IZVESTIYA I think of those who are no longer with us but who fully deserve to be remembered by us for what they thought and what they did. I could start to list their names but the list would be too difficult and long to write.

"I did not work in the newspaper together with Aleksandr Bovin but I fully share his thoughts: It is either they or we, and there is no third choice, and those who are considering serving in the reserve battalion will not experience the happiness of the professional journalist. I am saying this because that 'first attempt' which was made by the IZVESTIYA people nearly 30 years ago was not entirely fruitless. Perhaps something may have led us away from our positions, but we realized what the newspaper can do and what power our profession has, providing that we stand on the positions of party principle-mindedness, democracy and glasnost and not confuse service with serving.

"How not to envy those who are producing IZVESTIYA today! They have the experience of attack and they live in a time which will not forgive sluggishness and procrastination!"

In politics and social life a backward movement occasionally starts with minor, with imperceptible features. Subsequently, when nothing can be changed any longer, one realizes that this was a long ebb and not even an entire human life can be sufficient to catch up, within the time granted us by the gods. We find examples in our own history. The 20th Congress restored the honesty and dignity of thousands of innocent victims of Stalin's arbitrariness. However, it was all the same to them, they were dead. Nothing will change if we erect to them the monument we have promised them. This monument is needed by us, as proof of our will and assertion of our ideals. It is dangerous to erect monuments "in opposition," for they easily fall off their pedestals.

During that anniversary evening of IZVESTIYA, a literary acquaintance of mine said: "We were lucky. We started after the 20th Congress and I hope that we shall be able to do something after the 27th."

Both of us knew that this would be no simple matter. There are also those who would be annoyed, saying that it is a pity that the "Khrushchev generation" is still here. They keep dreaming of the "strong hand," the "strong power," considering it the panacea which can heal all troubles. Well, here as well there is nothing new. The Trotskyites also claimed that there was nothing more reactionary than democracy. The "toy" general may thoughtlessly have said something similar.

Melor Sturua was among those who had contributed to the anniversary issue of the IZVESTIYA house organ. In 1959 he was one of the active people, a generator of ideas, as they say, among the journalists. All together, the editor in chief and the literary associate, regardless of rank, would run to the presses to change wearisome clichéd headings. We looked for any opportunity to free ourselves from grayness, boredom and monotony, and to awaken the interest of the readers.

On one occasion, on an urgent editorial assignment, Melor bought four kilograms of black caviar at the Yeliseyevskiy Store and that night took the caviar to Sheremetyevo and talked the English crew of British Airways to carry that package to London. This was the exact fee which Charlie Chaplin demanded, when I asked him on the telephone to allow us to be the first to publish a chapter from his "Autobiography." The book was about to go on sale and THE SUNDAY TIMES was planning to serialize it.

He explained that he was hosting a big reception on the occasion of the publication of the book and that the caviar would come in very handy.

"Crazy," Chaplin said to Vladimir Osipov, our special correspondent in England, after the latter had brought to the hotel the huge package, a saucepan from our familiar cafeteria, packed with ice provided by the ice cream makers and containing the four kilograms of caviar. "These boys backed me against the wall," he said and gave them the manuscript.

Charlie Chaplin knew how to keep his word.

With the manuscript in hand, our correspondent sat on the telephone and translated it on the run, dictating to the shorthand secretary an excellent excerpt from the book, covering an entire newspaper page. We published it the same day. The readers enjoyed this unusual material. We described also the way it was obtained and we too were happy. We beat to the punch the Western press, THE SUNDAY TIMES in particular. The point is that

shortly before that IZVESTIYA had had a visit by the editor in chief of that newspaper who, with some aplomb, had tried to lecture us on how to be more efficient and resourceful.

Seeing IZVESTIYA with an excerpt from Chaplin's book, this noted editor had enough guts to ring us up and ask for permission to send one of his editors to train in Moscow.

Incidentally, our bookkeeper as well was pleased. This publication had not cost a single kopek in foreign currency. At that time, in 1960, at home the cost of caviar was 22 rubles per kilogram. We did not find out how much it cost in England. More, probably.

I had to take this short aside to explain why I allow myself to quote what Melor Georgiyevich wrote in IZVESTINETS.

"I recall an editorial vigil. It was at the start of the 1960s. At our brief meeting, the editor in chief shared his worry with us:

"The newspaper made us step forward after the 20th Congress," he said. "However, time is passing and we are increasingly marking time. Let us gather tomorrow, after we put the newspaper to bed and discuss the second step. Everyone is invited. There will be no time limit. If necessary we shall sit throughout the night. Sandwiches and tea will keep us awake.

"We started thinking and jotting thoughts about how to take that second step. The shorthand secretaries were unable to catch up with our new ideas, sections, developments, and so on. Hours passed. The day turned into evening and the evening into night. Then came the dawn. All of a sudden, we felt a hidden sorrow: We felt that all of our seemingly heuristic suggestions had nothing in common with the second step and that essentially they could be reduced to a cosmetic time marking. Sadness turned into torture. I could not resist and spoke out:

"Aleksey Ivanovich,' I said, 'our vigil is senseless. The newspaper cannot take the second step unless and until it is taken by the party.'

"There was dead silence. Everyone looked at the editor-in-chief. Everyone expected that a bolt of lightning would strike this sacrilegious dragon. However, nothing resembling a galactic flare occurred.

"Let us disperse. Melor Georgiyevich is right,' Adzhubey said quietly and tiredly...."

In those October days of 1964, when life in our family changed drastically, my wife and I agreed not to look for the guilty and the innocent in fruitless conversations and not to remember insults and stupidities. I well remember

that already during the first days after her father was dismissed, Rada said: "You know, naturally this is sad and unwarranted but, perhaps, it may be for the better."

What this "for the better" encompassed was the hope that life, in the broad, the social meaning of the term, would recapture the disappearing dynamism and consistency. Not only we, but many others also hoped that the time for the "second step" had arrived.

Now, after almost a quarter of a century, going back to those experiences becomes natural for a variety of reasons. It is bad when ignorance passes a hasty judgment. That is why I have decided to describe that which I personally and those who were close to me knew. Naturally, those 10 years had their own prehistory.

The year 1949 was coming to a close. In 2 months the third-year students at the school of journalism, Moscow State University, after the exams, were to undergo practical training in the newspapers. Rada and I were studying for the examinations at the Moscow apartment of her father, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, who was then assigned to the Ukraine.

The house on Granovskiy Street, known to the old Moscow residents as the Fifth House of the Soviets and, previously, the home of the Counts Sheremetev, had been designed by the architect Aleksandr Meysner, in accordance with bourgeois taste of the end of the 19th century. This tasteless U-shaped building, with a small entryway, was entirely consistent with its purpose: Before the revolution its apartments were rented to the rich.

In the 1920s and 1930s the house was occupied by members of the government, and high military and party officials. In 1938 an apartment was given to N.S. Khrushchev, who moved from the "House on the Embankment." That year Nikita Sergeyevich was elected candidate member of the Politburo and assigned to the Ukraine as Central Committee First Secretary. Coming to Moscow on assignment, from Kiev or the front, during the war, he stayed here. This was a semi-empty apartment, furnished in the ascetic style of those years, without rugs, cabinets, crystal chandeliers, paintings or engravings. The table lamps on granite stands with shades made of frosted glass and bronze etchings looked like huge mushrooms.

The furniture was dull and heavy: beds, tables, chairs and cloth-upholstered sofas, bookshelves and bedside tables. Apparently, the same furniture could be found in the other apartments in that house, based on the prevailing unwritten standards. At that time highly placed officials paid no attention to "interiors," and the concept itself had not become part of ordinary life.

It was only later that I traced the origin of the fashion prevalent at that time. It was Stalin who lived in this style of "official" austerity. Whether in the south, in

Moscow or in the Moscow area, wherever Stalin lived everything was precisely identical. Wooden floors and wood-paneled ceilings and walls. Minimum furniture, no paintings. The furniture was manufactured by the same factory and in the same style.

The apartment owners, in the Khrushchev family in any case, did not consider themselves the owners of the household furnishings, in the generally accepted meaning of the term. Wherever they lived they owned virtually nothing. Sheets and towels had blue labels sown with the inscription "Fifth House of Soviets," or the labels of other institutions. Metal inventory tabs were bolted on the chairs, tables and sofas. From time to time severe-looking men showed up to see if the inventory numbers matched their records, as though any of the residents could have been tempted by such items.

Khrushchev's apartment was particularly hollow sounding and barren. Most of his family lived in Kiev. Nikita Sergeyevich came to Moscow infrequently and paid no attention whatsoever to furniture or his surroundings.

On that late evening, when my wife and I were winding up our studies, voices were heard in the entrance hall and someone entered the room. It turned out that it was Nikita Sergeyevich, accompanied by Vanda Lvovna Vasilevskaya and Aleksandr Yevdokimovich Korneychuk. Rada went to the kitchen to lend a hand to the maid and, soon afterwards, everyone sat down to eat. It was not accepted to interrupt one's elders and it was only by the flow of the conversation that we found out that Nikita Sergeyevich had just seen Stalin. On his way home, he had run across Vasilevskaya and Korneychuk in the hotel. They had come to Moscow on their own business.

That evening apparently Khrushchev simply needed company. He said that he was returning to Kiev to wind up his affairs, for he was to become secretary of the Moscow Party Obkom. The decision had been made.

Vanda Lvovna started to cry: "You will be sorely missed in the Ukraine, Nikita Sergeyevich." These words touched Khrushchev. He knew that Vanda Lvovna was sincere. She was a Polish and Soviet writer, a true internationalist. During the war she had actively written for the newspapers and journals and had met Khrushchev at the front. Vasilevskaya's novel "The Rainbow," which had come out in 1942, had been awarded the Stalin Prize. It was referred to as a fighting book.

Both Vasilevskaya and Korneychuk nurtured their friendship with Khrushchev. Aleksandr Yevdokimovich was a noted playwright, author of "Death of the Squadron," "Platon Krechet," and "The Front." He was active socially. There was a time when Nikita Sergeyevich had firmly defended Korneychuk as the author of the libretto for the opera "Bogdan Khmelnytskyi," composed by Dankevich. In the summer of 1951 that opera was scheduled to inaugurate the Ten Days of Ukrainian

Literature and Art. An article appeared in PRAVDA, criticizing "nationalistic" errors in the literary-historical part of the performance. This was a serious accusation. Khrushchev later described the great difficulty with which he was able to pacify the angry Stalin. The author was allowed to make his own corrections. The opera "Bogdan Khmelnytskyi" was not on the list of the criticized works of literature and music on which the corresponding frightening decrees had been promulgated by the Central Committee.

Vanda Lvovna Vasilevskaya died in July 1964 and was never aware of Khrushchev's dismissal. What Aleksandr Korneychuk thought about it is not known. In any case, when Nikita Sergeyevich died, Nina Petrovna did not receive from Korneychuk even a short expression of condolences.

The theme is familiar. As Ilya Erenburg wrote, "Suddenly the telephone fell silent...." Could such instant changes be explained merely by forgetfulness or lack of breeding? Both of these are consequences, and while their sources may be deeper, they are found in the alienation of the individual from himself and in the fear which protects him from hasty actions. One may eat and drink with someone, hunt and fish with him, visit him, seek his advice or help and yet the time comes when he does not know him. A tremor shakes the man to the bone: It is as though one forgets that one had been a friend, a fellow worker; how can one be sure that he has not blamed someone, demoted someone, deprived someone of something....

Not everyone is like this, but many are.

Slowly, imperceptibly there is an ebb and where there was water splashing there is now dry land....

What was the reason for Stalin's unexpected decision to have Khrushchev return to Moscow? Today no one will ever find out, any more than one could know about the conversation the two men had.

However, this "cadre move," albeit seemingly improvised, was being made with a view to the subsequent steps which were to be taken. It may have seemed more expedient for Stalin to keep Khrushchev in the Ukraine, for things there were gathering pace, the republic was giving the country an increasing amount of grain, the Donbass was being rebuilt, power generating capacities were increasing and destroyed cities were being rebuilt. Khrushchev enjoyed a good reputation in the Ukraine. Stalin knew this yet nonetheless urgently summoned him to Moscow. Here G.M. Popkov, first secretary of the Moscow oblast and city party committees and chairman of the Moscow Soviet, had already been removed. It was being said that Stalin was worried by Popkov's lust for power, having given himself those three positions. I now think that Khrushchev was aware of the situation which had developed. He could not but be concerned about the increased tension caused by the "Leningrad case." On

Stalin's instructions, Malenkov, Central Committee secretary, and Abakumov, the minister for state security, were actively destroying the Leningrad cadres.

It is now known by whose will this "case" sprung up. Documentary data on this account was published in the Leningrad journal *DIALOG*, issues Nos 18 and 19 for 1987, and in the January 1988 issue of *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*. An anonymous denunciation had been sent to the Central Committee on the unseemly action of the chairman of the accountability commission of the Leningrad oblast and city party conference, which had taken place in December 1948: The accurate results of the vote had been concealed. It was announced to the party members that the head of the party organizations in the city and oblast had been elected unanimously, although such was not the case. Four votes had been cast against P.S. Popkov, the obkom first secretary; two opposed G.F. Badayev and 15 F. Kapustin. There were two opposing votes cast against P.G. Lazutin, chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet.

Such fraud is a severe party crime. However, as it will become clear later, Stalin's tempestuous reaction was caused by something else. Stalin had never liked that city. It was not there, it was not in that city that he had won the right to consider himself the leader of the party. It was not there that he had been the subject of servile reverence. He remembered Zinovyev's opposition and Kirov's assassination.... Then, the proper pretext was found. Malenkov and Abakumov made a safe move, anticipating Stalin's wishes, which coincided with their own objectives.

Leningrader A.A. Kuznetsov, a hero from the days of the blockade, who had been elected to the party's Central Committee, was acquiring power too rapidly and could have pushed Beriya and Malenkov, who closely followed the steps of each potential rival, out. N.A. Voznesenskiy, Gosplan chairman, and M.I. Rodionov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, were also from Leningrad. Were there not too many Leningraders in Moscow?

The repressions began in 1949. As early as September 1950, the circuit session of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, after trying the case of A.A. Kuznetsov, N.A. Voznesenskiy, M.I. Rodionov, P.S. Popkov, Ya.F. Kapustin and P.G. Lazutin, charged with betraying the homeland, counterrevolutionary sabotage and participation in an anti-Soviet group, had sentenced them to death. At that time the death penalty had been abolished in the USSR but, while the trial was under way, it was reintroduced.

In the courtroom, saying his good-byes to the living, A.A. Kuznetsov said: "I have been a Bolshevik and will remain one, whatever sentence you may pass on me, we will be acquitted by history." How frequently today such tragic words, filled with faith, come out of the void. And how can we forgive those who, for the sake

of their careers, subserviently drafted lists of "conspirators" for an opinionated and vengeful leader. History can not only vindicate but also accuse.

I frequently saw G.M. Malenkov. How could I conceive at that time that this mild and well-mannered person, loving family man and father, was able to engage in such terrifying and merciless intrigues which would take the lives of many Leningraders—party and soviet officials—and that their wives and children would be sent into exile, their fate as enemies of the people being sealed by virtue of family connections. And what about Abakumov? All it took was an indication or even a hint about someone's opinions, and he was ready to do any kind of dirty work. Yet in his final hour, when he was justly sentenced to the supreme penalty, he begged to be given a minute to show his newborn child....

On that evening, as he treated Vasilevskaya and Korneychuk to tea, it was obvious that Khrushchev was nervous: He told the guests not to be in a hurry. He probably was unwilling to remain without company. To him it was not merely a matter of how relations with Stalin would develop, for in that area, apparently, Khrushchev could rely on some support. But then he had left Moscow in 1938 and had come here only on business and yet, that same evening, he had found himself stuck in the ring set by the leader's fellow workers. Each one of them was closely and jealously watching the others, counting even the number of times Stalin had turned to any one of them, whom he summoned or not summoned to his evening meals-sessions, or invited to spend with him a day of rest and the manner in which he joked and with whom he joked when he was in a cheerful mood.

Everything had been prescribed quite precisely, even where and when the families of the leadership were to spend their holidays. Such were Stalin's orders. In the summer of 1950, Nina Petrovna said: "We are going to Livadiya." At that time the huge palace of the tsars was considered Stalin's summer cottage. Resting in one of the buildings was the Khrushchev family; in the other was Svetlana Stalina with her second husband, Yuriy Zhdanov. No contact whatsoever between them existed. Family acquaintanceships were not encouraged, for who knew what could happen tomorrow?

To anyone who had long been familiar with their master and had become so accustomed to absolute obedience, he was increasingly becoming a puzzle. The unpredictability of his actions, decisions and conclusions could never be explained. Once Khrushchev described the following episode: During one of the table sessions, Stalin rose and said: "I will ask Mao Zedong for a loan of \$20 million," and left. At that time there was a direct government line linking Moscow with Beijing, and one could imagine the way dozens of people along the line

hastened to patch the connection between the two fraternal capitals, and the tension of the interpreters who had been instructed to translate Stalin's words and Mao Zedong's answers.

All waited in silence. Stalin returned. He slowly pushed the chair back. He did not like to be helped. He sat down. He said: "He will give us the money but we shall not take it!"

In Moscow Khrushchev had to be reckoned with. He only seemed like a simple person. He also pretended to be simple minded. I frequently noticed, however, how cold and distant were his small hazel eyes, when he got angry.

He knew the rules of the game and the cruel variants in its course. Stalin kept everyone tense, including Khrushchev. At the beginning of 1947 the leader replaced him as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party but did not remove him from Kiev. Instead, he made him chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers. L.M. Kaganovich became first secretary. The shift occurred after Khrushchev had reported to Stalin that there was severe hunger in the Ukraine, there were cases of cannibalism, entire villages were dying out and it was extremely important for the republic to be given immediate assistance. "I put down the receiver on its cradle," Nikita Sergeyevich recalled, "thinking that that was all. Stalin said nothing, I could only hear his heavy breathing."

A certain amount of grain was shipped to the Ukraine. Then Stalin rang up again and there was another excitement. Stalin had found out that Yevgeniy Oskarovitch Paton, a famous scientist and engineer, had demonstratively left one of the numerous conferences which Kaganovich had been holding for the sake of "bringing order," and, furthermore, had slammed the door behind him.

"Your nationalists are not calming down in the least," Stalin said angrily and hung up.

Nikita Sergeyevich summoned Yevgeniy Oskarovitch and demanded details. The conference had dealt with rural problems and, having listened to the speakers for half an hour, Paton had realized that their concerns had nothing to do with him. "As you know, Nikita Sergeyevich, I do not tolerate waste of time and as to slamming the door, I do this because I am somewhat deaf."

Khrushchev reported to Stalin what had happened. Stalin heard him out in silence. The Supreme Commander in Chief knew Paton quite well. It was on his recommendation that in 1945 Yevgeniy Oskarovitch had been accepted in the party. He called Paton the great welder. There was a reason for this. Paton had organized the serial production of T-34 tanks. At that time no one anywhere in the world knew how to weld steel armor.

By the end of 1947 Kaganovich was recalled to Moscow and Khrushchev resumed his previous position as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

Now, in December 1949, once again he was in Moscow.

Several days later, the newspapers reported that N.S. Khrushchev had been elected Central Committee secretary and first secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee. He was to provide overall leadership in the oblast and the city. Ivan Ivanovich Rummyantsev, an aerospace engineer, Moscow city party committee secretary, was to handle current gorkom affairs. At that time Ivan Ivanovich was a young man, charming, and energetic and one could sense that his relations with Nikita Sergeyevich were good. City and oblast problems were solved jointly. On Sundays Nikita Sergeyevich left his dacha in Ogarevo and frequently visited the rest home of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee, where he spent time with his comrades.

Suddenly, I.I. Rummyantsev disappeared, in a flash. I can only assert that his disappearance was in no way related to his relationship with Khrushchev but had been decided somewhere higher up. When such sudden actions took place, anything could follow. Apparently, Ivan Ivanovich was lucky. After a while he was sent back to head the aerospace plant where he had worked before the start of his party career. The "Leningrad case" was not repeated in Moscow.

The year I am writing about marked the middle of the 20th century. 1950 was the common birthday of several generations. This feeling of a landmark develops in me also because on 21 December 1949 it was virtually the only time that I saw Stalin at close range, not marching as a student in a demonstration but in the Bolshoy Theater, where a celebration in honor of his 70th birthday was taking place.

Stalin sat in the center of a table which stretched the length of the stage. Next to him sat Mao Zedong. As Moscow Oblast Party Committee secretary and organizer of the evening, Khrushchev sat on the left of the celebrant. It seemed as though Stalin was not reacting at all to the floods of greetings which were being poured from the rostrum.

The celebration lasted a number of hours. Ever new bouquets of flowers which seemed particularly striking and elegant during this winter month lay on the presidium table. At one point Stalin's figure disappeared between the mound of flowers. I asked my wife: "Why does Nikita Sergeyevich not remove the flowers?" "He has not been asked to," Rada answered. Perhaps Stalin liked this unusual screen separating him from the hall.

The speeches eventually ended and there was a long ovation in the hall, everyone standing on his feet, but without shouts or recitations, as befitted this type of

public. Stalin as well rose. This short and frail man turned his back to the hall to leave the stage and suddenly I noticed a big bald spot. The famous silver-colored crew cut which was so thoroughly painted by the painters and touched up in photographs turned out to be a sparse crown of hair. I told Rada nothing, probably fearing that I had learned something super secret. Stalin left the stage slowly, without stopping or talking with people who respectfully made way, keeping his right arm bent at the elbow, close to his side. Rumor had it that it had dried out and shrunk and that he instinctively bent it so that it would draw no particular attention.

A strange feeling of pity struck me at that time, destroying the stereotyped image of the leader. For an instant he appeared like an ordinary person, like everyone else. But then do we know a great deal about him as a person today? For a long time we were satisfied with the minimum such as, for example, that he liked to smoke in his pipe tobacco from ripped "Flowers of Hertzegovina" cigarettes....

In her book "Twelve Letters To a Friend," Stalin's daughter Svetlana Iosifovna has written about her father quite frankly and, in her own way, has told the truth about him. But was that all? The fate of this book is strange and confused, as is that of Svetlana herself. I shall not undertake either to accuse or justify this woman. Obviously, she has to answer to her own conscience. How angry Stalin would have been had he been able to see the future of his daughter! His wife committed suicide, his son perished from drunkenness, and his daughter left the homeland. Terrible.

I am recalling all of this now and, naturally, past experiences are seen from a different angle. We, like our fellow students at the university, knew little and had little interest at that time in what was happening "up there" and why. Our range of interests was strictly demarcated. Blabbering and intrigues, which are so prevalent today, were considered an inadmissible and, furthermore, a dangerous occupation. The Komsomol organizations operated according to strict procedures. They observed the directives they received, limiting their concerns mainly to studies, the life of university students and the minimum of entertainment at the Moscow State University club on Herten Street.

The students in the journalism section (at that time it was only a section, part of the philology department, and our class of 30 people, most of whom war veterans, was the first) displayed some initiative and occasionally organized their own small evenings in the Stromynka, in the small rooms of the student hostel where our comrades from out of town lived. We danced under the sound of a gramophone, we sang and, naturally, read to one another our own verses. No human habitat other than Moscow University at that time could gather such a large number of poets under its roof. Philologists, physicists, jurists and historians wrote poems. Naturally, with

its tightness, lack of comfort, noise and the permeating smells from the kitchen, nonetheless this young Stromynka association will never be forgotten by us....

We were not particularly affected by the replacement of the Moscow Oblast party committee secretary and of Popov, chairman of the Moscow Soviet. It is true that after that the Komsomol organizations began to criticize the faulty management methods of Krasavchenko, the then secretary of the Moscow city Komsomol committee. However, I no longer remember what he was being accused of.

I must point out, however, that the young people were by no means indifferent to the country's and people's social life. The talk was that the replacement of Moscow city Komsomol committee secretary Nikolay Sizov had not been all that smooth. The Komsomol conference was unwilling to give him up. It did not want a new election and demanded more convincing arguments. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev had to go to the conference and, in a fatherly fashion, suggest to the stubborn activists that if the party said "one must," it meant one must.

It was only after Stalin's death, when the question of promoting young party cadres to high positions in the internal affairs and state security agencies arose, that Khrushchev approved of the motion to appoint Sizov chief of Moscow's militia; he then proceeded to become deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet. The legend of Nikita Sergeyevich's personal dislike of Sizov because of old Komsomol matters was debunked. Most frequently legends running around on various likes and dislikes, views and considerations expressed by Khrushchev turned out to be slanders, floated for discussion by a circle of people who knew how to skillfully use political intrigues to promote their own selfish objectives.

In his novel "The Diehard," Daniil Granin describes how, referring to Khrushchev's "opinion," Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa was forbidden to invite Timofeyev-Resovskiy, one of the most noted biologists and a man who had led a difficult life, to teach a seminar in his institute. The pressure applied on P.L. Kapitsa was so strong that someone else in his place would have given up. However, those "advisers" were unfamiliar with Kapitsa's character and the extent of his human and civic independence and dignity. He telephoned Khrushchev and began to prove to him the usefulness of having Timofeyev-Resovskiy teach a seminar.

Khrushchev answered that this was the prerogative of Petr Leonidovich, who could invite to the institute anyone he pleased and have anyone conduct a seminar. It became clear that Nikita Sergeyevich had never heard of Timofeyev-Resovskiy and his planned lecture at Kapitsa's institute and even less so forbidden it. At the end of the 1960s, when my wife and I met Timofeyev-Resovskiy at the home of Academician Oleg Georgiyevich Gazayenko, he himself described to us this anecdotal event.

As though to confirm the fact that science lives its own life and that not even the highest-placed individuals have any power over it, Timofeyev-Resovskiy remembered his youthful years as well. The event happened in Denmark. Usually, a somewhat ceremonious five o'clock tea with a precise ritual was being hosted by Niels Bohr, under whom he then worked. No one had the right to be late and no conversation was permitted until the very first cup of tea was served. Timofeyev-Resovskiy was warned about it and 5 minutes before 5 o'clock he took his assigned seat. It turned out to be behind Niels Bohr's seat. Three minutes after the tea drinking ceremony began in absolute silence, the door screeched open and a small man in heavy walking boots, embarrassedly bowed his head and sneaked up to an empty chair. Niels Bohr looked at the laggard and turned away demonstratively. "Who is he?" Timofeyev-Resovskiy asked the host. "It is the king," angrily answered Bohr. "He is eternally late and I shall warn him one last time and will no longer invite him."

Nina Petrovna with her family moved to Moscow at the start of 1950. The house on Granovskiy Street came alive. Lena, my wife's younger sister, her brother Sergey and Yulya, the daughter of Nikita Sergeyevich's oldest son Leonid, who had died at Smolensk in an aerial battle, were all secondary school students and all needed attention. Nina Petrovna ran the household in a somewhat edifying manner. She treated all members of the family equally and created a strict atmosphere which was enhanced by the restraint shown by the master of the house himself. No whispering was allowed. The youngsters saw their father virtually only on Sundays, a day during which, furthermore, he prepared to spend somewhere in a kolkhoz or construction site or with his new Moscow acquaintances Professor Lorkh, whose potato strain was the best in the country, Kolesnikov, who grew lilacs, or Lesnichev, the Michurin-style gardener. Farmers, the magicians of the soil, triggered in Nikita Sergeyevich strong emotions. In general, he valued outstanding capabilities and talent which he supported and encouraged. This was the source of his faith in miracles. He was always fascinated by the apples grown by Lesnichev, Kolesnikov's lilacs, the compost peat developed by Lysenko, soil mulching, suggested by scientists at the Timiryazev Academy, hydroponics, compost pots, the square-cluster method of potato growing and, subsequently, corn planting, belief in the rescuing power of Pryanishnikov's idea of maintaining the fertility of the land with chemical fertilizers, and many, many others. Bearing in mind his energetic character and the inordinate enthusiasm with which he undertook projects, naturally, not everything always turned out acceptable or accessible, and not always did it prove to be as useful as he hoped it would. However, I dare to claim that his only objective was to improve life.

Having begun his second stint of work in Moscow, naturally, he was forced to behave more "cautiously" than in the Ukraine, where control was not so strict. He was a cheerful man. He had a funny way of describing

some of his trips to Ukrainian kolkhozes. I recall the following: Once, during the first postwar year, he went to visit an acquaintance of his, a kolkhoz chairman (Khrushchev knew well the rural workers and found it easy and simple to be among them). Toward the evening, after they had toured the farm, the chairman invited him to dinner. After he had become quite drunk, he started demanding a case of nails. "Comrade Khrushchev," he kept asking ever more insistently, "find us a case of nails, for our kolkhoz is named after you." Realizing that things were not going his way, he had another drink and then came up with what he considered the most telling argument: "Comrade Khrushchev, please procure one case for us. Bear in mind that you are named after our kolkhoz!"

For a while Rada and I lived with her parents "on Granovskiy." To me all of this was unusual, particularly the puritanism of my mother-in-law. I had been raised in an entirely different type of family. My mother, Nina Matveyevna Gupalo, was considered one of the best Moscow seamstresses. Many women, actresses and wives of major writers dreamt of being dressed by her. In some cases business relations developed into friendship, such as those with Yelena Sergeyevna Bulgakova, Marina Alekseyevna Ladynina and some others. Svetlana Stalina as well knew my mother. Obviously, her father liked the way his daughter dressed. On one occasion he saw her wearing a dress unfit for her age and said: "Why are you dressed like this? Why don't you wear a Gupalo dress and take this thing off?" I do not know how Stalin knew who was dressing his daughter but this was written by Svetlana herself.

Today, when neither Nina Matveyevna nor Nina Petrovna are among the living, I think of their place in my own life and the life of my children differently. My mother rarely visited the Khrushchev home. On this matter she had her principles. She had been raised as an orphan in a convent and it was there, among the nuns, that she had become a first-rate seamstress and it was there that her character—strict and independent—had been molded. However different they were in terms of views, habits and tastes, my mother and my mother-in-law were similar in that they never liked to ask anyone for anything.

When Nina Petrovna died and we buried her next to Nikita Sergeyevich in the Novodeviche cemetery, at the grave I said a few parting words about this wise woman. Like my mother, Nina Petrovna had told nothing about herself to her children and it was only after the burial that we learned from old friends about her youth and clandestine work with the Red Army. At that time, at the grave, I said that I wished for our children to be more like their grandparents than their parents.

Their lives had been harder than ours and had a lot less of those pleasures without which today life is not considered worth living. From the viewpoint of such people, idea-mindedness was the main virtue of the individual.

Their actions were closely linked to the social needs of their time. It is thus that they developed their moral foundations to which they remained loyal to their last hour.

At one point Rada asked her mother to write her memoirs. Nina Petrovna did not answer her.

In looking at some papers after her mother had died, Rada saw some autobiographical writings. Nina Petrovna had been able to record very little. Here was what she told her daughter:

"I was born on 14 April 1900 in Vasilev village, Poturzinskaya Gmina (Volost), Tomashovskiy Uyezd, Kholm'sk Guberniya.... I had a brother three years my junior. The population of Kholm'sk Guberniya was Ukrainian. Ukrainian language was spoken in the villages but the administration in the village, in the gmina and on higher levels was Russian. In the schools the children were taught in the Russian language, although no Russian was spoken at home. I recall that in the first grade of the rural grammar school which I attended, the teacher would smack with his ruler the hands of students for infractions, one of which was poor understanding of the explanations given by the teacher in the Russian language (the children did not speak Russian). This was known as 'getting it on one's paw.'

"Mother—Yekaterina Grigoryevna Kukharchuk (nee Bondarchuk) was married at the age of 16 and was given as dowry one morg of land (0.25 hectares), a few oak trees in a forest and a chest with clothing and bedding. In the countryside such a dowry was considered quite adequate. Soon after the wedding, my father was drafted in the army.

"My father, Petr Vasilyevich Kukharchuk, came from a family which was poorer than that of my mother. They had an indivisible parcel of land of 2.5 morgs (three-fourths of a hectare), an old peasant house, a small garden with plum trees and one cherry tree by the fence. No horses.

"My father was the eldest son. After the death of grandmother Domna, his mother, my father inherited the land and had to pay his sisters and brothers 100 rubles each (which was a large sum at that time). I believe that the 1914 war prevented him from completing payments.

"Our Vasilev village was poor. Most of the population worked for the landowner, who paid women for a full day's work raising sugar beets 10 kopeks, and paid the men 20 to 30 kopeks for mowing. I do not remember very much of that life: My job was to gather nettle and to cut it with a big knife to feed the pigs which were being fattened for Easter or Christmas. The knife frequently fell on my finger rather than the nettle and to this day I have a scar on my index finger on the left hand.

"My mother, Yekaterina Grigoryevna, and I lived with her family. Grandmother Kseniya's hut was more spacious and, furthermore, at that time my father was doing his military service in Bessarabia and later, in 1904, fought in the war against Japan. We all ate out of the same bowl, sitting not at a table but at a wide bench. Mother held on her lap the small children whereas I and other older children had nowhere to sit and had to get the food out of the bowl across the shoulders of the adults. If we spilled something they would hit us on the forehead with their spoon. For some reason grandfather Anton always made fun of me, promising that I would be married to someone in a large family, the children would be snotty, I would have to share a bowl with them and eat by dipping over their heads, etc.

"In 1912 my father put in a bag some potatoes and a piece of wild boar meat, put me on the saddle and took me to the city of Lyublin where his brother Kondraty Vasilyevich worked as a freight train conductor. Uncle Kondraty enrolled me in the Lyublin junior high school (a 4-year school); for the previous 3 years I had attended the rural school. The teacher in the village had told my father that I had a good learning mind and that I should be taken to the city to school, and my father listened to him.

"I went to school in Lyublin for 1 year. The following year my uncle became senior watchman at the Kholm treasury and transferred me to the same type of school in the city Kholm.

"When World War I broke out I was spending my summer holidays in Vasilev village. I was a second-year student at Kholm junior high school.

"The autumn of 1914 came. Austrian troops entered our village and began to misbehave, to plunder, to pick up girls.... Mother hid me behind the stove and ordered me not to get out of there, telling the soldiers that I had typhoid fever. Naturally, they left immediately. The situation soon changed, the Austrians were expelled from the village by Russian forces and we were ordered to evacuate but no one knew where and how. We had no horses, we carried all that we could and, with our little bags, left home. We marched with all the rest of the people.... I remember that for a long time mother hauled a primus-stove, which was a prized possession of hers, but since there was no kerosene, she had to throw it away. We marched for a long time and with difficulty, ahead of the advancing Austrian forces and at some station we came across my father who was a member of the Kholm troops.

"Father reported to his commanding officer about meeting with his family, and the latter allowed us to stay with the unit. Mother was hired as the cook of the unit's command, while I and my brother followed my father and helped as best we could. I was 14 and my brother Vanya, 11.

"During a calm period at the front, the commander summoned my father, gave to him a letter to be delivered to Yevlogiy, the Kholm bishop, and ordered that I be taken to Kiev. There Bishop Yevlogiy was the head of some kind of organization for help to refugees. My father and I went to see him and he placed me at the Kholm St Mary school for women, which had been evacuated from Kholm to Odessa. I was a boarding school student in that school in Odessa until 1919 and completed my eighth grade.

"Let me say a few words about Bishop Yevlogiy and the school. Yevlogiy, bishop of Kholm, was a major bulwark of autocracy in Poland and a zealous promoter of the policy of Russification. He trained Russification personnel among the children of the local population, from the West Ukrainian villages. Without his intervention I would never have been able to get a government scholarship for that school where the children of peasants were not accepted. The school was attended by especially chosen daughters of priests and officials. I was accepted there by virtue of the special circumstances of wartime which I described.

"After graduation I worked for a while at the school's office, transcribing certificates and various papers, for we had no typewriters.

"At the beginning of 1920 I secretly joined the Bolshevik Party and began to work in the citizen villages of Odessa Guberniya as assigned by the party. In June 1920, when the communists were mobilized, I found myself on the Polish front. I first became an agitator attached to the military unit because of my knowledge of the Ukrainian language and local conditions. I rode around villages and spoke about the Soviet system. Riding with me was a Red Army man, also an agitator. When the Western Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee was established, I was put in charge of the department for work with women. We were at that time in the city of Ternopol. It is common knowledge that in the autumn of 1920 we had to withdraw from Poland. Together with Comrade Krasnokutskiy, the secretary of the Western Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee, and others, I went to Moscow and was assigned to study at the Communist University imeni Ya.M. Sverdlov, attending the 6-month courses recently set up by the Bolshevik Party Central Committee.

"In the summer of 1921 I was sent to the Donbass, to the city of Bakhmut (now Artemovsk), to the guberniya party school, to teach the history of the revolutionary movement in the West. Before the students began arriving, I was employed by the guberniya party committee to work as secretary of the guberniya commission in charge of purging party ranks. It was then that I went through my second purge, the first being at the front in Ternopol.

"As we know, after the 10th Party Congress, the tax in kind was abolished and markets opened, at which a variety of goods appeared, if only we had money. I and

two women teachers also went to the market to buy bread and all three of us caught the spotted fever. One (Abugova) died while the two of us were sick for a long time, after which we also caught recurrent fever. However, our youth was able to surmount the disease and we recovered. We were not accepted in the hospital but were treated at the school. The sick were being fed by Serafima Ilinichna Gopner, who was then head of the agitation and propaganda department, Donetsk Guberniya party committee. She supplied us with miners' rations through the TsPKP (Central Board of the Coal Industry). This institution was headed by Pyatakov, who was later to become a Trotskyite. In the summer of 1922 Serafima Ilinichna assigned me to work at the guberniya teachers' courses organized in Taganrog, on the Sea of Azov. It was there that I recovered after the typhoid fever.

"In the autumn of 1922 I was assigned to Yuzovka (today Donetsk) to teach political economy at the okrug party school. It was there that I met Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, who was a student at the worker faculty in Yuzovka. We were married in 1924 and later worked together at the Petrovskiy mine, Yuzovskiy Okrug. Our rayon was named Petrovo-Marinskii. It included the shafts of the Petrovskiy mine and the farmland of Marinka and the adjacent villages. The rayon executive committee of the soviet of worker and peasant deputies was in Marinka village while the rayon party committee was in Petrovka. The raykom secretary lived in Petrovka and the rayon executive committee chairman in Marinka.

"Earlier than that, at the end of 1923, I was assigned as a propagandist for the party raykom at the Rutchenkovka mine. It was here that the parents and children of N.S. (from his first by then deceased wife), and his sister with her families lived; he was employed as deputy manager of the ore-mining administration. From there he was sent to study at the worker faculty in Yuzovka. I was teaching miners classes in political knowledge and delivered lectures in the club on political topics and carried out various raykom assignments dealing with current affairs. I settled in the home for new arrivals (something like a hotel run by the ore-mining administration), across the street from the club. After a rain, however, it was very difficult to cross this road. The shoes remained stuck in the mud and the feet "came out" of the shoes. The shoes had to be tied in a special way. People were frightening me with the Rutchenkovka mud before my trip. Since I had no shoes I had to go to a private shoemaker. The lectures I delivered at the club were attended by many women. It turned out that they were interested in me as being the wife of their friend Nikita Khrushchev, a wife which he had found not in the mine but on the outside....

"After N.S. graduated from the worker faculty, he was assigned secretary of the Petrovo-Marinskii Party Raykom while I was transferred from Rutchenkovka to Petrovka, also as a party raykom propagandist. An

interesting feature here is that propagandists were being paid at that time out of central funds while raykom secretaries, from local funds. At one point I was earning more than N.S.

"At that time there was still unemployment, some of which among miners who were party members. After attending classes at the political school in the mine, my students would accompany me to my home and sometimes blamed me for being employed alongside my husband while others were unemployed and had big families.... Gradually, however, life became organized and there was no more unemployment in the mines....

"Lenin died in January 1924. N.S. went to Moscow to attend the funeral as a member of the Donetsk delegation. Answering the appeal of the Central Committee, many workers joined the party. This was a Leninist draft. There was more work for the propagandists. One had to teach semi-illiterate workers the foundations of political knowledge, which was difficult. New propagandists came from Moscow, mobilized by the Central Committee from among students who had graduated from different VUZes.

"By the end of 1926 N.S. went to work for the okrug party committee where he headed the organizational department, while I left for Moscow to improve my skills at the Communist Academy imeni Krupskaya. There I studied at the department of political economy until the end of 1927. After graduation I was sent to the Kiev interokrug party school as a teacher of political economy. The lectures had to be delivered in Ukrainian, for the students were clandestine workers from Western Ukraine.

"During the year of my training in Moscow, N.S. had worked in Kharkov, in the UKP(b) Central Committee, and by the autumn of 1927 he was head of the organizational department at the Kiev Okruzhkom (the committee secretary was Comrade N. Demchenko, who was subsequently subject to repressive measures although he was innocent). For that reason I too was assigned to Kiev, although the comrade from the Central Committee cadre assignment department strongly insisted that I go to Tyumen....

"Rada was born in Kiev, in 1929. That same year N.S. went to Moscow, to study at the Industrial Academy. In the summer of 1930 we joined him and settled in the academy's hostel on No 40 Pokrovka. We had two rooms at different ends of the hall. One was for the two of us with the young Rada and the other was occupied by Yulya, Lenya and Matresha, who was the nurse N.S. had found before we came."

(First of Nina Petrovna's notes.)

(Nikita Sergeyevich had two children—Yulya and Leonid—from his first wife, Yefrosina Ivanovna. In 1918, escaping from the Germans, Yefrosina Ivanovna came

to the Donbass mine, in Uspenka, where she and Khrushchev lived in his native village Kalinovka, Kursk Oblast. Nikita Sergeyevich was at the front. He received permission to visit his wife. He came at a sad moment: Yefrosina Ivanovna was in a coffin, dead of typhoid fever. Khrushchev buried her and left the young children—Yulya, 2 and a half years old and 8-month old Leonid—in the care of his parents. It was Anna Ivanovna Pisareva, Yefrosina Ivanovna's younger sister, who told me of Khrushchev's first independent steps in life and his involvement with the revolutionary movement. As a 17-year old boy, in 1911, he went to live in their miners' house; in 1914 Nikita married Yefrosina.)

"I was assigned to the Elektrozavod party committee: Initially I organized and headed the soviet party school. One year later I was made member of the party committee and head of the agitation and propaganda department at the plant's party committee.

"The plant's party organization consisted of about 3,000 communists. The plant worked in three shifts and I had a great deal of work. I went to work at 8 am and returned home after 10 p.m. Then we had another misfortune: Radochka caught scarlet fever. She was taken to the hospital next to the plant. Evenings I rushed to the hospital to look through a window at what the children were doing. I saw that she was given a bowl with kasha and a big spoon and the nurse had gone to chat with her friends. Rada was small, slightly over 1 year old; I could see that child standing up with her feet in the bowl, crying, while the nurse was no help.... We removed the child from the hospital, for which we signed, ahead of schedule.

"I worked at Elektrozavod until mid-1935, i.e., until the birth of Serezha. The first 5-year plan was fulfilled in 2.5 years and I received an honor certificate from the plant organizations. At the plant a party purge, my third, was taking place. I became acquainted with a large circle of the aktiv, literary workers, old bolsheviks and political prisoners who had come to work at the plant as assigned by their organizations, and with sponsored kolkhoz members. I consider these years to be the most active period of my political and, in general, my social life.

"N.S. was not allowed to complete the Industrial Academy. He was assigned party work: initially as secretary of the Baumanskiy and, subsequently, Krasnopresnenskiy party raykoms. At that time the party was engaged in a fierce struggle against the right wing. N.S. attended the 15th Party Congress as delegate from the Donetsk organization in 1927; he was a delegate to the 16th Party Congress in 1930, representing the Moscow party organization. In 1932 N.S. was secretary of the Moscow gorkom and, subsequently, obkom. In 1934 he was a delegate to the 17th UKP(b) Congress and was elected member of the party's Central Committee. In 1935 L.M. Kaganovich, who had been first secretary of the Moscow city party committee until that time, became people's commissar of transportation while N.S. Khrushchev was

elected first secretary of the Moscow city party organization. He worked in that position until he left for the Ukraine at the start of 1938, where he was made Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee secretary. He was in Kiev when the war broke out in June 1941.

"In Moscow N.S. had worked very hard on the construction of the first part of the subway, the embankments along the Moscow River, and the development of a bread-baking industry (the old round-shaped premises were being adapted to the purpose as required technologically). It was necessary to organize the urban economy, public baths and street toilets, and to supply electric power to enterprises in Moscow and, particularly, Moscow Oblast.... Stories were added to the low buildings to increase the residential area, and many other projects were carried out....

"By then, when we already had an apartment, at Government House on Kamennyy Most (four rooms) N.S.'s parents came to live with us. At that time products were being rationed and my rations could be obtained not far from the plant while those of N.S. at what is today Komsomol Lane. Sergey Nikanorovich, N.S.'s father, went to these distribution centers for potatoes and other food products, which he carried on his back. No other way was possible. At one point, carrying this load, he jumped on a running streetcar, from the opposite direction, and was lucky not to get killed. It was he who carried Radochka to the nursery on the 11th floor of our house, when the elevator was not working.... Rada loved her grandfather very much.

"Her grandmother, Kseniya Ivanovna, spent most of the time sitting in her room or else would take a stool and sit on the street, by the entrance. People always gathered around her to listen to what she had to say. N.S. disapproved of such "sittings," but his mother ignored him.

"In the early spring of 1938 we moved to Kiev and I had to cut my work short; anything since then has been work on assignments by the party raykom. In the Kiev period I taught party history at the raykom party school (in Molotovskiy Raykom, Kiev), lectured and attended evening English language courses. My small children (three) were frequently ill and demanded attention.

"Here is a curious aside. Unfortunately, I do not remember the dates. When V.M. Molotov became people's commissar of foreign affairs, a custom-made dacha was built for him, with large rooms where he would receive foreign guests. It was announced that on thus and such a day the government would be giving a reception for the people's commissars and the party leaders of Moscow in that dacha. The women were invited to the dining room where I settled down by the door and listened to the conversation of the Moscow guests. All the women who had gathered there had jobs. They spoke of various things and about their children....

"We were summoned inside, where the tables had been arranged in the shape of the letter U. We sat down as indicated. I found myself next to Valeriya Alekseyevna Golubtsova-Malenkova; opposite me sat the wife of Stanislav Kosior, who had just been transferred to the USSR Sovnarkom. The news was already out that N.S. Khrushchev would replace him as secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. After the dinner I started asking Kosior's wife as to what kitchen utensils I should take with me. She was quite astounded by my questions and answered that in the house where we would be living there was already everything and that nothing should be brought. Indeed, a cook came with the house and she had the type of kitchen utensils I had never even seen. The same was the case with the dining room.... Everything was provided by the state: furniture, utensils and bedding. Food was brought in from the base and we settled our accounts on a monthly basis.

"But let me go back to the reception, where I found everything quite curious. While the guests were sitting at the table, J.V. Stalin came out of the pantry room, followed by the members of the Central Committee Politburo, and sat at the table which was set crosswise. Naturally, they were greeted with lengthy applause. I do not recall exactly but I believe that it was Stalin himself who said that recently a number of new people's commissariats had been set up and new managers appointed, and that the Politburo had decided that it would be useful to gather all of them together in a friendly atmosphere, to get acquainted, and to talk....

"Many people then spoke, naming their establishments and describing the way they conceived of their work. The floor was given to the women. Valeriya Alekseyevna Golubtsova-Malenkova spoke of her scientific work, for which she was criticized by the women. Conversely, the young wife of the people's commissar of higher education Kaftanov said that she would do everything possible for her husband to work better at his new and responsible position, which triggered universal approval.

"After the meal I found out that Comrade Kosior had two sons. Kosior's wife made a very pleasant impression on me; subsequently I frequently remembered her, years later, when I found out that she had been innocently sent to a camp and executed by firing squad and that the decision to execute her had been issued by V.M. Molotov personally. I was told of this by N.S. under the following circumstances: Polina Semenovna Molotova met with me in the yard of the house on Granovskiy Street and asked that I transmit to N.S. a request that she address the Central Committee on the subject of restoring party membership to V.M. Molotov, who had been expelled several years previously.... N.S. saw Polina Semenovna and showed to her the document containing Molotov's resolution on the execution of Kosior's Postyshev's and other senior Ukrainian personnel's wives and asked her whether, in her view, one could speak of readmitting him

in the party or trying him in court. It was N.S. who told me of this in answering the question of whether Polina Semenovna had gone to see him, and this marked the end of the discussion.

"In 1935-1936 the enterprises worked on the basis of a continuous week: 5 days of work with the sixth day off, on a sliding scale. This system was quite inconvenient for me, for I never had the same day off as N.S. He worked on the basis of regular days off. The purpose of a continuous work week was good: to make full use of the equipment, to increase labor productivity and make people less tired. However, this procedure proved to be inefficient, for which reason we went back to a 6-day work week with free Sundays.

"I remember that at that time Yevgeniya Kogan, Kuybyshev's wife, worked as secretary of the Moscow city party committee in charge of propaganda; I also remember her daughter, Galya Kuybysheva. I remember how sad I was when Comrade Kogan would organize visits by her comrades to the theater, which were frequent, whereas I was unable to join them, for I worked at the plant on Sundays. All other cultural projects in which N.S. participated, were inaccessible to me because of this 'continuous work.'

"Comrade Yurov, a very energetic comrade, was party committee secretary at Elektrozavod. At that time we addressed each other formally and were not particularly interested in family affairs. Yurov neither knew nor was interested in who my husband was. At one point he rang up late evening at home. I picked up the receiver. He quite abruptly asked who was speaking and I answered automatically 'Kukharchuk.' 'What are you doing there, I am ringing up Comrade Khrushchev's apartment?' He was quite stunned by the fact that I, it turned out, was Khrushchev's wife. His problem was urgent: The meadows under our care were about to be trampled over by the cavalry and the Moscow city party committee had to interfere in this matter before the next morning. The following day he asked me how I had been able to conceal my family relationship with the secretary of the Moscow city party committee. I answered that I had not concealed anything but had not deemed necessary to inform my fellow workers at the plant if not asked. Incidentally, with the help of the Moscow city party committee we were able to protect from the cavalry the meadows under the care of Elektrozavod....

"We worked very hard at the Elektrozavod party committee. As I mentioned, I left home at 8 am and returned not before 10 in the evening. I rode the streetcar from Government House to Elektrozavodskaya Street and the trip took more than 1 hour. On my way to work and from work I read fiction and I remember reading 'How the Steel Was Forged,' for the first time in the streetcar. The plant worked in three shifts and the party, trade-union and Komsomol organizations (committees) had to provide services to all three shifts: meetings, political training classes, etc.

"In the 1950s I was still in touch with the plant workers through Varya Syrkova whom I visited and could meet at her place fellow workers and, after her death and, subsequently, the death of Comrade Tsvetkov (the previous director of the light bulbs plant), direct contacts were broken and I could pass on greetings by telephone only through Tamara Tamarina, who had been employed at the light bulbs plant since 1916. Subsequently, Comrade Yurov was innocently prosecuted and perished.

"How did my parents meet Nikita Sergeyevich?

"In 1939 the Germans occupied Poland and had come close to my native area—Vasilev village. As we know, at that time our troops were moving west and occupied areas of the Western Ukraine, Lvov and Western Belorussia. N.S. rang me up in Kiev and told me that my village Vasilev and the surrounding areas would go to the Germans and that if I wanted it, I could have government transportation to Lvov, from where I would be taken to Vasilev to be able to collect my parents. N.S. also added that my trip would be organized by Comrade Burmistenko, UKP(b) Central Committee secretary. Comrade Burmistenko told me that the Central Committee was assigning two women to work in Lvov and that I could travel with them. One of them, a young Komsomol member, was going to work with the young; the second, a party worker, was to work among Lvov women. We were ordered to put on military uniforms and issued revolvers. We were told that this was for our convenience, so that military patrols would stop us less frequently along the road. The trip was more or less smooth but along the way, not far from Lvov, we were almost hit by a truck coming from the opposite direction: its driver had not slept for 3 nights and had fallen asleep behind the wheel. The only casualty was the Komsomol member who hit the ridge of her nose.... We were picked up by his commanding officer who came up with his car (to check our documents). The girl was sent immediately to a hospital while the two of us stayed on the premises of the commanding officer. The troops were commanded by Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko, who was then commander of the Kiev Military District; N.S. Khrushchev was member of the Military Council. When N.S. and Timoshenko came home and saw us in uniforms with revolvers, they burst out laughing, after which N.S. became quite angry and ordered that we immediately change into civilian clothes. He went on saying quite indignantly: 'What are you thinking about? You wish to conduct propaganda among the local population for a Soviet system armed with revolvers? Who would believe you? For decades they were being told that we were aggressors and you, with your revolvers, can only confirm this slander....'

"I changed and went to pick up my parents in Vasilev. I was accompanied by Vasilii Mitrofanovich Bozhko, a member of N.S.'s guard. Our trip was uneventful and we located my parents' house. Father and mother were home. Many people gathered to take a look at me and to be told the news. No one wanted to believe that the

village would go to the Germans. Not even the young unit commanders were aware of this fact. However, Comrade Timoshenko had allowed me to say why I had come to fetch my parents. That night a tank was moved into my father's courtyard. All night long military people came into the house to get warm. Mother fed them, and V.M. Bozhko kept them company. In the morning representatives of the newly organized local authorities came to arrest me as a spy and provocateur. Bozhko and the tank men barely managed to make them realize that they were wrong. That same morning my parents and my brother with his family loaded their property and climbed aboard a truck and we took off for Lvov. A representative of the local authorities traveled with us to the first military commandant's office to get more specific news. However, the office had as yet no information whatsoever on the territory which, according to the treaty, would go to the Germans.

"I took my parents to Lvov, to the palace of the district leader, where N.S. was billeted. They started walking around the rooms, amazed at everything. For example, my father turned on a tap and started shouting to my mother: 'Come here and take a look, water is coming out of this pipe.' Everyone came, looked, and exclaimed and it was only my brother Ivan Petrovich who said that he had seen a water main during his military service.

"When Comrade Timoshenko and N.S. entered the room, pointing at Timoshenko, my father asked: 'Is that our son-in-law?' I, however, did not notice that he was disappointed by finding out that N.S. was his son-in-law."

Our children read Nina Petrovna's notes. My wife and I wanted them to know more about their grandparents, to know how they began their life and the times about which they knew only in general.

After considering whether what Nina Petrovna had written could be published, for she had not intended to do so, Rada and I decided that it was worth it, for a wide circle of people could find interesting the realities of life at that time, which was harsh, a time when kindness was scarce. The lives of many members of that postrevolutionary generation had no glitter or a broad outlook, and lacked profound and serious knowledge about many things, such as literature, art or history. These people were not to be blamed for having learned in bits and pieces and more through practical action which faced them with strict demands and which demanded powerful obedience.

Nina Petrovna's notes ended with 1939. Neither she nor Nikita Sergeyevich spoke to their relatives about their lives. From the very first days of the attack mounted by fascist Germany on our country Khrushchev was at the front. Together with General Kirponos he headed the defense of Kiev where he returned on 6 November 1943 after the city was liberated by the Soviet forces.

On one occasion, at the ceremonies celebrating the anniversary of the Stalingrad battle, one of the visitors was Zinoviy Timofeyevich Serdyuk, Khrushchev's fellow worker in the Ukraine and member of the Military Council of the 64th Army commanded by General M.S. Shumilov, who had fought at Stalingrad. He entered the memorial museum. At the farthest corner a small photograph had been exhibited of a meeting of the Military Council of the front. A group of visitors were crowded around it and someone asked with amazement: "Look, this looks like Khrushchev, did he indeed fight at Stalingrad?"

"These were adults, not adolescents, and I felt it necessary to deliver a small lecture," Serdyuk said. "After they left, I thought: It may be that not only many people but many events will be forgotten...."

He was right. Do you bow your head and stop with a minute of silence in front of the Arch of Triumph, erected in honor of the victory of the 1812 Patriotic War? Actually, how could one do it? It has been built in such a way that it is very difficult to approach, for there is a stream of traffic from the right and the left. No one thought, when it was being rebuilt, to remember those who had died for us at Borodino. Stone and bronze were restored but in themselves they are meaningless.

The first graduate class of the department of journalism of Moscow State University had its 35th class meeting in 1987, with an already somewhat depleted group of old comrades. Life had scattered us in town and country and many, alas, had not lived to see this day....

When questions are asked today about the first postwar years and when people say "naturally, it was difficult for you!" my answer is by no means expected.

No, I say, it was not so! Although we cannot say that those were simple and easy times, the prevalent feeling was one of happiness. We were aware of the significance of the cause we intended to serve and we wanted to prove ourselves as well and as energetically as possible. These personal objectives prevailed over anything else in life at that time.

No one among us would dare to describe Moscow University at that time as an island of freedom, any more than anyone would rate as being high the level of education we were then officially acquiring. Philologists had not read a good half of the books written by the best Russian and Soviet writers; historians studying Western literature were unfamiliar with the names of many literary workers "from over there." Journalists were told little about the world press. Conversely, we memorized Latin and declaimed in our examinations in ancient Greek literature: "Like young deer, the Trojans ran horrified into the town...." to the pleasure of our precious old man Professor Radtsig. This may have made us better educated but we lacked any more important knowledge.

We mastered the rules of self-education for life and caught up eagerly and stubbornly with what had not been provided in university curriculums.

During examinations, facing the blackboard on which, as assigned by Professor Galkina-Fedoruk (who taught a course in the history of the Russian language) lengthy and complex sentences had been written, not every one of us could quickly identify what was a subject and what was a predicate, while Yevdokiya Mikhaylovna kept wheezing in her annoyance. Galkina-Fedoruk did not lower grades for gaps in knowledge gained at school, for front-line service stood between secondary school and university. She usually invited the students to her home, having made them memorize in advance some basic rules. In her home she pointed to the student which of the two huge desks was hers and which was her husband's. He was a historian and, at that time, prorector of Moscow State University. If her mood was particularly good, Yevdokiya Mikhaylovna would serve some preserves, pour some tea and maliciously ask: "Do you, dear comrades, know that before 'but,' 'however,' or 'yes' there is a comma and in what case the particles 'by,' 'li' or 'zhe' stand by themselves?" Most frequently, this examination at home ended successfully.

The university had not come easily to Yevdokiya Mikhaylovna. She had begun her career with most ordinary work. She had even worked as a freight loader and had mastered the elements of grammar only as an adult. Rabelais himself would have envied her juicy and vivid verbal expressions when she read lectures on vulgar words and expressions in the Russian language. "You better close that door," she would tell the class president.... It is perhaps because of hearing such daring and frank lectures delivered by Galkina-Fedoruk that not one of us used curses. Mores in the time of our youth were quite strict. At that time the Great Victory influenced everything. It created a feeling of brotherhood and unity. It was on its foundations that the confidence was built that the best lay ahead, that we can do anything, that no devil could scare us. This feeling of a happy future was probably due also to ignorance, to lack of knowledge of many things....

Naturally, we were not some kind of cheerful simpletons. A few things, nonetheless, made us watch out. For example, docent Pinskiy was arrested in 1949. He was an excellent lecturer in the history of 18th-19th century Western literature. Not only teachers but students as well began to "disappear" from the biology department. A course in Michurin-style biology—known to the students as "Lysenko study"—was introduced in all departments after the August 1948 VASKHNIL session. On one occasion Professor Prezent, Lysenko's main supporter, showed up at Communist Hall, which was the largest hall at the university, and reported that he would acquaint us with a new and important theory. He read his lectures in a malicious and somehow arrogant way, as though he was teaching his defeated opponents.

I think that many biology students had no respect for this new theory although it was more than dangerous to express such feelings out loud. During lectures the philologists played the game of "sea battle" during the lectures, for they were not interested in problems of the struggle between species, the influence of the environment on the upbringing of the individual, etc.

On one occasion Prezent jumped from the pulpit and ran to my neighbor Avenir Zakharov, grabbed from him a little leaflet with squares indicating a "sea battle" game in progress. "What are you doing, student," he shouted, waving the piece of paper in front of Avenir's nose. "What is this?!" Zakharov, a short man, thickset, somewhat on the fat side, in a faded pea-jacket, for he had spent the war on a torpedo boat, calmly took the piece of paper away from Prezent's hand and said: "Professor, you are talking to a petty officer first class of the Soviet Navy, and plea-please do not shout. The 'sea battle' which I am playing now, which is my professional occupation, calms me down and helps me to understand your excessively complex lecture!"

Strange though it might seem, Prezent seemed deflated and hastily returned to the pulpit. A minute later a note was passed on to him: "Could the professor recommend a means of crossing a bug with a glow-worm. This would make our life in the Stromynka easier."

However the main events for us, philologists, lay ahead.

On 9 May 1950 PRAVDA carried an article by the Georgian linguist Arnold Stepanovich Chikobava on some problems of Soviet linguists. This article was in a special insert and was accompanied by a preface from the editors announcing that a free discussion was hereby being opened on problems of linguistics, aimed at surmounting stagnation in this important scientific area.

Many years later, PRAVDA's editor of that time, a man of sharp and ironic turn of mind, described the way this work appeared in the newspaper.

He was unexpectedly summoned by Stalin to his "nearest dacha" in Volynskoye and shown a thick pile of sheets neatly filled with words. Sitting behind his chair, Stalin said that one of his acquaintances from the provinces had sent this article. He asked the editor to read it immediately and to tell him whether it was worth printing. The editor realized that Stalin would not summon him simply because he wanted his advice. The decision had already been made but he needed confirmation of the importance which he ascribed to this article.

Stalin silently paced along the room, from time to time leaned over his desk, selected a pencil from a neat pile, and would lean over the editor's shoulder to make a minor correction, such as a comma or delete an unnecessary preposition.... I do not know how the editor was

able to read under those circumstances this rather specialized article and what he could understand as to the nature of the linguistic debate between Chikobava and Marr that occupied Stalin, who evenly paced behind his back. Stalin asked no questions or made no remarks. There was silence. And even when Stalin stopped and, for some reason, pulled at the editor's thinning hair, the editor was unwilling to turn around.

The jocular nature of this story (to a newspaperman anything could happen) does not fit in the least the events which developed subsequently. The moment Chikobava's article was published there were weekly articles in PRAVDA. The discussion spread throughout and the philology students realized that its fire would set fire to us too, the sinners. We were the students of N.Ya. Marr and were taught by his firm supporters. At that time Nikolay Sergeyevich Chemodanov, a fierce Marr supporter, was department dean. He was a strict man who read his lectures in a difficult manner, not concerned in the least whether the students would understand them. In the course of the examinations he gave, frail girls, cornered by unexpected and hardly understood questions, would faint. What excited us immediately was the main thing: Would we have to retake the exams?

Unlike the VASKHNIL session, where Lysenko and his lackeys immediately began by routing the "Weismanists-Morganists," literally trampling their opponents underfoot and openly directing a scientific debate into a political channel, initially the linguistic discussion was different and more democratic.

An entire group of scientists sharply opposed Chikobava. The Marrist linguists felt entirely secure, for they were backed not only by Marr's authority, whose viewpoint was considered officially recognized, but also the views held by Academician Ivan Ivanovich Meshchaninov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Linguistics and Thinking. He was the first linguist awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor.

Initially, the learned men did not understand where, in whose office had the editor I mentioned read those pages which they so sweepingly rejected. The discussion was joined by those who shared Chikobava's viewpoint. Marr's theory to the effect that language is the superstructure over the base began to crumble. Students were particularly excited by an article written by a young scientist in our department, Boris Aleksandrovich Serebrennikov. At that time he was either a postgraduate student or had only recently defended his candidate dissertation. Serebrennikov had always behaved in a principled way, independently, without concealing his negative attitude toward Marr's theory. He was the student of the noted linguist Academician V.V. Vinogradov. The academician was removed from the department and his students were being attacked at meetings, seminars and scientific councils and, in the final

account, expelled from the party. The students considered this unfair and were pleased to see Serebrennikov's article in PRAVDA, where he defended his viewpoint....

Boris Aleksandrovich is now an academician and one of the greatest Soviet linguists. His principled stance and entire subsequent career in science are an example of dignity and loyalty to one's convictions. To many students at that time this was a good lesson as to how a person can and must defend his views.

Stalin's article "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics," which was published in PRAVDA on 20 June 1950, put an end to this debate. The losers repented and the winners triumphed.

I am holding in my hand a little pamphlet which was especially published by Izdatelstvo "Pravda," with materials on the debate, including Stalin's answer, as it stated, to a group of young comrades who had turned to him "with the suggestion to express his view in the press on problems of linguistics, particularly in the part pertaining to Marxism in linguistics." I am rereading lines which, at one point, one had to memorize.

Stalin wrote: "The discussion revealed above all that a system which is extraneous to science and scientists prevailed in the linguistic authorities, in the center and the individual republics. Even the slightest criticism of the situation prevailing in Soviet linguistics and even the most timid attempt at criticizing the so-called 'new theory' in linguistics were persecuted and blocked by the leading linguistic circles. Valuable workers and researchers in linguistics would be demoted or fired for a critical attitude toward N.Ya. Marr's legacy or for expressing even the slightest disapproval of his theory. Workers in linguistics were promoted to responsible positions not because of practical accomplishments but on the basis of their unconditional acceptance of Marr's doctrine.

"It is universally acknowledged that no science can develop and prosper without a clash of opinions, without the freedom to criticize.... A closed group had developed of infallible leaders who, having secured themselves against any possible criticism, began to display a willful and scandalous behavior.... Had I not been convinced of the honesty of Comrade Meshchaninov and other leaders in linguistics, I would have said that such a behavior is the equivalent of sabotage."

Who could disagree with Stalin's expressive thought as to how science should develop? But how could we today fail to be stricken by this pharisaic attitude. This was as though no tragedy had befallen the great scientist Nikolay Ivanovich Vavilov and dozens of his colleagues. It was as though there had not been Lysenko's insulting, abusive or, more precisely, informing attitude. It was as though those who questioned the discovery made by O. Lepeshinskaya were not being persecuted. Without leaving her apartment, she had "unraveled" the great secret of the way life had developed from inanimate matter. It

was she, incidentally, who claimed that it was possible to rejuvenate people with soda baths. It was then that this powder, which had been previously used for heartburn, disappeared from the pharmacies.

All of this was against a background of the steady aspiration to exacerbate to the extreme the social atmosphere. This was a kind of theater of the absurd, something beyond the range of logic.... Today, more than 30 years later, this appears like scenes from an infernal world. Yet we lived in a real world and the masses believed everything they read in the newspapers and listened at meetings or else, perhaps, took everything on faith, everything that came from high on up.... Self-removal from the complex processes of social life was not only a defense reaction but was steadily cultivated: "Mind your own business." "One can see clearer from the top." "Do you need more than others do?" This mentality which was essentially alien to the nature of our society was being encouraged in the minds of many.

It was after the 20th Party Congress that it became clear why for so long and so persistently a system was being developed of reducing the individual to the status of a "cog," for it was simpler to deal with political innocents.

After the storm of linguistic discussions had blown over, Vitaliy Kostomarov, my fellow student in the department, sighed with relief. It was true that he had been strictly reprimanded and a note was made in his file that he had failed to say something suitable at a linguistic seminar. However, he was not expelled from the Komsomol. It was only later that, considered ideologically unstable, Kostomarov was not accepted as a typist for KOMSOMOLIYA, the house organ. We met recently and, naturally, laughed over the vigilance of our classmates. Vitaliy had preserved a sheet of the MOSKOVS-KIY UNIVERSITET, also a house organ, where in a short note student in journalism A. Adzhubey claimed that the position of typist could be offered to V. Kostomarov, for it was a purely technical job. After that note I was forbidden to march on Red Square in the students' sports column of Moscow State University and assigned to be on duty at the department during holidays. Today Vitaliy Grigoryevich Kostomarov is director of the Russian Language Institute imeni A.S. Pushkin.... Each class of students colors its university time in a distinct hue. I single out my fellow students not only for the fact that we were the first postwar graduating class but also for the reason that quite soon afterwards we had to face most crucial events.

The new building of the Moscow State University was under construction on Lenin Hills. It was inaugurated 1 year after we graduated, in 1953. The construction pace was record-setting even by today's standards: 6 years only. The barbed wire, the watchtowers and the high fences which surrounded the huge construction site separated us on Sundays, when we dug trenches for laying pipes, carried bricks and cleaned the territory

where the future flower beds were to be planted, from the "zeks" (strangely, to this day there is a Zone A, Zone B, and so on, at the university), who were engaged in more difficult work. However, this neither bothered nor frightened us. As we believed then, behind that barbed wire people were being re-educated through labor which we, who were free, considered the main feature on which human dignity is based. Our work was to study. We were not being sent to dig out potatoes or sort vegetables at bases. To learn well or excellently was considered to fulfill one's duty and a manifestation of social awareness. Recipients of Stalin scholarships were respected.

By the end of 1950 I was a trainee at the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. I received my first assignment as a journalist at the military sports department headed by Boris Ivanov: to write about the marksmanship competitions at the Dinamo shooting range in Mytishchi. The participants in the competition lived in white tents. At the firing range they shot at the type of simple targets found at the marksmanship club of Moscow State University. I recorded all the data on the competition and the winners and rushed to the editorial room and, that evening, gave my work to Boris Ivanov. "It will do," he said, glancing over it.

The next morning I did not find my note on the last strip where sports information was usually printed. In the editorial room I shyly knocked at the door of Boris Ivanov's office. He shook my hand and said: "Congratulations, old man, on your first article." He bent over the desk and marked on the paper a tiny column of five lines, in small print, mixed in with other information. What I regretted most was the loss of the heading "White Tents, White Fire." However, I found it pleasing to be called "old man...." At that time this word had some importance in KOMSOMOLKA.

Boris Ivanov set in front of me a stack of letters to the editors and dismissed me with an inimitably elegant gesture. The daily rate for literary personnel at that time was to process 40 letters. I could not cope with this and day after day the pile of letters grew and so did my concern: I was failing. The working day stretched to early dawn. I began to understand how a newspaper was being put out. It was a chaotic bunch of people, running to the duty or chief editor, heaps of clippings with notes "information department," "new heading," shouts on the domestic telephone from the setters: "Cut off Semushkin's tail," "smooth over Chachin," and so on.

After a while I began to handle the mail more confidently and even to make selections of letters. Such selections were increasing and a larger number of letters were dumped on my desk by the "head," or "deputy head" or even the oldest literary assistant who, therefore, was also my senior in status. Grumbling was not allowed. If one showed any zeal one received assignments as a reporter more frequently....

It somehow happened by itself that after my training period ended I continued to work for KOMSOMOLKA. Once Boris Ivanov suggested that I get a permanent job in the department. Anticipating my questions, he settled them with convincing simplicity: "Do you think that you would be unable to graduate if you work for us? There will be no problem, the chief editor told me that he would be able to set a schedule according to which you could go to lectures freely (at that time there were neither correspondence nor evening departments)." And so, in 1951, I became a "free student" of Moscow State University and a paid member of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Without skipping a single official rung on the ladder, I covered the entire path "from" "to."

In recalling KOMSOMOLKA, many of its former associates describe the newspaper as their home, as a united family where they were all brothers and sisters. Personally, I consider something else more important. To begin with, professionalism was valued and developed. Second, from the very beginning of the 1950s, in more than other newspapers, freedom of opinion and arguments were allowed and sensitive topics were encouraged. The staff liked those who liked to deal with letters, and who dealt on the basis of real stories and the thoughts of readers and facts of life, rather than on the basis of plans which crowded at that time the pages of many newspapers.

However, the price of the honor to work in such an outstanding collective was high. The entire interest was focused on the newspaper and so did all of one's time. (I am not exaggerating: The workday lasted no less than 12 and, frequently, 14 hours.) One would go on assignment to the very end of the world if asked. The main thing was steadily to supply the newspaper with findings, to find the unusual. The point was to "beat" colleagues from the other edition. "The old man," one would hear in such a case in the department, in the elevator or the hall or the cafeteria, "the old man, the editor in chief approved. I will go, fly, meet with...."

Legends were told of KOMSOMOLKA associates who procured materials under most incredible circumstances. In 1934, during the first physical culture parade, Semen Narinyani, a brilliant columnist, rushed to Maksim Gorkiy on Red Square and, with his help, was able to record a few lines of impressions on the holiday from all members of the Politburo, including Stalin. When Narinyani reported this to the editor, the editor disbelieved. At this point, however, there was a telephone call from this high secretariat, and several more lines were added to what had been said on Red Square.

The reader of today's KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA would rarely see a newspaper from the beginning of the 1950s in a library or a museum. More than 30 years have passed since then. If by any strange set of circumstances one would find in one's mailbox "our" KOMSOMOLKA he, the young man of the end of the 20th century, would be probably amazed at it and would

probably feel sorry for both the readers at that time and those who were publishing that newspaper. In the 1950s KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was much more modest and, if you wish, simpler, drier than it is today. There would be two or three small photographs on its four pages and, frequently, no photograph at all (there was a strict limit on "embellishments"), there were "blind" columns of articles, small headings, no striking notices, a minimum of drawings and cartoons. Every centimeter of the area was dedicated to the cause. There was an abundance of official protocol notes. The teletype categorically ordered where to place them. "Upper right corner, second column," or "bottom left, third column."... It so happened that there would be three different items claiming the "corner" spot, at which point the superior department prevailed.

KOMSOMOLKA was set during the night. Matveich or Stepanych, exhausted and impatient (they had had made up the prerevolutionary newspaper KOPEYKA) would be hoarsely cursing the editors in charge and the "upper" editors. Both of them were precious and good people, treasure houses of all sorts of stories about newspapers and newsmen and enjoyed our tremendous respect. Tension was the overall style of work of the night editors. The newspaper would be printed during the day or the night. It would find itself in other cities several days later. There were no facsimiles and the matrixes were taken to the airport and trains which, in turn, were either unable to wait for the newspaper or were themselves slow. How could we explain to the readers that an announcement that a luncheon would be given in honor of Mr X had reached us after it was over? The officials in the numerous departments hardly paid attention to the newspapers or, actually, the journalists.

I am leafing through old KOMSOMOLKA numbers. They no longer smell of newsprint and are yellowish. The furriers say that when the white fur begins to turn yellow it is dying. However the color of a newspaper may change, its value can only go up. The past, if it was worthwhile, works for the present, calling upon the people not to slumber but to build a new life on earth.

We loved our KOMSOMOLKA and did everything possible to make it the reader's friend and adviser. To be frank, however, we had to work circuitously more frequently than we would have liked. It was precisely during that period that journalistic expressions such as "the battle for grain," or "the battle for metal" became popular. Naturally, these expressions stemmed from reality, for people had to fight for many things. Victories were hard to win, as they had been in the past war....

Quite recently a friend of mine, precisely one of those who knows how hard it is for the journalists to write, came to his alma mater at Moscow State University to meet with senior classmen. There were two vacancies in his newspaper and he was looking for suitable candidates among the graduates. My friend is a dreamer. In order to provide equal opportunity for all, he suggested to the

students to write two or three pages on a topic of their choice, to assign it a code word and, in a second sealed envelope, to put their name. The newspaper in which he worked, one of the most militant, did not care if even an actor had passed Yefremov's competition. A month later, as agreed, he returned to the department. In the dean's office he found out that not one of the graduating students had expressed the wish to participate in the competition.

I am confident that when we were students not one would have refused. Our attitude toward our profession was one of greater concern. If a future journalist was indifferent to his own life he would hardly be affected by someone else....

At KOMSOMOLKA the authority of the editor in chief was absolute. His mind, range of interests and sharpness of views had earned Goryunov universal respect. Dmitriy Petrovich was strict, almost formal; the young people rather feared his anger which, however, did not appear without a reason. Everyone knew that the "chief" was rancorous and, if wrong, could change his viewpoint. He was pleased with the success of any contributor, whether experienced or a beginner, and was ready to support him in difficult times even if, by the virtue of circumstances, this turned out to be difficult. On one occasion Boris Ivanov, who was the head of the military-sports section, wrote a long article on Canadian hockey. It was K.Ye. Voroshilov himself who aimed his wrath at KOMSOMOLKA, which had allowed a propaganda of "cosmopolitanism" (at that time such an accusation could be interpreted at will). They considered Canadian hockey suspicious. Why did it have to be Canadian? This meant groveling!

On the subject of Canadian hockey Goryunov was constantly being summoned somewhere from where he returned angry and abrupt. The hall would empty out, for no one wanted to be seen by the editor at that time. Boris Ivanov was then summoned to the editor in chief and the entire staff was worried. We never found out who Dmitriy Petrovich talked to and the topic of their discussions. However, Canadian hockey, along with Boris Ivanov, were rehabilitated but the game was referred to as "ice hockey."

Goryunov left KOMSOMOLKA in 1957 for PRAVDA. Subsequently, for many years, he headed TASS daringly and energetically. Unexpectedly, although anything unexpected is, in its way, natural, Dmitriy Petrovich was appointed ambassador to Kenya and, subsequently, to Morocco. He was kept in those places for a long time, for more than 10 years, until he retired and this excellent journalist was sent out to a "deserving rest." At that time Brezhnev frequently sent away to foreign countries those considered "obstinate." Goryunov was not an obliging person and did not hasten to agree with everything he was told. Many members of the KOMSOMOLKA staff consider him their teacher, for that same reason among others.

On 15 January 1953 KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carried an editorial entitled "Be Watchful and Vigilant!" Three days before that I had been summoned by Otar Davydovich Gotseridze, the deputy editor in chief. After sitting behind his desk and closing the door to his office, he pushed a small file to me and said: "Read and remember what you read and then write the editorial. The announcement will be made tomorrow and the editorial must be delivered this evening. Read, read and then we shall talk about it."

He went on busying himself with his own work and as I started leafing through the file I was stunned. Lidiya Fedorovna Timashuk, a physician at the Kremlin hospital, had exposed a gang of physicians who were saboteurs, murderers and spies, who were to be blamed for the death of many noted party and state leaders and who were preparing to commit even worse crimes (it was reported that they had treated Zhdanov and Shcherbakov to their deaths).

The murderers-physicians included Professors Vovsi and Vinogradov, Yegorov, who was head of the medical treatment center of the Kremlin, Professors Kogan, Feldman and others. These were academicians, doctors of sciences, and medical luminaries, admitted to the holy of holies, the Kremlin! Reading the reports, I shuddered. My personal experience as far as contacts with the physicians was concerned was equal to zero. However, I came across familiar names. One of the first to be named was Vladimir Nikitich Vinogradov, who was one of the greatest therapists and a brilliant diagnostician. He had frequently visited the Khrushchev home, treated Nina Petrovna, stayed for dinner, invited by the hosts, and told jokes from his medical practice.

And it was that Vinogradov, a well-wishing person, who looked people straight in the eye, a person who had watched for many years over Stalin's health, that had turned out to be a spy and a murderer! It was only shortly before that, on 21 December 1952, on Stalin's birthday, that Nikita's first grandson had come into this world; Rada was still at the maternity home on Vesnin Street, out of the door of which had come many sons, daughters, and grandchildren of party and Soviet leaders—the "government children," as the personnel of the maternity home referred to them. In reading the documents I was unwittingly thinking of Rada and the baby.

I remembered Vinogradov also because he kept crowding his speech with the strange little word "stumpy." "Last night, coming home, stumpy, and the wind had blown the window open and all of the papers, stumpy, were scattered on the floor...." This little word, which he somehow mispronounced, strangely fitted the personality of Vladimir Nikitich.

This word "stumpy" was beating on my temples and I must have looked crazed. Gotseridze shook his head and significantly said: "So there. Did you understand everything? We need an editorial. The materials which we

shall use you must read thoroughly." He stood up, opened the door to his office and gave me the key: "Lock yourself in so that no one would disturb you. When you finish, give it to me." He did not have to add "to me only," for this was self-evident.

The editorial contained lines such as: "In his speech at the February-March UKP(b) Central Committee Plenum, in 1937, Comrade Stalin said: 'The question is, why should the bourgeois countries behave toward the Soviet socialist state more gently and like better neighbors than they would toward bourgeois countries of their own kind? Why should they send behind the lines of the Soviet Union less spies, saboteurs and killers than they send behind the lines of bourgeois states like their own? How could such a conclusion be reached?'"

In the papers I was given, the use of this quote was particularly strongly recommended. The editorial was printed. Not a word was said about it at the editorial meeting in which the newspaper issues which had come out the previous week were rated and analyzed. Such topics were not to be criticized. I shall not start to claim that the tone of this editorial was any calmer than in the other newspapers. This newspaper called upon the young to be watchful and vigilant. The only thing which distinguished the editorial was that it did not list the names of the physicians. Today I can claim credit for this. However, this credit is worth little!

Many years later Svetlana Stalina was to write that after the physicians were arrested, her father would no longer use the services of physicians and began to choose his own medicine. He used iodine drops against sclerosis. How could he have let in his home people such as Vinogradov, who had treated him for 20 years, in whom he had confided, telling him the intimate aspects of his life and his mental and physical pains while this despicable murderer was surreptitiously preparing his terrible end?!

To a patient the physician is like a priest to a believer. If priests can lie, which was something that Stalin knew, for he himself could have been one, why would physicians not be liars? Why would bourgeois countries "send behind the lines in the Soviet Union any less spies, saboteurs and murderers than they would to other bourgeois countries? How did one reach this conclusion?"

I realized that there were at least two reasons for this urgent assignment: First, I had to find particularly angry words, for my family could have been poisoned as well; second, this assignment meant that I was trusted. Khrushchev's son-in-law was the proper person.

The moment I was free, I hastened to visit my wife in the maternity home and there, whispering, we discussed the terrible news. A young nurse, Galya Semennikova, was in the room. What struck her the most was that the list included Yegorov, the chief of the Kremlin's treatment administration. His wife had just given birth to a son in

that same maternity home. "My God," Galya said in tears, "such a darling and beautiful woman, and such a lovely baby, what will happen to them now? What else did this monster need, after gobbling up everything...."

This sincere feeling of pity and anger touched me more than the lines of my own editorial.

My family and that of Galina Semennikova have been friends for 35 years. Galina Anatolyevna became a good physician and health care organizer. Occasionally we recall this conversation on Vesnin Street and we are pleased that the child who was born before his father was detained did not carry throughout his life the cross of the son of an enemy of the people. And this applied to more than just this child!

Fear and hatred are similar feelings. Hatred of the physicians-murderers was gathering strength. Physicians in polyclinics and hospitals walked as though beaten. The newspapers published reactions by the working people, who accused the monsters and murderers. A ukase was published awarding Timashuk the Order of Lenin "for her help given to the government in exposing the physicians-murderers." A number of people were willing to include their own rayon doctor in the list of spies and saboteurs. Mothers recalled, horrified, that they had taken their children to be treated by one of the doctors mentioned. Patients demanded that the pharmacies establish stricter control over filling prescriptions.

In the Khrushchev home the detention of the physicians was not discussed although it would be natural to assume that no one had remained indifferent. Nikita Sergeyevich preferred to treat himself without physicians. Occasionally he would come home during the day and would take a hot bath. It was with this simple but tried method that he was able to cure kidney attacks. As in the past, he traveled a great deal and visited kolkhozes and construction sites where the first plants for prestressed concrete were being built. The city was catastrophically short of housing. Hundreds of thousands of people lived in basements and communal apartments, under tight conditions. If he happened to be traveling on Sundays, he invited Rada and me to accompany him, for the others were still too young for that.

I find it difficult to imagine why he took us along. At that time journalism was not considered a serious occupation and, furthermore, he did not expect of us any kind of "publications."

Nikita Sergeyevich could not stand to be alone. He liked to have company. At the Moscow Oblast party committee he would stay until late. Usually the chief of his guard would ring me up at the newspaper and asked: "Well, have you put out our dear KOMSOMOLOCHKA?" If the circumstances permitted, they would send for me the "tail" car (members of the Central Committee Presidium were accompanied by a car with bodyguards) and, it would happen, that I would wait for a long time in the

hall until Khrushchev would show up and we would be driven to the dacha in Usovo. He preferred to live there rather than in the crowded apartment in the city. He liked to be among nature. However late it may have been, he never failed to walk 15 to 20 minutes and in the morning did a quick walk of one and a half to 2 kilometers. This helped him to withstand the pressure while in the city there was no way to take a walk.

In the course of those night return trips no business talk took place with Nikita Sergeyevich and anyone who believes that they were possible at all at home, such as "I told Khrushchev," or "I sought Khrushchev's advice," and so on, are very naive. We usually traveled in silence. Khrushchev did not ask me what I had done in the paper and I did not ask questions about his working day.

Usually, Sunday mornings Nikita Sergeyevich would ask the theater section to be read to him and almost always selected a familiar play. The young members of the family started accompanying their father to the theater later; at the beginning of the 1950s this duty fell upon me and my wife. I have used the right word: duty. Nikita Sergeyevich chose most frequently the MKhAT, although he had seen virtually all of its plays several times. He had probably seen "A Warm Heart," at least 10 times, and so had we, with him. He would agree to watch any opera in the Bolshoy Theater and was indifferent toward ballet. It is true that he would also go to a ballet providing that Ulanova or any other famous ballerina would be performing.

He liked the Theater imeni Mossovet, which he considered to be his own, Moscow's theater. He never failed to invite to his box Yuriy Aleksandrovich Zavadskiy for a cup of tea. The two would recall many actors of the time when Khrushchev, at the beginning and the middle of the 1930s, was only at the start of his career in Moscow. However, if Zavadskiy tried to involve Khrushchev in a business talk and in assessing the play, Nikita Sergeyevich would decline with a joke: "As you can see I do not intend to leave with the second act." After a pause he would add: "Perhaps, however, I would like to. But then why insult the actors...."

At that time he did not consider himself any judge of theater affairs, motion pictures or literature. It is true that, in the car, he could say: "What foolishness." But that would be all. He did not like folk shows or "muck-raking."

He particularly liked documentary movies. He never missed newsreels dealing with science, construction or agriculture. If his assistants were present during the showing he asked them to gather additional information about one or another new development, invention or interesting person. Alas, not everything that was being promoted on the screen actually existed. I do not know what measures would be taken on the occasion of such "movie forgeries," but for a while the viewing of such movies would stop.

During Moscow performances of the Kiev Opera, actors visited Nikita Sergeyevich in his dacha. Together with him they sang folk Russian and Ukrainian songs. A kind of musical competition was held (Khrushchev had no voice) about knowledge of rare and folklore songs. To the honor of the Ukrainian singers, he always would mouth the words of even the most "forgotten" songs or refrains. Khrushchev had been born in the Kursk countryside and had driven herds a great deal and, naturally, in his childhood had heard a great deal of southern Russian folk songs; not far from there were Ukrainian villages and a lively exchange of cultural legacies had been well organized. His mother as well, Kseniya Ivanovna liked to sing; like the peasants said, she did not speak of "singing" but of "shouting songs."

As I recollect now features of Nikita Sergeyevich's character and think of what he valued in people most, my conclusion is that it was practicality, professionalism and dignity of labor. Khrushchev respected those who energetically build their lives. Not without pride he recalled that in his best work years in the Donbass he earned 30 gold rubles. A fitter had to be highly skilled to earn such a high wage. On one occasion the dream of the young Khrushchev came true. He was able to save enough money to buy an overcoat. He entered a store in Yuzovka. "The salesman jumped," Nikita Sergeyevich said, "and asked: 'What can I do for you?' I told him about the overcoat and he immediately brought one, stroking the sleeves. 'Which one do you want, the one on the right or on the left?' I felt the material, hesitated and said that I wanted the right one. The salesman grinned. It turned out that both sleeves belonged to a single overcoat." Khrushchev frequently cited this example at different conferences on trade, usually adding sententiously: "That is how the prerevolutionary salesmen knew how to trade. Our Soviet salesmen would not confuse the customer and would tell him to go pick it up himself."

In World War I Khrushchev was not taken into the Army, for miners were exempt. Life in the Donbass became increasingly harder. Strikes broke out and Cossack units appeared in the miners' settlements. By that time Khrushchev already knew what he believed in. He had become a bolshevik. He went to fight the Whites. During the civil war he was commissar in the political department of the Ninth Army, in the Southern Front.

I recall that during Nikita Sergeyevich's visit to the United States, at a reception in Los Angeles one of the hosts was the son of a merchant from Rostov-na-Donu. During the civil war the merchant's family had been thrown out of its city precisely by the unit in which Nikita Sergeyevich served, and the family found its way to America. After this was established, there was a slight pause after which, ignoring "protocol manners," Khrushchev said that he did not wish either to eat nor drink side by side with a "contra," and that he had come to meet with real Americans and not with Whites. The son of the "White" was shoved somewhere aside and a

"real American" sat next to Nikita Sergeyevich. The incident was diplomatically hushed. Khrushchev was not sorry in the least. In frequent cases Nikita Sergeyevich would astound public opinion. However, people who had seen him under those circumstances would note that behind a seeming lack of restraint there was a fine and, sometimes, malicious thought.

God knows how many "features in the portrait" of Khrushchev could be painted by different people! I look above all at the year of such descriptions, for this explains a great deal. Naturally, Khrushchev was neither an angel nor a cold person and a politician. He did not conceal his explosive nature. He was particularly irked by lies, by scorning work and, even more so, by dulled ideological vigilance, as he understood it. In such cases he was sharp and no arguments would make him change his view about a person or a decision.

Today frequently examples are being quoted of Khrushchev's errors, his lack of objectivity and even self-negation in approaches to the essential development of events which were taking place in society thanks to his efforts. But what is done is done. Khrushchev was frequently told that in his novel "Not by Bread Alone," Vladimir Dudintsev had described precisely the negative phenomena which he, Khrushchev, criticized. This, however, did not change his negative attitude toward the book. He was inscrutable! When the sculptor Ernst Neizvestnyy was designing the monument to N.S. Khrushchev for the Novodevichye Cemetery, he combined white with black stone. A fractured black and white line on the headstone was the visible confirmation of the fact that in this interweaving we find the truth about any man other than Christ, perhaps.

We know that proclaiming the truth is much easier than finding it. Khrushchev loved to tell the joke of two military men, a colonel and a general. When the colonel, as the saying goes, pressed the general against the wall, to the point where the latter had no more arguments, the general took one step forward and barked: "Colonel, you are forgetting yourself!"

I believe that everyone has found himself in the position of either the colonel or the general. Coarsely put, this situation may be expressed as follows: "I'm the chief and you're the dolt; you're the chief and I'm the dolt."

For a long time we have avoided any democratic comparison between viewpoints. We either shout or remain silent. Note that the higher the level on which one problem or another is discussed and the higher the position of those who participate in such a discussion is, the less frequently and the more quietly we hear an odd opinion. I discussed this topic with Nikita Sergeyevich after he was already retired. I asked him whether he considered normal that at Supreme Soviet sessions and party congresses no one objects to anyone else, that there are no arguments to break out or polemics. Could it be that a given decision is all that unquestionable? What

happens if it is not accepted unanimously? Is it not more honest to express one's disagreement or separate view than to create the appearance of unanimity?

Khrushchev remained silent for a long time. We walked nearly 1 kilometer before he answered. I thought that he may be unwilling to pursue the conversation and did not repeat the question. Suddenly, Nikita Sergeyevich said: "Our party is already old, a great deal has become firmly set within it, it has become immovable...."

Yet now it has moved. I believe that Khrushchev would have been happy to see the revolutionary changes which are increasingly determining our lives. We are seeking the truth in the most difficult problems of ideological and economic building, unafraid of the different approaches. The general's "do not forget yourself!" is becoming part of the past.

The spring of 1953 was cold. The snow had still not thawed in the fields around Moscow and snowdrifts, untouched by the sun, remained in the forest. My wife and son lived in Khrushchev's dacha. Rada got up early and usually asked the maid when her father would come back and whether she should wait for him for lunch. It turned out that on that day Nikita Sergeyevich had arrived after midnight but 2 hours later he had been summoned again and had still not returned. At that time anything would come to mind with such sudden departures. The terrible news was announced on the radio the next morning.

The governmental announcement spoke of the illness of Comrade Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, USSR Council of Ministers chairman and CPSU Central Committee secretary. This announcement was published on 4 March, Wednesday.

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers announce the misfortune which has befallen on our party and people: the grave illness of Comrade J.V. Stalin.

"On the night of 2 March, in Moscow, in his apartment, Comrade Stalin suffered a brain hemorrhage which affected areas of the brain important to life. Comrade Stalin lost consciousness. His right hand and leg were paralyzed. He lost the power of speech. Severe disturbances appeared in the activities of his heart and breathing functions."

Bulletins on Stalin's state of health were published until 4 p.m. on 5 March. The next day the front pages of the newspapers came out bordered in black. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium announced that Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, USSR Council of Ministers chairman and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had died on 5 March, at 9:50 p.m., after a grave illness.

This was immediately followed by the medical conclusion on the illness and death of J.V. Stalin and a report by the commission in charge of organizing the funeral. The casket with Stalin's body was laid in the Hall of Columns of the House of Unions. N.S. Khrushchev was appointed chairman of the commission in charge of organizing the funeral. The commission also included L.M. Kaganovich, N.M. Shvernik, A.M. Vasilevskiy, N.M. Pegov, P.A. Artemyev and M.A. Yasnov.

Although Khrushchev headed the funeral commission, this did not mean in the least that he would automatically assume the leading position in the party. Malenkov and Beriya were in front in carrying the casket. Malenkov, Molotov and Beriya spoke at the funeral meeting. All of these protocol fine points were an indication of the deployment of forces. A triumvirate was becoming clearly apparent: Malenkov, Beriya and Molotov.

On the day of the funeral, 9 March, one more name appeared on the marble pediment of the Mausoleum: Stalin.

The mourning was slow. It was not even a question that the pain of the loss was shared by millions of people. The atmosphere was affected by the general feeling of concern, a feeling of defenselessness, a kind of orphanhood. To the majority of the population, the name Stalin was related to the special position which our country held in the world arena, and confidence that difficulties, obstacles and troubles can be surmounted. "He is omnipotent, he can find the only true solution." That is how the people had become accustomed to believe. That is what they thought and that is the way the phenomenon of this personality had been established: higher than God, closer than father and mother, unique of its kind.

He lay in state in the Mausoleum and in one of the first days when visiting was permitted, the members of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA somberly approached the two glass-walled caskets which were laid almost side by side. The stars shining on the shoulder straps were reflected in the heavy transparent glass, which made Stalin's sarcophagus more noticeable, as though overshadowing the one in which Lenin lay. This complex sensation, which I felt sharply, came and went....

Stalin's death could not fail to raise for his heirs the question of how to live and act further. Nikita Sergeevich recalled that in the last years (or perhaps months) of his life, Stalin said: "Without me you would perish.... Lenin wrote a testament and made a mess for all of us." Why did Khrushchev remember these words, what was behind them? Was Stalin warning someone or, at such times, truly realized the actual state of affairs in the country and, looking back at his life, was he repenting for something?.... Was it his alienation from the children and the fact that after his wife's suicide he did not spare even those among her relatives whom he had liked at one point? Why did he say "you will perish?"

Thoughts of this nature can be based only on guesses. A great deal in Stalin's life was wrapped in secrecy.

During those days of mourning we virtually did not leave the premises of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. We telephoned our authors and asked them to write posthumous poems or notes for the newspaper and prepared selections from letters. The days of mourning blended within an endless length of time. We took turns in taking interviews at the entrance to the Hall of Columns. The fragrance of millions of flowers which had been brought to Stalin's casket filled the raw spring air. Even now, decades later, whenever I walk past the House of Unions, I can still smell those flowers.

Earthly matters pushed sadness aside. Bread had to be baked, trains had to be run and newspapers to be published. One month after the death of the leader or, more precisely, on 3 April 1953, a news item about which everyone commented was received by the editors. After the newspaper hit the stands, everyone began to comment on the news item.

No instructions could be received "from over there." The anger of the dead does not frighten the living.

Physicians who, only a few months back, in January, had been labeled spies and murderers, proved to be innocent. KOMSOMOLKA was rumbling from the voices of visitors—readers, authors, and those who always hasten to visit the newspaper, the source of news. Everyone was excited not only by the staggering report but also by the logic which necessarily followed it: Timashuk was an inept adventurer and informer. But who needed her "exposures?" She had been awarded the Order of Lenin "for assistance rendered to the government." Now justice triumphed. The people were happy for the unknown physicians. They were happy because this lifted fear and suspicion. Life seemed better and cleaner than it had been only 12 weeks earlier. However, the dropping of the false charges were conceived in much broader and significant terms. The fact that an error had been acknowledged indicated the existence of a hard, shameful truth!

The detention of those who had organized the provocation against the physicians was discussed not with vengeful malice but as a just retribution. However, ever new questions could not fail to arise in the public consciousness. The people recalled Yagoda and Yezhov and their numerous "associates." In the past as well they had been detained, tried and executed. Such unfortunate people—both executioners and victims—having committed their sinister deed disappeared, yielding their place to others. How often could this recur? For it was not only we, newsmen, who looked down in shame: today we wrote one thing and tomorrow something else. There had been millions of people who had been summoned to meetings to condemn and express their indignation.

G.K. Zhukov returned to Moscow in March. He was appointed first deputy minister of defense (N.A. Bulganin was minister). On Stalin's order, since 1946 Zhukov had commanded the troops of the Odessa and, subsequently, Ural Military Districts. Zhukov's return from Sverdlovsk was meaningful. Georgiy Konstantinovich immediately saw to the rehabilitation of a group of military who had been arrested after the war. Aviation Marshals I.I. Novikov and G.A. Vorozheykin, and Admirals V.A. Alfuzov and G.A. Stepanov returned to Moscow. Naturally, they did not keep their silence. Milchakov, former Komsomol Central Committee secretary, who had served the full term of his sentence in the camps, met with Nikita Sergeyevich. The terrible details of arbitrariness became known....

My wife was friendly with Alla Kuznetsova, the wife of Sergo, who was the son of Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. This intelligent, gentle and restrained young woman took hard the detention of her father and, subsequently, of her mother, Zinaida Dmitriyevna. Repressive measures had been taken against Kuznetsov in 1949, in connection with the so-called "Leningrad case." During the war Aleksey Aleksandrovich and his family had remained in Leningrad for the entire 900 days of the blockade.

On one occasion Rada decided to ask Nikita Sergeyevich about Kuznetsov's fate. He did not answer. Several days later, walking with her in the forest, he briefly said: "Tell Alla that Aleksey Aleksandrovich is not among the living."

The entire Mikoyan family—himself, his wife Ashkhen Lazarevna, and Sergo's brothers—displayed amazing tactfulness and paid great attention to the Kuznetsov family. They helped Alla and her sisters and brother after their parents had been detained. They did this openly, although aware of the risk they were taking. Many, alas, abandoned even closer relatives and, in some cases, even their fathers and mothers.

Alla Kuznetsova went through a long and severe illness, as a result of the days of the blockade. She died on 6 November 1957. Zinaida Dmitriyevna, who had returned from exile 1 year previously, survived her oldest daughter for many years.

Unexpectedly a flood of letters reached the newspaper reporting that gangs of criminals and recidivists had shown up in many cities and oblasts in the country. The people were afraid of leaving their homes. They demanded that night patrols on the streets and parks be reinforced. An amnesty was granted after Stalin's death. With a strange haste inveterate criminals, who had lost their human face, were pardoned. It was only later that we understood what was actually concealed behind this "act of mercy."...

I was away from home in July 1953. I was in Shanghai with a Komsomol delegation which had attended the proceedings of the congress of the People's Democratic

Youth League of China, and which then toured the country. At that time nothing was spoiling our relations. One could hear everywhere the song "Moscow-Beijing" with genuine enthusiasm. Our last night in Shanghai was alarming. We were awakened by a persistent knocking at the door. Incoherently, as though apologizing, our hosts reported to us a Japanese radio broadcast to the effect that tanks were rolling on Moscow's streets, there were detentions and there was talk that Beriya had been killed in a shoot-out. In the morning we checked with the Soviet embassy in Beijing. Ambassador Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov calmed us down. He said that the trip around the country should go on and that he would give us an explanation when we met again. On that day Romanian friends, who had checked with their embassy, reported that there was no question of canceling the youth and student festival in Bucharest and that it would take place as scheduled, in August. Already in Shanghai we learned that Beriya had been arrested, and that tanks had indeed been positioned along some streets and squares in Moscow. I found out the whys and wherefores of the events only after I returned from China....

I had seen Beriya from close on several occasions. I had listened to his speech at the ceremony on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the October Revolution. He spoke well, virtually without an accent, clearly and powerfully. His timing was good, and he would turn his head while the applause lasted. His speeches did not follow the usual pattern.

On the surface Beriya was somewhat fat, with a puffy and flabby face. He looked like an ordinary "Soviet official" of the 1930s. He wore a drooping hat down to his ears and baggy cloaks or overcoats. This appearance, however, was misleading. Hiding behind the shapeless wrinkled clothing and fat was an unprincipled, clever and merciless character. Everyone feared Beriya for a reason. During that period several strange events had taken place in my own life, the significance of which I realized only later. My mother was Beriya's wife's seamstress. Nina Timurazovna was an agrochemist, a candidate of sciences. She valued my mother's efficiency and lack of obtrusive servility. On one occasion, with a hint of regret, Nina Timurazovna remarked: "Why did Alesha have to become part of the Khrushchev family?" Naturally, my mother was disturbed and mentioned the conversation. We had just gotten married and, naturally, were discouraged, the more so since an anonymous denunciation was passed on to us from the MGB: It was a philistine description of mine and Rada's "blabbering" on the subject of the "beautiful life" in Nikita Sergeyevich's family. Khrushchev let us read the anonymous denunciation without a comment.

On one occasion two of our friends and fellow students had visited the Khrushchev dacha. It seemed crazy, but only they could have fabricated such utter stupidities. The denunciation gave details of the situation and of family interrelationships which no one else could have known. Many years later Nikita Sergeyevich described

the way in which this anonymous denunciation had found its way into the "Khrushchev family" file. My mother and I lived at that time in a communal apartment. A citizen visited our neighbor, whose husband had been arrested in 1937. It was he who had dictated this denunciation, warning the woman not to blabber unless she wished to share the fate of her husband.

Not only the premises, homes and families of high leaders of the party and the government or, in general, of anyone who was of interest to Beriya, but their offices as well, were kept under observation. One night high officials showed up in the reception room of the Moscow Oblast party committee and demanded of V. Pivovarov, the secretary on duty, the key to Khrushchev's office. Asked why, they rudely answered that they had to check the reliability of the safe and the telephones, adding that the secretary had no right to be interested in details concerning their duties, for this was none of his business. Pivovarov sharply refused to allow the night visitors into the office and threatened to summon the boss. And although he was subjected to a flood of abuse, he refused to open the office.

Amazingly, this nocturnal event had no consequences. Pivovarov reported the event to Khrushchev who, apparently, decided to keep his council.

It was precisely at that time that Beriya was trying to become good friends with Khrushchev and gain his favor. Sometimes, late at night, he would wait for him on the highway leading to the dacha, to talk. If I happened to be coming back from night duty at the paper together with Nikita Sergeevich, I had to transfer into the car of this frightening person. The mustachioed chauffeur did not even nod to me. He sat motionless, like a sphinx, and it was as though the car was driving itself. The passengers in the first car talked. All that was left to me was to look at the trunks of the birch trees which lined the Uspenskoye Highway. Birch trees in this Moscow area are very photogenic and they have been frequently filmed.... On one occasion I could not restrain myself and asked the driver whether I could smoke. He did not dignify me with an answer but somehow managed to indicate that it was forbidden, perhaps with a motion of his shoulder straps, showing his rank as major. Actually, it would have been sinful to smoke in a car which smelled of fresh leather.

According to Khrushchev, during the days when Stalin was painfully dying, Beriya no longer restrained his true feelings. He maliciously cursed Stalin without any restraint and when Stalin would regain consciousness for a minute, he would rush to him, kissing his hands and fawning. The moment the end came, not even approaching the crying daughter of the departed, Beriya rushed out of the Volynskoye to be the first to announce the news to his friends and stooges. "I then told Bulganin," Nikita Sergeevich said, "that the moment Beriya would seize the power he would kill all of us, he would start a new round...."

For a long time Beriya had been playing up to those he considered necessary to neutralize and dull their vigilance, those who were watchful about his ambitions. He appointed his own people to leading positions in the internal affairs organs and began to interfere in the matters of the party obkoms and abuse secretaries who demanded Central Committee instructions and were unwilling to obey the orders of Beriya's apparatus. Zinoviy Timofeyevich Serdyuk, first secretary of the Lvov party obkom, reported to Khrushchev that in answer to his objections to Beriya, the latter shouted on the telephone: "I shall turn you into camp dust!"

After Stalin's death, Beriya thought of a clever move in connection with the amnesty. The amnesty covered large groups of inmates. Beriya was worried by the fact that he no longer had the power automatically to extend prison terms of those who had been sent to camps during the years of mass repressions and had served their time. These people were returning home and demanding that justice be restored. Yet it was extremely necessary for Beriya once again to send into exile those he found unsuitable and not to release those who were still there. It was at that point that criminals and recidivists began to be released. They immediately took up their old professions. Discontent and instability could have given Beriya an opportunity to return to the old methods.

Once Nina Petrovna described Khrushchev's trip to the Caucasus in the summer of 1952. Beriya as well was on vacation there. Naturally, he went to see Khrushchev. He invited him to visit Abkhaziya. They reached the pass, and lunched on the scenic platform not far from Sukhumi. Below them was the blue sea and a golden valley. Beriya spread his arms and said: "What space, Nikita. Let us build here our homes, let us breathe the mountain air and live to be a hundred, like the old men in this valley." Nikita Sergeevich asked: "And what shall we do with the old people here?" He asked this in passing, with no blame attached. Beriya without thinking, immediately answered: "We shall move them somewhere else...."

Was Beriya checking on Khrushchev's feelings? Or did he want, at the proper time, to accuse him of immorality and turn the Abkhaz against him? According to Nina Petrovna, Nikita Sergeevich returned home in a state of rage.

On what do I base my conviction that it was precisely Khrushchev who took the firm decision to render Beriya harmless, to prevent him from seizing power? It is based not only on the stories told by Nikita Sergeevich himself who, after these worrisome weeks had passed, frequently recalled what happened and how it happened, although this too is important testimony. Those around him could not fail to see that on the eve of Beriya's arrest, all of a sudden Nikita Sergeevich showed up at the dacha in the middle of the working day and, on

several occasions, he was visited by Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Bulganin and Mikoyan. Usually, Nikita Sergeyevich took long walks toward the river with the visiting comrades.

Khrushchev also described the reaction to his suggestion. Everyone was in favor of the detention. The fact that Malenkov and Molotov had agreed was important. The views of the former worried Nikita Sergeyevich. For many years Malenkov and Beriya had been attracted to each other. Malenkov, however, was firm. He said that he would announce at the meeting of the Central Committee Presidium Beriya's detention. Nikita Sergeyevich recalled that when he started his talk with Voroshilov, initially the latter began to praise Beriya. Having heard Nikita Sergeyevich out, he started crying. He considered Khrushchev almost as Beriya's friend. He had seen the latter make approaches to Nikita Sergeyevich and simply feared for himself. Voroshilov was prepared personally to arrest this adventurist.

There is yet another circumstance the consequences of which were important. After Stalin's death Khrushchev was not elected Central Committee first secretary. As member of the Central Committee Presidium, Khrushchev headed the work of the Secretariat. However, the country's political leadership was centered on Malenkov, Beriya and Molotov. It was also they who headed the USSR Council of Ministers.

On whom were the old communists, the Bolsheviks-Leninists who had come from exile relying? In whom did they expect to find understanding and support and, above all, reinforcement of their convictions? Was it Malenkov or Molotov, who had worked side by side with Beriya? Nonetheless, the people found their way to the Central Committee. They did not link Stalin's crimes of the 1930s to Khrushchev. He had not sullied himself with personal participation in mass repressions. It was thus that exceptionally important information reached the Central Committee and Khrushchev could find out first hand details on the death of many party members, including many comrades he knew personally.

Naturally, he was aware of what he could expect. Maximal restraint had to be shown until the very last moment. Beriya's informers could be anywhere. Khrushchev took a riskier step. He knew from the Ukraine Serov, Beriya's replacement. Apparently, he reached an agreement with him as well. Serov kept his word and gave his firm support. I shall not discuss the reasons for which he did so but, in any case, he had a certain share in the operation.

What was essential was that Nikita Sergeyevich obtained the full support of Marshal Zhukov and Army General Moskalenko. It was precisely they who entered the Kremlin Hall of Sessions of the Central Committee Presidium and told Beriya that he was under arrest. This act was only the finale of the precautionary work which the military had carried out.

During those days Khrushchev and the others did not display merely personal courage. The will of the party's Central Committee was behind these fateful days in our history.

The Central Committee plenum which was then held expelled Beriya from membership and from the party. Deprived of his awards and titles, he became vulnerable to prosecution.

The bourgeois press spread around the world all kinds of fabrications! It was claimed that "Beriya was killed without a trial and an investigation, right in his automobile."

During those days our press reported the establishment of a special court under the USSR Supreme Court, consisting of the following: Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, chairman, with the following membership: N.M. Shvernik, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; Ye.L. Zeydin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Court; Army General K.S. Moskalenko; N.A. Mikhaylov, secretary of the Moscow Oblast CPSU Committee; M.I. Kuchava, chairman of the Georgian Trade Unions Council; L.A. Gro-mov, chairman of the Moscow City Court; and K.F. Lunev, USSR first deputy minister of internal affairs.

The investigation took several months and the trial was conducted behind closed doors.

Beriya's hands were covered with the blood of thousands of innocent people. In Azerbaijan and Georgia he systematically eliminated anyone who, one way or another, may have known about his ties with Musavatist intelligence, which was a branch of British intelligence, along with many other people. Coming to Moscow, initially as Yezhov's deputy and, subsequently, as full master of the NKVD, he became the zealous executor and organizer of the mass repressions of 1937-1939 and all subsequent years.

By the end of December the special court of the USSR Supreme Court, after studying the materials submitted by the USSR prosecutor's office and having heard the testimony of the accused, sentenced L.P. Beriya, as an enemy of the people and the party, together with six of his main subordinates, to the supreme penalty—death by firing squad. The sentence was carried out on 23 December 1953. Beriya was able to send a letter to Khrushchev, at the Central Committee. He begged for mercy and for the opportunity to redeem his guilt under the harshest possible conditions....

A time will eventually come when Beriya's trial and the dozens of volumes related to the case will be made public.

The year 1953 was drawing to a close. A party Central Committee plenum was held in September to analyze the condition in agriculture. Although the problem of grain

had been proclaimed solved at the 19th Party Congress, grain purchases did not meet the full needs of the country and this particularly affected the development of animal husbandry. Between 1940 and 1952 industrial output had doubled or tripled, while gross agricultural output had increased by no more than 10 percent. Khrushchev's speech noted that increasing grain production was being held back by the abandonment of the principle of material incentive, which is a basic concept in socialist economic management. Khrushchev recalled Vladimir Ilich Lenin's important idea that many years will have to pass before communism could be attained and that during the period of transition the economy must be built "not directly on enthusiasm but with the help of the enthusiasm created by the great revolution, on the basis of personal interest, personal incentive and cost accounting" (V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*," [Complete Collected Works], vol 33, p 36).

The September Central Committee Plenum played an important role in our party's history. Khrushchev was elected first secretary. This confirmed not only the growth of his personal influence but also the enhancement and the strengthening of the party's role in the country's life.

In January 1954, in a note to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, Khrushchev described failures related to grain resources. By the end of 1953 the procured grain was not only lesser than the amounts harvested in 1951 and 1952 but even below the 1940 level, while grain outlays had increased by more than 50 percent. No further successful development of the entire national economy was possible without the necessary amount of grain. The grain problem became number one. Khrushchev's note substantiated the suggestion of growing grain in the virgin and fallow lands of Kazakhstan, Siberia and many other areas. It was thus that for the first time the term "virgin lands" appeared in a political document.

The economic turn which was being initiated in the country at that time could not fail to bring about changes in journalism. The main feature in our lives is the road. This is something I know from personal experience and from that of my comrades. The most active reporters spend on assignments some 100 days annually, changing from one airplane to another and from one train to another. Today things are more comfortable but in the 1950s, when the airports in Domodedovo and Sheremet'yevo did not exist, when no hotel reservations were possible and, furthermore, hotels were most frequently "tourist homes," the conditions of journalistic life and work were not easy. The main difficulty, however, was not living accommodations but prohibitions.

It is ridiculous and sad to recall but we were not always able to "insert" in an article even a note on a fire or flood, not to mention worse accidents. According to the press, there were no railroad or airplane accidents in our

country; ships did not sink; there were no explosions in mines; automobiles did not run over pedestrians; no snow avalanches fell on mountain villages and no floods threatened cities.

At the start or the middle of the 1950s, and even in the 1960s, publishing news on disasters was not encouraged. I was already working for IZVESTIYA when, one day, I found from an associate that an electric train had collided with a freight train in the Moscow area. All sorts of rumors were making the rounds: there had been 200, no, 300 deaths! The Ministry of Railways confirmed that there had been a collision and that two people had died. The editors assigned a reporter to the site of the accident. He found out all that was necessary but the article remained unpublished. We had no right to publish the news without the permission of the Ministry of Railways which, however, told us as follows: "Absolutely not! Those who know know; those who do not know will not find out. You must write that two people died, for which reason anyone reading the news will know that there were many more victims." This highly placed railway official knew that many people had become accustomed to interpret news items in their own fashion. If we wrote that a motion picture was worthless people would line up to see it, and vice versa.

It was difficult to paid pictures of such an ideal life. This included the newspapers. Conflict-free situations were convenient. To begin with, it was alleged that people would work with greater optimism; second, those who were saved from criticism by such "taboos" would turn out to be infallible, strong and clever.

We too had to be retrained. However, not everything was being renovated as we liked and not so perceptively. Aleksey Maksimovich Gorkiy wrote an essay on the use of high explosives. Gorkiy had come to the Dnepr on the day when rocks on the rapids, which prevented the building of an electric power plant and navigation, were to be removed. The young engineer told the writer to watch closely the river, for the rocks would disappear and the Dnepr would no longer bubble and foam. Gorkiy expected to hear an explosion and see how rocks and fountains of water would rise in the air. Nothing of the sort happened. There was a dull sound, and a final wave and then the water started flowing smoothly. Happy and excited, the engineer ran to him and asked: "Well?" Puzzled, Gorkiy answered that he had no impression of the fact for, actually, he had noticed nothing. The engineer explained that the entire secret was the high explosive. The explosive was set under the rock, on the bed on which the rock rested. This would make it possible to avoid the waste of unnecessary power and although on the surface there would be no effect the method was reliable, for in one fell swoop everything which blocked the flow would be removed. At that time Gorkiy thought of how beautiful it would be if in social relations life could be cleansed from all trash and accretions with such a high explosive.

The year 1957 came. The pages of KOMSOMOLKA became more lively and more human. Discussions were launched and more extensive use was made of letters to the editor. We were the first to start the publication of sharp essays on moral-aesthetic topics. To this day readers of the older generations remember the article "Mold," by Ilya Shatunovskiy, which discussed the nature of double life, double morality, words and their essence.

A discussion of this article was held at the Art Workers Club, and the passions which were fanned were such that a senior worker was ready to accuse the speakers of almost attacking the "foundations." This protective vigilance, the aspiration to block thinking and to be satisfied with silence, remains strikingly enduring. Later, in 1958, when the monument to Mayakovsky was inaugurated and young people began to gather around it to listen to poetry, the initial reaction was, once again, to ban, to summon the militia. It was forgotten that Mayakovsky loved disputes, and that he came out of them the winner. In an ideological struggle one wins not by shouting but with arguments.

In the newspaper as well, not without errors and arguments, we learned democracy. This was difficult for a number of reasons. Our generation had been raised on instructions. It took a great deal of strength to violate them, if the job demanded it. Yet we were unaware of the fact that only the memory of the few survivors and legends could tell us that in the first years of its existence the militant KOMSOMOLKA of the 1930s remained alive. We were unable to rely on the experience of our elder comrades.

The repressions of the end of the 1930s did not bypass Komsomol cadres and journalists in the youth press. Even before Aleksandr Kosarev (who was executed by firing squad in February 1939), general secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, had been detained in 1938, his friend Nikolay Bubekin, editor in chief of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, had been arrested. When I became editor in chief of KOMSOMOLKA I took over Bubekin's office. The opening in the wall behind my back was barely noticeable and I would occasionally "replay" in my imagination the day when Bubekin disappeared from the editorial premises.

The building of the Pravda Publishing House Combine, in which, to this day, the editorial premises of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA are located, had been designed by the architect P.A. Golosov. Small elevators could take the personnel directly to their offices in the wood-paneled section of all floors. No one ever used these elevators and many people did not even know of their existence. In Bubekin's office walnut paneling had blocked the elevator's door entirely. One evening Dusya Mikheyeva, the editor in chief's secretary (who subsequently worked in the same position under other editors) brought the latest edition for Bubekin's signature (the thus signed newspaper would be taken subsequently to

the setters); he was not in his office. He was sought everywhere in vain. Panic broke out: There was no one to sign this issue for publication. Mikheyeva claimed that she had not left her office even for a minute, and that the editor in chief had not left his office. The officials on duty started ringing up people but suddenly the "big" telephone on the table of the editor in chief started ringing. The report was "do not seek Bubekin, he is with us." His office had been reached from this undistinguished elevator.

Not only Bubekin but the virtually entire editorial staff of KOMSOMOLKA, many splendid reporters, were "with them." It was only in the mid-1950s that their names were rehabilitated and that their experience began to be adopted, but very slowly at that....

Naturally, we wanted to know what kind of life our comrades were living, we wanted to know about a great many things. What was the price and why was it paid for, what were the objective difficulties and where did different ideas prevail. This is the wish of any thinking person if he seriously considers himself responsible for the common cause. Innuendoes and silences are dangerous for at least two reasons: They free a person from responsibility (including historical responsibility) and lead to the old delusions and errors. To repeat errors and "burn" oneself and not remember it is forgivable only when one is a child.

Could a sapper dare write: "Apparently, there are no mines here?" This would be absurd. But why is it not absurd to conceal something in various phenomena and processes in which a careless step is no less terrible than a minefield? When Stalin structured his own concept of building socialism, he cut off the past, for it did not fit the framework of his political, economic and social views. Why did we mandatorily have to observe this rule?

Today, more than ever before, we realize that any action by any person cannot be evaluated without a free critical interpretation. We realize how much society loses by giving an individual the right to make uncontrollable decisions. Collectivism is the foundation of our policy. For the time being, however, we are gravely short of standards in the interpretation of one political event or another, including things affecting people in politics.

As we pointed out, the September 1953 Central Committee Plenum urgently raised the grain problem. The newsmen knew the actual situation of the kolkhoz fields. They knew that many farms paid nothing per labor day and that the peasants were able to have ends meet through exhaustive toil on their private plots. Not without bitterness Khrushchev said that when he had toured the kolkhozes around Moscow in 1950 he found in one of them 12 debilitated old people. Yet the kolkhoz's name was "New Life." Had Khrushchev been unaware of this before that? Did not all of us understand that we were very far from the prosperity which had been

depicted by so many people, including newsmen? I recall how in 1952 Valentin Ovechkin shook up everyone with the truth and the daring of his "Rayon Days." At that time few were the writers who dared write such a thing. Mikhail Ulyanov described how difficult it was to show the motion picture "The Chairman," although it had been filmed after the 22nd Party Congress. Its authors were being threatened with all sorts of punishments. Alas, this is happening to this day....

By whom? And why is this necessary? Who can love a lie, knowing that sooner or later it would turn into trouble?

Most frequently, these people are anonymous. They do not exist, they are a substance. They cannot be understood or grabbed by the hand. They consist of instructions, opinions, an expression of disgust, raised eyebrows, and a scratch of the pen. This "elusiveness" is the main difficulty.

I was born in Central Asia, in Samarkand. In the 1930s, as a child, I experienced hunger. There was no bread. The market was bare. Whipped by hunger we, children, ran out of the city, caught turtles and boiled turtle eggs on campfires, scrambling them in empty cans. This led to intestinal diseases, the cities were cordoned off by the militia, and the turtle catchers were brought back to their parents under escort.

I saw the traces of the terrible destruction later, before the war, as member of a geological prospecting expedition in Kazakhstan. We were looking for tin ore—cassiterite—in the area between the Irtysh and Ishim Rivers; we traveled along the wild and burned-down steppe, aboard a truck, in the Ayaguz, Kokchetav and Semipalatinsk areas, and the Kara-aul and Bayan-aul Rayon centers. We frequently crossed small dry riverbeds. The prospecting pit is a rectangle 80 by 125 centimeters, and the deeper we dug the more hopes there were of finding the ore which concealed red bits of cassiterite, which looked like cherry pits.

The banks of the little rivers along which we stopped and put up our tents and lit our campfires, were uninhabited. For many kilometers on end, along the banks, we would come across the ruins of village homes. Occasionally we could cross a small empty street. We saw human bones mixed with bones of animals. The people who had run away from hunger in these areas had no strength to bury their relatives.

In the evenings, as we sharpened our shovels, like cavalymen sharpening their swords, we naturally talked. Valentin Ivanovich Pytnov, the head of the expedition, remembered the years of collectivization which he had witnessed in many of his expeditions, for geologists keep moving. But what could he tell us, his younger comrades, when to this day we are still avoiding the thorough and calm analysis and a comparison among specific figures and facts....

Yet the main thing is not the wish to dig into the past but for a great country to be able to solve more successfully its current agricultural problems.

Quite recently we found out that the works of the Russian economist and expert in the cooperative movement, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Chayanov, are being published in many countries and that his thoughts on the organization of rural labor have been tremendously useful to farmers in Italy, India, Japan, etc.

In 1987 Chayanov and other major economists were rehabilitated by the USSR Supreme Court and declared innocent of the charge of organizing the so-called Labor Peasant Party (TPK), while the charge of sabotage and espionage had been lifted as early as 1956. In 1930 views which did not fit Stalin's scheme of comprehensive collectivization were burned out with "a hot iron." Brilliant people were executed and different viewpoints were rejected.

Nikita, the older of Aleksandr Vasilyevich Chayanov's sons, died as a member of the Moscow militia; the younger brother, Vasiliy Aleksandrovich, fought at the front as a soldier. After the war he did a great deal to prove the innocence of his father. Today I think of other such sons: Svyatoslav Nikolayevich Fedorov, a surgeon-ophthalmologist; Yuriy Nikolayevich Vavilov, a physicist; Stanislav Yakovlevich Doletskiy, a pediatrician and scientist; and Yuriy Valentinovich Trifonov, a writer. These are but a few of people I know.... At one point, Fedorov said: "Without the 20th Congress, the majority of people like myself would have been cast on the side of the roads of life...."

The enthusiasm of those years was manifested most clearly in the tremendous epic of the development of the virgin lands. The country was short of grain and grain had to be procured quickly. I shall not undertake to judge whether Khrushchev had considered all other choices in solving the bread impasse. The virgin land epic has been assessed differently in different years. In the mid-1960s I heard statements to the effect that the virgin lands had been Khrushchev's biggest error along with the creation of sovnarkhozes, the closing down of a number of ministries and changing the role of the remaining ones. Subsequently, it is true, the new general secretary "adopted" the virgin lands and the critics fell silent.

In February 1954 Khrushchev addressed the Komsomol members of Moscow and Moscow Oblast who were about to leave for the virgin lands in Kazakhstan. They were accompanied by an entire KOMSOMOLKA brigade. We wrote of the desperately difficult and joyless first failure of the 1955 crop and of the second one, when endless golden fields could be seen all the way to the horizon. We were proud of the fact that Semen Garbuzov, a KOMSOMOLKA essayist, had written the scenario for the first feature film on the virgin lands.

One after another, Nikita Sergeyevich toured the virgin land sovkhozes. The venturesome nature of this person demanded personal impressions and meetings with people. I frequently heard his speeches at large meetings and talks with young virgin land workers at campfires. He never promised them benefits as sent from heaven. He was not afraid to speak of the difficulty of their work and misled no one on this account.

The topic of grain and, in broader terms, food, food-stuffs, produce, and eating, could be heard in all of Khrushchev's numerous speeches. In 1954-1955 alone he visited Siberia, the Far East, Sakhalin, Central Asia, the Ukraine, Saratov, Voronezh, Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast, Riga, Kursk and once again Central Asia, not to mention the numerous conferences he attended in Moscow along with Central Committee plenums, the purpose of which was to feed the country.

He concentrated his entire energy, temperament and tenacity on achieving this objective. To a political leader this meant linking his authority and influence and, to a large extent his own future, to the results of his plan.

The 30 million hectares which were plowed, sowed and harvested sharply increased the state resources. Three years later, by 1957, the food problem became less acute. The scarcity of many foodstuffs, bread, milk and meat above all, virtually vanished.

Young people frequently ask how do leaders in the higher power echelons appear in our country. How did Khrushchev reach this position? For some reason such topics are not discussed in our country. That is perhaps why I am explaining it now.

Nikita Sergeyevich turned 60 in 1954. He did not recognize family celebrations. In the morning, as they did every day, the young went to school and the older members of the family went to work. Nonetheless, we did celebrate the birthday surreptitiously. Guests gathered in the dacha. One could not fail to notice how different the host was from them. Burned by the wind and the sun, with a graying crown of hair around his powerful cranium, Khrushchev looked like an unexpected relative, out of place. That evening he was in good form, pouring out sayings, puns and Ukrainian stories. Naturally, he knew that his apparent simplicity would grate on some of the guests but this did not bother him in the least. His sharp eyes slid across the faces of those around him and it seemed as though they reflected, like small mirrors, anything which had captured his attention. Coatless, wearing a Ukrainian shirt folded in the arms (his arms were short and, as he said, especially suitable for the work of a fitter), Khrushchev asked the others too to take off their coats but no one was willing to do so.

The guests were sitting with a condescending expression on their faces, not particularly hiding their wish to go home but did not dare leave the table. Clearly, they

accepted Khrushchev differently and were forced to tolerate the fact that he had fallen in their circle instead of remaining there, in the Ukraine, where, obviously, he himself found life and work easier and more successful. This incompatibility between Nikita Sergeyevich and his guests created a feeling of unease and even concern. Nina Petrovna said: "Let us let the guests go."

After everyone had departed, Nikita Sergeyevich stepped on the veranda and asked that the tape recorder with a tape of the singing of birds be turned on. He had brought this recorder from Kiev and was very proud of the fact that it worked reliably through the efforts of Kiev engineers and workers. He played it frequently. He had recorded bird songs himself, setting in the evenings the heavy wooden case in the bushes, where nightingales and other songbirds nested.

This machine had been working for 30 years!

The tape recorder was not Nikita Sergeyevich's exclusive attraction. He persistently promoted the production of electric razors and electronic watches (he had given to the Moscow Second Time Pieces Plant his own watches which he had received as a gift from an American), straw hats, lighters, although he himself had never smoked, and, somewhat later, synthetic leather. He demonstratively wore a hat made of artificial leather. His colleagues wore the same hats but made of real leather and he jokingly and surreptitiously would switch hats. The owner of the hat would realize that it was not his and, as he returned the hat to its owner, Nikita Sergeyevich joked: "You see, you did not even notice that it was made of artificial leather."

He particularly watched over the development of synthetic materials. Khrushchev said that without developing the production of synthetic materials the question of clothing would remain unsolved. He actively sought Western businessmen who had hastened to come to Moscow. Unless I am wrong, Marinotti, the major Italian industrialist (I had visited his company in Rome) delivered to us the first plants for artificial fibers. That is how the "bologna" fabric became part of our life.

The attraction for anything new, and some kind of childish happiness from the fact that someone had mastered the production of tape recorders, watches and shavers, proved his constant eagerness to improve the life of the people not on a global but, rather, on the specific, I would even say the itemized level. Today the many lovers of tape recorders and possessors of electronic watches do not know through whose efforts their production was initiated. To this day, however, there are people at work at the Second Time Pieces Plant, who remember the electronic watches given to them by Khrushchev. Semen Borisovich Rivkin, to whom I gave at one point old American-made watches, and who is deputy general director of the plant, immediately recognized them. "It was from these watches," he said, "that a new trend was initiated in our output."

Naturally, it was not simply a matter of giving and producing. Nikita Sergeyevich raged if shavers, watches and lighters broke down quickly and shamed engineers at conferences. As a temperamental and "explosive" person, he was frequently unable to restrain himself. I recall the event which was the subject of a great deal of reactions, ranging from affectionate, such as "that is our boy," to scornful: "Think, he banged his shoe on the table at the United Nations! Shame! What will they think of us?" However, this was not against the protocol of the meeting. Many delegates attending the United Nations session were laughing and Secretary General Hammarskjöld made no remark at Khrushchev although he strictly saw to the observance of all basic rules of behavior in accordance with the statutes.

Actually, all that began one day before the memorable event. A discussion had been scheduled on the so-called "Hungarian problem." During the luncheon held at the Soviet mission, Khrushchev was told of the agenda and that he would be warned when the time would come to walk out of the hall at the proper time. Khrushchev seemed to fail to understand what he was being told and after explanations he said, amazed: "Walk out while our friends are being abused and, furthermore, abandon the right to obstruct?" Humoristically, he described the way Badayev, member of the Bolshevik faction in the Duma had learned from children how to whistle, and all Bolsheviks in the Duma whistled at speakers they did not like, making it impossible to hear their speeches.

The time came when the chair declared that the "Hungarian problem" was to be discussed. The Soviet delegation did not walk out. There was a whisper of astonishment: "The Soviets have not left." And then it began. Continuously (but in accordance with procedural rules and regulations) Khrushchev asked questions, demanded explanations and asked for the speakers to check the mandates of the members of delegations, and so on. This was no longer a question of the "Hungarian problem," but clearly it was obvious that this time the discussion would be wrecked by more "loud" methods. All members of our delegation, in accordance with their temperament, thumped on the folding tables in front of their seats, supported by many other delegations. As ill luck would have it, Khrushchev's watch slid off of his wrist. He started to look for it under the table, he was hindered by his belly, he started swearing and at that point his hand touched his shoe....

Still on this episode of "shoe diplomacy," let me add something else. When the "Algerian" problem began to be discussed after the "Hungarian problem," the French properly walked out. Someone asked where they were going. With proper French politeness, they answered: "We are going to the store to buy ski boots...."

In the mid-1950s I and my fellow workers in the newspaper kept receiving endless assignments (those same 100 days annually). In 1954 KOMSOMOLKA was able to beg from the Pravda Publishing House a car for a trip

to the Ukraine on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of its reunification with Russia. Our three-member brigade was headed by essayist Ilya Kotenko. He had the splendid quality of not suppressing others with his authority but imperceptibly teaching us professional fine points in the work, so that the authors did not develop a feeling of embarrassment when they signed their names along with that of the brigade leader. However much others insisted that his name come first, he preferred to sign in alphabetical order.

Ilya Kotenko was guided by the correct journalistic or, rather, purely human principle: "If you yourself find interesting that which you see, hear or learn, this could be interesting for the readers too; if you pretend to be interested, you are torturing the reader." Kotenko, a Don Cossack, who loved and knew well the southern lands and the southerners, both Russians and Ukrainians, found himself in his element during the trip. Mixing Ukrainian with Russian languages, he would involve in conversation anyone who would interest him, from a child to an old man, something which is very important in our work. "Why are you selling honey?" he would ask the owner of a stand in front of his house. Carefully looking over the strangers, the other would answer: "I am not selling." "But why are others selling?" Ilya would ask. "God only knows," the owner would spread his arms. "So, could it be that you have no honey?" Kotenko would say, taking a step toward the car. "There is," his interlocutor would say, offended. "Come and try it." We knew that this time again we would have where to spend the night and that the talk would continue endlessly.... "But why are you selling lard?" "I am not selling it," and so on.

I did not become a newspaperman all of a sudden. At first I wanted to be, and almost became, an actor. After the war I attended the school-studio of the Artistic Theater. A course in theater skills was offered in our group by Pavel Vladimirovich Massalskiy and Iosif Moiseyevich Rayevskiy. It was they who discovered and brought to the stage talented people, such as Oleg Yefremov, Mikhail Kozakov and many others. For Oleg Yefremov the theater remained forever his first and one and only occupation in life. Few know how Oleg Nikolayevich developed this passionate love for the theater and the stage, how it began. The biographers of this now noted director seek it in the evening-time rehearsals of what was to become the Sovremennik Theater. However, this is not exactly accurate, for it developed earlier. Once, during the first year, when we were performing wordless studies (for a dramatic actor this is as necessary as playing the scales by a pianist), Oleg pushed me into a dark corner, pushed in my hand some kind of paper, and said: "Read and, if you want, sign."

The paper was an oath of loyalty to the fraternity of actors, loyalty to the profession and to its high purpose. Noting that I was taking my time, he added: "But only with your blood," and quite seriously presented me with a shaving blade.

But I did not become an actor. I transferred to Moscow University to study philology and, subsequently, to the department of journalism. These were two beginnings. To this day, in my sleep, I sometimes go on to perform the role of Shvanda in "Lyubov Yarovaya." Unfortunately, in our class in the university no person was found carrying a shaving blade and a text of a professional oath. Had we signed such a paper at the beginning of our path, the path itself would have been straighter and stricter. I am speaking more for myself. I do not recall with pleasure everything I have published. One could play a number of roles but there is a first one which remains with the person forever. One can write many articles and essays until one realizes that, in the final account, one has reached a professional standard. If you were to wake me up today at night and ask what it is that I remember best and where and when did I realize this elusive "I found it," whatever else you may expect I would not mention an interview with a head of state or many other events in my practice as a journalist but a little story.

At the entrance of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA as I entered to start my night watch, two boys who, as it turned out, were deaf and mute, came to me. In the small editorial premises, with gestures and notes they explained their problem. They gave me a letter which I read on the spot.

The story takes us to the newspaper BRITANSKIY SOYUZNIK and its postwar issues. On 5 March 1946, in Fulton, Churchill delivered his memorable speech. In the presence of U.S. President Truman he called upon the Western world "to show strength to the Russians." The "Cold War" began and BRITANSKIY SOYUZNIK stopped publication. For some unknown reasons in one of its last issues it discussed deaf mutes, the fact that they were unfortunate and poor. It was accidentally that this issue of the newspaper had fallen into the hands of the boys.

Both had just graduated from a vocational school and were working as fitters in a Rostov plant. They had come to Moscow to seek support. The reaction of the boys to the article in BRITANSKIY SOYUZNIK had been an original one. Deciding to prove that the deaf mute as well could do something, they began to rummage in Rostov industrial dumps, finding parts of simple airplanes and motors (a great deal of those had piled up during the war). In a "secret" premise, with the help of friends, without blueprints, and with the simplest possible tools, throughout the night they worked and built a real flying machine, resembling the U-2. Eventually, they took their creation to a barren area, sat in the cockpit, started the engine and felt the wind hit their faces, bringing tears to their eyes. Perhaps these were more than tears, for simply recalling this meeting that took place long ago I find myself remembering that, as I listened to them, I had tears in my eyes.

The "first hour," the hour of triumph, came. They took off! They circled over the city, over the beaches of Rostov, they fell in cold air pits and then the warm and

moist clouds once again would take the plane up. Their air adventure lasted 30 minutes. These 30 minutes were their victory. Although they did not believe in God they left this earth, and it would be impossible to explain how they were able to do this without divine intervention. You must agree that anyone coming across this miracle deep within his heart, for an instant, would stop being an atheist.

When the Rostov engineers studied the computations the children had made by themselves, they were amazed above all by the extraordinarily accurate way of putting together the chassis with the fuselage, the angle at which the wing is connected to the fuselage and the reserve strength of the aircraft. KOMSOMOLKA saw to it that the daring fliers were supported by the Moscow aeroclub which presented them with a real modern glider. The boys were given blueprints and instructions how to assemble it and returned to Rostov. BRITANSKIY SOYUZNIK was put to shame. But did this trigger a feeling of shame among the Rostov sourpusses who "put an end to something forbidden" and burned the airplane put together by the boys, the moment it landed.

We are helpless to explain accurately the numerous cases of striking manifestations of the human spirit, which attract us and fire us with the natural aspiration to test our own strength as well. One must not deprive the individual of the need for lofty ideals if we wish for as many of our citizens as possible to act like Stakhanov at the time when he was digging coal, or Fedoseyenko, Vasenko or Usyskin, who reached record-setting heights on the stratospheric balloon "Osoaviakhim-1" and who kept their courage during their catastrophe. Society must welcome daring, risk and action, features which are inherent in the unusual individuals. I disagree with those who, in principle, reject heroism only because at one period of the cult of personality or another its fictitiously developed aspects were cultivated.

We too experienced something similar. Initially, the standard was to wear floppy trousers and then tight ones. In girls the neckline was set with even greater care. By ministerial order women wearing pants were not allowed inside official premises. The length of the hair was also monitored. A beard was considered a challenge to public opinion and although beards were not cut off by force, as Peter the Great had done, they nonetheless greatly spoiled one's reputation. References to the appearances of Marx, Engels and Lenin were considered sacrilegious. Our children, however, do not wish for us to separate problems facing society into adult and youthful, for such problems are truly indivisible. The young wish to engage in serious conversation. They are not afraid to ask us any, even the most sensitive questions. They want answers rather than irritated snubbing. One should be pleased by such spiritual closeness which demands convincing and strong arguments instead of ordinary boring cliches. How strikingly Lenin was able to speak with young people! He was always their interlocutor and not their instructor. Why did we consider so important to

note on the street a group of youngsters whose pants would be 1 centimeter narrower or wider than the stipulated size? Why is it (what a strange coincidence) that any time that society is faced with most difficult economic, moral and social problems and the young people (in their absolute majority) are calling for a serious discussion of the "problems of the day" and the future, someone converts sharp discussions into mini- or maxiskirts?

I do not wish in the least to be considered a defender of the "metallists," "rockers" and other lovers of borrowed fashion. Furthermore, artistic tastelessness does not always come to us from the West.

During a trip to Mexico, which I took a long time ago, I was received by President Lopez Mateos. I told him of the great interest with which I had listened to the outstanding street musicians, the Mariachis. The president noted that Mexico cares a great deal for its national cultural traditions although this is not a simple matter, considering the musical expansion of the neighboring country. In the course of those few days I spent in Mexico City I saw superb national mass spectacles: folk dances, races and costume shows. These were held in squares and sports stadiums, everywhere, covering the entire city and everyone. The organization of such events requires a great deal of taste on the part of directors and producers and substantial funds. I eventually asked Igor Aleksandrovich Moiseyev whether we were unable to develop a folk dance which would be liked by our young people and would, perhaps, capture the entire world? He answered: "We can but do you know how much this costs?"

I recall another conversation, one with Leonid Osipovich Utesov. He believed that the migration of styles into music for the stage was both possible and useful and that it was another form of global exchange of cultural values. He showed me clippings from old newspapers from the 1930s, which included sharp debates on jazz, adding, not without irony, that IZVESTIYA had opposed jazz as the "music of the rich," while PRAVDA was in favor of energetic rhythms....

At the start of the 1960s IZVESTIYA was able to "rescue" Oleg Lundstrem's jazz. We invited musicians in the small editorial premises, where they started beating their drums and playing their instruments. The windows were open and this entertaining music led to the gathering of a crowd on the square of Pushkin's Monument. We heard "bravo!" "more!" and gray-haired handsome Lundstrem was ecstatically happy. "All Moscow in the know" (there is such a category) started buzzing: "The son-in-law" had decided to go against his "father-in-law."

It is not that Khrushchev did not like jazz but, eventually, he told Dmitriy Dmitriyevich Shostakovich about his displeasure on the subject of a jazz attack on the audience during one of the final concerts of amateur

performers. Shostakovich was president of the jury and invited Khrushchev to attend the opening of the Kremlin Theater (today the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet meets in this reorganized hall). The concert began with a parade by five jazz orchestras which thundered to the point of piercing the eardrums. Khrushchev attended the entire performance but then frankly told Shostakovich that he did not expect of him such tastelessness. Shostakovich was unaware not only of the fact that, like any old-fashioned person, Nikita Sergeyevich was not a particularly great lover of jazz rhapsodies but also that such a start of the concert could seem to him some kind of a challenge. The desire immediately to turn such a misunderstanding into an instructive caution had led to the fact that jazz was eliminated from musical life.

And after all this, jazz could be heard inside IZVESTIYA. This was no challenge whatsoever. I knew that Khrushchev had not demanded in the least that jazz be prohibited. He simply considered that five jazz orchestras at the same time was excessive.

The passing of time has proved that it is stupid to insist on going back to old-fashioned haircuts, that it is stupid to try to equal the inflated shock workers of communist labor if an entire army of administrators was working for them (people who today are particularly afraid of journalists).

Recently I had the occasion to participate in the telecasting of "The Twelfth Floor." The "floor" was not in the studio but at the entrance of the Botkin Hospital. A fine cold rain was falling but the youngsters, the head physician of the hospital and manager Olesya Fokina continued to ask questions of their adult comrades, sitting in their warm premises in Ostankino. They asked about the labor upbringing of adolescents and their attitude toward the type of jobs they could hold and about their earnings. Boys and girls, aged 14 and 15, were amazingly unanimous and exigent. They wanted to work. They wanted to distribute mail, take care of the sick, deliver laundry to individual homes, during their school holidays and leisure time. They said that they wanted to earn their own money and not beg it from their parents.

The head physician supported the children who were ready to spend several hours weekly working as practical nurses and medics. "They cannot," was the immediate blocking answer by the representative of the Ministry of Health. "There is an instruction forbidding the lifting of heavy loads in turning or carrying the sick" (those were his words—author). The "floor," having heard this, started laughing. The youngsters were impressively taller than many adults. When that same comrade was asked about the attitude of the Ministry of Health to the fact that every year tens of thousands of secondary school children would spend several months picking cotton on fields sprayed with defoliants, he remained silent.

We sometimes think that our young people see nothing, hear nothing and understand nothing. We are wrong.

[No 7, Jul 88, pp 80-133]

[Text] In the summer of 1954 Nikita Sergeyevich took along Rada and me to the dacha in Volynskoye, to that very same house where Stalin had lived, almost never leaving it, during the entire war and postwar years, and where he had died.

Behind today's reinforced concrete area which was laid with fantastic haste to cover the Poklonnaya Gora, by the same people who had installed the rejected variant of the monument to victory, grows a small spruce forest, low but thick, with an occasional birch or aspen tree, concealing several buildings—the dacha itself, the guard-house and other services.

Stalin's dacha, painted in a dark green camouflage color from the foundations to the roof, entirely blends with the natural greenery. Immediately behind the entrance gates, one follows a narrow single-lane asphalted path lined by thuya, looking like soldiers dressed in green. After several sharp turns, the car stops in front of the dacha.

One had to decide what to do with it. The suggestion was made to open here a memorial museum to Stalin. However, no one could say how to do so and what it should contain.

Molotov, Malenkov and Mikoyan came, in addition to Khrushchev. They spoke with each other unhurriedly, moving from one room to another, describing specifics or recalling something. Today we cannot know what it was that tied them to that place and what separated them or what it is that they spoke about or thought about.... My wife and I toured the dacha and this in itself was striking. Until very recently one could not even imagine this, for only a very small circle of people were able to visit Stalin at home or be familiar with his way of life, tastes and habits. It was here that he conducted his meetings, read, ate and slept. It was here, within these wood-paneled walls, which made the rooms look like huge wooden cases, that he became like any other person. I approached the window and looked at the pouring rain outside. In the summer he could hear bird songs and in winter he could see the snow falling on the southern thuya trees. These trees had been planted in many government dachas. They would die during bitter colds and would be replanted.

We followed the soft dark red carpet paths which contrasted with the waxed oak flooring, remembering something that had become quite well known in Moscow after Beriya's arrest. At night Stalin's batman quietly walked along these rooms, in his thick woolen slippers, a man who had been with Stalin since Tsaritsyn, in 1919, and who had stayed on with his boss for a lifetime, as his servant. He carefully examined the content of any basket that was brought in, supplied fresh paper and tore up

into small bits papers to be discarded, so that, God forbid, no one could read what was written on them which may have been great state secrets. It is thus that he displayed his particular vigilance.

A clumsy servant, a fat and slow Old Believer woman, whom Stalin tolerated even though she was hated by all the other minor servants in his home, watched the batman and denounced this house "spy" to her boss. The boss did not speak to him but ordered that the man be arrested and interrogated with prejudice. A case was started against the batman, and his entire life was raked over, hour by hour and month by month. Nothing was found. Actually, what could be found that was "criminal" about someone who had not left that house for more than 30 years, knew no one and was always in sight of the other batmen. However, eventually he was forced to admit to something, perhaps that he had planned to dig a tunnel from Volynskoye to Camp David and pass on the bits of paper? Nothing was left of the man. The case was conducted by Abakumov, who was a great master of investigations.

The furniture in the dining room consisted of a table, tall-backed chairs and several corner tables. An open turntable was placed on one of them. No one had removed the record. What was the final thing Stalin had listened to? It was a recording of the chorus of the Red Banner Ensemble. I do not recall the songs on the record but in the middle of the record the owner had written: "Bassos should be one-quarter of an octave higher. Stalin." Who knows whether this remark had been passed on to the ensemble, whether the bassos had been raised by a quarter of an octave or continued to sing as before! In the seminary, the young Josef Dzhughashvili was considered a good member of the choir and in all likelihood Boris Aleksandrovich Aleksandrov, the head of the Red Banner Ensemble, took into consideration this remark coming from high up....

Khrushchev never spoke of his visits to this house, of the way Stalin received his fellow workers, the way he behaved toward them, or what he served them during those late lunches and dinners. All we knew was that his meetings with Stalin were long, sometimes lasting until the morning, and that the host was accustomed to sleeping during the day and working at night. This custom was reflected on the official system of all governmental institutions. Ministries and departments started their work late; during the day the high officials went to lunch, slept a few hours and returned to their desks in the evening, to be available if "Himself" needed them or if they needed him. During the night they could be asked to provide certain urgent information, summoned by telephone, etc.

Incidentally, after becoming Central Committee first secretary, Nikita Sergeyevich immediately abolished these "night-time sessions." When he worked in the Ukraine, the official work was done strictly during the day. Stalin knew this and did not wake up Khrushchev at

night. Starting with 1954, the Moscow establishments returned to normal working time. Today this event may seem naively petty but at that time it triggered a great response. As always, jokes appeared. I remember one of them: Finding himself at home one evening, the master of the house asked his wife with irritation: "Who is this boy moving around this apartment?" His wife answered: "My God, this is your own son!..."

It was there, in Stalin's home, that Rada recalled the following case: On one occasion her father brought from Volynskoye a dark red rose. He said that in sending them off Stalin took all of them through the flower beds and gave a flower to everyone. He was given a flower with such an odd color. Stalin loved flowers. He loved to take the gardening shears and make a small bouquet for his guests, thus expressing his liking or simply his good mood.

On that day Khrushchev had come on Stalin's summons (no one would come otherwise) slightly ahead of time. In the room, looking around, he noticed behind the shutters a puff of smoke and a hand waving to disperse it. He took a step toward the window and at that point, pushing aside the heavy curtains, the host showed up. After a short pause, realizing that Khrushchev was somewhat puzzled, he said: "Everyone keeps saying that Stalin has strong willpower, but to stop smoking is very difficult. I have ordered all ashtrays to be removed but I sometimes smoke by the window."

I reminded Nikita Sergeyevich of the story in the movie showing the way Stalin broke up the "Flower of Hertze-govina" cigarette and stuffed the tobacco in his pipe. After the war he repeatedly tried to stop smoking....

My wife and I stood a long time near the sofa on which the leader had died. It was an ordinary leather sofa in the far corner of the room, placed so that it could not be seen from the window. Next to it was a small bedside table on which stood a plate with a buzzer. It was impossible even to conceive of coming closer to the sofa, so inaccessible and distant it seemed.

There was a time when around this sofa, hidden by their white coats, physicians fussed around. There were so many of them that they stood in each-other's way. Or else, perhaps he died in the middle of the room and it was only after his death that the sofa had been put in its old place? Svetlana Stalina wrote that it was on Beriya's order that the furniture and objects belonging to her father had been removed but I believe that no one would have wanted them.

A photograph was hung over the sofa in a simple wooden frame: a girl nursing a kid with a bottle. The photograph had been taken by my comrade Nikolay Drachinskiy. It was being said that in his final moment of consciousness Stalin raised his eyes to the photograph. Everyone ran to

him to give him water, thus interpreting the motion of his eyes. However, Stalin wanted something else.... No one could understand what....

Stalin died in terrible pain, unable to breathe. At the moment of his death he said nothing. Was he unable or unwilling to do so?

I am familiar with the death of another person, of Mikhail Afanasyevich Bulgakov. Before the war I frequently visited his home and was friendly with his stepsons Yevgeniy and Sergey. They died young. When Mikhail Afanasyevich was already sick in bed, there was always a crowd of people in his home, those who loved Bulgakov and those whom he loved. The more frequent visitors included conductor Melik-Pashayev with his wife. Melik, as he was known to his friends, was afraid of catching anything. Bulgakov, being a physician, knew that his disease was not contagious (he had kidney failure) and liked to tease Melik. Before the latter's arrival, Bulgakov asked for make-up and painted on his face terrible "ulcers," and when Melik would come to the bed he would theatrically put his arms out and, surmounting the resistance of his friend, would hug him. Naturally, later he would remove the make-up and both laughed while Melik-Pashayev cursed his own squeamishness.

Yelena Sergeyevna Bulgakova spoke of Mikhail Afanasyevich's final hours. He could no longer speak or see. Yelena Sergeyevna felt, from barely detectable signs, that he wanted something. She approached, dropped down on her knees, patted his head and asked him if he wanted to drink something. Bulgakov's body did not answer. Then, intuitively, she asked: "You want me to save 'The Master,' and you want me to have it published? I promise, this will be done!" Bulgakov, who until then had been lying still, tensed, moved his head away from the pillow and clearly said "I want them to know...."

Then the telephone rang and Yelena Sergeyevna lifted the receiver.

Someone is asking after Bulgakov's state of health. Yelena Sergeyevna did not answer. Then she heard: "Comrade Stalin would like to know whether any assistance is needed." Bulgakova did not answer and the voice on the phone said: "Hello, hello, this is Poskrebyshchev...."

The house in which Bulgakov died was torn down and now there is an empty lot there. Stalin's dacha, as it were, did not become a museum.

Back from Volynskoye in the evening, everyone in the car, Nikita Sergeyevich, Rada and I, were silent, everyone with his own thoughts and, probably, so different that no conversation was possible. All of this has been impressed on my memory clearly, to this day.... I remember the little steps at the entrance to Stalin's dacha. They were framed by high concrete walls, for Stalin did not

like to be seen walking out of the house. Lamps covered with metal caps lined up the narrow paths, thickly planted in those same thuya, placed almost on the ground. They lit up the path while the figure of the person remained in darkness, so that the guards could not see Stalin in his full height....

Even an outsider could observe that by the mid-1950s the country was already setting a different pace in its progress. Not only were big projects implemented, but daily life was being renovated steadily. At that time monuments to the leader could still be found everywhere, and his portrait hung in official places. However, in newspapers Stalin's name was mentioned ever less frequently. Ritualistic references and mandatory quotations no longer seemed all that mandatory. In frequent cases the editor in chief of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA himself would delete a quotation he considered unnecessary. At the beginning of the 1950s, however, one could not even conceive of this, for a clipping of an article with a deleted paragraph could find its way into someone else's file.

KOMSOMOLKA no longer needed someone to look with a magnifying glass at the photographs of the leader, and see to it that undesirable combinations did not appear in the printing, for in that case the cliché would be sent to the engraving department to be redone. For there were vigilant readers who kept sending to the editors (and not only to the editors) their decoded photographs in which they "detected" a Zionist star or a fascist swastika. The decision was made not to respond to such messages and, as time passed, their stream dried out.

On the eve of the new year 1955, the first youth ball, open to visitors, was held in the Kremlin. Districts with new residential buildings were springing up in the Moscow suburbs (today they have become the virtual center of the city). The extremely grave housing problem had to be solved as soon as possible. The completion of housing steadily increased starting with 1953. Our country took a leading position in the world in the pace of housing construction. Hundreds of thousands of Muscovites entered their private apartments. Now, having forgotten the joy and hope with which they followed the building of Cheremushki, they scornfully describe such housing as "slums." Incidentally, they were planned to last 25 years and it was believed that by the 1970s all of them would be replaced with new and more comfortable buildings.

Within an extremely short time the now famous Sports Stadium imeni Lenin was built on the ice-skating swamps. Leninskiy Prospekt was being developed; modern 30-story buildings were being erected on Kalininskiy Prospekt, and the Palace of Congresses, which was the subject of extensive criticism, was being built in the Kremlin (it was described as "a dandy among the nobility").

A great deal at that time was labeled "first." This "first" was being developed within ourselves, in our new type of mutual relations, in involvement with common projects and in the atmosphere of an upsurge of social energy.

On several occasions, during Stalin's life, I had visited the "closed" Kremlin, when Khrushchev's car would cross Spasskiy Gates and stop on Sobornyy Square. At night, returning to the dacha, together with Nikita Sergeyevich, it could be delayed. Khrushchev would go somewhere while I waited for him in the darkened Kremlin. The rare lights could not disperse the thick darkness. There were no lights from windows nor the now shining lit domes. Infrequently, the square would be crossed by a person in a hurry. It did not take too much imagination to imagine the Kremlin during the time of Tsar Ivan or under Boris Godunov. It was not in vain that Okhlopkov wanted so much to set a historical plot in the Kremlin. This would have been eventful.

I also attended the new year's ball in honor of the opening of the Kremlin. Hundreds of young men and women danced in its halls, or engaged in snowball fights along the sharp drop of the Kremlin's wall, acting freely and informally, as though they had been here frequently. That is how one behaves in one's parents' home or with close relatives, where one can be oneself.

Foreign policy was also changing. Stalin did not acknowledge the diplomacy of personal contacts and after the war, other than going to Potsdam, never left the country. Many difficult problems were pushed aside and left unsolved. Bulganin and Khrushchev visited China and England and such trips were becoming the norm. An increasing number of guests visited the Soviet Union. I shall not start to enumerate in detail all diplomatic actions of that time, for this would take too much space and would demand a separate discussion. The Soviet leadership was trying above all to put an end to two violent conflicts: in Korea and Vietnam. Eventually, the armistice in Korea was signed, followed by that in Vietnam. Furthermore, the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with Austria.

A delegation headed by Nikita Sergeyevich visited Yugoslavia, opened the road to normalizing relations between the two socialist countries. Eliminating the break with Yugoslavia and its heroic party and people, a break which had been caused by Stalin's arbitrariness, was a good sign of new relations among fraternal parties and countries.

Two international events which occurred at that time, although different in nature, stand as one in my memory: the visit of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian prime minister, to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1955 and the Moscow World Youth and Student Festival in the summer of 1957. Whereas the former embodied the new, open diplomacy, the latter became a step toward an open

society, a manifestation of the hope of young people for a better future for the world and faith in the young people who were to build this future.

In that same 1955, for the first time in the postwar period, a conference of heads of the governments of the four great powers took place, with the participation of Bulganin, Khrushchev, Molotov, Zhukov, Eisenhower, Dulles, Eden, Macmillan, Faure and Pinet. It was thus that the "spirit of Geneva" appeared, the predecessor of the retreat of the Cold War. On his return, Khrushchev said that during the meeting he had become "particularly friendly" with Dulles: "He was the main personage there." Nikita Sergeyevich frequently used his "friendship" with Dulles. Apparently, in Geneva he had strongly attached himself to this American figure. In any case, at receptions attended by foreign journalists, he would frequently say: "What, that friend of mine is not keeping his word?" and would start expressively and humorously to criticize Dulles for his negative statements.

At that time not everything in international relations developed according to plan, simply and easily. However, a great deal was changing for the better. It was decided in Geneva to cooperate in the exchange of delegations and individual specialists. The Americans made immediate use of this opportunity. Our specialized delegations were preparing themselves for such trips: groups of construction and agricultural workers, physicians, architects and journalists. The American authorities insisted on taking our fingerprints before issuing visas but later gave this up.

We were beginning to find out about the world firsthand. This was needed for our cause. When the world industry fair opened in Brussels in 1958, Khrushchev suggested that a large group of people in many professions and production organizers visit the exhibit to study its experience. At that time the saying was, "We are going to the Brussels seminar." Soon afterwards it was decided that Inturist would not only accept "ladies from over there," but would also organize mass trips abroad for Soviet people.

The 20th Party Congress took place in February 1956. The discussions centered on the accountability report of the party's Central Committee and the directives on the sixth 5-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR. Reports were submitted by N.S. Khrushchev, CPSU Central Committee first secretary, and N.A. Bulganin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The congress was drawing to an end and the agenda had been almost covered. The journalists knew that the leading party bodies were to be elected at closed sessions. Our friends—the Central Committee secretaries and secretaries of Komsomol obkoms from many republics—would come to KOMSOMOLKA. It was from them that we found out that, for some reason, the

departure of the delegates was being delayed. A strange expectation could be felt in the air. It all became clear when we learned about the second, the closed speech by Khrushchev.

He spoke about Stalin. Khrushchev's report became the greatest political event of that time. The congress passed a decree on eliminating the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality; thousands upon thousands of innocent victims were rehabilitated and the good reputation of the survivors was restored. Decades have passed since then but to this day we are seeking the sources of the tragic events, of Stalin's arbitrary behavior and crimes. Again and again we go back to Vladimir Ilich's letter to the 12th Party Congress of December 1922. We would very much like to believe that had this letter by Lenin been made public, a great deal could have been changed and a great deal prevented. Let me recall once again the rather meaningful statement by Stalin: "Without me you would perish. Lenin wrote a will and made us quarrel with each other." Khrushchev frequently repeated these words precisely after the 20th Congress.

More than 30 years have passed since. This is a long time and a great deal should have been forgotten but it is not. How many were the errors and later repentances, caused by our ignorance.... Repentance is an eternal category. To sin and repent is the lot of the weak. It is better not to repent and, in any case, without having a reason to repent. Something else is being said too: 30 years ago anything which was said at the 20th Congress was extensively discussed throughout the party and the country. At the 22nd Party Congress this topic was discussed once again. Could this be enough? The answer, from my viewpoint, is simple. Very soon the truth expressed at the 20th Congress was reduced to "semitruth" and, subsequently, by the mid-1960s, once again an entire range of problems were stamped "secret."

Everyone is affected by major and minor events and everyone has the right to discuss the times and himself providing, naturally, that this is done without any egoistical considerations, not to mention claims to be the final authority on the truth. Glasnost and democracy today lift the ban on the interpretation of relatively recent events.

I did not hear Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress and will not use someone else's words to describe what took place in the hall. The complexity of feelings of many millions of people, who subsequently became acquainted with the published facts, can be perhaps expressed most accurately with a single word: horror. However, at that time public consciousness was not dominated by despair or confusion. No one who could rise above philistine speculations could even conceive of any remote intention of negating or questioning the socialist gains of our country. It would be very stupid to believe that this was part of Khrushchev's intentions. The tragedy included a purifying charge.

The witnesses to those tempestuous years are dying out and details are vanishing. I tell myself that one must remember. One must remember in order to go back, to find oneself among those who lived in the thick of events, who could not remain indifferent, for at that time one had to make a personal choice and clearly define one's stance.

In considering how to make such a return more accurate and as objective as possible, I decided to ask myself several questions and to answer them.

Did Khrushchev have any strictly personal reasons or ambitions which led him to take this decisive step during the 20th Congress, to deliver his second speech?

While standing guard at the bedside of the dying Stalin (he shared this duty with Bulganin) Nikita Sergeyevich would come home for no more than a few hours at a time, drawn and somber, saying little, and then again would return to Volynskoye. For days Khrushchev's son and younger daughter, shaken up by the events, and rushing to the Hall of Columns, to part with the leader, would be lost and disappear in the mourning crowd. On one such day, Nikita Sergeyevich took with him Rada who, leaving behind the child she was nursing, stayed by the casket until nightfall, without the strength to leave. In the final mourning minutes Khrushchev cried, like many others, unashamed of his tears.

His entire life had been spent in the party headed by Stalin and together and, subsequently, side by side with Stalin. Having come to Moscow from the Ukraine in 1929, to attend the Industrial Academy, where the most energetic and talented party members were being trained, Khrushchev became not only a diligent student in the mining department but soon afterwards was elected party committee secretary at the academy. Also attending the academy was Alliluyeva, Stalin's wife, and she too was a party committee member. Khrushchev remembered Alliluyeva with great respect, as a good and modest comrade, who did not overemphasize in the least her own status. It was only after the leader's death that Khrushchev found out that, like Ordzhonikidze, Alliluyeva had committed suicide, so thoroughly had the circumstances of her death been concealed.

Khrushchev actively participated in the sharpest possible ideological discussions and struggled against the Trotskyite opposition. Obviously, Kaganovich, who was then Moscow city party committee secretary and who knew Khrushchev from the Ukraine, had mentioned him to Stalin.

Actually, he was not alone in this. Khrushchev did not frequently engage in recollections about his promotion to the upper party circles. Sometimes, already in retirement, he would put down his book and think, as though for his own benefit, and speak of the past. He regretted that he had been unable to graduate from the Industrial

Academy and, in general, that he had not been successful in his studies: his classes would be interrupted at all times for one urgent reason or another.

Eventually I asked him to tell us about Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva and whether she could have engaged in a political dispute with Stalin and was it true that she had defended Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin, who was close to her family? Was this dramatic tangle the reason for her suicide?

Khrushchev excluded this possibility, although he noted that Alliluyeva could have "stumbled" during an argument or discussion. It is true that she never insisted on her viewpoint if convinced that she would not be supported by the majority of the comrades. Khrushchev also recalled the following event: During the November 1932 demonstration on Red Square, he found himself next to Nadezhda Sergeyevna. It was a windy, rainy and cold day. Alliluyeva looked toward the rostrum on the Mausoleum, clearly concerned for her husband. She said: "He is probably freezing! I begged him to dress more warmly but he, as always, grumbled something rude and left...." "In my view," Khrushchev concluded, "she was afraid of Stalin...." (It was that same night that Alliluyeva put an end to her own life.)

It was already after her death that on several occasions Khrushchev and Bulganin were invited by Stalin to family dinners. At that time Bulganin was chairman of the Moscow City Soviet. When he summoned them by phone, Stalin said: "City fathers, I invite you to dinner!" Sitting at the table were Nadezhda Sergeyevna's father and mother, and her sister Anna Sergeyevna, whose husband, Redens, was head of the Moscow Internal Affairs Administration, and her children. This took place until 1936; after that Redens was executed by a firing squad and the family scattered.

"At those dinners," Khrushchev recalls, "Stalin let it be known that he was well familiar with the way I had conducted myself at the academy during the struggle against the right wing and the Trotskyites. It was only Nadezhda Sergeyevna who could have given him such details. Stalin would suddenly ask: 'Is your father still working as a carpenter or has he moved in with you in Moscow?' Stalin knew the past of every one of the people he had promoted and, naturally, I was one of them."

At that time the Industrial Academy was a major support of the party's Central Committee. Many major economic and party leaders were its graduates. At the very start of the 1930s, without completing his studies, Khrushchev had to go into party work. At first he was made first secretary of Moscow's Krasnopresnenskiy and, subsequently, Baumanskiy Rayon. In 1935 he became first secretary of the Moscow oblast and city committees of the VKP(b).

On one occasion, already by the end of the 1960s, I showed to Nikita Sergeyevich a rare photograph: Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and Khrushchev, walking on the sidewalk down the big Kremlin Palace. The building had still not been repaired properly and looked dilapidated. Although they walked together, everyone walked separately. Stalin walked in a free and calm manner, wearing a white semi-military suit, with a short black cloak, unbuttoned. Ordzhonikidze, wide and with powerful shoulders, even shorter than Stalin, seemed almost square. He was wearing a Russian-style shirt, worn over his trousers, girded by a thick Caucasian leather strap. Nikita Sergeyevich, thinner, was wearing a black suit with white canvas shoes which, at that time, were cleaned with dental powder.

Khrushchev looked at the photograph for a long time, and then said: "This was probably on May Day 1936. At that time I went to see Stalin in his apartment to invite him to the rostrum on the Mausoleum."

During those years, as was probably the case throughout his entire life, Stalin kept a close look on anything which was happening in the capital, such as the construction of the subway, clearing the city from the "junk of past centuries," and reconstruction. At one point Khrushchev reported to Stalin that there was an objection to the wrecking of ancient buildings. Stalin thought and then answered: "Blow them up at night."

The period of building the subway remained for a long time a favorite topic in Nikita Sergeyevich's recollections. Almost daily he began his working day as city party committee secretary with a visit to the most difficult sections of the tunneling. It was as though by going underground he went back to his youth, to mining. He was very proud of the fact that, together with the other subway builders, he had been awarded the Order of Lenin, the first order he ever received in his life.

Many facts, including Khrushchev's return to Moscow in 1949, indicated that Stalin had long and persistently kept track of him.

At the 1937 electoral meeting in the Bolshoy Theater, Stalin began his now familiar speech as follows: "Comrades, I admit that I had no intention of speaking but our respected Nikita Sergeyevich, one could say, pushed me forcefully to this meeting: Give them, he said, a good speech. What am I to talk about? What kind of speech precisely?"

This opening, one would think, was not accidental. Stalin invested in each one of his words a certain additional meaning known only to himself. In this case, this confirmed his state of mind. One year later, in 1938, Stalin recommended Khrushchev for the position of first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. That year he was elected candidate and, in 1939, member of the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo.

At that time Khrushchev was 44 years old. Many young workers showed up in numerous positions, for thousands of old party members were no longer among the living....

The start of the Great Patriotic War found Khrushchev there, in the Ukraine. With the troops he traveled from Kiev to Stalingrad and back to Kiev as member of military councils of many fronts and as commissar, which he had been during the civil war. In his speech to the soldiers he frequently, naturally, appealed to them as follows: "Forward! For the homeland, for Stalin!"

Subsequently, after the 20th Party Congress, Nikita Sergeyevich frequently recalled the start of the war and its first days and even the days on the eve of the war itself, and bitterly blamed Stalin for the errors he had made then. His heart ached at the difficult story related to the failure of the Kharkov offensive of 1942. The southwestern forces were unable to carry out the task given by the command, the offensive bogged down and losses were heavy. The responsibility for this fell not only on Marshal Timoshenko, who commanded those forces, but also on Khrushchev as member of the military council. For a long time and virtually to the last days of his life, this tortured Nikita Sergeyevich.

He rethought the Kharkov events many times over. Well-wishers provided him with ever new "variants" of the course of that operation, relieving him of responsibility for its failure. During those fatal hours Khrushchev rang up headquarters, asked Malenkov to wake up Stalin to be given permission to withdraw the forces and avoid encirclement; he said that Malenkov refused to wake up Stalin. However, this did not assuage his feeling of guilt.

Khrushchev frequently justified his lack of interest in memoirs by military commanders as follows: Wars are usually lost by soldiers and won by marshals. Every one of them is above all concerned with protecting and glorifying himself. "Khrushchev never exaggerated his role in the war and did not go along with the well-wishers. He retained his rank of lieutenant general and, as chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, of Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

In 1951 Nikita Sergeyevich published in PRAVDA an article on the state of affairs in the Moscow countryside. By then he was familiar with the situation there. He had seen the wreckage in the kolkhozes and the barren and abandoned villages. He suggested that the kolkhozes be consolidated—in some farms no more than 10 to 20 old people and children remained—and called for initiating the construction of modern and comfortable settlements, involving in them urban residents and developing in the areas surrounding Moscow a kind of agrocities.

A small note in PRAVDA, following the article, stated that Khrushchev's article was being published as a basis for discussion. The newsmen quickly found out what was happening. Stalin did not like Khrushchev's suggestions. No discussion took place. However, nor were there any

drastic worsening of relations between Stalin and Khrushchev. Nikita Sergeyevich continued to hold a firm, albeit not the most visible, position close to the leader. Frequently, picking up the house telephone (for a while we lived with my wife's parents), I would hear the muffled voice: "Get me Mikita...", which is how, in Ukrainian style, Stalin addressed Khrushchev.

But let me go back to the days of the 20th Congress. What could make Khrushchev return to the rostrum with a speech about Stalin? What was the reason for his resolve? It would have been stupid to claim that Khrushchev was totally unfamiliar with the mass repressions. At one point Nina Petrovna mentioned that it was only after the 20th Congress that Nikita Sergeyevich surrendered to the chief of his guards his own pistol, which he kept in the bedroom. Khrushchev himself rarely parted with details about Stalin's night-time dinner meetings. However, he considered particularly important one, as though standard Stalinist replica. Stalin would suddenly, interrupting the conversation, ask anyone of those present: "Why are your eyes shifty today?"

"Shifting eyes" were a poor sign. This question and the long pause which followed it were discouraging to others. In the last months of Stalin's life such immediate "targets" of the leader were Molotov, Mikoyan and Voroshilov. What this meant and what the next step would be all of them knew perfectly and, naturally, so did Khrushchev.

By 1956 many tens of thousands of the most famous party workers, military leaders, diplomats, writers and scientists had already been rehabilitated. False accusations were lifted from those who were dead and their names were cleansed from slanders and wild calumnies. The living wanted not simply sympathy and apologies and the restoration of their honor and dignity. They received back their passports and were given a monetary compensation and help in finding housing and jobs. However, this was not enough. It was necessary openly to mention the mass tragic trials. Already before the 20th Congress and, naturally, during the sessions, Khrushchev's conviction grew that it was the party, above all, that had to speak of this openly. The accompanying data, drafted by a special Central Committee commission, which included many bolsheviks-Leninists who had returned from camps and exile, was on his desk during one of the last days of the congress.

Nikita Sergeyevich repeatedly returned to that day, to events which became forever part of his life. He recalled the night before the end of the congress, when, once again, he reread the report and it seemed to him that he could hear the voices of the dead comrades. Was his feeling of guilt toward them oppressing him? What was happening in his heart?

Everyone has the right to judge Khrushchev for this turn taken by the 20th Congress, and for the role which he played in the history of our country and party. One thing,

obviously, is unquestionable: This congress left no one indifferent. It became clear that, sooner or later, someone had to be held responsible for the evil, for the crimes committed against the people, and that forgiveness would not come out of the silence.

The guards in the camps where the "enemies of the people" were being detained are still alive. To them as well this congress was a tragedy. One of them described in OGONEK his "spiritual pains." No, it was not in vain that he was watching over this "Hydra" and feeding it with the horror of the tayga. No one could convince him that Academician Vavilov was not an enemy. A merchant father cannot raise an honest son. One cannot ignore this "cry from the heart," however heartless or malicious it may seem. Nor can one ignore the rhetoric of those who consider the debunking of Stalin as though vitiating their entire life, as though negating all that the party and the people have accomplished....

On that morning, when Khrushchev, as I believe, made his decision, he had no idea about how complex the history of the 20th Congress would become. I do not know whether such was the case or not. I am merely expressing my strictly personal viewpoint. The fact that Khrushchev apparently submitted this report unexpectedly also had its reasons. Could he have discussed long before the congress this report with the members of the Central Committee Presidium, particularly with those who were to assume their share of responsibility? Would he have been able to deliver it in that case? He made the decision to appeal to the party by addressing himself directly to the congress.

When he announced his decision, others started to frighten him with unpredictable consequences. The more Molotov, Malenkov and Voroshilov were against it, the stronger became Khrushchev's conviction that everything had to come out in the open. From his viewpoint, making a halfway decision which would condemn the cult of Stalin's personality without giving details of the mass repressions, would mean deceiving the party. He offered Molotov to present the report. The latter refused. Nikita Sergeyevich warned him that he would not change his decision and that he would submit the report as a congress delegate. Nor was he stopped by the fact that he would make himself vulnerable, for he too had been alongside Stalin. He said that he was not about to lie or prevaricate. "The young will come and will ask: Why did you remain silent? What would we answer them? How would they feel about us? We tried to save our skins and rejected responsibility? Did you feel no pain for the death of comrades?!"

That is how Khrushchev recalled that day in his life.

His decision demanded a great deal of courage. Would he be understood? Would he be supported? For the question would also be asked: And where were you in the past, dear comrade, did you not know that your party

comrades were being arrested, people with whom you had worked for many years side by side. Did you truly believe that all of them were enemies?

To this day we ask ourselves and others these same questions. Did Blyukher believe that Tukhachevskiy was guilty when he signed, together with the other members of the military tribunal, the death sentence of one of his comrades, a civil war hero and marshal of the Soviet Union? Did Mikhail Koltsov believe it, when in 1937, at the Paris Congress of Writers, he angrily condemned the shame of the "Fifth Column" and expressed his pleasure that the "enemies" were being mercilessly annihilated? Several months later he was arrested and died like Blyukher, like thousands of others, who believed....

It is naive to assume that Khrushchev and people in his position did not think at all, when left alone with their conscience, of the reason for the increasing wave of arrests. But what could each one of them do? The 1938 Central Committee Plenum and Yezhov's deposition and, subsequently, detention, somewhat eased the situation and there was a decline in the repressive measures. Khrushchev left for the Ukraine. He could rest content with the fact that he personally had not committed base actions. At a post-congress meeting, Khrushchev received a note from the hall asking how such repressions could have been allowed and what had the party leaders done to put an end to it. Nikita Sergeyevich asked that the questioner stand up. No one rose. "We were afraid as much as the person who has asked this question."

They were afraid.... I believe that this was the truth.

Nikita Sergeyevich had been a delegate to the 17th Party Congress. Once Mikoyan told him about an event which occurred at that time. While the congress was drawing to a close, in the breaks between sessions, several party obkom secretaries, headed by Vareykis, party committee secretary for the Central Chernozem Oblast, who held a noted position in the party, entered the presidium room. They approached Kirov and asked him to pass on to Stalin their remarks about his rudeness, intolerance and arrogance. Kirov interrupted them: "Tell this to Stalin yourselves." "You are one of his friends, it would be easier and simpler for you." Stalin showed up and Kirov repeated to him the conversation. Anastas Ivanovich remembered Stalin's answer: "Thank you, Sergey, you are a real friend, I will not forget this."

The congress of winners, which was precisely the name given in party historiography to the 17th Congress, ended on a high note. Successes were unquestionable: Industrialization was turning the USSR into a powerful country. Ovarions in honor of Stalin thundered at length. Clearly, however, it did not please him. But how could it, if several hundred delegates had deleted his name from the secret voting slate? How could he trust the people? Applauding and hating! His hypochondria turned into vengefulness. How otherwise to explain the fact that out

of 1,966 delegates to the congress 1,108 were soon afterwards destroyed, including 98 of the 138 Central Committee members and candidate members.

Before that, however, something terrible happened.

Sergey Mironovich Kirov was assassinated on 1 December 1934.

In his novel "Children of the Arbat," Anatoliy Rybakov provides his own version of this murder. One could agree or disagree with it. A novel is not a document. Kirov's murder was, perhaps, the most horrible secret which, as it were, will not be entirely revealed. The 20th Congress set up a commission to investigate the circumstances of this criminal murder. Some facts came to light. It was reported to Nikita Sergeyevich that the driver of the car in which the detained chief of Kirov's personal guard was being driven had been located. Unexpectedly, the NKVD official, who had made the arrest, had wrestled the steering wheel from the driver and the car had crashed against the wall of a house. Shots or heavy blows could be heard coming from inside the car. That was all that the driver remembered before losing consciousness. It was thus that during this planned automobile accident the chief of Kirov's bodyguards had died. The detaining officers were also killed soon afterwards, and many other individuals, one way or another involved in this matter, disappeared. I do not know whether the commission completed its work. In any case, its activities slowed down and, apparently, eventually ground to a total halt. It would be probably very difficult to find the truth now. However, the chairman of this commission and many of its members are alive. As the saying goes, all that is needed is goodwill.

The 20th Congress was over. It seemed as though the double morality standard had had its day. The collection of the old oaths and assertions and the enthusiastic "tranquillity" of bombastic glorification was grating on the ears to such an extent that the honorable creators of odes fell silent, in any case, for a while. It seemed to us that this would last forever. Perhaps precisely for that reason, those who had "calmed down" were able to sit it out.

At that time another scale of merits was applied. In the light of the new knowledge and the new truth, the inertia of the customary way of life was interrupted, and the philosophy of "the hell with it" crumbled. Pretending and fear were disappearing from social life.

This accursed fear! Why is it that it has been able to last such a long time? How and why did it become part of a system the very foundation of which demands fearlessness?!

It so happened that many people not only tolerated to be described as "little cogs" but were even proud of it: Put us where you like, install us in any kind of machine, we immediately begin to work, as long as we can advance

matters. As long as.... Such dedication seemed to them the main thing. To this day, when it is a question of what is the most sacred thing in human life, we sing: "We need a single victory and we shall not look at the cost...."

Why not think of the cost?

Or else do we think and keep silent?

This is that same old fear.

At the ceremony celebrating the 70th anniversary of IZVESTIYA Mikhail Ulyanov spoke. He told us an edifying story.

"Do you know how the proud eagle is being taught to obey the will of man and to obey any one of his commands? The eaglet is taken into the tent, a leather hood is put on its head and it is kept on a string. The eaglet holds the string tight. The string is then shaken loose. The bird is horrified. It can see nothing. It does not understand. All it wants is a brief respite. After a while the hood is removed and a hand is advanced to the eaglet. Sitting on the hand is comfortable and firm. Then everything is repeated. The hood is put on the head and the string is rocked again. This is done as long as is necessary, until the proud eagle has become obedient, hunting for man, bringing him his prey, forgetting the distant sky and free flight."

Is this not the same with our fear? It was instilled in us for decades through a variety of means. Yet man has a great need for a firm soil under his feet and it is the tempting devil that whispers to him: "Do not flutter, say 'I agree,' you may think within yourself whatever you want, this is your own private business. In front of others accept everything with approval, for nothing else is expected of you."

Why did such feelings of self-censorship and accommodation, which are alien to our morality and dignity, appear? Did they come from some kind of vacuum? About himself, Khrushchev said: "I was scared!"

There was fear in the high circles as well. Remember Marshal Zhukov. He answered this question in his memoirs. Those who were particularly close to the leader were well aware of the price one had to pay for such closeness. No other explanation is possible for the degrading and tragic situations in their lives.

How to understand Molotov, with his exceptional loyalty to anything Stalinist. How to evaluate his sincerity when he tolerated the detention and solitary imprisonment of his own wife? How to understand the fact that he believed that Polina Semenovna was guilty and calmly waited for Beriia to report her trespasses to Stalin?

And what about Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, whose wife spent many years in hard labor while he was unable to do anything to ease her lot?

Yekaterina Ivanovna was arrested in 1937 and was released with the amnesty (!) in 1945, after Mikhail Ivanovich was already gravely ill. She was released but was not allowed to live in the Kremlin apartment and was asked to move elsewhere. One can imagine what Yekaterina Ivanovna felt when she had to march behind Mikhail Ivanovich's casket, side by side with Stalin, Malenkov and Beriia.

I had known Yekaterina Ivanovna since the 1960s. She used to come to IZVESTIYA asking our help to set up a museum for Mikhail Ivanovich, but she never spoke of the past.

Polina Semenovna Molotova behaved differently. After her release from jail, once she came across me and my wife on Granovskiy Street. Loudly and challengingly, she praised Stalin. Was this out of fear or exultation? There were many people like her.

In 1936 Jan Eduardovich Kalnberzin, a courageous Latvian Communist who worked for the Comintern in Moscow, was clandestinely sent to Latvia: His assignment was to head the party underground. Under conditions of most frightful terror he organized party cells. In 1939 he was captured and sentenced to death. He spent many months wasting away in solitary, waiting for his final hour. One year after his departure to Latvia, his wife Ilga Petrovna was arrested. Two years later she died in Butyrki. Three small children were left. The eldest, Rita, was 9, Robert was 7 and Ilga was one and a half. They were sent to children's homes; Rita had cried for her brother, asked that they be sent together, and as to where the youngest was taken, they were not told. The father knew nothing about the fate of the family.

Jan Eduardovich cheated death. The Soviet system was restored in Latvia in 1940. Kalnberzin became first secretary of the republic's communist party Central Committee. He immediately hastened to Moscow where, with tremendous difficulty, he found where his children were. Jan Eduardovich, a restrained person of not many words, once admitted to his daughter: "I asked no one about your mother. It was senseless. Nor did anyone tell me anything about her. Do not blame me for this. I do not even know where her grave is...."

Rita Kalnberzin and I were university classmates. We have been friends since then and it was she who told me this story.

Many no less terrible and no less tragic stories were included in Khrushchev's "closed" report, which is well-known throughout the world (but is "closed" for us to this day). They seem to defy logic and normal human understanding. How could one explain, perhaps, the very first events, the first motivations to start the repression. At the start of and in the mid-1930s Stalin hit at those who truly could be or seemed to him to be enemies, communists who, at one point or another, had belonged to other party factions. They had long realized their

errors and mistakes and were actively working in a great variety of positions. Nonetheless, he mistrusted them. Then there was the 17th Congress, which he never forgot. He did not like and considered as potential enemies many old communists, particularly those who had been close to Lenin.

The more he destroyed his actual or imaginary enemies, the broader became the range of those who, from his viewpoint, could stand in his way, and who had the type of power or independence in decision-making, which he feared. These people did not fit the power system he had created. They could have hindered the assertion of his special role in history. It was thus that ever new "layers" of unsuitable or hurt people or else excessively subservient people, whom he equally disliked, arose. Their number increased in geometric progression. They included party, soviet and economic personnel, military, diplomats, scientists and men of culture, treating physicians and household help.

A natural and ordinary human question would be the following: Was he not disturbed by the death of millions? Were these millions of people not individuals, flesh, breathing, thinking, suffering, engaging in ordinary actions, but an amorphous mass? Did he not remember faces?

Eyewitnesses have told me that in 1949, when he suddenly decided to replace the PRAVDA editors, substantiating this intention by saying that the newspaper was excessively inflating the cult of Stalin's personality, he slowly paced in his room, and as he began to name the new editors, those who were present froze. He was recommending as heads of the main departments individuals who were long dead. They had been destroyed with his agreement. No one interrupted the leader. Suslov was appointed editor in chief and settled everything.

We had to go through a great deal, all of us and, particularly, Khrushchev. He assumed a heavy burden. It was perhaps heavier than he imagined. The counter-revolution in Hungary, encouraged by Western provocateurs, threatened the socialist gains of that country. The Hungarian communists went through most severe trials. Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov was, at that time, Soviet envoy to Hungary. He described what he had seen. Stars were painted in blood on the bodies of the killed patriots as a sign of the hatred of those who dreamed of overthrowing the power of the working people. Khrushchev kept rushing around (no other word would describe it) in sudden trips in many of the hot spots in connection with the Hungarian events, organizing contacts with comrades, seeking their advice, engaging in emergency talks and assuming the burden of responsibility. That is how he gained his new political experience.

Nikolay Ivanovich Tsybin, an experienced pilot, who had flown with Nikita Sergeyevich during the war over the front lines, at one point was almost forced to land in

the sea in the course of a night flight to the Yugoslav island of Brioni, to see Marshal Tito. He flew the aircraft blind, without lights and without radio contact with the ground. Such measures of secrecy were also needed.

Many years later, as a member of a delegation headed by Brezhnev, I visited this sunny toy-like island. The whitish coral shelf, washed away by the centuries-old action of the waves, was drowning in the green waters. The fine fragrance of blossoming trees and shrubs blended with the sharp breath of the sea, and I remembered Tsybin and thought of the unexpected turn which life presents man and how quickly we forget hardships....

In these notes I described the New Year's Eve among friends, Oleg Yefremov and the way he described those same 10 years which were not mentioned, starting with the mid-1960s. Yefremov became the artistic manager of the MKhAT and was made Hero of Socialist Labor.

But before that, there was the beginning.... On 15 April 1956, on the small stage of the studio of the Arts Theater, late at night, several young actors were performing Viktor Rozov's play "Eternally Alive."

Even the most brilliant performances of those years could not gather such a glittering public. This was a "glittering" public not in the usual sense. There were no ladies in splendid dresses, influential officials or professional critics. A different spirit was felt in the hall and on the stage. There was intelligence, talent, sincerity and openness. No one spoke at that time of the 20th Congress and, in general, no one said any big words. The people felt no need for the old turns of speeches.

It was that evening that the Moscow Sovremennik Theater was born. For many years it became the embodiment of its time and its presentations were perceived not only as artistic revelations but also as political events: The combination of these two most important principles for the arts was the new feature which entered our lives after the 20th Congress. We were returning to the best that had existed in the past, not fearing to assume responsibility for the future.

"How did you risk this," I was asked later, after 1964, by a newsman who was beginning to develop a reputation: "Sovremennik was praised in IZVESTIYA yet not everyone liked it." "Very simple," I answered. "We saw the shows, we exchanged views among the editors and decided what to do." "By yourselves?" asked my interlocutor, sincerely amazed. Obviously, after seeing a show he would find out (on the official telephone) what the "opinion" was and only then he would write his review. I did not know what his intentions were when he started this conversation but, in all likelihood, something like "well, if someone can hide behind some broad back he can do anything he wants." Other people probably thought so also. Based on such a logic, it is difficult to realize the simplest thing: Any person in any position has

to pay for everything he does. Our life, alas, is so structured that those who do nothing frequently find themselves in the best positions.

It is not necessary for my coevals to force their memories to recall parts of the films "The Cranes Are Flying," "Ivanovo Childhood," "Clear Skies," "Human Destiny," or "Nine Days in One Year." In desperate conflict with the puritans, we defended in the newspaper the film "And if This Is Love...." We were the first to support Pomerantsev's article "On Sincerity in Literature," which had been published in NOVYY MIR. We were not astounded in the least by the insincere indignation of the leading critics who immediately attacked the newspaper.

The 20th Congress accelerated so many things and brought into motion so many different structures in social life that it would be naive to assume that a single person could not even analyze them but simply recall them. In the autumn of 1987 I read in OGONEK a curious essay by the critic Sergey Kuprinin. He pointed out that in no more than a few years after the congress, in Moscow alone the journals YUNOST, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, DRUZHBA NARODOV, MOSKVA, NASH SOVREMENNİK, TEATR, VOPROSY LITERATURY and INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA and the weekly LITERATURA I ZHIZN (subsequently renamed LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA) had been either newly founded or had resumed publication; and a constituent congress of the RSFSR Union of Writers had been held. In the various parts of the country the literary-political journals NEVA, SEVER, DON, PODYEM, VOLGA, and URAL appeared. With great enthusiasm and tremendous debates the first collections "Poetry Day," were welcomed and poetry itself broke the silence and emerged on streets and stadiums!

Poets Andrey Voznesenskiy, Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, Bella Akhmadulina, Robert Rozhdestvenskiy, Rimma Kazakova, Yuliya Drunina, Yevgeniy Vinokurov, Novella Matveyeva, David Samoylov.... As to prose? I better stop, for the list would be long, incomplete and, perhaps, even subjective.

Almost 30 years later, I can recall Andrey Voznesenskiy's debate with Academician Petr Aleksandrovich Rebinder. This occurred in the IZVESTIYA editorial premises. Andrey was reading new poems, including "Anti-Worlds." Suddenly we heard the indignant tirade by the academician: "Young man! Everything in your verses is wrong. What was your grade in physics in high school?" Bitingly, the academician began to criticize "Anti-Worlds" for "inconsistency" with the laws of physics. "One should not take all this literally," Andrey said excitedly. "No, it is precisely literally that one must take it," Rebinder insisted. Petr Aleksandrovich did not lack youthful temper and loved the heat of an argument and poetry but was unable to forgive Andrey's inaccuracies.

Everyone was pacified with a cup of tea. We drank tea out of a small copper samovar which reporters from the information department had procured from who knows where, and ate hot bubliki, which was the main delicacy we served when we met with friends of the newspaper. Such meetings became a regular feature. In many editorial premises "Thursdays," "Fridays," or "Saturdays" appeared or were resumed and enhanced. The people yearned for contacts and for the possibility to speak loudly about anything which concerned them.

During the May Day 1960 demonstration on Red Square, I met "secretly" with a group of young people: Yuriy Gagarin, German Titov, Andrian Nikolayev, Pavel Popovich and Valeriy Bykovskiy. You can imagine what a company this was, standing on the rostrum! We shook hands and dispersed, so that no one would pay any particular attention to us. Everything to these boys was still ahead. However, they were already on the rostrum of Red Square. Strong boys, not very tall, with somewhat identical spring coats, cloaks or hats, just purchased. These military fliers were obviously uncomfortable in civilian clothing. That is the way I saw the future cosmonauts for the first time.

At that time it was not permitted to write about them nor to mention the name of the man who had become family to his young students. For a long time, for an almost entire lifetime, Sergey Pavlovich Korolev had remained a secretive personality, who was identified for the benefit of outsiders, with the solemn term of general designer.

Together or separately Korolev, Glushko, Keldysh and Kurchatov were frequent visitors to Nikita Sergeyevich's dacha. His many affairs did not prevent Khrushchev to have them for dinner during their day off, expecting them with a sort of happy impatience. Generally speaking, he valued scientific and engineering work, placing them, so to say, above the humanities. In his view such people dealing with real, specific matters, produced things that one could feel with one's hands, things which could yield visible benefits. In scientific and technical discoveries he immediately sought material advantages, ways of moving ahead and, above all, a social effect.

One Sunday Nikita Sergeyevich went with Korolev to his "company," and invited me along. All he said in the car was "whatever you see, forget it."

I am now breaking this secret, somewhat regretfully....

What I saw then I write here for the first time.

Our contemporary concepts about space research laboratories and testing facilities with their numerous screens, sophisticated printers and the blinking of mysterious lights, indicating noiseless operations of the artificial computer intelligence, have sunk in our minds so strongly and are so closely tied to the tremendous complexity of tasks that I fear I may disappoint the readers.

A small room was equipped with an ordinary blackboard, such as one can see in a classroom for first-graders. Korolev was drawing on it with a piece of chalk the trajectory of the future flight, indicating at different points the variety of manipulations with the rocket. He then invited everyone to a big hall and it was there that I saw a steel-gray ribbon, many meters in length. Sergey Pavlovich would tell Nikita Sergeyevich something as they occasionally stopped in their walk. Khrushchev came closer, looked under the rocket and touched its cold sleek hull.

For a long time all of us looked at the engine booster. It was huge, shaped like a badminton shuttle cock, looking like a pleated skirt. Millions of horsepower could give this rocket a dizzying speed.

Later, when many flights had already taken place, I reminded Korolev of my first acquaintance with his offspring. "And I thought that you were a member of Khrushchev's guard. If I had known who you were I would have sent you out," Korolev said semi-jokingly. He was a blunt man.

Why was it that Sergey Pavlovich was frequently sad or, perhaps, was he simply concentrating? At Kremlin receptions he stood aside from the unfamiliar public. Once he told Rada: "I so much wish I could go somewhere to look at the world, to see Golden Prague in the spring...." He found his absolute secrecy difficult to live with. I saw Korolev shining with happiness on only one occasion. Again this occurred in the Kremlin. Carrying the first copies of the special editions of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on Gagarin's flight, Pavel Alekseyevich Satukov, PRAVDA's editor in chief, and I were totally unable to make our way to the "main" table. "Let the press come!" Sergey Pavlovich shouted and thus helped us to deliver our newspapers. He was standing side by side with Gagarin, his arm around the latter's shoulder, like a father, thick-set, with a high brow, his head slightly bent forward, as though too heavy. Stubborn and powerful strength emanated from him.

It was precisely that same strength that helped him to endure solitary imprisonment in the Butyrki jail, where he was sent after his detention in June 1938 (his comrade Glushko was arrested in March).

It was only very recently that I found out on whose report—containing the standard set of accusations of sabotage—that Sergey Pavlovich had been detained and sentenced. This "distinction" falls on one of his colleagues. The reason was jealousy, the pettiness of the soul.

On 12 April 1961 Korolev rang up Khrushchev from Baykonur. Hoarse from fatigue and excitement, he shouted in the receiver: "The parachute has opened! It is about to land! The ship is in order!" It was about Gagarin's landing. Khrushchev kept asking: "Is he giving

the signal alive? Is he alive? Is he alive?" At that point no one could say precisely how the flight would end. Finally, Khrushchev heard: "He is alive!"

Today we have trouble recalling the names of those who are circling the earth. Some kind of particularly difficult or record-setting launching or something extraordinary must happen to draw our attention again. We have become accustomed to consider this natural. The work of the cosmonauts is, as in the past, risky and extremely difficult. The payload is increasing, the programs are becoming more complex. Man has already walked on the moon and is planning a flight to Mars.

On that long ago day, when an airplane brought to Moscow the first man on earth who had seen our planet from outer space, the entire city was excited. Hundreds of thousands of people poured into streets and squares, rushing to Leninskiy Prospekt. It was more difficult to have a place on a balcony in a home along which the solemn procession would pass than to obtain tickets for the most popular show in a theater. No one was chasing children off roofs, trees or fences.

No militia, no security units could keep order on the streets had such order not existed by itself. Greetings were carried on huge posters and pieces of paper. "Our people are in space!", "Hurrah for Gagarin!", "Hello, Yura!" A burst of patriotic pride triggered joy and happiness, a spiritual release and a feeling of lightness. In a word, this was happiness.

The fighter planes which provided the honor escort separated from the silvery IL, the airplane softly landed on the landing strip releasing a plume of fumes and the airplane came to a halt.

Gagarin showed up at the door. He stopped for a second and, walking lightly and elegantly, followed the red carpet to the rostrum. We were later to find out that the string of one of his shoes had become loose and this bothered him, but at that time no one noticed anything. Major Gagarin, a military man, walked along that carpet as though he had spent a lifetime walking down this triumphal carpet.

He was a man of natural dignity, simplicity, modesty and self-confidence. It was those human qualities that Sergey Pavlovich Korolev had sensed with amazing accuracy.

Yuriy Gagarin stopped in front of the rostrum, saluted and, turning to Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, began his report.

Subsequently, however, for many years, Brezhnev would be considered the main organizer of all of the country's achievements in space. Judging by the films shot at that time, Gagarin was reporting "to nobody." On the rostrum of the Mausoleum as well the strange isolation of the hero was also "organized" (the tremendous possibilities of montage and retouching in motion pictures have

long been practiced), and there will be more than enough people who would like to present the beginning of the space epic in precisely that fashion.

Nor would anyone write about the fact that after a short session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, chaired by Ulrikh, in July 1938, Korolev had been sentenced to 10 years for sabotage. It was not all that simple to escape from the clutches of "justice" as it was practiced then. In answer to his claim to innocence and the absurdity of accusations, a special commission would be created, again with that same Ulrikh but also with Beriya. Two years after the detention, a special session would pass on Korolev's sentence: 8 years in jail.

Korolev told his wife Nina Ivanovna that on his way to Kolyma he was saved from death accidentally. The steamship with the inmates aboard, on which Sergey Pavlovich was to travel, had left. It was only later that it became known that it had sunk with all passengers aboard.

In September 1940, on orders of Kobulov, Beriya's deputy, Korolev was transferred to a special technical bureau. It was thus that, since the beginning of the 1930s, use was made of many "specialists-saboteurs." One would think that this helped us to make great progress in developing the ordnance for the Red Army. This was convenient: sit down and work. Few people were interested in problems of mood or ability to work. The "kатыushas" were to show up in military positions only after the war had started. They did show up, however, and that was good enough!

Never, neither in the past nor now, do I ever argue with those who, one way or another, find a justification for all this, and consider Khrushchev's report about Stalin and the decree on eliminating the consequences of the cult of personality, as being almost an error. During the years of stagnation this viewpoint was expressed quite energetically. It was easy to see in this view the triumph of the administrative-order system which had been reawakened and given the right to issue orders and to order one and all. How pleasant it is once again to hear "we'll do!" Plant, opera, novel, poem, newspaper or home.... How pleasant it is to see fear in the eyes of a subordinate. What plant and what opera does not matter. People willing to slap together something suitable will always be found.

This is a yearning not after Stalin but after the system of power he created, after fear. Such people believe that fear means order, the growth of crops, the production of the best machines in the world, the lowering of prices and a great deal of many other things which are good for the people. What happens in real life and not in an approved plan does not matter. It matters little what really happens....

Something else: Fear does not allow one to ask the main question, the practically and politically most essential of all, as I already pointed out, giving the right to anyone to ask: what price? No, this is not the price dictated by supply and demand, market circumstances or hierarchical subordination but the higher price of living and acting. For if one thinks about it it means that one is seeking the most humane, the most efficient variant in solving the problem. If one does not, one is deluding oneself and others.

The 20th Congress provided a clear demarcation between these opposite views. Khrushchev's inconsistency began to appear not immediately, but eventually made him face the alarming fact of marking time. The capital repair of the command-order management system, the pulling of weeds, opening the windows to the big outside world may still seem effective. Meanwhile, the bottom of the ship is becoming increasingly encrusted with cockle-shells. The ship is still sailing forth but its engines have to work harder although they have already reached their limit.

These 10 years included Gagarin's flight, civil aviation jets, and many other scientific and technical discoveries and achievements which amazed the world. By the end of the 1950s the Soviet screens showed the motion picture filmed by Thorndike "The Russian Puzzle." It was as though through this motion picture we once again reassessed a great deal of what we had been able to accomplish within a short time. Faith in man and the faith of man was what this period represents to me. It defined views, eradicated falsehoods and asserted the truth.

The following came out in issue No 2 of the journal NOVYY MIR for 1987, in an article by V. Selyunin and G. Khanin, entitled "Tricky Figure:"

"In the 1950s the national economy developed quite rapidly. In our view, this period seems to have been the most successful for the economy. Growth rates outstripped previous accomplishments. However, the question is not one of pace alone. Most important is the circumstance that for the first time the growth was achieved not only by increasing resources but also through their better use. Labor productivity rose by 62 percent (almost 5 percent annually!); capital returns rose by 17 percent and material-intensiveness declined by 5 percent. All sectors developed quite harmoniously: not only heavy industry but also the production of consumer goods, agriculture and housing construction.

"There were impressive achievements in the financial area. The balance between commodity and money was ensured although it had previously seemed inaccessible. Whereas between 1928 and 1950 retail and wholesale prices had increased by approximately a factor of 12, between 1951 and 1955 retail prices dropped and wholesale prices were stabilized. Only a slight price increase occurred in the second half of the 1950s.

"We see, therefore, that that which we are now trying to achieve was already achieved once. For quite some time the economy worked efficiently. That is why it is important to determine the sources of this success and separate transitional factors from lessons which would be applicable to this day."

Those years should have become a lesson for the future. However, they were taken out of circulation and, quite soon afterwards, a reverse movement began.

A sigh of relief was heard in some offices. During those 10 years the world of familiar concepts and the administrative power pyramid, which had taken a long time to create, were crumbling. Telephones were silent. No one said "you must," "immediately," and "report." Many people were confused when faced with current tasks and were unable to issue orders with the power they previously had. Concessions had to be made, decisions and actions were needed. These people, however, had become accustomed to let others deal with the concerns. They complained. I would hear the puzzled "what have I done? Why is someone making my life difficult when I had structured it according to specific orders? I have never deviated. I supported, I propagandized, I executed!"

In 1958, my last year of work for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, I was editor in chief. The newspaper had given me a certain amount of experience and skills.

I found my first independent planning session strange: the short morning conference to discuss the next issue. On the table in front of me there was a folded piece of paper. I opened it. It was a drawing of a casket, a skull with crossbones and the inscription "do not come close, death." I asked who had written it. One of the associates immediately stood up: "I did." He hesitated and added: "It's a joke." I never asked him what the joke meant. He continued to work for KOMSOMOLKA even after I had gone to work for IZVESTIYA.

During one of the very first days of my work as "chief," I received a telephone call from V.P. Moskovskiy, from the Central Committee propaganda department. He asked me to see a visitor. "He will tell you all about it."

My visitor proved to be a man of about 40, with sparse and graying hair and a shy dull look in his eyes. It was those eyes that I noticed immediately. He told me the following story: In 1938 he had sent a letter to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA which, to use his words, was not all that good, because of youthful inexperience. After a while, he was looked up and asked to give explanations and sentenced to a remote area for making counterrevolutionary statements. The charges were dropped in 1956, he was rehabilitated and now he had come to the newspaper with a small request. "What?" I asked. "Could this letter be found and destroyed, for anything could happen...."

I told him that, naturally, the newspaper did not keep letters, that we did not keep files for such a long time, and that, furthermore, there was nothing to be afraid of now. "How is one to know," he answered. "I nonetheless would try to find my letter and burn it." Burn bridges.... It is a natural wish, assuming that someone else is still left on the other side.

In the small dacha settlement near Dmitrovo, our neighbor is Georgiy Stepanovich Zhzhenov. He is a people's actor of the USSR, an outstanding comrade, and a splendid ironic storyteller. If you "urge" him somewhat, he could produce a short novel. Here is the essence of one of them, for it is impossible to imitate Zhzhenov, one must listen to him.

After a performance, he was removing his make-up when a couple stood at the door. They greeted him pleasantly and warmly thanked him for his "exceptionally high mastery" and "profound, tear-bringing performance." They left while Zhzhenov tried but totally failed to recall where he had met these people. Several weeks later they showed up again. Same words, same humble gratitude, same emotion triggered by the "exceptional mastery" and "profound, tear-bringing performance." At that point Georgiy Stepanovich remembered. He was being congratulated by the chief of one of the camps in which he had spent "a certain amount of time." All in all, Zhzhenov had spent in various camps a total of 17 years. For nothing. Initially it was his brother, a university student who was arrested, and then came Georgiy Stepanovich's turn. In Leningrad, where they lived, the net was thrown frequently after Kirov's assassination.

What were the visitors interested in? Had Zhzhenov become a party member? They were ready to give him the best possible recommendations....

Such an initial step cannot be taken without a hitch. One must not gloss over and conceal the hitches. Aplomb and ignorance are the quickest and categorical judges. Supported by existing stereotypes, they assume such a power of "veracity," that it is virtually impossible to shake up. Unless we abandon such ways, we may start judging any other period in our history with the same frame of mind.

Many among us, as I already said, did not notice how the ebb began and how once again those same "decrees" from which we seemed to have gotten rid of once and for all began to encroach on our lives. Everything becomes more noticeable with the passing of time.

On the eve of 1963, Irina Aleksandrovna Antonova, director of the Graphic Arts Museum imeni A.S. Pushkin, called IZVESTIYA. The museum was preparing the opening of a major exhibit of the works of the French painter Leger. At that time such exhibits were not all so frequent as they are now and contacts were only being established. The opening, naturally, triggered increased

interest and attention. Interest and attention! Irina Aleksandrovna, an experienced person, was well aware of the fine distinction between these two words.

The items for the exhibit were brought by the painter's wife, Nadia Leger, a great friend of our country, curator of Leger's works in France, in Nice, where, through her efforts, a splendid museum had been built. Nadia Leger invariably invited to her home Soviet guests who would visit the city. She was an energetic woman and was not simply keeping the memory of someone close to her alive, but also skillfully promoted his work. I had visited that museum and, although I do not consider myself an expert in painting, I had admired the fantastic pageantry of many of his works, his artistic excitement and his unusual vision of the world.

Then, unexpectedly, there was the phone call by Irina Aleksandrovna and the friendly request to come for consultation and, possibly, help. Irina Aleksandrovna was worried about some of Leger's abstract canvases. At the Manege Khrushchev had recently exploded against home-grown abstractionists, and here we had a Frenchman with his puzzling canvases. We paced from one hall to another, myself as a judge-inquisitor, for I had attended the exhibitions at the Manege and had answered Antonova's questions of "what about this canvas?" and "what about this tapestry?" Despite the entire seriousness of the situation there was something foolish in our concern. It is rightly said that only one step separates tragedy from comedy. Neither Irina Aleksandrovna nor I wanted to please, with such a step, art experts of a special kind. We decided to put a few things in corners, and not to show a few items. However, it was simply inconceivable to remove anything "dangerous" from Leger's retrospective exhibit, and just as inconceivable to cancel it.

The difficulty was that Nadia Leger had already visited the museum, and now the reasons for changes in the location of the exhibits had to be explained to her. How to do it? Should she be told of the objections which Moscow abstractionists had triggered at the Manege? The argument was doubtful. Nadia spoke Russian well and could use nonparliamentary expressions in an argument. In Moscow she did not recognize any chiefs.

I understood how distasteful this entire difficulty was for Irina Aleksandrovna, an intelligent and educated woman, a brilliant art expert and a daring organizer of exhibits, but what was one to do? One would not suggest to Khrushchev to hear a lecture on the history of art. There was no way to rely on the support of those who, by virtue of their work, would listen calmly. Recently, at the Manege, Serov, the president of the Academy of Fine Arts, had made his viewpoint public. One could be certain that neither Khrushchev nor Suslov would attend the exhibit. But then there were the others.... "And more others." Following a long list of officials, in a short note, this brief "and others" is frequently encountered. It may be short but sometimes significant....

Another one who was worried was Yekaterina Alekseyevna Furtseva, at that time party Central Committee secretary. What if all of a sudden, at the New Year's reception in the Kremlin, Madame Leger, considering her temperament, would start a conversation on the topic of art with Khrushchev "himself?" A scandal could break out. It was decided to ask Nadia Leger to celebrate the New Year in a domestic atmosphere, to avoid official boredom. That was quite a military operation. This created the witticism that "nothing worse could have happened to the Leger exhibit than the fact that it happened."

Tension in cultural life increased. It had been difficult to present on the screen the motion picture "The Chairman," and the painting "Ilich's Outpost" was among the first to be criticized and shelved. It is true that the hope that all of this was temporary did not vanish. However, arguments became sharper in literature, the arts, theater and cinematography and shifted from offices to rostrums. There were those who liked Erenburg's novel "The Thaw," while others vilified it; some liked Dudintsev's novel "Not By Bread Alone," while others accused the author of attacking the foundations. Prejudices became ever clearer. Discussions on consolidation no longer led to anything. It cannot be said that such a situation developed unexpectedly. Its origins, nonetheless, were in the resolutions of the 20th Congress. Did Khrushchev himself understand how differently this congress had been accepted by some literary workers? I think that he did.

The first meeting between the party leadership and workers in culture was held in the summer of 1957, followed by a second and a third. Khrushchev addressed the Second Congress of Writers. He met with painters before their congress and attended the congress. He saw in his office many men of art and literature, Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovskiy in particular, with whom Khrushchev had a long conversation. Naturally, Tvardovskiy told Khrushchev the truth. He told him the truth about everything, including the 1930s, and the elimination of the kulaks. Remember Aleksandr Trifonovich's poem about his father. Khrushchev had great respect for Tvardovskiy and loved to hear his poetry. In August 1963 Aleksandr Trifonovich read to Khrushchev his poem "Terkin in This Light." After the final lines were read, Khrushchev turned to the newsmen: "Well, who has the courage to print it?" The pause lengthened and I could not restrain myself: "IZVESTIYA will take it willingly." The poem was published and, with Aleksandr Trifonovich's permission, I gave it a short preface:

"We believe that the new poem by Aleksandr Tvardovskiy does not need any particular preface and the nature of this brief note is entirely different. It is not the result of any literary analysis of the poem or a retort to criticism (such encounters are as yet awaiting both the poem and its author) but rather, in the language of journalism, a first impression, the first thing we thought after Aleksandr Trifonovich concluded his reading.

"That was a day of meeting of members of the European Association of Literary Workers, who met with Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev on the Black Sea shore, near Gagra. Mikhail Sholokhov, Konstantin Fedin, Leonid Leonov, Aleksey Surkov, Boris Polevoy, Mikola Bazhan, Leonid Sobolev, Georgiy Markov, Aleksandr Prokofyev, Aleksandr Chakovskiy and Konstantin Voronkov either laughed loudly, with tears in their eyes, or else, in the great quiet, transported themselves somewhere beyond the thoughts of the author and lived the tale, lived with Terkin. Even foreign guests, many of them noted poets and writers, listened or, rather, observed carefully, with a special feeling, this instructive picture, since some of them were unfamiliar with Russian. From the short comments by interpreters, the general reaction and the sound of the poem they too felt the mischievous satire and the intelligent and beautiful smoothness and fabulous poetry of this new creation.

"I particularly remember the way Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sholokhov listened to the poem. Naturally, I could not anticipate his view on the poem but he listened to it in a very beautiful way. It was as though he was alongside with Terkin in his inordinate travel, laughing with him and with a clever far-sightedness, like a writer, he gave life to the images painted in the poem.

"I well remember that long gone time of more than 20 years ago, when Vasilii Terkin for the first time identified himself and his front line service. Millions of people love him. On the front there were arguments as to whether this was a literary character, or was Aleksandr Tvardovskiy writing about some actual soldier? The power of the writer and the power of his work was precisely that in this debate both sides were right.

"And now, once again, we meet with Vasilii Terkin in such an unusual, one can even say extremely unusual poem, sharply satirical, almost to the point of being grotesque. It will probably trigger arguments and objections, and this is good! The best, however, is that Vasilii Terkin lives. It is good that the great poet Aleksandr Tvardovskiy did not hurry, taking 9 years (let this be an example to some young poets) to offer his trip "on this world" to the judgment of the readers. Instead he worked and worked, rewriting and seeking more accurate thoughts.

"Once again millions of readers will meet with an old familiar character and front veterans will remember past campaigns. Anyone familiar with the way Terkin started will be pleased, and for the young this new work is bound to make them read 'A Book About a Soldier...'"

With this I did not wish in any way to bask in the glory of a great poet. At that time it seemed important to me not only to publish the poem but also to describe who had heard it, and where, what the attitude toward this new work was and what its destiny would be.

Emphasizing the particular respect he had for M.A. Sholokhov, Khrushchev went to Veshenskoye and invited Mikhail Aleksandrovich to accompany him to the United States. Sholokhov went to see Nikita Sergeyevich in his dacha. He read to him the final and recently completed chapter of "Virgin Soil Upturned." The tragic epilogue touched Khrushchev. "I would so much like for Davydov to remain alive," he said to the writer. Sholokhov answered: "Truth dictates otherwise."

Nikita Sergeyevich frequently asked to be read things. "Let my eyes rest and let yours work," he would say by giving someone a book. He could see well but, because of excessive stress, his eyes were quite tired. Reading aloud became a custom. Khrushchev could spend hours listening, particularly during his days off.

It was thus, "by ear," that he became familiar with Kazakevich's "Blue Notebook," Solzhenitsyn's "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," and many other works by writers who were waiting for the "special decision." Nikita Sergeyevich listened quite attentively, sitting still, sometimes shutting his eyes.

He never commented on the work in my presence and it was virtually impossible to determine his attitude toward it. The latter became known by the future of some of the books, which were quickly published. Alas, Khrushchev was not able to read all the new books which were being written and was not familiar with all controversial literary problems. Nor was he able to accept or, more accurately, to understand everything. The more extensive and difficult became his governmental concerns, the less time remained for literature. Even the theater was visited by him less and less frequently, and mostly with official guests.

As the years passed, the pressure exerted on Khrushchev by various advisers "on cultural problems" increased. He frequently became irritable and nonobjective. During my work in IZVESTIYA, I frequently felt my helplessness in an effort to provide my own evaluation to a given work. Such was the case with I. Erenburg's book "People, Years, Life." The publication of a critical article by V.V. Yermilov on Erenburg's memoirs was sanctioned without our participation. As a whole, the situation was unsteady. The stupid accusations leveled against Dmitriy Dmitriyevich Shostakovich were lifted. The works of Akhmatova and Zoshchenko began to be published and many great names were returned to literature and the arts but, it is true, by no means all. The cleansing process proceeded, I repeat, by no means painlessly. Increasingly, Khrushchev assumed the right to provide sharp and one-dimensional ideological evaluations of a given work. Unfortunately, this right was not always combined with a broad view, education, erudition, trust and desire to hear out those who could provide a thoughtful advice. As a pensioner, Nikita Sergeyevich frequently discussed the level of tolerance under such situations....

Khrushchev frequently blamed Suslov for errors in ideological work, dullness and philistinism in the motion pictures and the theater. Suslov became tense and nervous and translated remarks into the usual method: cut! Those who executed his instructions tightened restrictions. There were clashes of opinions, passions and assumptions and efforts to determine what was said and by whom in similar situations. A tangle more complex than one aboard a ship would develop, such that no master-boatswain could untangle. There were also surprises. Suddenly something would break through, hope would burst out, the progressives would become energized. However, they would quiet down with the very next "delivery." At one of the sessions, Simonov, Academician Kirillin and myself tried to persuade Polikarpov, who was in charge of cultural problems in the Central Committee, to try to allow the publication of Hemingway's novel "For Whom the Bell Tolls." Polikarpov exploded: "Do you know who is against it?..." No arguments worked. Perhaps Polikarpov himself considered that the publication of this novel was necessary but the habitual "what if something did not work out," made it inflexible. Nonetheless, time worked in favor of those who were promoting in the public self-consciousness democratic principles, who fought for the assertion in our life of the ideals of the 20th Congress. I am referring above all to the young poets, writers, cinematographers, actors and directors, people I knew personally. In their works they expressed the nerve of the time and extensively and actively asserted themselves and their understanding of morality. Other famous people lost some of their glitter against the background of such renovation. They began to be read by fewer people, praised less and criticized more severely. These were complex times. People did not conceal mutual dislikes, such dislikes having been already anticipated by the cruel circumstances of recent years. Let us recall the campaign waged around the struggle against cosmopolitanism, and the threadbare immorality with which its activists operated.

Lack of conflict, pseudopatriotism, peremptoriness and bureaucratic priorities were abandoning literature and the arts with difficulty and strain, and those who, one way or another, had to yield and assume a different position or, perhaps, abandon this road altogether, used all conceivable and inconceivable means of retaining their positions. Any error was raised to the level of principle, any word could be construed as a statement. Unfortunately, many of the young literary stars of that time were short of a considered view on the totality of events "within" and "without." Their intoxication with success and the conviction that they were absolutely right turned into errors. It turned out that it was not all that simple to blow off the dust of the past. The saddest thing was that in the excitement of impatience some, in a way explainable, exaggerations gave ammunition to those who had always carefully gauged their steps, who "never crossed the line," who did not risk, who did not dare, allowing them to point an accusing finger: "This is

where they lead, this is what they try to hit: the holy of holies!" At that point, settling this dispute was in the hands of those with both the right and the power to do so....

Frequently they incited Khrushchev himself to be one of them, and he could be unforgivably rude.

I recently read that Vasilii Grossman's "Life and Fate" was "arrested" in 1961 and that Grossman had written a letter to Khrushchev. At that time I knew nothing about it. I would think that Khrushchev either did not read the letter or did not understand its essence. According to eyewitnesses, Suslov gave no explanation to Grossman concerning his novel. He said that the book will not be published even 250 years from now.

As we know, the novel was published in 1988.

Could this have happened earlier? What would have changed in his destiny, had Khrushchev shown greater attention to the work of Vasilii Grossman? No simple answer is possible. I believe that Nikita Sergeyevich would have been unable to comprehend the entire complexity of this novel and could not have accepted it. Understanding a novel requires more than intuition. It is entirely possible that Khrushchev would have been (or was?) in agreement with Suslov.

In his retirement, Nikita Sergeyevich read Pasternak's "Doctor Zhivago." He did not like the book, he found it boring. The complex ties in the story and the characters, who seemed alien in terms of their spirit and their past, and a great many other things, as he said, seemed to him unsubstantial, outside the range of his aspirations. However, he then regretted that the novel had not been printed and, with some sadness, admitted that "nothing would have happened...."

This latter admission is indicative. It reveals Nikita Sergeyevich's views not only on literary processes and the interrelationship between men of arts and the leadership at the time when he thought about this, as a retiree, but also the "technology" of aggravations, which took place while he was in power. What am I referring to?

At big conferences or within a small circle, Khrushchev frequently said that one should not allow ideological stir from which, in his view, uncontrollable processes could appear in social life. For example, he did not particularly care for Erenburg's definition of "the thaw," believing that any thaw could turn into a catastrophic flood. Others made quite skillful use of this view. By 1963, when the ideological situation had become particularly aggravated, Khrushchev reached the limit. He saw everywhere the intrigues of ill-fated abstractionists, philistinism and petty badgering. His world outlook was clearly being suppressed by inner censorship which forced him to check himself: Had there been too much slackness, and had that same frightening flood taken place? There

were two people within Khrushchev. One realized that a healthy tolerance, an understanding of the views of the artist and giving him the possibility to reflect real life with all of its true contradictions, was needed. The other believed that he had the right to shout, unwilling to listen to anything and tolerating no objections.

Today it is precisely that Khrushchev who is recalled most frequently. I would like to say something about it. It was precisely in 1963, that "grave" year, that Nikita Sergeyevich saw a Mosfilm motion picture about American airmen who were to drop an atom bomb on our country but, rising in the air, ignoring the order, dropped their bombs in the ocean. As it were, I was unable to find the title of this film. I was told that Khrushchev became enraged. How could it be that we were depicting our potential enemy as some kind of noble knight, humanists who would disobey an order to bomb Russia! What kind of ideological meaning did this motion picture impart? Had it been filmed by Soviet movie makers or had this film been financed by the Americans?

A corresponding decree was drafted several days later. It did not discuss this motion picture alone. The "blacklist" contained many others, including the just released movie "Nine Days of One Year." As editor in chief of the newspaper I was familiar with the draft of the decree. I was perturbed. The point was that several days previously, the articles by A. Agranovskiy had shown firm support for this picture in IZVESTIYA, whereas PRAVDA had published a sharply negative review by V. Orlov. On that occasion I had not telephoned PRAVDA's editor in chief to clarify the reason for which our newspaper had been rebuked and did not think that this concealed something more than a difference in assessments.

After reading the draft decree I decided to consult with one of Khrushchev's assistants. He confirmed my worst fears: Khrushchev's irritated reaction to the film about the American fliers was extended to other motion pictures which were totally unrelated. What to do? Essentially, it was a question of a sharp change in the view on the work of the best masters of the motion picture, of films created after the 20th Congress. Vladimir Semenovich Lebedev, who dealt with ideological problems in Khrushchev's secretariat, was unable to do anything. "Ask to be seen by Khrushchev, explain to him the situation and express your viewpoint." "When, how?" I asked. "Right now, there is no time to waste. Khrushchev is alone in his office (it was already 11 p.m.), let me announce you."

I must point out that this was the first time that I had asked to be received by Khrushchev. I do not know what he thought after Lebedev had reported that I was there.

Nikita Sergeyevich looked quite tired. He asked me what I wanted. After briefly describing the situation, I put the sheet with the decree on his desk and left. The next

morning the Central Committee held an urgent conference chaired by Khrushchev. I do not remember his speech. The decree, as it had been drafted, was not adopted. Many excellent films, including "Nine Days of a Single Year," which were the pride of the renewed cinematography, were not mentioned in it at all.

Such actions did not come at that easily to me or other newsmen, as some comrades may think. I believe that Suslov did not forgive me this appeal to Khrushchev. When the question of replacing Nikita Sergeyevich was being discussed at the Central Committee Plenum, he addressed a few retorts to me. One of them I remember well. "Imagine," Suslov said, "that in the morning I open IZVESTIYA not knowing what it will have printed."

Already in "retirement," it seemed as though Khrushchev may have realized that not everything in his relations with some of the intelligentsia had developed well. To the end of his days, however, he believed that his requirements were entirely legitimate: not even in petty matters should one violate ideological convictions. He did not pull his punches when he "waved his fists," shamed others, defended, or got excited. During a quite heated discussion with the sculptor Neizvestnyy he promised to visit his workshop. He saw the entirely realistic compositions of the sculptor and said: "Now this is something else."

It was Ernst Neizvestnyy who sculpted the monument on Khrushchev's grave.

At the exhibit in the Manege, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the MOSKh, it was Serov, president of the Academy of Fine Arts, who gave Khrushchev explanations. I was part of the crowd surrounding Nikita Sergeyevich and listened to the deliberate negative intonations with which Serov discussed Falk and many other painters who, for the first time in many years, were being exhibited, clearly "for the sake of objectivity." I therefore can certify that, in looking at the paintings, Khrushchev revealed no personal impressions whatsoever. He was then taken to the second floor, where a group of abstractionist works had been assembled in a corner of the small hall. At this point he showed no restraint.

It was precisely for this that many people are willing to recall Khrushchev in periods of his irritated arguments with poets, writers, painters and directors. It was as though to criticize Khrushchev was simpler during the period of stagnation, when it met all kinds of support. Obviously, however, at that time not everyone wanted to emphasize his connection with the age of the 20th Congress. Some were fully satisfied with their "stagnating" personal well-being. Is this not the reason for which they find it so important today to remind others of themselves: I too was the subject of Khrushchev's ire!

I sometimes feel like asking: Would we have had the possibility of engaging in a great variety of recollections had there not been the Khrushchev decade? On the other

hand, is it right to link the entire complexity, heterogeneity and inconsistency of the processes which began in the country after the 20th Congress only to one feature or another in Khrushchev's character? Let us ask ourselves another question as well: Is it possible for any person in the situation provided by such a position of power to totally avoid errors? Is it easy to retain a feeling of self-control when you are being told every day and every hour that any one of your remarks is accurate and profound, that your analysis of events is true and scientifically considered, when your advice has had an inordinately fast result and when you go to sleep with the idea that this high position will last forever and that all possible means will be applied to extend your life span? The administrative power system which was created by Stalin was, precisely, aimed at the peremptory nature of the opinions of a single person, of the leader. Stalin departed from this life but the System did not surrender. This System was Stalin's greatest invention. It survived the upheaval of the 20th Congress. To defeat it at that time proved impossible. And there are also those who will be in favor of preserving it to the end.

Although it is said that "man does not live by bread alone," his life does depend above all on bread. The essential fact was that along with the steady work of industry and its most important sectors, agricultural production developed more stably on the basis of the achievements of scientific and technical progress. The following figures were cited at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961: Whereas during the 5-year period of 1951-1955 the average annual grain production was 5 billion 442 million poods, it reached 7 billion 742 million from 1956 to 1960. In terms of the yardstick currently used in our country, this amounts to about 130 million tons.

The increase in grain procurements was essentially the result of the development of the virgin lands. However, yields increased as well. The countryside was no longer the milk cow from which both the town and its industry drew their resources without consideration, little concerned with observing a sensible balance within the unified national economic complex. The increased material incentive of the peasants, the sale to the kolkhozes of agricultural equipment and concentrating such equipment in the hands of single proprietors, the introduction of a guaranteed wage minimum in the countryside and kolkhoz member pensions, and equalizing their social status in society yielded substantial results.

Major breakdowns occurred in rural affairs as well, including some created by impatience and whitewashing. The Ryazan "experiment," according to which, within a short time, meat production could be tripled, turned out to be purely adventurist, and Larionov, Ryazan party obkom secretary, committed suicide. At a time when it seemed that we would outstrip the United States in per capita meat production and along highways we could read appeals, we would see frequently added to the bombastic statements, ironical subscripts: "I am not so sure—we shall not outstrip."

At this point the readers would have the right to ask us, newsmen of those years: And where were you? Did you fail to see or understand, and did you lack the courage to tell the truth? Had Khrushchev, in the euphoria of success, lost track of the real situation in agriculture and prefer to live in a world of illusions? Could it be that Larionov's end did not seem all that terrible? Was it not a warning?

Today one can be beating one's chest and repent, acknowledging cowardice assenting and admitting to all kinds of sins. The errors, fundamentally, were much more substantial. There was no firm concept in economics but an eclectic mixture of a variety of approaches in management. The upper hand was gained either by the "merchants," or the "cavalry men," the latter with increasing frequency. It became more difficult to write in the newspapers, sharply and openly, about blunders and errors of an economic nature. However, there was still some powder left in the journalistic powder-flasks.

I well understand the mood of an editor, of any member of a newspaper at a time when the presses gobble up an endless amount of newsprint, materializing the word, addressing it to millions of readers. For a while there is a feeling of devastation, as though something had been taken out of the person.

The next morning that sense of fatigue disappears, it has to disappear.

To some the newsmen bring joy, to others disappointment or even distress. The profession does not tolerate indifference. It is like medicine. However, the physician talks to one person while the newsmen, who reviews the work of the day covering huge areas and involving a large number of people, addresses himself to millions of people. Whether he writes about a hero or exposes a money grubber, whether he brings to light thievery and account padding or describes a clever experience, it is like tightening up the string of his bow with its numerous arrows and would like to hit the bull's-eye with each one of them. The accuracy of the hit depends on many factors. The worst is when someone grabs his hand just before the shooting. I respect my fellow journalists and I know how bitter silencing may be.

I was appointed to IZVESTIYA in May 1959. There have been two main editorial positions in my life: KOMSOMOLKA and IZVESTIYA. I had the opportunity to see, find out and understand a great deal and I do not regret in the least having chosen this profession.

At that time I was considered a young editor at the age of 35 although, as it turned out, I had not been the youngest in the history of the newspaper. L.F. Ilichev, one of my predecessors, had been 34 at the time he took over IZVESTIYA.

The editors were experienced journalists, tough and with a sense of irony. It seemed to me that they were somewhat shocked by the appointment of a "youngster" to such a respectable newspaper.

In the course of my appointment, I was told that it was necessary somehow to separate the spheres of influence of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, not only on the basis of their official affiliation (the party newspaper and the newspaper of the soviets), but also in their essence, for they had become too similar to each other. Ways of distinction had to be found, with the help of the entire collective. I received a kind of instruction also from Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. He told me as follows:

In 1947, during a meeting, Stalin once again started discussing the topic of how public opinion is being shaped in our country. His thought was reduced to the fact that, although there neither was nor could there be any opposition party in our country, we must not forget the possibility of holding unofficial views and judgments. If, according to Stalin, such views have no outlet one must keep silent. Knowing the truth, however, is necessary and useful, particularly in the case of a ruling party which alone expresses the interests of all classes and social groups in society; it would be useful, bearing in mind the inclination of cadres to slide into lethargy, conceit and uncritical assessments.

Stalin recommended that the critical activities of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA be broadened and that it be given the possibility of acting more daringly. Anastas Ivanovich concluded as follows: "Comrade Stalin liked the sharp tone of the newspaper for a while but then it began to irritate him. In my view, Simonov, the editor in chief, may have expected major difficulties had Stalin not died before he had been able to order an investigation of a newspaper headed by Comrade Simonov...."

The manuscript with my notes was in the hands of ZNAMYA, the third issue of which had started the publication of the last and unfinished work by Konstantin Mikhaylovich Simonov "Through the Eyes of a Man of My Generation." Simonov described his conversation with Stalin concerning LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. What I was told by Mikoyan and what Simonov wrote coincide, if not literally, at least in spirit.

My first day of work with the new collective.... Pushkin Square was being rebuilt. The big Rossiya Movie Theater was opening its door to the public. The building of the newspaper, a model of the constructivism of the 1930s, was next to a private home which was known as Famus House although, as I was told by an expert on the old Moscow, Viktor Vasilyevich Sorokin, this house was not directly related to the subject of Griboyedov's play "Bitterness." Thoughtlessly, this unusual old house was wrecked.

There was a small announcement on the door leading to the editorial premises: "The barber shop will be open (the hours were indicated); no service for outsiders." I summoned the guard and we started to remove this announcement. It yielded but, along with it, a big glass plate crumbled, covering the floor with bits of glass. Meanwhile, the editorial staff began to arrive. Most of them did not know me and I heard not particularly polite witticisms on the subject of two individuals who had been wasting time on such a stupid occupation.

The morning conference began with a discussion of the plans for the next issue. This was happening at a somewhat slow pace and I could hardly control my irritation. To this day I am unable to tolerate in the people's behavior at work some kind of profound lack of haste which, more than anything else, is an indication of laziness and indifference, features which are contraindicated in a journalist.

Toward the end of the short meeting, Sonya, already familiar to the readers, showed up with her assistant. Carrying two huge trays, they brought mugs with tea and sandwiches. Anticipating my question, one of the deputy editors in chief, leaned toward me and said: "We shall now read out loud the editorial and discuss it." The sandwiches were appetizingly piled up on the tray but no one dared pick one up. Glancing at the editorial, I said: "Shall we abolish this rule? Let its author, the editor of that section and the editor in chief be responsible for the quality of the editorial." I then suggested that we start eating the sandwiches, while personally I began to read the article. It consisted of four typewritten pages of general statements and cliches. "What do you think," I said, turning to my colleagues, "what if we carry no editorial today?"

Within myself I was proud of my decisiveness. Soon afterwards, however, I found out that this was precisely the way Yuriy Mikhaylovich Steklov, who had edited the newspaper from October 1917 to 1925, had acted. Instead of such meaningless editorials, he preferred the publication of a few specific notes which other called "Steklovisms." We frequently resorted to this tried method. The IZVESTIYA people willingly wrote such "Steklovisms." The notes were given a by-line. In answering "instructive" telephone calls, I referred to Yuriy Mikhaylovich Steklov. Citing an authority is the most reliable means of calming down those who check on you.

That evening I walked the various floors of the editorial premises. Leaning shelves, crowded to the ceiling with torn volumes of journals and newspapers stood in uncomfortable offices; in a number of areas the old flooring had been covered with squares of linoleum. Compared to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, everything seemed squalid.

Sometimes the dirt and neglected condition of many of our institutions are justified by the smallness of the premises, the lack of cleaning women and many other excuses. All of this is true except one. An interested person will find the possibility of organizing his workplace suitably.

Soon afterwards, the IZVESTIYA personnel had their first (but not last) subbotnik: they cleaned house. After that, they were no longer ashamed to receive guests. Later we were given funds for capital repairs of the building. Therefore, it was not only the newspaper but the editorial premises that were being reorganized. This was a hellish period. New topics and a new pace were being sought amidst dust, noise and stupefying smells of lacquer and paint. Everyone began to move faster. At that time I was strongly supported by the pillars of IZVESTIYA: Tatyana Tess, Yevgeniy Kriger, Aleksandr Galich, Vasiliy Koroteyev, and others. They were entitled not to come to the editorial premises but to receive their assignments by telephone and take creative time-off. Apparently, however, the noise and thunder were somehow attractive, for they began to show up on premise with increasing frequency.

The repairs of the editorial premises had an unexpected side. The library had to be moved to a temporary location, and the young personnel of the information department were asked to move to that place the bound issues of previous years. I asked to take a look at them. I would sign out an issue and would leaf through the old pages. No stories by eyewitnesses, collections of articles or scientific notes or even newsreels could equate the value of such a study. It was as though these issues had been produced by me personally and that they had just come out of the presses. These evening hours were not only a trip to the core of history—the facts—but also to the area of feelings, for history lives through feelings as well.

Konstantin Sergeyevich Stanislavskiy believed that those who think that the life of even very purposeful people is a straight line between two points are wrong. A straight line means lack of character, individuality and struggle. The true line of life is always one of fractured sharp segments which may take off far from the straight line but which always come back, which aspire toward it.

I read minutes of unedited reports of Central Committee plenums of the 1920s and was amazed by the bluntness, the openness with which outstanding party leaders talked with one another. They did not conceal, they did not fear aggravations. Naturally, I was familiar with party debates and in my university course could enumerate them with perfect accuracy. However, I could still remember how lifeless such lectures felt. A different world was recreated from the pages of the old issues.

Virtually every issue contained articles discussing construction projects, plans, books, scientific projects and trends of social development. No one feared to express his viewpoint which may not have coincided with Stalin's claims or assertions by other party leaders.

Other topics could be found in subsequent issues. I believe that if such newspapers would have been seen today by any normally thinking person, he would not believe this possible, explainable or needed by anyone. The four pages of the newspaper were the equivalent of some 80 typewritten pages of text. In some issues of the 1937-1938 period some kind of practical information could be found in no more than a dozen pages. The rest was filled with articles exposing the enemies of the people. They were written not only in a dry style but as though it was not a question of people but of inanimate objects. There were reports on exposed and detained groups, gangs, and secret counterrevolutionary organizations. Appeals to be vigilant not only urged but demanded that enemies be sought everywhere—in rural cooperatives, Komsomol organizations and party and soviet agencies; among the military, writers, engineers, agronomists and kolkhoz members. Hundreds of details were given about enemy camouflage, the need for universal mistrust, and suspicion; denunciations were encouraged and praised.

All that became known after the 20th Congress pertained essentially to noted party, soviet and military leaders and the intelligentsia, after which they dropped to the primary level: Small and sometimes entirely invisible people were depicted as major concealed enemies of the Soviet system.

The newspapers called to order, warned and drew attention. In one oblast or another the search was insufficiently energetic; elsewhere, people were being timid, and so on. Those who had exposed, detained, sentenced and exiled more actively became prominent.

Issues of the 1920s, and issues of the 1940s! The cautious removed them from public access; they were not issued in libraries without special permission even after the 20th Party Congress. But is this admissible: to study one's history by someone else's permission and only by a narrow circle of people?! Our history is ourselves. A sequence of most difficult and, sometimes, tragic changes were the lot of my generation, but no one was able to dampen our faith.

At one of the editorial conference, Yuriy Konstantinovich Filonovich, the editor of the propaganda department, was assigned to write biographic outlines of outstanding leaders who had fallen victim to the cult of personality or else deleted from our history for subjective reasons. It seemed to us important for the readers, the young in particular, to be familiar not only with their names but also with their lives. Such materials interested the people, as we gathered from the letters to the editors.

Soon afterwards, however, such publications began to meet with concealed opposition. It was not merely a matter of various telephone calls and "rebuttals," but of

hostility toward us. Frequently the authors of such materials and actually the entire editorial staff, were threatened: "Who are you looking for? Who are you praising?"

Strange situations occasionally developed. An essay on Filipp Kuzmich Mironov, who commanded the Second Cavalry Army, was the subject of an essay for "Nedelya," which was the newspaper's supplement. The history of that army, as well as the role played by its commanding officer, had long been tightly sealed. The essay described the complex combat career of this brave individual.

As a member of the Cossack Department of the VTSIK, this exceptional man, ignoring the ban of the RVSR, in August 1919 took off from Saransk for the front, with an incomplete corps. He was arrested for violating the order, sentenced by the revolutionary tribunal to be executed by firing squad but amnestied by the VTSIK. At the same time, the RKP(b) Central Committee lifted the charge of counterrevolutionary activities. From September to December 1920 he commanded the Second Mounted Army. For successful combat against Vrangeli's forces in the Crimea he was awarded an honor revolutionary weapon and a second Order of the Red Banner.

The essay by journalist V. Goltsev was already signed to press. Late that evening, Semen Mikhaylovich Budennyi rang up the editors. I do not know how and what he had learned, but he urged that nothing about this "traitor" be printed. Only a few minutes remained before going to press. This strange warning by Budennyi discouraged both me and Goltsev. I decided to ring up M.A. Suslov at home. I briefly described to him my talk with Semen Mikhaylovich. Suslov was brief: "Print it," he decided. The essay was published but I realized how long hatred can live in the heart of a man, taking him so far from the truth.

Mironov was executed in the yard of the Butyrki jail in 1921. The secret of this event has never been unraveled.

Budennyi's telephone call to IZVESTIYA was by no means random. He continued persistently to oppose the decision to rehabilitate yet another noted military commander from civil war times, B.M. Dumenko. A former cavalry master sergeant in the tsarist army, Dumenko had actively joined in the struggle against the Don counterrevolution. By the end of 1918 he was already commanding the Combined Cavalry Division. S.M. Budennyi was his assistant. The First Mounted Army was based on the combined military corps, commanded by Dumenko. Vladimir Ilich Lenin praised the heroic exploits of Dumenko's cavalymen. On the basis of a false denunciation, Dumenko was sentenced and shot by a firing squad. He was fully rehabilitated in 1964. IZVESTIYA carried a story about him. Budennyi no longer rang up the editors. In 1970, however, in the second issue of the journal VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS,

he attacked with unconcealed hatred his former commander. The fact that the latter had been rehabilitated did not bother him. Semen Mikhaylovich had a good sense of what was permissible and what was impermissible. He was aware of the difference between 1964 and 1970.

Here, in a big official newspaper such as IZVESTIYA, the lessons and experience of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA could not be applied directly. However, nor did we wish to publish the newspaper as in the past. The circulation of this respectable publication was small. The difficulty was not in writing sharper and more topical articles but making them more human, which proved to be harder. However twisty were the paths of social life at that time, it was governed, above all, I would say, by the emancipation of the human soul.

The yearning for openness, sincerity, friendliness and mutual aid was the basis of change and the determining feature of social optimism. Two articles published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, virtually on the eve of my transfer to IZVESTIYA, although on different topics, were related by the sameness of the moral principles they expressed, and to this day, remain basic from my viewpoint as models of human journalism. I am referring to the essay by Nina Aleksandrova "Someone Else's Children" and the political report by Arkadiy Sakhnin "The Echo of War."

The essay by Nina Aleksandrova was simple. It was a story of love and loyalty, endurance and nobility between two adults and two children, an accidental event, an unordinary drama and even a melodrama which concealed great passion, not on the stage but next door, on our street, and today; the force of love and salvation within love was what our Nina, an excellent journalist, wrote about. "Someone Else's Children" was made into a movie and broadcast on the radio. It was read aloud. No, it was not the sentimental reminiscences in the spirit of Charskaya that had attracted the minds and hearts of the readers. The SOS signal was received by millions of people and pulled them out of a state of indifference and apathy....

Nina Aleksandrova transferred to IZVESTIYA. She died tragically, en route to check on a letter to the editors. Her plane crashed....

The article by Arkadiy Sakhnin dealt with something else. The echo of war was heard not far from Kursk, where huge dumps of ammunition, left behind by the Germans in their retreat, had been found. Hundreds of bombs, shells and mines had been hidden underground. This was one step away from tragedy, for the area not far from the site was heavily populated.

Arkadiy visited the sappers. He saw young soldiers who had not experienced the trials of the war working with their elder comrades, who had turned gray in the old

battles, engaged in mortally dangerous work. A wrong movement could have been their last. In brief and restrained terms Sakhnin described this extension of the war in peacetime.

Time may confuse some important events and prevent us from precisely placing them in our recollections chronologically. The 20th Party Congress is remembered by millions of people as a courageous truth which exposed the cult of Stalin's personality. At that time many other most important decisions were made and new theoretical and practical approaches to world politics were defined. In contemporary terminology, a political thinking, consistent with the existing deployment of class forces in the world community, was formulated.

The congress's resolutions invariably emphasized that under contemporary conditions war was not fatally inevitable and that peaceful coexistence was the only possible form of relations among countries resting on different political, ideological and social foundations. Under circumstances in which nuclear weapons were increasingly becoming a fact of sharp and risky politics, our party once again proved its loyalty to the Leninist ideals of peace. The public highly rated the significance of such statements, made at the 20th Congress.

The visit which the head of the Soviet government paid to the United States was the first of its kind in the history of relations between the two great powers. It was a concentrated manifestation of our resolve not only to proclaim our objectives and intentions but also to back them with actions.

In his article "A Time of Hope," which came out in IZVESTIYA on the eve of the visit, Ilya Erenburg wrote that the invitation extended to Khrushchev to visit the United States came equally from that country's government and people....

The Soviet exhibit on "Science, Technology and Culture in the USSR" had just ended in New York's Coliseum. It had been opened by F.R. Kozlov, Central Committee Presidium member and Central Committee secretary. The exhibit had been seen by President Dwight Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon, who had praised it highly.

Our labor productivity was still low. Technology was backward and the quality of many light industry goods and conditions in agricultural production were depressing. However, 14 years after the end of a devastating war, our hopes were based on a strengthening material foundation.

The term "Iron Curtain" had made its appearance in the time of the Cold War, proclaimed by Churchill in 1946. Western journalists cannot be refused nimbleness of expression. Setting aside the argument as to the purposes for which this curtain had dropped between East and West, it was "supported" by both sides. And now it

seemed as though this curtain had begun to rise and to open to millions of people a world in which human interaction was becoming increasingly active....

Khrushchev took off for the United States on 14 September 1959.

After a lengthy run the TU-114 rose from the concrete runway and the thunder of the powerful turbines dropped immediately, as though remaining on the ground. The inside of the airplane, at that time considered the biggest in the world, appeared exceptionally spacious. Khrushchev was accompanied by Aleksey, the son of Andrey Nikolayevich Tupolev, an aerospace designer and one of the creators of the TU-114. In saying his good-byes, Andrey Nikolayevich joked: "Do not worry about the new aircraft, Nikita Sergeyevich, I am giving you my son as hostage. Had there been any problem I would have flown myself." Andrey Nikolayevich addressed virtually everyone in the second person singular. This included Khrushchev but, in this case, not because of habit but as a sign of respectful closeness.

The airplane was flying over the Atlantic. Four years previously, its waves were being cut by the "Ile de France," carrying on its board seven Soviet journalists, including myself, on their way to America. How would America welcome the Soviet people now? This was a visit on a different level and these were other times.

Together with Aleksey Tupolev, Nikita Sergeyevich toured the aircraft. On both sides of the fuselage, not far from the pilot's cockpit, some people were peacefully sleeping. Alesha Tupolev said that these were plant engineer-mechanics and that he would wake them up immediately. "Why are they wearing headphones?" Khrushchev asked, stopping Tupolev Jr. The latter answered: "It is their job to listen to the work of the engines." "Let them sleep," Khrushchev said. "If they are not concerned it means that the engines are running as they should."

In April Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev had turned 65. Five of these years he had spent as CPSU Central Committee first secretary and one and a half as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Khrushchev was full of vigor. His personal energy blended with the energetic accomplishments in the country. The invitation to visit the United States triggered a sensation in the world press. One can imagine the mood of a person to whom such a mission had been entrusted.

Nikita Sergeyevich met with the American navigator Harold Renegar. The American asked about our second space rocket which had placed a Soviet pennant on the moon. Khrushchev asked that a little case with the pennant be brought to him. He showed it to Renegar. With simulated ingenuousness, the latter said: "Well planned! You dropped one such thing on the moon and you are now dropping a second one on us, in America."

The protocol of welcoming a high guest involves the American partiality to their own short history: The motorcade was surrounded by horsemen in the uniform of the age of the War of Independence of the United States. Huge crowds of people filled the approaches to the city and Washington's wide boulevard, in a strange posture of immobility. The faces expressed amazement and caution. Many of them held small American and Soviet flags but did not wave them....

In short, Khrushchev liked America. He liked the honest and daring formulation of difficult problems of the contemporary world, the keeping in touch, and the ability to understand one's interlocutor and his mood: trading seriousness for seriousness, joke for joke and pressure for pressure.

On the streets or at a railroad station, in a plant, in a cafeteria, in the rich decor of Hollywood or at a refined dinner, every journalist (our colleagues "tailing" Khrushchev numbered some 5,000 people, which was a record-setting number of people ever following a guest of the United States at that time) discovered in Khrushchev not only the political leader of a great country but also an understandable, sincere and excitable person. They believed that he had come with friendly intentions. The itinerary of the trip included many American cities, from east to west and back.

Three months later, several Soviet journalists who had accompanied Nikita Sergeyevich, wrote a book entitled "Face to Face With America." The book came out in a large edition and was translated into many languages. I do not know where the copies of this book went, when they disappeared from the shelves but whenever I am asked to lend it, I caution the people that all I have is a single copy. I have asked for this book in various libraries and it is nowhere to be found. No joke, almost 30 years had passed since its publication!

The description which Nikita Sergeyevich himself provided on his trip reveals more clearly what happened in America at that time and how it happened. Returning to Moscow, he went straight from the airport to Luzhniki, where he delivered a speech at the Sports Palace, the notes for which he had dictated on the plane. It is true that, as was frequently the case, he needed virtually no notes. He did not read his speeches. Following are some excerpts from that speech:

"... From my very first steps on American soil, security around me was so tight that there was absolutely no possibility of establishing contact with ordinary Americans. This security turned into a kind of house arrest. I was transported in a closed car and I could see the people who had come to welcome us only from the car window. The people were greeting us although frequently they had been unable to see me.

"I by no means accept all the feelings of friendship which were expressed by the American people as addressed to me or even our own communist ideology. Through those greetings the Americans were telling us that, like us, they stood on the positions of the struggle for peace and friendship between our peoples.

"In the first half of the trip we noted that the same record was being played over and over again. Speakers claimed that at one point I had said that we shall "bury the capitalists." At first I patiently explained what I had indeed said, that we shall "bury capitalism" in the sense that socialism would inevitably replace this social system, which had outlived its time, as had, in the past, feudalism been replaced by capitalism. Later I realized that the people who were persistently repeating such matters needed no explanations whatever. Their specific purpose was to frighten with communism people who had a very vague idea of what it represented.

"In Los Angeles, at a reception, the city mayor who may have been no worse than other mayors, but who was perhaps less diplomatic, once again started speaking in that spirit, and I was forced to express my reaction to this.

"I said: Would you like me to organize in each city and at each meeting a demonstration of hostility? If this is the way you would be welcoming me, as the Russian folk saying goes, 'turning back from someone else's door is easy.' If you have still not become mature enough for talks, if you have not as yet realized the need for putting an end to the Cold War and you fear that it will come to an end and would like to continue it, this does not bother us in particular, we can wait....

"At that time I was engaged in diplomatic talks. I asked Comrade Gromyko, the minister of foreign affairs, to go and tell Mr Lodge, who represented the President, and who was accompanying me, that unless this matter is not straightened out, I would not deem it possible to continue my trip and would have to go back to Washington and from there to Moscow.

"I must point out that such discussions conducted by Comrade Gromyko took place during the night. In the morning, when I woke up, everything had indeed changed and when we started from Los Angeles for San Francisco, metaphorically speaking, my 'handcuffs' had been removed and I was given the possibility to come out of the train and meet with people....

"In hearing this speech, someone may think that Khrushchev, while speaking of friendly meetings, conceals hostile demonstrations. No, I do not intend to conceal facts of hostile or inimical attitude toward us. Yes, such cases did occur. You know, in the same way that American journalists were my traveling companions

in my trip around the United States, so were fascist-leaning escapees from various countries, moving from city to city, raising a few pitiful posters. We also came across malicious and frowning American faces....

"There was a great deal of good but one must not forget the bad. This worm or, rather, this nest of worms is still alive and could reveal its vitality in the future as well....

"... The President was kind enough to invite me to visit his farm. In the farm I met with his grandchildren with whom I had a discussion. I asked them if they would like to visit Russia. Unanimously, from the youngest to the oldest, they said that they would like to go to Russia and see Moscow. The oldest was 11 and the youngest was 3 or 4. I promised to help them. Jokingly I told the President that I find it easier to agree on returning the visit with his grandchildren than with him, for his grandchildren live in a better environment than he does and that, apparently, he had some difficulties which prevented him from realizing his wish in the spirit and the time of his choice.

"Time is a good counselor, and, as the Russian people say, 'the morning is wiser than the evening.' This is a wise saying. Let us wait for the morning, the more so since we flew in toward the end of the day and as I am speaking, it is already evening. Perhaps more than one morning will pass until all this is properly straightened out. However, we shall not stand idly by and wait for the dawn, wait for the development of international relations.

"In our turn we shall do everything possible for the barometer to show not storm and not even variable but clear weather...."

While in the United States, Khrushchev addressed the UN General Assembly. He submitted a proposal for universal and total disarmament. Better than anyone else, Khrushchev knew how distant we were at that time from such a pleasing possibility. Nonetheless, the first word was said. Khrushchev appealed for taking a decisive step, pointing at the target, and anticipating the difficulty of reaching it, emphasizing that the Soviet side was ready, with all possible energy, to start a restructuring of global relations from disunity to unity, from quarrels to friendship and from inequity to honesty and trust.

Several days before that speech, Nikita Sergeyevich held an informal conversation with Dwight Eisenhower, at Camp David, which is the President's summer residence. They recalled World War II and famous battles. Suddenly, Eisenhower asked Khrushchev how does the Soviet government regulate the appropriation of funds for military programs. "And what about you, Mr President?" in turn Nikita Sergeyevich asked. Eisenhower waved his hands, and slapped his knees: "Our military

run to me, telling me what outstanding military accomplishments have been achieved by the Soviets and immediately ask for money, for we cannot fall behind the Soviets!"

The host and his guest both laughed. Nikita Sergeyevich frequently told this story.

Clearly, not without an ulterior motive did Eisenhower discuss with Khrushchev the topic of who was promoting the arms race. Toward the end of his presidential career, he warned the nation not to yield to the influence of the military-industrial complex of the United States. That complex could become a self-propelling political force which could lead America into terrible adventures.

Our country proved its love of peace through specific actions. At the January 1960 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N.S. Khrushchev described the dynamics of the development of the Soviet Armed Forces over several decades, as follows: In 1927 they numbered 586,000; in 1937, 1,433,000; in 1941, 4,207,000; in 1945, 11,365,000; in 1948, 2,874,000; in 1955, 5,763,000; in 1955-1958, 3,623,000. On behalf of the Soviet government, at that session, he called for another reduction in the strength of the Soviet forces by yet another 1.2 million men. Our Armed Forces totaled 2,423,000 soldiers and officers, which is lower than the level demanded by the Western powers. The USSR Supreme Soviet accepted this motion. IZVESTIYA carried a well-meaning cartoon: N.S. Khrushchev standing in front of a rank of soldiers. The order is heard: "Every third man, one step forward!" At that same session an appeal of the USSR Supreme Soviet was adopted, addressed to the parliaments and governments of all countries in the world, as the foundation of Soviet foreign and domestic policy. It appeared as though the situation on earth had become calmer.

Time weaves the fabric of human life as though at random, and we do not often think of the fact that the life and activities of any individual is a particle of the historical process. A faded sheet fell off from an old book I was reading. I recalled that it had been given to me, during N.S. Khrushchev's trip to France, by a stranger who described himself as a friend of our country....

The words "Alliance for Freedom" had been written above two wax seals. Under them were the bold signatures of the commanding officer of the battalion and the prefect of the third division of the Saint Cloud Battalion. This was followed, in big letters, by the words "Diploma of a Volunteer of the National Guard." This patent had been issued before the Parisians had brought down the Bastille, the hated citadel of coercion....

The most amazing thing, however, was that this diploma issued to a volunteer of the Paris National Guard had been granted to a Russian! "We, the undersigned," it read, "state that said diploma is issued to Mr Nikolay Grachev, age 49, height five hands, one ell, three-tenths

of an inch; hair and eyebrows, brown; eyes, blue; nose: long. Recorded on 13 May 1790, commissioned as second lieutenant in the National Guard of Saint Cloud, as confirmed by departmental records...."

Our historical studies have not come across the name Nikolay Grachev. Apparently this Russian volunteer was one of those who stormed the Bastille, for 11 months later he was awarded the then high rank of second lieutenant. At that time Napoleon was only a general.

Catherine II recalled the Russian colony from Paris. Did Nikolay Grachev return to his homeland? Was he alive by then? A no longer young and, therefore, a fully mature man, had taken up arms. There, in France, he defended his convictions.

This antique document about a Russian officer in France at the end of the 18th century reminded me of the history of yet another officer.

A military cemetery can be found in the small French city of Ainin-Lietard, similar to our small coal-mining cities in the Donbass. We find engraved on a white headstone the name: Red Army Lt Vasil Porik. He was wounded by the fascists and captured. He escaped from a concentration camp. For a long time he roamed the roads of Europe until he found his way to a detachment of the maquis, consisting of miners. They hid him in an old worked out shaft and saved him from the fascist bloodhounds. Vasil Porik soon became the commander of the detachment. He learned the language of his comrades in arms and all that distinguished him from them was his uniform as lieutenant in the Red Army, thus asserting his loyalty to his oath and the homeland.

The fascists captured Porik and executed him by firing squad in July 1944, in Arras. Later his comrades in arms buried him in a common grave. It was only after the war that his name became known. Porik was awarded posthumously the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. A gold star has been engraved on his grave and elderly veterans come here to render Vasilii military honors....

Soviet people fought the fascists in various European countries. On French soil alone 20,000 of our compatriots fell, many of whom, like Porik, had been soldiers of the army of liberation. Although this political term was not as yet popular, they knew the importance of what they were doing. Here, in France, they fought for their homes and for France, as did the fliers of the Normandy-Neman Regiment, fated to land on Russian military airfields.

All of this remains alive in our memory and it is important to be remembered in the future. There must be a chain of names; events must not be forgotten nor should the destinies of people, the noblest manifestations of human goodness and courage, but also the evil. This too has its meaning.

In the areas where Vasil Porik fought and lived I met many of his comrades in arms—Russian and Ukrainian—who, like their commander, had escaped from fascist captivity and had fought in maquis detachments. Most of them worked in the mines and had raised families but had not become "Frenchified." Everything in their houses was like at home: food, customs, songs and, mainly, speech. I asked why they had not returned to the homeland the moment the war had ended? There was silence. It was a long silence, and then someone said: "We very much wanted to go back. Those who went back were sentenced to 25 years for betraying the homeland...."

Those who immediately after the end of the war sent Soviet prisoners, liberated by the Soviet Army, "for sifting" and, subsequently, many of them to camps, did not simply display callousness. The immoral principles of 1937 were reasserted: put under arrest as many as possible even if only one may be guilty. All of this, naturally, was accompanied by talks about vigilance.

A great deal had to change and began to change in the 1950s. At that time the world was becoming more open but also more vulnerable. Despite the divisions which existed among countries and nations, we began to feel the importance of events not only in our immediate surroundings but also far from our home and from our borders. World politics was being subjected to general review and universal judgment. The world was assuming a different aspect. Many global concepts had still not become terms of daily use and we did not consider ecological problems as worriedly as we do now; it seemed to us that the forests were forever, the land was fertile, there would always be fish in rivers and seas; we were still proud of the successful whalers of the "Slava" floating base, commanded by Captain Solyanik, who were welcomed by marching bands as they docked in Odessa.

The panic horror of radiation which could penetrate everywhere had still not penetrated the human mind, as it had in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Soviet Union was the first of the nuclear powers to call for a halt to nuclear tests. At the same time, however, we had proclaimed that we had developed a bomb the explosion of which would break the windows of many homes throughout the earth. It was precisely then that Academician Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov shaped his opinion on this subject. He opposed bomb testing.

Stupid customs are contagious. We learned how to break the windows of houses leased by foreign embassies in Moscow, as expressively as in foreign capitals where rocks were hurled at Soviet embassy windows. The possibilities of broken glass diplomacy soon wore themselves out. The world was experiencing periods of crises, becoming aware of the fact that there was only one indivisible earth. At that time good and evil were close neighbors.

Item one: 18 January 1960.

The Kuril Islands. Storm. An emergency situation breaks out. In the stormy wind, at night, a small landing craft with four soldiers aboard on duty is torn away from its moorings. A search revealed nothing. Week after week passed and the barge was considered lost without a trace.

All of a sudden, in the evening of 12 March, IZVESTIYA received an American news agency report. The pilot of an aircraft based on the aircraft carrier "Kirsarge," patrolling the ocean, had noticed a strange vessel. He had gone down and seen four soldiers in Soviet military uniform. The "Kirsarge" changed course in the direction of our barge.

I rang up the respective office and asked whether additional information had been received. No, no information whatsoever. The IZVESTIYA call triggered some complex mechanisms. The instruction I received was, "Do not publish, possible provocation." This was followed by telephone talks with a faceless crowd of prohibition-issuing officials. They kicked me around from one telephone number to another, clearly marking time until the end of the working day. We gathered the editors together and decided to act. If everything would turn out well, we would get a pat on the shoulder: "Good for you, well done!" If we failed, "a puncture," as the newsmen say. Our disobedience would be recorded in a special little notebook, a kind of behavioral diary. Alas, an editor must always remember the number of such "unsatisfactory" remarks.

PRAVDA's American correspondent, my fellow worker from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Boris Strelnikov, reported new details. I asked him as a fellow journalist (at that time IZVESTIYA had no American correspondent) to rush to Los Angeles to meet the boys.

Finally, the four boys landed. The fact that they had withstood their trial and their behavior triggered in America an explosion of amazed enthusiasm. They had spent 49 days in the ocean with winds blowing from 60 to 120 kilometers per hour. They had one tin can of food and a few loaves of bread. They drank rainwater. They had eaten their shoes, straps and the airbag of an accordion. They had lost weight, 15 to 16 kilograms, and grown beards. The sun and the wind had turned their faces into masks, but they never lost hope.

To America this was yet another confirmation of the special character of the Soviet person. IZVESTIYA devoted an entire page to the exploit. A group of journalists wrote a documentary story. Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky awarded the soldiers the Order of the Red Star. IZVESTIYA welcomed the multinational crew consisting of Filipp Poplavskiy, Askhat Ziganshin, Anatoliy Kryuchkovskiy and Ivan Fedotov. We were doubly pleased: for the boys and for the newspaper.

Item two: 1 May 1960.

During the parade Khrushchev was nervous. Eventually, a military man stepped on the rostrum of the Mausoleum and took Khrushchev aside. After his report, Khrushchev doffed his cap off and, smiling broadly, waved it over his head. He regained his good mood.

Details of the event of that May Day were to become known to the public during the May session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Before that, however, the Americans would be officially told that a spy plane, conducting in a reconnaissance flight, had been brought down over Soviet territory and that the government of the USSR considered this an unfriendly act, aimed at undermining peaceful cooperation between the two countries and a return to the Cold War in international practices.

The Americans pretended not to know anything about the plane. It was difficult on their part to assume that the pilot would parachute to the ground. This was not the first time that American pilots had made such flights but we had been unable to intercept their diversionary action, for our fighter-interceptors could not fly as high as the American. Impunity had dulled the caution of the American military.

Diplomats and correspondents of the foreign press, radio and television, had filled all the guest seats at the Big Kremlin Palace, long before the beginning of the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. A kind of political show was being performed there.

The deputies and guests saw enlarged poster-size photographs: the equipment of the aircraft, the film which had recorded a number of areas on Soviet territory, a photograph of the pistol with a silencer, which Powers could have used in a forced landing, and a poisoned needle with which he could kill himself if that was the only way out of the situation.

A Soviet anti-aircraft missile had done its job. The U-2 spy plane had been brought down with a single shot.

Powers' trial raised doubts as to the very possibility of having a summit meeting, which was to take place in the autumn of 1960, in Paris. Khrushchev took off for Paris with the firm demand that Eisenhower was to apologize to the Soviet Union and guarantee that there would be no more spy flights. The U.S. President rejected this demand and the summit failed.

Nonetheless, the search of ways for easing international tension went on. Khrushchev took off to attend the meeting of the UN General Assembly.

In the autumn of 1960 America welcomed Nikita Sergeyevich by no means with open arms. When the "Baltika," the turbine driven small tourist-class ship, approached New York, the news reached us that stevedores were on strike and there was no one to secure the

lines. It became necessary to send a crew of "Baltika" seamen with a lifeboat to secure the ship to the dock. This is a rather complex operation, for the force of the tide and other features of the port of New York were unknown. However, everything went well.

As they were nearing New York, the skipper asked Nikita Sergeyevich where to dock, quoting the prices charged at the various piers, ranging from the "royal" (which was quite expensive) to the "collier," where docking would be embarrassing. The latter was declined and the next one, which seemed to be for fishermen, was chosen. In addition to comrades from the Soviet embassy and the embassies of the socialist countries and several friendly states, no one else welcomed the "Baltika" passengers. The ship carried Khrushchev, Gromyko, and the heads of states and governments of the socialist countries in Europe. This was the first time that the leaders of many countries throughout the world were attending the UN General Assembly session.

After they had landed, a group of journalists who were accompanying Khrushchev, were taken to some kind of dilapidated warehouse and closely looked over by a sturdy policeman. For some reason, Dmitriy Petrovich Goryunov, the general director of TASS, drew his particular attention. Goryunov kept looking at the policeman, smoking a cigarette. The policeman unhurriedly walked to him and pointed at a poster hanging on the wall: "The fine for smoking is \$10,000." Dmitriy Petrovich read it and, stepping toward the edge of the wooden platform, threw his butt into the water. The Moscow Novost cigarette turned for a while in the dirty stream of garbage and disappeared. "It sailed home," Goryunov said, and turned away from the poster. The journalists settled in the small Solgrave Hotel, next to the Soviet mission.

Nikita Sergeyevich stayed in New York for quite some time. As head of the delegation, he spoke on all basic problems on the agenda, and attentively listened to the other speakers, emphatically behaving like a disciplined political leader who was not neglecting his obligations; he once again raised the question of universal and full disarmament and called for putting an end to the shameful system of colonialism. On one occasion, he was scheduled to address the morning session while in the hall, on a Monday, there were no more than a dozen representatives of different countries. This made Khrushchev indignant. Turning to the chairman and to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, he demanded a quorum. "The peoples of the world," Khrushchev explained, "think that their representatives in the United Nations are tirelessly fighting for peace and justice. In fact, many of those gentlemen have obviously not recovered from their Sunday entertainment." A short break was announced and telephones started ringing. One could imagine the way some sleepy delegates were summoned to the session. "Come, Khrushchev is making a scandal." Soon afterwards both the hall and the guest gallery were filled. The public was instantly aware of the development of events.

The journalists saw how difficult it was for Khrushchev to withstand this "New York sitting," being almost constantly tied to his seat, the impossibility to move around and the limited nature of contacts. For hours on end, from the balcony of the Soviet mission to the United Nations, Khrushchev answered the questions of American and other foreign correspondents. Several dozen and, on some days, a hundred reporters would crowd the entire street with their still and film cameras, while Nikita Sergeyevich would discuss frankly any kind of subject. Occasionally pickets with posters would appear on the street. Khrushchev addressed them as well. No questions or heckling, however tricky, would put him against the wall or irritate him. At worst, he would shake his head and shame the questioner: "You look like an intelligent young man, why are you stuffing your mind with such stupidities?" Frequently one among the crowd of journalists would say: "Mr Khrushchev, your white shirt against the red background of the wall is a good target, watch out!"

During the time that the "Baltika" was moored in the port of New York, a member of the crew defected. The newsmen literally threw themselves all over Khrushchev with questions. He stopped to think (we must point out that no one had told him of the incident), asked what was all that about and, clearly playing for time, simply noted: "Why did this young man not turn to me for advice and help? I would have even given him some money, for here, in your country, he will be wasted, what a pity...." The topic was closed. The newspapers printed Khrushchev's answer and calmed down.

Nikita Sergeyevich had an unusual meeting. The decision to visit Fidel Castro in a Harlem hotel could have had unpredictable consequences.

Having communicated by telephone, Khrushchev went to see Fidel Castro. He did not warn the police or the other security services of his intention, for he believed that any member of a delegation to the UN Assembly had the right freely to move around Manhattan. Initially, Khrushchev's car moved peacefully with the stream of traffic. Halfway through, however, the police intercepted his car and, their very presence, the sirens and awkward maneuverings disturbed the entire traffic. A tremendous confusion developed. We know how passions can flare up in traffic jams. Many drivers became aware of this babble. Political malice was added to this. Tomatoes and apples started being hurled at Khrushchev's car and curses were heard.... It was only the skill and composure of the Soviet driver that saved the situation. A crowd was seething around the hotel. There were blacks, Puerto Ricans and contras who had escaped from Cuba. Some shouted welcomes and others, curses.

Khrushchev's bodyguards "opened" a narrow passage in the crowd and urged Nikita Sergeyevich on inside the hall. The elevator took him to Fidel Castro's floor. One could not stay or sit in that small room.

Khrushchev and Castro hugged: a small fat man with a crown of gray hair and a thick-haired giant with a beard black like tar. For a few seconds they stood clasping each other. I understood why Khrushchev had wanted to see Castro. It was one thing to welcome him in the official residence of the Soviet mission to the United Nations, and another to meet here, in Harlem, forgetting rank and status, like brothers.

The people crowding the room, pleasantly excited, moved away enabling Nikita Sergeyevich and Fidel Castro to talk, face to face. A spontaneous meeting was now taking place outside on the square, in front of the hotel. The contras somehow disappeared and the entire square thundered with greetings: "Khrushchev!" "Castro!" "Patria o muertos!" (Homeland or death!)

The year 1961 was on the calendar. The opposite sides were facing each other dangerously in many areas, like confronting troops. Trouble could come from anywhere. This was realized by John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the new president of the United States, who was sworn in on 1 January 1961. His inaugural speech contained many statements about peace. In April, however, he gave his okay for a first attack on Cuba. The gangs of mercenaries and contras were routed at the Bay of Pigs. Revolutionary Cuba passed its battle test.

Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna in July. Pointing out that the attack on Cuba had taken place on 17 April, on his birthday, Khrushchev asked the President whether this was deliberate. The President did not see the joke. Back from his meeting, Nikita Sergeyevich summed up the talks somewhat hopefully: "It appears that the young president is prepared to listen to the arguments of the other side. In any case, he denied claims of the direct participation of the United States in the anti-Cuban operation."

That was roughly what Khrushchev told me, on the eve of an urgent assignment to the United States. Entirely unexpectedly, I was assigned to interview President Kennedy. This was not the best of times. On that occasion, the stormy clouds were gathering over West Berlin. Here the Americans had aggravated the situation to the maximum in October, when the GDR had erected a real border to replace the conventional line of demarcation between West and East Berlin. The "Berlin wall" drove the West German extremists crazy. Kennedy's visit to West Berlin had poured oil into the fire but realistic politicians knew that there were no reasons for interference. International law was on the side of the GDR. Each country resolves independently the problem of how to set up its own borders.

During the proceedings of the 22nd CPSU Congress, in October 1961, West Berlin was restless. American and Soviet tanks, their engines running, were standing with their guns facing each other at the control point on Friedrichstrasse. One could easily imagine the tension of their crews. How long could this go on? The situation

was quite shaky and could easily get out of hand, considering that the lives of millions depended on the crews of Soviet and American tanks. A single shot in Sarajevo led mankind into World War I. Here, we stood perhaps one step before a third....

The congress was in session. On 20 or 21 October, Marshal I.S. Konev entered the hall of the Presidium and asked that Nikita Sergeyevich be summoned for an urgent communication. Ivan Stepanovich reported that the engines of the American tanks had been revving up for half an hour. Marshal Konev, as one who knew what war meant, was nervous. Khrushchev considered the situation. "Take our tanks to the neighboring street but have their engines run at the same higher rpms. Use loudspeakers to increase the noise and thunder of the tanks." Konev hesitated: "Nikita Sergeyevich, they could rush us!" "I do not think so," Khrushchev answered, "unless, naturally, hatred has totally confused the minds of the American military." Turning to his aides, Khrushchev asked that this order be put in writing and the time marked precisely. He instructed the editors of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA to draft the proper announcements.

After a while, Ivan Stepanovich reported that the American tanks had left. So did ours. Nothing was printed in the newspapers.

About 1 month later I flew to Washington. An interview with the American President was a first of its kind in the history of our press. IZVESTIYA was the newspaper of the USSR Supreme Soviet, of the government. It was decided that it was the editor in chief of that newspaper who should talk with the head of the American government.

I was hoping that Kennedy would receive me in the White House. However, matters developed differently. The visit to Washington of Konrad Adenauer (he had been down with the flu for 3-4 days) dragged on and the end of the week came. I had to have my interview in Hyannisport, a small resort area not far from Boston. It was there that Kennedy was spending his weekend.

The weather in Boston was bad. Rain was pouring. When the time to land came we thought that the pilots had decided to land us in the ocean. A wave of water was splashing against the portholes.

Hyannisport is half an hour drive from Boston. The landscape greatly resembles the Baltic area. White sand dunes edging the bright green line of the ocean. The ocean hurled at the shore heavy thick waves. The rain drifted toward the horizon. There were low pines with strangely twisted branches and crowns. Clearly, the wind here never stopped.

The summer home of the Kennedy family looked, with its white walls, like a building from the Victorian Age.

A double line of police cars blocked the alley leading to the presidential house. There were sedans and convertibles, brightly colored or black.... Men in uniform and heavily armed, stood there aware of the importance and prestige of their service. One of them, after spitting tobacco from his mouth, jumped into a convertible which he moved slightly aside, and we drove toward the low white fence, the gates of which were opened by a policeman. There was not a whiff of curiosity on the faces of the 100-kilogram guards: They were doing their job. The car which had been moved returned to its original position and the symbolic path to a retreat was cut off.

John Kennedy hospitably welcomed me and Yu. Bolshakov, the APN correspondent in the living room. The print of the curtains and the upholstery of the chairs and the sofa was the same, making this wide glass-walled room bright and elegant. The President sat in a tall rocking chair, leaning against a hard back. His spine had been hurt in the war and needed support....

On the previous day Robert, the President's brother, had seen us in Washington. Now, looking at John Kennedy, I caught myself thinking of how similar the brothers looked and yet somehow different. Robert was more tense, more aloof. It was true, however, that he had approved of his brother's wish to grant a Soviet newspaper an interview. "John and I," he said, "are unanimous in the need to find as many ways for contact with the Soviet Union as possible. A great deal depends on relations between our countries."

Robert spoke of his visit to the Soviet Union and mentioned that long before him, even before the war, John Kennedy had also visited our country....

While preparations for the interview were under way and the stenographer was arranging his notebooks, the President made some preliminary remarks:

"I visited the Soviet Union in 1939, as a very young man. Your country was at its beginning but even as a simple American student, I could see its future. Naturally, I realized that a great deal has changed now in your country and that the living standard of the people is rising; in our country as well the people have begun to live better."

The President said that during the war he, a naval officer, had fought in the Pacific, far from Europe, but had closely followed the battles fought by the Soviet Army. As though incidentally, he noted: "This horrible war did not leave our own home unaffected."

We knew that during the war Kennedy's elder brother had died tragically. He and his partner, the second pilot, had been assigned to take off on a "Liberator" from a British airfield, set the airplane on automatic pilot

toward one of the targets in fascist Germany, and immediately bail out. They took off in an airplane loaded with 11 tons of explosives. This "flying powder keg" exploded before the crew could abandon it....

Anticipating our questions, the President said:

"I value the opportunity, through your newspaper, to talk to the people of the Soviet Union. I believe that such contacts, exchanges of views, and the truthful story about the way life is in our countries, what the people aspire to and what they want, is in our common interests, and the interest of peace."

I now reread the minutes of the 3-hour talk with President Kennedy. He touched upon many topics. I shall mention a few.

One of them seemed at that time to lead to an impasse. The situation concerning West Berlin, and the problem of the arteries which led to that city through GDR territory, did not yield to any acceptable solution. Kennedy was pessimistic about it. We could hear in his views the sharp expressions of a politician engaged in an electoral campaign under the flag of the Cold War. He criticized his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, for insufficient armament build-up. It is true that in this case as well the President's statement was complex: "I found Soviet-American relations in a worse state than I thought when I became president." Answering the question of the possibility of taking real steps to improve them, he was cautious: "Both small and big steps are important in this very difficult process." Not without irony he pointed out that he had lifted the embargo on purchasing from our country... crabs. "Naturally, the crab war was small but it is pleasant to end even such a war."

Kennedy ascribed the tension which was promoted by Washington on the subject of West Berlin only as the consequence of the intransigence of the Soviet Union. He could not find real ways leading to mutually acceptable solutions. However, he was wrong: Several years later patient and complex talks led to the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin. However, by then Kennedy was no longer there to see it.

Many of the other answers given by the President reflected the stereotyped views of the American leadership. This applied above all to the second range of problems we discussed. Kennedy saw "the hand of Moscow" behind any social movement in the world. Nonetheless, in answering a straight question on this matter, he stipulated: "... Naturally, I do not believe that the Soviet Union is responsible for all changes which are taking place in the world." However, in all likelihood he thought otherwise.

In any case, his idea of the "freedom of choice" of nations could be reduced to a somewhat vaguely formulated idea of democratic elections. For example, he agreed (although reluctantly, this was clear) that in

British Guiana, where the Marxist Jagan had come to power as a result of elections, everything had taken place "by the book." Elsewhere, however, where the people were defending arms in hand their right to choose their own way, in his view, matters were not clear. Kennedy did not answer the question of how democratic was the rule by the dictator Trujillo or the Shah of Iran.

The main feature which determined virtually all of his answers to the questions could be described in a single word: anxiety. The talk with the President could not be described as cold. In the final account, it contained the same constructive principles which Kennedy, alas, was unable to implement in their entirety. "I believe," the President said, "that the Soviet Union and the United States must live in peace with each other. Our countries are big countries, with energetic nations, and we are steadily ensuring the enhancement of the living standard of the population. If we can keep the peace for another 20 years, the life of the people in the Soviet Union and in the United States would be significantly richer and considerably happier with the steady improvement in the living standard."

"If we can keep the peace for 20 years...." Let us assess the contribution of the deceased president to this extremely important fact in human history. Under John Kennedy an agreement was signed banning nuclear weapon tests in three media. This was the first of the nuclear problems. Very difficult talks were taking place on other problems as well.

The familiar view is that "the more significant a person would like to become, the more he must mature." We believe that this applies not only to simple mortals but to political leaders as well. Kennedy was among those who took this rule into consideration. In any case, despite some setbacks, the Kennedy presidency carried with it, particularly in its final stage, the features of a new approach to world events and, above all, to Soviet-American relations.

In June 1963 Kennedy delivered his famous speech at American University (Washington). He had been guiding the affairs of a great power for more than 2 years. Kennedy addressed himself to the young. He asked for their help and support. He promised them to build an America which would not be afraid of peace but which would strengthen it, on an equal footing with other nations.

The President's speech at American University for which, in the testimony of people close to him, he had prepared himself seriously, was sincere. The President called for taking a new look at the Soviet Union and the Cold War, and to realize that all of us live on one small planet, breathe the same air and are concerned with the future of our children, and that all of us are mortal. He called for realizing the simple truth that universal peace

does not demand that everyone love his neighbor but only to live in a state of reciprocal tolerance, discussing differences with a view to their just and peaceful resolution.

The world welcomed this speech with hope. However, it was precisely in the United States that it enraged not only "some" or "a few," but those who, for decades, had promoted and instilled in politics ideas of an opposite nature.

It is perhaps precisely this speech that made someone lose patience. The attempt had already been prepared. The possible routes that the presidential motorcade would follow had been studied and a sharpshooter (or sharpshooters) assigned to pull the trigger, had already received instructions....

When the time allocated for the interview neared its end, the President suggested a walk on the beach. Before that, he gave me a warm jacket: "Here the northern wind can pierce you to the bone." He himself kept his light coat with the explanation that "I'm a naval officer, I have sailed torpedo boats and I fear no wind or cold."

Meanwhile, the wind was gathering strength and raising powerful waves. The horizon had turned black. Kennedy silently enjoyed this strange play of the elements. He then said a few sentences which were not part of the interview but which I recorded immediately after we returned to the hotel. He said: "The great leaders of the great coalition, having defeated fascism, realized that the world would become even more confused and complex. They had not the strength or, perhaps, the time to begin this hellish work on its further improvement. The more we postpone it, the more everything will become even more difficult. Future generations may not forgive us for this."

The Romans believed that one should either say something good about the dead or say nothing. However, had mankind always followed this rule, instead of history we would have had an apology of the past. John Kennedy was a controversial figure in American history, as was the period of his short presidency.

A quarter of a century ago, when America buried President Kennedy, Senator Mansfield said: "A part of each one of us died at that moment. Even in death, he gave to everyone of us a part of himself.... He gave us that which we would wish for ourselves, for everyone of us, until there would be no place for treachery, hatred, prejudice and violence, which struck him in one horrible moment."

"In leaving us, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the President of the United States, has left us this gift. Do we now have the common sense, responsibility and courage to accept it?"

Will history forgive the politician who tarries?

Very recently, in late autumn of 1987, quite suddenly Pierre Sallinger, who was White House press secretary during the Kennedy administration, came to Moscow. We had not seen each other for exactly 25 years. He now works for an American television company. His assignment was to describe glasnost and perestroika. Naturally, before dealing with present affairs, we spoke of the past. I asked about his life and family, which I knew, and about the children of the President and his brother Robert, who had been very small when I had visited America.

We spoke about Robert Kennedy. We recalled an old event: Finding out that my wife and I were passing through Washington, Robert Kennedy invited us to lunch. A horde of boys and girls sat around the table: Robert Kennedy and his wife had a large family, they were raising 11 children.

The eldest, 10 years old, was sick but wanted very much to talk with the Russian guests and Robert's wife asked Rada to visit him in his room. Twenty minutes later Rada came back. The boy had asked about our children and what they liked. He wanted to visit our country and see the Siberian tayga. He made a gift to Nikita, our eldest son and his coeval, a book on which he had inscribed: "To a Russian boy with whom I dream to ride a horse in the tayga."

His dream was not fulfilled. Robert Kennedy's oldest son did not live long. Several years ago he was found dead in a New York basement. His arms were covered with needle pricks. It has not been found out whether he had personally injected himself a lethal dose of a drug or someone else had forced him to do so, while he was unconscious.

There was also this: When our dog flew in outer space, Caroline (she was 6 years old), the President's daughter, received as a gift from Russia a black and white puppy, the offspring of mama, the space traveler. The ancestry of the puppy was uncertain and his character was wild and I do not know how it adapted to American conditions but Caroline was pleased with the gift.

The way the mother of the puppy found herself in space was a happenstance. An ordinary dog was being kept in a cage as the next test animal. It had to carry out a certain program. Out of idleness it simply gained weight and, at the time of the start it turned out that it could not get into the module. The situation was tragicomic: The ship could not wait another hour. Associates of Oleg Georgyevich Gazenko (today an academician), responsible for the medical-biological program in space and for the training of cosmonauts, rushed into the steppe in a car, with the urgent mission of finding a thin dog. They took a happy-looking dog who was strong, and who was running around in search of food. It was precisely that dog that participated in the test flight.

Such was the mother of the pup which was sent to the White House.

President Kennedy's daughter now works at the Metropolitan Museum of Art and should she have the occasion to read these lines, she may find it pleasing to recall this minor detail.

That day, after visiting Robert Kennedy, my wife and I were invited to spend the evening with the President. John Kennedy was a charming and simple man. Jacqueline, Pierre Sallinger, Rada and I sat in his office; cups of tea had been placed on a small table, and nothing else. Suddenly, a cry was heard behind the door and Jacqueline said: "Caroline must have dreamt something again." The president stood up and we followed him down the hall. Walking with her eyes shut, like a sleepwalker, there slowly walked on the tiles a little girl, barefoot, in a long nightgown. The President took his daughter in his arms and invited us to follow him to the nursery. Kennedy put the little girl in her bed. The room was spacious, with nothing unnecessary, with toys scattered on the floor, as one sees in rooms of boys and girls all over the world. We were ready to leave quietly but the President asked us to stay. "Look," he said quietly, pointing at a bedside table. Side by side there stood a Russian matryoshka and a crucifix. "The matryoshka is a gift from your father," he said to Rada. "The crucifix is a gift from John XXIII." He thought for a second. "Let Caroline herself choose her object of attachment and her own way." The President smiled. With this statement he was answering the thought expressed by Khrushchev that our grandchildren would live under communism.

Indeed, everyone chooses his own way. I reminded Pierre Sallinger of that evening and asked whether John, the President's son, intended to go into politics. Pierre waved his arms: "Whatever the case, I am not destined to become his press secretary and you will not live long enough for any of the young Kennedys to start voting the slate of the U.S. Communist Party...."

I told John XXIII of this coexistence of the matryoshka with the crucifix, when my fate as a newsman took me to the Vatican.

In the spring of 1963 journalists with met the head of the Roman Catholic Church, on the occasion of presenting John XXIII the peace prize awarded by the Bolcana Foundation. The event took place in the spacious hall known as the Throne Room. The so-called ceremonial seat was set against the back wall, on a slight platform. Apparently, it was precisely here that ambassadors, and official state or church guests were received. The walls were lined with gray-silvery brocade. Heavy chandeliers and age-old bronze lamps illuminated the stern premises. Several dozen chairs had been lined for the occasion, upholstered in bright red velvet, covering the superb encrustations on the floor. The strict suits of the journalists sharply stood out against the background of the splendid clothing of high-ranking clergy. One was

stricken by the amazing taste of the artist who had "designed" these lilac-, pale-pink, snow-white, black, and bluish-violet-clothing. Crucifixes, rosaries and signet rings also indicated age-old traditions. What was striking, however, was not the clothing and decorations, but the faces. They were pallid, almost anemic, somewhat puffy, totally remote, as though not belonging to the living.

John appeared suddenly, through a respectfully opened gate and shuffled in little steps toward the throne seat, presenting his hand to be kissed. Everyone rose and some (many of the journalists were ardent Catholics), dropped on their knees and waited until the Pope sat on his chair. The chair was too high for him and he, an already old and corpulent man, settled on the chair as do children, in two or three movements.

He remained silent for a long while, simply looking over the hall with eyes which may have been hazel once but were now light-amber colored, leaning forward with his years, as though he wanted to hear something unusual.

The presentation of the prize to John XXIII was made by Senator Giovanni Groncci, after which the Holy Father spoke.

John spoke quietly and calmly, with no theatrical affectation, rather as a discussion. He even leaned forward to be closer to his audience, as though he was about to leave his throne and sit next to us.

John casually rejected charges of violating Papal traditions as to the acceptance of worldly awards, repeating that the defense of peace was one of the most important obligations of the clergy and that he was appealing to everyone to observe this obligation....

Unexpectedly, behind my back, a priest dressed in black turned to me in Russian. "My name is Aleksandr Kulik, a Papal assistant at the Eastern Institute. If you wish to be granted an audience, I have been instructed to take you to the Holy Father and act as your translator. Remain in the hall after the ceremony."

Having spoken, John rose. He slightly lifted over his head his chubby hands, either asking everyone to go in peace or else to block unwanted questions, and vanished as quickly as he had appeared.

He received me in his private library, i.e., where he worked, read and wrote his encyclicals. Silently, he let me look around the antique semicircular bookshelves, with fine gold-colored partitions. The fragrance of flowers came through the big open windows and, quite unexpectedly here, in the very center of Rome, birds were singing. John said that he considered the many initiatives taken by our country in defense of peace very important.

"I have lived through two world wars and seen what incredible misfortunes they have brought to people. A third world war would be the doom of mankind. Is that why the Lord has given us this splendid earth?"...

The conversation then turned to the recent meeting with the journalists. "Let some people be angry," John said, "that I accepted the peace prize, and let some people think that I have garnered the votes of an electorate 'not from my party.' This will not change my position. I believe that had our Father and Teacher been in my circumstances He would have acted the same way."

As I looked at John XXIII, I could not fail to notice the features which made him so likable. Having reached the peak of the Catholic hierarchy, Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli had preserved his appearance as a peasant.

He said that for as long as he could he frequently visited his small native village and had even invited to come to Rome a childhood friend, a gardener. "He and I frequently talk about life and he sometimes feeds me a meal." John smiled slyly. It had been suggested to him to undergo surgery for a not specifically diagnosed stomach illness. He had refused: "What if it is unsuccessful? I am pushing 80. I would rather keep my pain." The physicians had prescribed a strict diet. Whenever his patience would run out, John would turn to the gardener, who would regale him with a spicy bean soup.

In parting, John stopped at a small marble-covered table. Figurines of different color, artfully sculpted, and also made of marble, stood on it. The scene depicted the Biblical story of the birth of Christ in very realistic details. This was a gift from his native Lombardy, on his 80th birthday.

John touched the figurines and it was obvious that he liked the work of the amateur sculptors very much. "Every mother," he said, "gives birth to her child in pain and every mother wants for that child to live and be happy. Let us protect the mothers from the fate of the One whose Son suffered for his faith and bequeathed to us to prolong mankind and improve the earth...."

Seeing me off to the door, John asked that I pass on to the Soviet people his wishes for happiness and peace. He said that he was presently working on a document in which he would speak out quite clearly on a wide range of problems which concerned him and that this would likely be a final opportunity, for his illness was worsening.

Pope John XXIII's encyclical "Pacem in Terris" ("Peace on Earth") was his actual testament. Following are a few reminders: "If one country produces an atomic weapon the others must produce an atomic weapon of the same destructive power. The result is that the people live in a

constant state of fear, expecting the hurricane which could break out at any moment and bring inconceivable suffering. They have reasons to expect this, for the weapon is already made."

"The feelings of justice, wisdom and humanity demand a halt to the arms race, simultaneous and parallel reduction of existing armaments and the banning of nuclear weapons and, finally, disarmament based on common agreement and under effective supervision.... True peace can be established only on the basis of reciprocal trust...."

These words remain relevant to this day. It is worth reminding them to the many people who do not wish to prove through their actions their support of the only possible realistic course in world politics.

This reminder is justified also because no one can classify such a statement as "communist propaganda." John XXIII remained an anticommunist to the very end of his life....

In those days, at the other end of the earth, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, President of the United States, like John XXIII, had realized that the only possibility for the development of global relations was peaceful coexistence among countries with different political and social systems.

Naturally, it was not a question of the fact that Kennedy was a Roman Catholic and followed the Pope, but that simply, like John XXIII, he proceeded from the realities on earth.

John XXIII died in Rome in July 1963. His death was difficult. He had refused pain killers in order to experience the pain and suffering of simple mortals. For several days running several thousand Romans waited in St Peter's Square, staring at the light in the window of John's bedroom. Then, at one point, the light went out.

April 1964 came.

Khrushchev was celebrating his 70th birthday. There were greetings presented by the Central Committee, his photograph appeared in newspapers and journals, he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. There was a ceremonious dinner in the reception hall of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. By then a huge portrait of Khrushchev, full size, his arm raised in greeting, was already standing against a metal structure at the beginning of Leningrad Prospekt. I do not recall this but I am told that the inscription under the portrait was the conventional "peace to the world."

The praising of Khrushchev was becoming almost customary. With one difference: The old adjectives of "great," and "wise" were missing; not even the super-groveling public dared to call him a "genius." Portraits do not appear by themselves, but only if so ordered. The

concept of praising the position of first secretary and his name had been established and sunk roots. In the newspapers as well he was constantly quoted.

Do I personally feel guilty, being at that time the editor of a big newspaper, and did I approve of the rejection of praises so that I could blame for them someone else? No, naturally, I do not deny my guilt. Whether or not IZVESTIYA sinned on this account more or less than did others is of no essential significance. What matters is something else. I know that those who closely followed the publications would also point out that suitable quotations were missing in some important articles. This was considered a sign of disrespect, a kind of political neglect and, sometimes, even of rebelliousness.

We had barely escaped in our newspaper and political vocabulary the stereotyped sentence "in the light of the advice and instructions," but that statement was ripening and was being "forged out" and, as we know, eventually showed up.

Incidentally, that same comrade who noticed the lack of references to Khrushchev's statements in articles, himself later, in October 1964, computed with bookkeeper accuracy, the number of times his name had been mentioned in one newspaper or another. Naturally, he blamed this on the editors, the IZVESTIYA editor above all. I shall not name this person simply because he shared totally the fate of those turncoats, whose passion for political intrigues led to their fall. Winners do not value defectors, even though they may need them. Furthermore, I am sorry for that person. Nikita Sergeyevich valued him and he had held high positions and could have probably charted a different course for his life.

The celebration of Khrushchev did not assume that semi-official tone which had marked the celebration of Stalin's birthday at the Bolshoy Theater. In addition to the cold and mandatory statements, there were sincere ones, which came from the heart.

In that April of 1964 the spring in Moscow was warm, and the sun shone. It was as though the revival of nature would give new strength to everyone. Khrushchev welcomed his 71st year of life with optimism. He could not sense the trouble that was brewing. This was yet another proof of his political decency: He did not like intrigues, he had no private investigative machinery. He was in a good mood at his birthday.

I remember one of the many toasts which were heard that evening, unique in its kind. It was not forgotten either by my wife or by the other members of Nikita Sergeyevich's family. On the following day as well, Nina Petrovna was so indignant that she could not resist and rang up the maker of the toast and told him what she thought of him.

This was the toast offered by Shelest, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, who ended with the words, "to the party leader!"

So far, no one had referred to Khrushchev in those terms. I sensed something evil in those words. I saw how a few people, as though not noticing the raised glass, did not clink glasses.

In October of that same year Shelest hurled himself at Khrushchev with particularly malicious attacks. I think that it was not in a fit of temper that he said "to the leader."

A 70th birthday is a time for summation, a time for thought. At that time, in the course of normal daily activities, there was neither the time, the opportunity, the desire or else the need to assess Khrushchev's path from the "resultant" viewpoint. To this day I would not undertake such a project. Those 10 years would require a more thorough study, for they were the years lived by a great country, a great nation, and are part of our history, whether we like it or not. It would be insincere to say that I deem just the juggling of facts, the silence on the subject of the "decade," and particularly of the 20th Party Congress. The deletion of the congress resolutions, which had been passed with such tremendous hope, affected many lives.

One year ago, when I began to put down these notes, Khrushchev's name was not being mentioned in the press. Now, as though outdoing one another, journalists and writers hasten either to recall something which linked them to him or else to assess and analyze the decade of his activities and sometimes such an analysis would consist of a few typewritten pages. Nonetheless, in my view this is better than silence. Everyone is free to express his viewpoint.

I would like to think that family feelings were not expressed too strongly in my notes. I have never been embarrassed by this relationship but have been proud of it and, in the final account, of the fact that whatever my wife and I achieved we achieved by ourselves. That, at least, is the way it seems to me. Did the impact of a family name help or hinder? There was a little of everything.... However, we did not take what was not ours. We have a strict proof of this: For 23 years we have been on our own.

As I recall one after another events in Khrushchev's life, I believe that he did not labor in vain. His party activities were dramatic. He was a political figure of the transitional period and it was his lot in life to experience a series of most difficult crises. I mentioned the events in Hungary. But what about Yugoslavia, Poland, China.... At that time Khrushchev had to find new principles to govern relations with the leaders of many countries and parties; in that sense as well the 20th Congress exposed major errors.

Khrushchev spent many hours talking with comrades from fraternal parties, identifying sources of misunderstandings and trying to surmount differences. Occasionally, most unexpected problems would appear in the course of such talks. I remember that Nikita Sergeyevich was amazed when Maurice Thorez asked that the rehabilitation of some major political leaders of our party be somewhat slowed down and postponed for a while. "We attended those trials," Thorez said, "and reported to our own parties everything we had heard and what we believed. It would be very difficult to explain now how naive we turned out to be. Time would help us to avoid unnecessary stress. Coming after the 20th Congress, this stress is high enough as it is." Khrushchev yielded.

Two grave events occurred in the summer and autumn of 1957 in the country's life. The course of the 20th Party Congress was opposed by seven members of the Central Committee Presidium: Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov. In principle, this was logical. Already in the course of the 20th Congress it had become clear that, one way or another, a more profound study of the circumstances which had led to mass repressions would follow. Above all, principles of party work, unacceptable to such people, were being asserted in the style of the leadership. Going to the people, away from the Kremlin offices, openness, truth and democracy. Priority was given to concern for the individual, not fictitious, in slogans and appeals, but practical and active. Molotov was nauseated by the diplomacy of personal contacts. Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov remembered the lists of those arrested, on which their resolutions had been entered. The facts were known. The June Central Committee Plenum had passed corresponding resolutions on the activities of antiparty groups.

No one had abolished this resolution. However, during the period when Chernenko was Central Committee general secretary, Molotov was given his party membership back. No explanations were given to the party on this account. It is thus that the old resolutions were disavowed: They were not abolished. They were not considered wrong but simply and quietly reduced to naught. It was then that MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI published an interview with Molotov. He described his time in retirement and said that he was pleased with his life. I read this note and thought: There was a party congress, passions were raving, the newspapers were thundering with articles and then there were a few people who, ignoring public opinion, decided everything themselves. This is an illustration to the argument on objective and subjective factors in historical processes....

A strange development of circumstances, to which I cannot provide an explanation but which, naturally, does exist, led to Marshal Zhukov's resignation and to a break which, in my view, Khrushchev himself did not analyze. I had frequently come across Georgiy Konstantinovich at Khrushchev's place. Khrushchev not simply respected Zhukov but was proud of him. On Nikita Sergeyevich's

initiative Zhukov had been reassigned to Moscow immediately after Stalin's death. At the 20th Congress Georgiy Konstantinovich had been elected candidate member of the Central Committee Presidium and, subsequently, full member. In 1955 he became USSR minister of defense. They were impressed by one another and no major differences existed between them. Their careers had been similar as well. They had met during the war and spoke a common language. I can only assume that, although I never asked Khrushchev about it, obviously, at a time when there was a sudden instability in the leadership (the plenum including the "seven" had just taken place), Nikita Sergeyevich might have been frightened by the increased ambitiousness of the marshal and his reduced role in the Army by decision of the party's leadership. Or perhaps Khrushchev had remembered some of Stalin's considerations about Zhukov? For Stalin had sent the marshal away to command military districts far from Moscow. Incidentally, Stalin's defenders do not like to discuss this topic. In any case, Zhukov's replacement did not contribute to Khrushchev's popularity. He could not fail to feel this and, perhaps, he regretted the break.

On one occasion, when Khrushchev was already retired, not by choice, he had a discussion with Zhukov's wife. The marshal had just published his memoirs. Khrushchev had not read them, as I already said he did not like military memoirs. Eventually, however, the discussion turned to the events related to the mortal wounding of General Vatutin at Kiev. According to Zhukov's memoirs, it turned out that Khrushchev was almost to be blamed for this, having failed to provide reliable protection for the general. Nikita Sergeyevich was bitter: "Did Zhukov write this? He knows that this is not true." Some of Nikita Sergeyevich's guests related this conversation to the author. Several days later Zhukov's wife phoned. Khrushchev reminded her what had happened. She presented excuses, cited the forgetfulness of the marshal and promised that the error would be corrected. The event was depicted accurately in the second edition. However, millions of people had already read Zhukov's memoirs in their first edition. Some people had noted the disparity but, naturally, they were few.

On very few occasions have I seen Khrushchev shed tears of sadness: while Stalin was dying, on the occasion of the death of Nikita Sergeyevich's sister, Irina Sergeyevna, and on another occasion, in February of 1960, when he was told of Kurchatov's death.

Kurchatov and he were essentially people with different characters, life-styles and education. Khrushchev greatly valued Igor Vasilyevich's practical qualities and his "death hold" on work, selflessness and daring. He considered him his scientific consultant. This makes it perhaps even harder for me to write of what Khrushchev may have remembered when Kurchatov died, of the reason for their quarrel.

Frequently friends especially familiar with biology and, in my family, I have three who are, my daughter and my two sons, asked how could Nikita Sergeyevich believe Lysenko's promises, those of a charlatan? Why was it that he so persistently rejected any study of the work of geneticists?

On one occasion, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov came to Nikita Sergeyevich's dacha. They sat down on an isolated bench, as they had frequently done, and talked for an hour or perhaps longer. Than Kurchatov left, hurt, it seemed to us. Nikita Sergeyevich as well was gloomy. His annoyance made him restless and he drew us into a discussion. "The Beard," as Khrushchev called Kurchatov, "is not minding his own business. He is a physicist but has come to plead the case of the geneticists. What idiocy, we need bread and they are breeding mold."

He expressed such firm conviction and irritated aplomb that Sergey, Nikita Sergeyevich's son, could not restrain himself and started an argument with his father. Rada supported her brother and even told her father: "You will see, you will feel ashamed."

Such views, disagreements and dare made Khrushchev lose his emotional balance. The conversation was difficult. We left the dacha depressed.

In one of their free days, the entire members of the Central Committee Presidium made a joint trip to Lysenko's farm. They were accompanied by journalists. The "great agronomist" did not conceal his joy. He displayed superb fields with rows of different crops, he pulled out of the ground fodder beets three feet tall, he led his guests to the livestock farms where picturesque cows were nuzzling at the guests' pockets. No one asked what the cost of this model farm was.

Khrushchev then invited everyone to have lunch with him. Lysenko kept singing his own praises as much as he could. He also complained that there were intrigues against him, he was not allowed to expand. Weismanists-Morganists were everywhere. Khrushchev paid little attention to Lysenko's pseudoscientific speeches. He was interested in agronomy, what he considered the simple practical use to any peasant who would listen to Lysenko's advice.

He supported Lysenko the agronomist and, furthermore, through this support he indicated his agreement with Stalin, for the latter had had a good reason for keeping Lysenko so close to himself!

Why was it that Khrushchev, who was such a thrifty and experienced person, showed such a rejection of genetics, such an unwillingness to find what it was all about? Even Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov, a person whose opinion Nikita Sergeyevich valued, was unable to talk him into showing any kind of interest in such problems.

Khrushchev could not wait. The drosophila flies, he believed, were only drawing strength away while making the fields yield more grain was something immediate. When one is impatient the simplest thing is to hope for a miracle. Agricultural production, in the drought in 1962 in particular, did not come up to the planned figures.

A price increase for meat and meat products was announced in 1962. The price per kilogram of meat was raised from 1 ruble 60 kopecks to 2 rubles. Our newspaper quoted figures of purchase and retail prices, spoke of the gap between them and the need to raise purchase prices and thus to ensure the profitability of animal husbandry. This proved to be an expedient step for quite some time, although meat production increased quite slowly and, on several occasions, even declined. The slogan of "catching up with and outstripping America" in the production of meat products was not being mentioned, even as a joke.

Breakdowns with the grain supply began to be felt as well in 1963. A substantial number of letters were sent to the editors on this subject. I rang up Pavel Alekseyevich Satyukov, PRAVDA's chief editor, and we decided to send excerpts of such letters to the Central Committee. Subsequent events were of a more dramatic nature. Khrushchev suggested (this may have been a sensible step) to introduce rationing for a while, to put an end to feeding bread to the cattle. However, considerations of prestige prevailed. The decision was made to purchase a certain amount of grain abroad. By the 1970s, however, this had become commonplace and purchases had increased manifold. From an exporter of grain, Russia had turned into an importer. The shock was of short duration. There were even "theoretical" substantiations provided of the possibility and expediency of such purchases. An increasing number of parts of the country were classified as "risky" farming areas.

During those final years of his stay in high positions, Nikita Sergeyevich traveled a great deal around the country. He kept paying attention to the development of production forces in the republics, the broadening of their rights and possibilities, and their role in the Union. Usually, he was accompanied by the editors of the central press, for reports had to be written on the conferences and progressive experience had to be described. Novosibirsk, Alma-Ata, Tbilisi, Voronezh.... Khrushchev made appeals, gave examples, and criticized; The thousands of people who listened to him appeared to be infected with his energy. With increasing frequency, however, Khrushchev heard something else at such conferences: There is too much paper shuffling, once again there is pumping, there is interference in kolkhoz and sovkhoz affairs and there is a lowering or total elimination of the principle of material incentive. The ghost of the tax in kind was roaming over the fields. The machinery which had become accustomed, over the decades, to the command-order system, was able to

adapt to the work of the newly-renamed offices. Everything was turning in circles.... The only abundant thing was promises. Khrushchev both believed and disbelieved them. The weakness of his own positions was becoming apparent.

On one occasion the journalists were present at a desperate and, essentially, tragic speech delivered by Khrushchev in Voronezh.

The train arrived in Voronezh early morning, stopping for the last time before the city some 100 kilometers away. PRAVDA's local correspondent climbed aboard the car with the journalists. We were standing by the windows, looking at the snow-covered landscape when someone drew our attention to strange waves which alternated on the land in a strict sequence. The PRAVDA correspondent explained what this was. They had been unable to harvest the corn and, aware of the fact that Khrushchev would pass by, they had brought to the field tractors to which steel rails had been hitched like a comb, to flatten the stalks to the ground, to "conceal" the unharvested crop.

We did not know whether someone should tell Nikita Sergeyevich. The decision was made to inform him.

There was no journalist to hear the explanations given to Khrushchev on the subject of "track" corn harvesting, provided by the oblast's leadership. However, nor did the local comrades show any particular embarrassment: There were always excuses. At the conference, in the presence of hundreds of agricultural workers from a number of oblasts, Nikita Sergeyevich told this story. The silence in the hall was tense. Khrushchev was standing not on the rostrum but at one end of the stage and he spoke not to a microphone yet every word could be heard, although he did not even raise his voice. Slowly turning to the presidium, he said, with some kind of strange indifference: "It may seem that I am trying to promote a quarrel between you and those people," he said motioning at the hall. "No, this is not so. I merely would like to remind you that once Comrade Vareykis had been obkom secretary here...."

What did he mean by this? Was it Vareykis' fearlessness at the 17th Party Conference or his tragic fate? This turning to the past was related to a period when deceiving the party was considered treason.

Many years passed since Khrushchev's retirement retired his death, but to this day some journalists and writers believe that the main reason for failure in agriculture was the forced planting of corn. The fields were freed from this capricious lady. Furthermore, even the farms which wanted to and did sow corn, including corn used to feed the cattle, had to do this semisecretly, not to pass for Khrushchev's defenders.

Khrushchev was well familiar with the advantages of corn. The reason for his persistent demand to expand corn crops was based on several considerations. To begin with, corn is considerably higher yielding than wheat. Second, it was precisely corn that we were short of in the production of concentrated fodder. After his discussion with the American farmer Garst, who had described to Khrushchev the possibility of using the green corn mass with unripened ears as cattle feed, Nikita Sergeyevich firmly decided to listen to the advice of a knowledgeable person. As he said, "One should trust Garst, he is a capitalist and does nothing without proper consideration."

I do not know what quantity of green mass of corn we gathered for silage at that time any more than I know why corn was planted in areas where it could not grow.

Why is it that in our country even the best of intentions, which includes corn and the building of large animal husbandry complexes or organizing industrial vegetable gardens, examples which could be continued, frequently turn into trouble and into something stupid and ruinous?

To shed some light on the topic of the corn let me refer to an article in the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (December 1987). VASKHNIL Academician V.A. Tikhonov told the correspondent the following: "Every year, this country produces as much as 90 to 100 million tons of wheat. Furthermore, we buy abroad no less than an additional 20 percent. The need for comestible wheat does not exceed 37-38 million tons.... There is in the world no more or less large-scale farmer who would voluntarily accept such a "technology" and structure of output.... The country needs annually no less than 60 to 65 million tons of corn. Instead, we grow between 10 and 14 million tons. And even our long-term plans do not as yet call for any serious changes in the structure of the grain balance. Yet there are areas in the country in which wheat is grown instead of corn, although conditions there for corn growing are no worse than in that famous Iowa."

In the 1970s some friends and I were spending our leave in the Caucasus, and traveled to Batumi aboard a motorboat. The captain allowed us to spend the night in our cabins in order not to start our trip at night. He warned us that the vessel would dock in the commercial port.

Strange rustling sounds prevented us from sleeping throughout the night. At dawn we came on deck. We saw next to us a dilapidated American bulk-goods freighter. Rust had corroded the once black and green sides of this freighter and the superstructure had also long lost its white paint. The ship looked as though dressed in a torn dress, with holes caused by the wind and the sun. The port's crane was hovering above the deck, the cable would be lowered and the steel jaws would clutch at some of the freight which would be poured on top of a huge gold-colored mountain. This was the famous Iowa

corn. In Iowa they know what they are talking about. We too realize its value, having dragged it across the world, having paid in gold not only for this golden grain but also for the efforts of this beaten up supplier.

Naturally, there was no need to plant corn beyond the polar circle or in Novosibirsk Oblast. But what about elsewhere? And who is responsible for this? Is it Khrushchev?

While I worked for IZVESTIYA, there was not a day for our post office box not to be crowded with letters coming with a great variety of requests. Petitioners besieged our apartment in such a thick circle that I was forced to drag behind me to the editorial premises an entire tail of petitioners, for otherwise they would not let me pass.

Everything changed the day after the announcement that I had been relieved of my position as IZVESTIYA editor in chief came out, in October 1964. No one needed my advice or my help. With commendable expediency not only small lampoons began to appear but even novels about me (particularly zealous in this area was the literary worker Shevtsov, who was given high-level support). It was claimed that I had given "poor advice," and rescued "the wrong people," did not support what I had to support and, in general, had been "a spoiled nobody."

This did not astound me. I was not at the origin of this. Such writings were the result of the rejection of the 20th Party Congress.

Again and again I cannot help but ask myself: What was wrong in Khrushchev's policies, the domestic ones in particular, and was the lesson that that period taught to the people of my generation? The fact that a half-truth is disastrous in anything. However good the objectives a man could set to himself may be, he must base them on objective possibilities, determine them democratically, through an open, realistic and truthful discussion. That was precisely the way Khrushchev had begun. What had blocked him?

Imagine a person who assumed that somewhere not too far there was a beautiful highway leading to a world in which there would be no injustice, immorality and dishonesty, and where all people would be brothers. He wanted to take his fellow citizens to this road as soon as possible. The objective seemed close by: one more effort, one more leap. He firmly believed that his grandchildren would live under communism and that the new social system would soon bury capitalism. He claimed that all one had to do was quote precise figures and the objective itself would attract the energy of the masses. He qualified frustrations and errors as the results of tactical faults, confident that the quest of the shortest way to the highway was being obstructed only by disorder. One walked along muddy byways and lost one's way and then

there were those who were insufficiently active or else had sunk thoroughly into philistinism, dragging on their way to communism a great deal of unnecessary baggage.

He favored leasing cars rather than owning them, room-and-board houses instead of dachas, and energetic work at kolkhoz fields and livestock farms rather than private plots. He was hastening to reach communism, the social system of the future. He wanted to reach the shining peaks within the deadlines his contemporaries had violated.

Having proclaimed the democratic principles which were the only proper ones for progress, he nonetheless was forced increasingly to rely on people who did not share his ideas in the least. The familiar command-order system was reborn. It was simple and convenient. Orders were given but things advanced ever more slowly. Khrushchev did not realize that it was precisely his inconsistency that was hindering the solution of economic, social and spiritual problems. There was no integral political concept. He forgot that in communicating vessels the liquid is always on the same level. This law cannot be changed. Nor could one call for openness, competitiveness and a free comparison among viewpoints in the world of science and technology while limiting the effects of such rules in the spiritual areas of life. One cannot be a democratic in a design bureau and a retrograde in the Union of Writers.

There is still a great deal of optimism in the people. The decline seems temporary and surmountable. However, something else becomes increasingly clear: The long path with constant shifts, in the search for better organizational forms, which do not touch upon the profound reasons for failures, and the accelerated "go-go" march trigger fatigue and increase irritation.

It seems to me that Khrushchev himself realized that the errors and omissions were on a level different than the one he assumed. He was told of the note by Kharkov Professor Yevsey Grigoryevich Liberman who, having analyzed the economic situation, drew attention to the lowered importance of commodity-monetary relations, optimal planning and economic management, and material incentive, i.e., the main economic instruments, the principle of which was known from the works of Academicians Leonid Vitalyevich Kantorovich and Vasilii Sergeyevich Nemchinov. Their outstanding studies remained unused. This note was the first impetus for the 1965 reform, preparations for which were started under Khrushchev.

What was Khrushchev thinking about as he was going, with Mikoyan, to Pitsunda for a short vacation, in October 1964? Usually, such trips indicated the wish to concentrate, to think.

Shortly prior to his departure, Nikita Sergeyevich had addressed the last big meeting of his life. He bitterly spoke of the failure of annual plans in the 7-year plan

and the figures he quoted were discouraging. He ended his speech with a sentence which made many people pay attention. It was roughly the following: "We must open the way to others, to the young...."

As we know, the statutes which were adopted at the 22nd Party Congress stipulated terms for the replacement of leading cadres. A draft of the Constitution had been written which codified these stipulations on the governmental level.

Khrushchev's leave in Pitsunda was relative. He immediately went to see a poultry farm, received Japanese and, after them, Pakistani members of parliament, sent greetings to the participants in the 18th Olympic Games in Japan, and spoke by telephone with Cosmonauts V. Komarov, K. Feoktistov and B. Yegorov. He then met with the French minister of state for nuclear research. Bearing in mind that this took slightly more than a week, it cannot be said that Nikita Sergeyevich frequently saw the sun or the sea or that he was developing a bad premonition. I am frequently asked whether Khrushchev did not know that preparations for his replacement were under way? I answer that he knew. He knew that one of the leading comrades, traveling in the various oblasts, had openly said that Khrushchev must be deposed. In flying to Pitsunda, he told Podgornyy, who was seeing him off: "Ask Ignatov, what is he blabbering about? What are these intrigues? When I come back we shall have to clear all this." He said this and left. It was not in his character to take seriously the strange trips and talks of N.G. Ignatov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, or even less so to think that Ignatov was not doing this on his own initiative.

This, apparently, was followed by the 13 October telephone call which Khrushchev himself subsequently described as "frankly hysterical." His immediate return to Moscow was demanded, because of the gravest possible disagreements within the leadership. To the best of my knowledge, it was Suslov who rang, although Brezhnev was named as well. Did Khrushchev guess what was the real reason for the summons? In any case, naturally, at Moscow Airport he was welcomed only by the then KGB Chairman V.Ye. Semichastnyy. Khrushchev immediately took off to attend the meeting of the Central Committee Presidium.

The plenum at which Khrushchev did not speak took place on 14 October. He sat silently, looking down. To him this short hour was, naturally, a terrible, an indescribable torture. At home, however, he behaved normally.

Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan lived on Lenin Hills, next to Nikita Sergeyevich. They traveled together from those sessions at which discussions on replacing Khrushchev were taking place by the Central Committee Presidium. At that time I went to visit Nikita Sergeyevich. He was silent. He had already understood by the time that he had been summoned back from Pitsunda under the

pretext of extremely urgent matters, everything had already been decided. Before the Central Committee Plenum was held he said: "They have conspired." Anastas Ivanovich expressed himself more bluntly: "Khrushchev forgot that under socialism as well a power struggle may develop."

Khrushchev could say with a clear conscience that he was leaving the matters of state in better order than they had been when he took over.

This thought is not mine but was expressed by Mark Frankland, one of those Western Sovietologists who has tried to understand what the "Khrushchev decade" had meant to the Soviet Union (I am quoting from "Khrushchev's Political Biography," by R. Medvedev). Views on this subject "from alien shores" are varied and curious. At the start of 1988 I met with the American professor Taubman. He ties together and compares the activities of Khrushchev, Kennedy, and John XXIII, believing that they all wanted to change the world for the better, began by acting in that direction in accordance with their convictions, but largely failed.

During that decade not only our hands but our heads as well were unable to find radical solutions. This includes Khrushchev. While helping millions of innocent people to regain the respect of society, debunking the cult of Stalin and rejecting terror and repressions as a method for managing the affairs of state, not only Khrushchev but a wide circle of people did not rise to a level of understanding a more complex truth: With gigantic efforts the peoples of our country were building a society from which, despite all of its unquestionable material accomplishments, Lenin's behest that the most important thing to socialism is man, had vanished!

Does this not conflict with what I said at the beginning of these notes, and how can we interpret the optimism which colored the activities of many postwar generations of Soviet people? Or could it be that there is no contradiction whatsoever in this case but that simply the "optimism of ignorance" had exhausted itself?

It was Brezhnev who delivered the final words to Khrushchev at the October 1964 Central Committee Plenum. It was somewhat emotionally that he ended the brief session at which a report was presented by Suslov. He said that Khrushchev had debunked the cult of Stalin after the latter's death and that we were now debunking the cult of Khrushchev during his lifetime. Well, Brezhnev was right. An end was put to the cult of Khrushchev. I believe that Khrushchev would never have agreed to the role which the theoreticians of the period of stagnation were preparing for Brezhnev himself. In the age of "developed socialism," the man who was described as the "gray eminence" was becoming increasingly important. Today he is virtually forgotten. Suslov's activities will be assessed with proper objectivity. In the same way that not everything could be ascribed to Khrushchev, not everything should be blamed on Brezhnev. Suslov loved

to stay in the shadow. But was this same shadow not controlling its master?

While Khrushchev was being relieved of his position as well as subsequently, a great deal of claims were heard on the need to improve the leadership of the country's affairs and to restore collective leadership. These assertions were received with hope. However, the disparity between words and actions became increasingly clear. Essentially, this was the revenge of the forces which aspired to tranquillity, grandeur, and a "reliable" leader who would defend the interests of a bureaucratic group of individuals who identified themselves with the people but who increasingly distanced themselves from the people.

Although to many people the replacement of Khrushchev from his high party and state positions came like thunder from a clear sky, it caused no great regrets. It was abroad that the event met with an inordinately stormy response. Virtually all social groups had some complaints about Khrushchev. He had reduced the pensions of the military; he had reduced the strength of the Armed Forces too many times. Bond holders blamed him for putting an end to bond lottery drawings, having forgotten that no loans had been floated since 1957. The monetary reform or, rather, the changed rate of exchange of the ruble, the corn problem, the break-up of party obkoms, the closing down of ministries and the sovnarkhozes were recalled. I already mentioned the dissatisfaction of a certain segment of the creative intelligentsia.

The list could be extended as well as countered by an equally lengthy list of positive accomplishments by Khrushchev. This involved above all the release of millions of innocent people from oppression, repressions, slanders and fear. This alone would suffice for a political leader to be remembered well. However, such a memory could be durable and profound only if the role and place of an individual in the historical process could be objectively assessed.

Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since those October days and I keep thinking less about the facts themselves than about the amazingly simple "technology" of their implementation. For all practical purposes, neither the party nor the country heard any kind of arguments or serious substantiations, neither "pros" nor "cons." There were no debates, there were no heated speeches or any kind of information; the people shouted "hurrah" in April and "down with" in October. As it were, we did not find out whether Nikita Sergeyevich wanted to say something or not at a time when more than his own personal fate was being decided.

To paraphrase Hamlet, let me put it this way: "To know or not to know, that is the question." Not only I, but many of my comrades and friends felt ashamed when, as secretly as in Khrushchev's case, the question of electing Chernenko to the position of Central Committee general secretary was being decided. This case affected me more profoundly than others, for I had known this individual

quite well. He had worked within the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium as head of Brezhnev's cabinet and his main job had been to handle the mail. As IZVESTIYA editor in chief, I spent several hours in his office almost every week, where he read to me letters and we made decisions on how to handle them. At that time Chernenko was a gentle and calm person. He was totally removed from any serious governmental concerns. He had no outstanding career or experience. However, by a strange development of circumstances, he began to climb with amazing speed up the party ladder (Brezhnev's assistant, head of Central Committee department and Central Committee secretary), until, in a few years' time, in a headlong career, he became a pretender for the position of general secretary. Almost immediately after his election, praises started pouring, his works began to be published, and his instructions and recommendations were considered. All of this was justified with "superior" considerations and the need for continuity of the course. Could one forget how, already in the hospital, where this flagging man was in the process of dying, the servile Grishin was reporting to him that Moscow had fulfilled its trade plan (through Tregubov's efforts), as though this could concern the patient? Why is it that people have such a poor opinion of us? We are not children. Why was it that some people had such a poor opinion of their own people, of the dignity of Soviet citizens?

Our society has acquired experience the hard way. The storm which is shaking it up today is the great cleansing storm, it is a lesson to those who think that one could escape responsibility. Sooner or later, as we can see, nothing escapes it. Neither Stalin, nor Khrushchev or Brezhnev.

Khrushchev was assigned to live in a small dacha settlement, in Petrovo-Dalnnyy, near Moscow, by the quiet banks of the Istra. It took a long time for Nikita Sergeyevich to regain his spiritual peace. He was a person who kept everything to himself, who did not have an outlet for his feelings. A whole day would pass during which he would say no more than a few words. He walked along the grass-covered paths of the park, alone. Later, the old shepherd Arbat, who belonged to Lena, Nikita Sergeyevich's daughter, accepted him as her master and went with him everywhere. I love dogs and I know that their loyalty cannot be bought with a tasty morsel of food.

In the summer which followed his resignation, Nikita Sergeyevich began to pay infrequent visits to Moscow. He visited the Czechoslovak exhibit and saw a play at the Sovremennik Theater where, after the performance, he talked with the actors.

Month after month, the years passed. Occasionally, Nikita Sergeyevich was visited by our friends and the friends of Sergey and Yuli—Sergo Mikoyan, Irina Lunacharskaya with her husband, the military chemist Rafail Sterlin, Roman Karmen, Viktor Sukhodrev, Vladimir Vysotskiy, Professor Mikhail Zhukovskiy, Emil Gilels, Yevgeniy Yevtushenko and Mikhail Shatrov. At that time Nikita Sergeyevich had become interested in photography, and his adviser in this matter was Petr Mikhaylovich Krimerman,

director of a photographic goods store. Sergey's comrades, engineers and scientists, came to visit. In their circle Nikita Sergeyevich felt particularly at ease. He understood better and was closer to the "technicians" than to the humanitarians.

Khrushchev closely followed the press, listened to the radio and realized how far his successors were deviating from the previous course. However, he did not comment on their policies. I do not think that the reason was that he was afraid or indifferent. He clearly was unwilling, he considered degrading and unworthy of a party member to engage in idle talk. To a tactless question he would answer "I am retired."

As the years went by, Nikita Sergeyevich became more gentle, warm and attentive to children. He considered as his own the daughter of his son Leonid, the pilot who had died in an air battle over Smolensk. Yuliya was raised in his home. Her mother Lyuba had been arrested in 1943, accused of maintaining contacts with foreigners and, without a trial, sentenced to 15 years of exile. Khrushchev had never discussed this with Yuliya previously and yet in the course of one of his talks, he began to ask about the life of his daughter-in-law and passed on greetings to her. "You can be proud of your father, he was a brave pilot, and your mother was totally innocent."

Relatives tried to visit Nikita Sergeyevich as frequently as possible in his lonely dacha, which he never left. However, all of us were busy with our own affairs and Nikita Sergeyevich spent many hours and days alone. He was depressed. Books helped. He read avidly: Tolstoy, Turgenev, Shchedrin.... He built two greenhouses, grew a vegetable garden and experimented with tomatoes.

A few pages of notes taken by Nina Petrovna about that time have been preserved. Brief though they may be, these are documentary proofs of someone close to him. In 1965, in connection with affairs related to his pension, a permit for the new apartment on Starokonyushennaya Alleyway and other matters, Nina Petrovna and Nikita Sergeyevich found out that their marriage had not been registered. When they were young no significance attached to such formalities. Now they had spent nearly half a century of life together.

Nina Petrovna survived her husband by 13 years. She died in August 1984 and was buried, as she had wanted, next to Nikita Sergeyevich, in the Novodeviche Cemetery. A notice of her death was printed, bordered in black, in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA. She was mentioned by her maiden name Nina Petrovna-Kukharchuk. They did not want to write "Khrushcheva."

The notes she wrote were in her final years.

"I do not recall exactly the month or the year, but N.S. calmed down somewhat and decided to write his memoirs about his work. He dictated it on a tape recorder. He did this on a regular basis, mornings and, sometimes, during the day. I transcribed the text from the tape. After

a number of pages had accumulated, N.S. gave the tape to Sergey, to be transcribed by a typist. On one occasion, he was sitting next to me watching me type. He did not like my work, for I was using four fingers only while he had become used to the professional typists at the Central Committee, who used eight or 10 fingers and were very fast. He even said, disappointed: "Is that the way you type? And when could you complete this work?" It was thus that the tape with notes of N.S.'s recollections and the pages of already typed text went to Sergey. I subsequently regretted this for, perhaps, what happened could have been avoided....

"In this connection, I must tell about the meetings which N.S. held with his former work comrades, meetings which hastened the end of his life. Unfortunately, I do not remember dates but the sequences I remember well. The first was with A.P. Kirilenko. N.S. stayed away a long time and, finally, he returned quite excited and immediately went for a walk to the river. I went with him. He walked a long time, silently, and then started talking. Kirilenko had summoned him to forbid him to write his memoirs and demanded that what he had already written be given to the Central Committee. N.S. answered that they could have given him a stenographer, at which point all of his memoirs would be available not only to himself but also to the Central Committee. They were unwilling to do that. He categorically refused to surrender his materials, for they needed more work. N.S. further said that no one had the right to forbid him to write, for this violated the constitution of our country. N.S. recalled that the tsar had forbidden T.G. Shevchenko to write and paint and what had the results been? Today the entire world is reading Shevchenko and who can remember those who persecuted him? Furthermore, thousands of people write their memoirs in our country and no one prevents them from doing so and why should they prevent him, N.S.? Where was the logic in that? N.S. said that he became angry and raised his voice.... On the following day N.S. was taken to the hospital in the "first aid" ambulance, suffering from a severe infarct. The treatment took a long time and when he came back he spent hours lying on the veranda, next to the bedroom, as he slowly recovered. Doctor Vladimir Grigoryevich Bezzubik came to see him quite frequently. During all of those weeks N.S. looked closely, and even lovingly, at the sky, the pines, the apple trees and the flowers in the garden....

"On one occasion I was delayed in Moscow later than usual and, coming back, I did not find N.S. in the dacha. He returned after more than 2 hours, and asked for the folding stool and sat on the porch, under the lilac bush. I waited for him to say something. He refused to eat. After a while he started talking. Pelshe had telephoned him. Pelshe said that a book with N.S. Khrushchev's memoirs had been published abroad. How had his memoirs gone there? To whom had N.S. given them? He answered that he had not given to anyone his notes, neither at home nor abroad, and that they were still not suitable for publication and he would never let them go abroad.... Pelshe asked what was the meaning of all this? Was this book a forgery? What to do in such a situation? A denial had to be issued.... N.S. agreed. Pelshe drafted a text, N.S. rejected it and wrote his own version, which was published in PRAVDA. It said

that these memoirs had not been submitted for publication either at home or abroad. Pelshe insisted that N.S. include the statement that he was not writing and had not written any kind of memoirs. N.S. disagreed and the denial was published without that sentence. His trip to Pelshe also ended in an infarct.

"N.S. felt better but did not recover and felt weak for quite some time. He stopped dictating. One day in the first week of September (1971) on the 5th or the 6th, N.S. returned from a visit to Rada. He took a walk after dinner, carrying his folding chair, but came back soon afterwards. That night he complained of heart pain and I gave him the necessary medicine, the pain subsided and he fell asleep. He got up in the morning, he washed himself and again he felt heart pains. Doctor Bezzubik came with a nurse, they gave him an injection and took him to hospital with a third infarct. N.S. insisted to sit and this may have worsened his condition. In the hospital he walked down the hall by himself and in the ward he had a long talk with the personnel. During the night he felt unwell and on 11 September N.S. died."

Neither I nor Rada know how Nikita Sergeyevich's memoirs found their way abroad and whether they were the ones he had dictated. Sooner or later, this will be cleared.

On several occasions Nikita Sergeyevich came to visit us in our dacha settlement in Ikshi Rayon. His loneliness in Petrovo-Dalnyy was shared by his younger daughter Lena. She was very ill and her strength was failing. She died after her father, young, at 35.

Nikita Sergeyevich was welcomed in our small settlement hospitably and respectfully. He was becoming communicative, as in the past. He liked to pick mushrooms and speak with the neighbors, who were veteran fliers. On the day described by Nina Petrovna, he stopped on the edge of the forest and asked my son Alesha to bring him a folding chair. He sat for a long time, feeling sad. He told us that he felt unwell and left. Rada felt that something was happening and followed him. Soon afterwards he was already in the hospital.

Khrushchev was dying. Before his death he asked Rada to bring him a pickled cucumber. Rada managed to go to the market and come back. Nikita Sergeyevich patted his daughter's hand and said: "But where is your mother, I need her so much now...." Did he want to say something in parting?

Two days after Nikita Sergeyevich's death, Nina Petrovna was informed that the burial should be strictly a family matter, without any official ceremonies. "Bury him as an ordinary citizen...."

And thus was he buried.

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Soviet Law Permits Children to Attend Church Services

18000104 Minsk SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 11
Oct 88 p 6

[Article by V. Fedayayev, lawyer: "Freedom of Conscience and the Law"]

[Text] [Question] "It so happened that I was taking my 12 year-old daughter to church. On the way we chanced to meet Katya's teacher, Svetlana Grigoryevna. She put me to shame by saying that not only is this not a good thing, but it is also forbidden to permit minors to go to church. Is it possible that this is true?" asks N. Panova from Irkutsk Oblast.

[Answer] Whether this is a good thing or not, Natalya Andreyevna, is your decision to make, as well as your daughter's when she grows up. On the second question of whether it is permitted to take minors to church, the law on religious cults does not contain this restriction. Children and teenagers may go to places of worship and may attend religious services. Children are permitted to have religious instruction, but only by mutual consent of both parents. The most important thing is, however, that this must be done only with the consent of the children themselves, and by the children's own free will. The use of coercion or force on a child's freedom of conscience is not permissible.

Millennium of Acceptance of Christianity Celebrated in UzSSR

Religious Officials Meet With UzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

18000112 [Editorial Report] Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian on 6 October 1988 p 2 reports that on 5 October representatives of the Holy Synod, clergy from Central Asia as well as from other USSR eparchies, and clergymen from Bulgaria and Finland in Tashkent for Millennium celebrations met with the Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet. The officials were received by P. Khabibullayev, chairman of the Presidium. During the talks it was stressed that changes in church-state relations will make it possible for believers to step up their contribution to peacemaking and charitable activities as well as their involvement in perfecting relations between nationalities.

Two-Day Long Commemoration Held in Tashkent

18000112 [Editorial Report] Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian on 7 October 1988 p 3 reports that 6 October 1988 was the second and final day of Millennium celebrations in Tashkent. A greeting from Patriarch Pimen was read in which he emphasized the importance of inter-religious cooperation in furthering

the "humanization" of society as well as the solution of general social-moral problems facing all soviet people without regard to faith or nationality.

Speakers at the celebration noted that the present "revolutionary perestroyka" is rejuvenating the relations between church and state. The speakers pointed out that Uzbekistan serves as a prime example of economic and spiritual cooperation between representatives of many nations and religions.

Moslem, Russian Orthodox Officials Meet with KaSSR Council of Ministers

18000109 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Sep 88 p 3

[KazTAG Report: "Meetings With Religious Officials"]

[Text] On 22 September kazi [moslem judge] R. Nysanbayev, chairman of the Central Asia Spiritual Administration of Moslems in Kazakhstan, Z. Iminov, naibiman [assistant imam] of the Alma-Ata mosque and M. Telenbayev, mutawalli [trustee] of that mosque met with the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers. On the same day, the following representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church met with the Council of Ministers: Yevseviy, Bishop of Alma-Ata and Kazakhstan, I.G. Slyusar, secretary of the eparchial administration and V.A. Zakharov, senior priest of the Nikolskiy Cathedral.

During the talks N.A. Nazarbayev, chairman of the KaSSR Council of Ministers, explained the work going on in the Republic in disseminating democracy and glasnost, the acceleration of social-economic development and improving the welfare of workers. It was noted that presently the Leninist principles of relations with the church are being renewed and that the great majority of believers have accepted perestroyka and are making great contributions to it. In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR and of the Kazakh SSR, they have the right to express their convictions fully. Religious organizations are meriting high marks for their contributions to the struggle for peace, humanism, equitable relations between nationalities, and support for the policies of the Soviet State.

The significance of such universal values as morals and conscience were underscored. It is necessary to respect the spiritual world of believers and to establish new approaches to church-state relations everywhere.

Representatives of the Moslem and Russian Orthodox religions expressed their thanks for being granted their requests to meet with the Council of Ministers and asked a number of questions connected with the activities of the attendants of mosques and churches.

Ye. M. Asanbayev, deputy chairman of the KaSSR Council of Ministers and T. Ye. Sauranbekov, representative of the KaSSR Council for Religious Affairs, took part in the talks.

TuSSR Laureate Writer Assesses Nationalism in Arts from Stalin to Perestroyka
18300358 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 7 Jul 88 p 3

[Interview by Ye. Prikhodko with Writer Turkish Dzhumageldyyev, laureate of Turkmen SSR State Prize imeni Makhtumkuli, under the "Artist and the Times" rubric: "Our Hopes and Fears"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] **No representatives of the republic's creative intelligentsiya were found among the delegates to the 19th All Union Party Conference. But nevertheless, let us assume that they were offered an opportunity to speak at the rostrum...What would you have spoken of first of all?**

[Answer] By not sending a delegate of the republic's creative intelligentsiya to the conference, are we not thereby expressing our attitude toward it? It's a pity that its representatives, who have such influence on the public's mood, are unable to bring their personal impressions to their countrymen from this forum, which is so fateful for their entire country.

Before glasnost entered our lives, I think, we had no idea of the size of the obstacles which had accumulated... The press has played the most important role in this, providing the people with a highly-charged, critical view on society, with its problems—many of which we have, alas, resigned ourselves to. Important laws have been prepared, which take into consideration the new reality of our lives, and the social demands. The time is now coming to carry out cardinal reform of the political system, and to make economic changes in society. For it is only on a harmonious bilateral basis that the restructured political and economic system can create a renewed society.

The specific nature of the economy weighs on the people's psychology far more than the most beautiful and elegant words. And if the anti-perestroyka forces manage to hide or disguise themselves in the political discussion—you see, these are as a rule people which have some skills in demagoguery—then the very first steps in the economic reform will be subject to betrayal.

Are we really not encountering economic sabotage in our day, when important and necessary decrees by the party and government, aimed at restoring the health of the economy, are carried out according to narrow departmental interests, however they please?...

Hence the alarm: some matters we have neglected in the course of the three years, and in certain very important matters we have made concessions. An analysis of this situation was given in Gorbachev's report and in the speeches at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. They inspire great optimism; but optimism is only half the matter. In order for them to become reality, effort is required. We have heard eloquent and even businesslike

speeches already in the 1960's. God forbid that the supporters of perestroyka become content with that. But that is what its enemies are counting on.

It was interesting to hear from the speakers, as to when their words would be backed up by deeds. Take the general director of the Ivanovo Machine Tool Building Production Association, V.P. Kabaidze—a unique personality in my view: he has a right to use high-sounding words; for they are backed by deeds. But I did not like the reaction: there was laughter in the hall when Kabaidze made use of expressions uncustomarily strong for that rostrum. For you see, there were many people in the hall, who were the direct targets of the speaker's sharp criticism.

One of the causes for the difficulties of perestroyka, it seems to me, is our rather superficial impressions about democracy. And it boils down sometimes to what one "may do." Electing our leaders? By all means. Demonstrations? Unofficial associations? No one is opposed to them either. But we still have a poor understanding of what, precisely, skillful use of democratic rights and opportunities will bring us. Hence our infamous unsystematic way of doing things, or our unhurried ways, and our stereotyped views.

Democracy is unthinkable without a culture for realizing it. Otherwise everything will be reduced to anarchy. At times it is even reduced to overthrowing all authority, to include the authority of the leaders. In my view there is still another problem here. I believe that getting the people more and more involved in management of social production need not at all weaken the role of the leaders, the commanders of industry.

And what is more, making management more democratic will provide practical results only when it is closely tied-in with clear-cut rules and the personal responsibility of every responsible official, to whom the state has, with majority approval, entrusted with the supervision of one economic sphere or another. Let us recall Lenin's words on the necessity for combining mass democracy "with iron discipline while laboring, and with unquestioning obedience to the will of a single individual, the Soviet leader..." The prestige of the leaders in the eyes of the people must be raised. There is one way to do this: educate, observe, and take note; and place our trust in those people who possess a heightened sense of responsibility before society, people capable of non-standard analyses and conclusions, justifiable risks and flexible maneuvers.

A personality, a leader—this, figuratively speaking, is piece-work production. A flow of such people is now urgently needed in all links of party leadership.

[Question] **Leaders must answer for what they do, or for that matter, for what they do not do. The opera and ballet theater is in pitiful condition, in spite of the great many press articles and the measures allegedly taken. In spite of**

the decree of the republic Council of Ministers on the opening of the Turkmen State Experimental Young People's Theater, and authorizing facilities for it—a month has gone by and the theater does not have them.

Why was construction of a monument on the esplanade to the fighters of the revolution halted?

Why has "Aura," a documentary film about narcotics addiction, not been shown? Why are the creative societies working so unproductively? And what is the attitude of the supervisory comrades toward all this and similar matters?

[Answer] We were badly hurt by an improper approach: the supervisors were appointed, as a rule, from among the economic managers. Perhaps they were not bad as specialists, but here their narrow brand of thinking has done a lot of harm. For example, among party and Soviet administrators, how often does one meet people with, let's say, a juridical, theatrical, or artistic education? We have too few people like that; people with a fixed view on life, with in-depth knowledge, and a great deal of culture.

What is there to hide? For a long time the party was above criticism. The pronouncements of party officials, which were quite often incompetent, were received as dogma and were not subject to discussion, much less contention. I can recall one such episode, although it is true it is not connected with the arts: In Mary Oblast, from time immemorial the peasants had always pulled all the weeds first, before plowing. But Akgayev, former party obkom first secretary, gave the order to plow up the weeds, regardless of the consequences, with a grading plow... And what happened is, I think, understandable: chair [sic], a terrible weed, choked out the entire harvest. The people were forced into a bad situation, but as far as the party figure is concerned, it was like water off a duck's back...

Here is what such harmful, choking weeds of inept instructions sometimes do to the harvest in the field of the arts. While in the employ of the Turkmenfilm movie studio, I was an editor of the films "The Way of the Gleaming Caravan" and "The Bondwoman." And when they were released, I encountered the shocking rudeness of the people who, without a shadow of a doubt, held court over these works of art. With respect to the first of these pictures, based on G. Mukhtarov's play, "The 1930's," the very Buro of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee was assembled, where a label of "anti-national" was affixed to the film.

Director M. Atakhanov, in defense of his brainchild, managed to utter exactly half a sentence, "Films are made in this manner..." Rudely cutting off the cinematographer, cast by the Buro virtually as the guilty party, then Central Committee Secretary B. Ovesov declared: "Y'think the members of the Buro don't know how to make a movie?" One could describe this as a joke, if it had not been so serious: for as it happened, the order was then given to burn the film. And with the passage of

time, the film which they had run down began to figure in the speeches of these same people as, "an achievement of the Turkmen Film Industry." It was no easier for Mansurov; the Buro presented something like 30 totally groundless changes to his film "The Bondwoman."

Right now it's something of a chaotic period in this respect. Many party leaders insist that, "It is not necessary to interfere," and thereby fall into another extreme. And the other side looks at them and waits for orders, by force of habit.

No doubt about it, supervisory officials who deal with the intelligentsiya must have a well-honed sense of the world of creativity, and the tender feelings of the artist. But there must also be will, steadfastness, and perspicacity in solving problems. This by the way also applies to the question of the opera and ballet theaters. Art will not be inspired in them by means of directives and statutes. We have neglected a very important feature—and here, I believe, the party leadership is largely to blame, when they should have been thinking about cadres.

The trouble with us is, we are unable to look ahead 10 or 15 years and estimate our future needs. And not only in culture, but in economics as well. According to the well-known memoirs of the prominent Soviet composer G. Litinskiy, in the 1920's Kaygysyz Atabayev came to his dacha one night in a pouring rain, and begged him to take on some gifted Turkmen children for instruction. Subsequently, from these children there came those splendid musicians, who laid the foundation for our professional arts. It is noteworthy that the leader of the republic himself would inquire every week how things were going with the teacher.

Is it really true that today, after so many years have passed, that the republic can not loosen the purse strings enough to train people to restore our unique architectural monuments? To send them off for training in, say, Uzbekistan?... Have we tried to look into the future, with respect to whether these majestic monuments will survive for our children? And having established a young people's experimental theater, have we thought about how it will exist tomorrow? After all, a baby must not only be born; one must also provide it clothing, shoes and food. But we, having given birth to our child, threw it right out into the street. That is not moral. And how many such "children" we have: the TYuZ [Theater for Young Audiences], or the Mary and the Chardzhou theaters... But the situation will not be corrected until everyone accepts the unalterable truth that, without a theater a nation cannot live. Without books, without culture—it is not a nation.

Of course, I have no prescriptions for interrelations between the creative intelligentsiya and the party leaders. But here there is a unique school for everyone—Lenin's attitude toward literary and artistic figures. What am I getting at here? Vladimir Ilich's understanding of the essence and the nature of the works (My

favorite example is the article, "Lev Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution," a work of genius), and—the greatest patience. The Stalin period canceled these principles. Everything that was not identical, or which clashed with the tastes of the powers-that-be, was immediately chopped off with an axe. Who knows how much new could have been developed from these severed limbs? One must not look upon criticism as upon a monopoly.

The years of stagnation had a negative influence on the appearance of individuals. Art and culture was especially afraid of this. An individual loves freedom; he is the enemy of obedience. An individual is willing to take risks for the sake of a cause. And if the risk ends in failure, society, in my view, should support the artist and not put him before a court of law. Creative people should have a right to make mistakes too, and this also should be understood today. But when confronted with ineptitude, an individual's animal instincts are directly incited. Alas, in our creative societies there are still quite a few such odious figures. Such people exist, and will continue to exist; but they need not come up to the top, or affect the matter.

[Question] What role do you attribute to literature and the arts, and to spiritual principles in general, in perestroika? Do literature and the arts play such a role in the life of the republic today? What, in your view, has the creative intelligentsiya done over the last three years that is important and beneficial for restoring a moral climate in our lives?

[Answer] I've already spoken about the enormous role played by the press and commentary in the unfurling of perestroika. By force of habit people sometimes say, "But where are the novels and films about perestroika?" If they were to appear just like that, right away, I am convinced that they would be false novels and films. After all, we've just begun a long and difficult psychological task. True realization of what has happened will come when perestroika is irreversibly established. And then there will also be a tangible type of hero for our "restructuring" period for the artists. And I am sure these will be heroes for a long time to come. Because the very idea of perestroika carries with it so much that is bright and human. I would call it the spiritual renaissance of man.

For the time being, whether we like it or not, the level of social thinking in the republic is behind the times. The readers will please forgive me, but as the editor of the weekly EDEBIYAT VE SUNGAT I became convinced that the problems which are so uncompromisingly clamoring for our attention in the country have hardly been "offloaded" here in the republic. We do not yet have such militant commentators or writers, whose articles can stir up a response from the people. Some take a position of "probably nothing will come of it," and others are afraid of losing the false prestige which they won during the years of stagnation. We have a lot of

satisfied, satiated people, who believe that nothing beyond the boundaries of the republic is of any significance; but others are poking sticks into the spokes. It is here, it seems to me, that principled party analysis is needed. As far as achievements are concerned, although I wish it were not so, it is too early to speak of them.

[Question] Which events and facts of the recent, and perhaps the distant past as well, require rethinking and re-evaluation today? What names from the history, literature and art of Turkmeniya should be restored to the people today? What is being done in this direction?

[Answer] Many people in Turkmenistan suffered under the Stalin Cult. But in the matter of restoring historic truth and wiping out the blank spots in the republic's history, there is, I would say, an unacceptable feeling of contentment. And this once again testifies to the fact that the moral fund of the intelligentsiya and the struggle for justice have, on the whole, lost their value among us. The materials appearing in the press are of an incidental, episodic nature. There are no purposeful, scientifically-based actions. The historians have lost this round; they are quite simply asleep. For the time being, literature is doing more.

We must, through the party organs, bring about the early rehabilitation of those people whose good name was wrongfully besmirched. This will provide a great deal of moral energy for perestroika. The people want to know how Atabayev, Aytakov, Sakhatmuradov, and many others disappeared... You see, we soothe ourselves by pointing out that access to many archival materials is still closed. We must strive to gain access to them; the moreso, since quite often there is no legal basis for denying access to them; it is merely the whim of the bureaucrats. No one is opening the heavy doors to the archives for us. That is a matter for our civic action, our civic duty.

The famous Battle of Geok-Tepe certainly has not been given truly honest treatment in scholarly or historical literature. You see, here is the problem: our historic events have been interpreted in accordance with orders from above, from the point of view of dogmatic assumptions, according to someone's desire to conceal the true course of events. History is always just; for those times live, apart from us. It is the historians who are unjust—as regards the annexation of Turkmeniya by Russia. In juggling the facts and distorting history, we are only inviting the wrath of the people.

Incidentally, not long ago Rasul Gamzatov wrote in IZVESTIYA that, "Today in Dagestan, by instruction of the local leadership, they are assiduously trying to determine the facts which would confirm the...voluntary annexation to Russia. We joined with Soviet Russia through the Russian revolution, which freed us from the Tsarist yoke. Is this truly not enough? What further facts are needed? However, like careless schoolboys, we again and again come up with 'convenient' answers on the

nation's history." Well said. In order for the nations to live in harmony, they must know the truth, and not a pretty lie. That's just like living on stolen money and not telling anyone that it is stolen.

This also concerns concrete historic persons. In the novel "The Fortress of Serakh," writer Atadzhan Tagan attempted, without foregoing historic accuracy, to depict far-off events, when under the leadership of Kaushut Khan, a remarkable person in our history, victory was gained over the usurpers—the Khiva khannate and the Shah of Iran. That was a time of heightened consciousness, and popular patriotic enthusiasm. And what was the result? The writer was immediately accused of idealization of the oppressor-khan, and even more serious labels were attached to him. The novel remained in manuscript form nearly 15 years. And it was first published in Moscow... When will we finally learn, that one cannot depict history in terms of black and white?...

Or, one need not go far: take Makhtumkuli; he has sufficient stature in terms of his complex philosophy that he stands as an absolutely unique figure in the poetry of Central Asia. He is altogether non-traditional both in essence and in form. I think that we—including the philosophers and specialists in literary scholarship—have not yet grown to an understanding of his phenomenal art. But just look at how, in order to conform with the views of time-serving political hacks, the estimation of Makhtumkuli has been changed: that he was exposed as a representative of the bourgeois tradesmen; or that he was a religious poet; and in our days there is virtual agreement on the fact that he was all but 100-percent atheist.

For a long time the Medieval popular epic "Korku-Ata" was under a "taboo." During the "Zhdanov period," the epic was declared, altogether without foundation, to be reactionary and antipopular, and its editions were withdrawn. Now our newspaper has provided several articles on this remarkable national epic, and a new edition is being prepared, albeit slowly.

During the Soviet period, estimations of Turkmen literature have been exaggerated in my view; from the point of view of high literature, it does not stand up to criticism. By presenting certain writers' works as classics we thereby significantly lower the criteria, and that has a bad influence on the readers' tastes. After all, once familiar with the world's classics, they know what's what. Value must be based on merits; literature does not like reduced standards.

This situation is also reflected in the low level of literary scholarship itself. Literary scholars and critics, having declared this or that writer's works classics, quite often do not know the proper criteria themselves. And after all, this is a very important matter; the times change, and a classic must remain a classic.

And I believe that the creative work of 1930's writer Khodzha Shukurov, author of the historical poem "Khorezm," which was also unjustifiably banned in his time, must be returned to the people; as well as the work Leniniana Kulmukhammedova, a literary scholar, poetess, and one of the founders of Turkmen literature. Here the Language and Literature Institute imeni Makhtumkuli of the TuSSR Academy of Sciences must swing into action.

[Question] Today the question of internationalism, and friendship of the nations of our country has risen with new strength. What facets of this problem can you see in our republic? What can the creative, scientific intelligentsiya do to strengthen friendship?

Why has the question of mastering one's native language and the Russian language become so acute today?

[Answer] How have we always interpreted internationalism? The rules of the game were not hard. All you had to do is cram your novel full of names of heroes from different nationalities, and there you have a book about friendship of the nations. You present the appropriate numbers in a concert—and you are strengthening internationalism. Such a superficial attitude has isolated us from the profound problems, and principled views on internationalism. And these are primarily, how to preserve the national identity of this or that people, how to support and effect its autonomy, how it participates in full-fledged social life, and how its democratic laws are implemented. What is required here is day-in-day-out attention, and ordinary everyday work, without any false pathos whatsoever. After all, the friendship of nations is not heroics, but the main condition of our life. Noisy campaigns actually offend the sense of worth of the small nations.

Internationalism is an attribute of a person's internal culture. In Makhtumkuli, who had seen so many cruel incursions by foreign aggressors, there is not a single line vilifying other nations. In other words, he understood the profound essence of one nation or another. Chauvinism and nationalism spring up on the soil of low culture, when a person knows very little about another nation.

You see, for example, at one time it was fashionable for us to speak about the exceptional Turkmen hospitality. But is there an inhospitable people on the Earth?... Or now and then you hear that Makhtumkuli is extolled over Pushkin. Such a person is ignorant of the culture of the other nation. I'm convinced that not even Makhtumkuli would take him seriously.

The struggle for internationalism must be waged not with slogans, but with culture. Otherwise it is like Don Quixote tilting with the windmills.

Without honoring the language of a nation, one cannot honor the people themselves. Today, I believe, this is becoming clear. But in order to reach this understanding it was necessary to pass through the well-known and very harmful theory of the vanishing languages.

Language is an enormous stimulus and is the necessary condition for development of social thought and philosophy, and for formulating one's world-view... The light of glasnost revealed that the question of language study has become very acute. We have not learned the Russian language well, and today one does not have to prove the necessity of knowing Russian; but we have not learned our own native language well either. The infamous gross-volume approach prevails in the training of teachers specializing in Russian philology. But you see, the quality of their training is poor. It is also pathetic that we have cluttered up and distorted the Turkmen language. To hear pure, erudite, literary Turkmen speech today is a very rare thing. I see a way out in the cardinal restructuring of the teaching of languages. It must be carried out according to principles of high pedagogical expertise, starting from an early age. Also required are good textbooks, translator cadres and in-depth linguistic research. And of course, those sent to supervise this sector must be knowledgeable people too.

[Question] What is your attitude toward newspaper commentary on critical questions concerning the republic?

[Answer] I found Gorbachev's remarks about the local press heartwarming. Truly, we must be more bold. The

press is our national means of intercourse. The views and interests of a certain group of people must not be foisted on it. Otherwise it loses its nationwide significance. Under the Stalin Cult we had already observed this.

We have also raised the problems of which the central press has written. But the editing has been miserable. Bureaucrats are always afraid of—not the public, but their higher authorities. You see, publication in the central press may decide their fate. The articles have been important and topical. But nevertheless we must speak out more ourselves. Correspondents arriving in the republic, whether they want to or not, skim the upper, the exotic layer of the phenomena and problems—be they bride-money, religion or self-immolation. This can prove stunning for the national readership. And nonetheless, at times the subtle, hard-to-reach connections among the phenomena are lost—at times at the level of the national psychology. We must with all boldness penetrate to the very core. And here, one cannot get along without in-depth knowledge of the national style and way of life, of the peculiarities of social contacts. Leading officials, in their statements, often place all the blame on vestiges of feudal or wealthy-landowner attitudes. And here one must be more perspicacious. After all quite often, forgive me for the play of words, these are vestiges of the present. Without honesty with one another, with our common cause and its history, we will be unable to proceed farther on the road to perestroika.

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**New Kazakh Decree on Public Demonstrations
Elucidated**

*18300017a Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 3 Sep 88 p 3*

[Interview with A. D. Myznikov: "Democracy and
Legality Are Inseparable"]

[Text] Recently the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR
Supreme Soviet enacted a Ukase entitled "The Responsibility
For Violating the Established Procedure for Organizing
and Conducting Meetings, Rallies, Marches, and
Demonstrations." A KazTAG correspondent had an interview
dealing with that Ukase with A. D. Myznikov,
KaSSR deputy procurator.

[Question] What necessitated this kind of Ukase?

[Answer] Perestroyka and the democratization of public
life have been involving the workers in resolving many
acute social problems in an increasingly active way.
Spontaneous informal associations have sprung up.
There are currently more than 300 of them in the
republic, and their members come to more than 3000
persons. Many of them were created in the sphere of
organizing recreational time and unite people sharing
common interests. Others are concerned with problems
of ecology, interethnic relations, food supply, etc.

There have been a rather large number of instances
when, with the aid of the public, it has been possible to
begin to see some action with regard to questions that
have been unresolved for decades. For example, in
Dzhambul and Chimkent, in response to the workers'
demand, they had a meeting with N. M. Olshanskiy,
USSR minister for the production of mineral fertilizers.
Together with the managers of the subordinate enterprises,
he firmly promised to allocate funds to eliminate
the negative effect that the chemical industry is exerting
on the environment. In Pavlodar and Ust-Kamenogorsk,
on an initiative from the workers, questions of the
ecology have been considered at sessions of the oblast
soviets.

The positive efforts of the spontaneous groups formed by
the public merit support. It is necessary not to shun an
open dialogue with them and, without applying labels, to
accept the unfamiliarity of their judgments and the
innovation of the forms in which glasnost and openness
manifest themselves, and to find the correct resolutions
for social problems. The main thing here is to reduce the
tension by carrying out practical deeds, to satisfy reasonable
demands, and to involve the citizens in the discussion
of the measures that have been planned and in
monitoring them.

However, there is another side to this question. Recently
all kinds of home-grown "leaders" have begun infiltrating
the spontaneous associations and using them for
their own prideful, selfish purposes, based on positions
that are alien to socialism and perestroyka. The leaders

of the spontaneous associations have been making
attempts to prevent the party committees and the soviets
of people's deputies from discussing problems, have
been laying claim to a monopoly in forming a program of
actions based on their decision, and have been instigating
the violation of public order and provoking the
militia to interfere. At times, illegal and politically
unacceptable demands are made.

That is why, in conformity with the decisions of the 19th
All-Union Party Conference, it was necessary to assure
the legislative regulation of the procedure for organizing
and conducting meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations,
and to have a precise definition of the responsibility
for violating that procedure.

[Question] What was the attitude to that previously?

[Answer] The ispolkoms of a number of local soviets
enacted various normative acts in the form of "model
statutes" and "provisional rules" concerning the procedure
for organizing and conducting mass measures. For
example, on 11 November 1987 the Alma-Ata city
ispolkom approved the Provisional Rules for Organizing
and Conducting Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches, and
Similar Measures. However, those acts were not in
precise conformity with regulations and did not define
the responsibility for illegal actions.

[Question] What is the current procedure for conducting
meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations?

[Answer] In conformity with the Law, before organizing
such a measures it is necessary to apply to the ispolkom
of the local soviet of people's deputies no later than ten
days before the date when they will be held. That
application must indicate the purpose, form, and place
of the measures, or the planned itinerary, the time when
it will begin and end, the projected number of participants,
and the last name, first name, and patronymic,
place of residence, and occupation of the responsible
individuals (organizers).

These conditions are a result of the fact that the
ispolkoms have the duty of guaranteeing that the actions
taken by the persons participating in the measures do not
infringe upon the rights and freedoms of other citizens
and do not interrupt the normal functioning of the urban
services. Nor must one disregard the possibility of various
other city-wide or rayon measures, that is, the
ispolkom must find the optimal decision when selecting
the place and time for conducting them and must provide
them with the necessary conditions.

The participants are prohibited from having in their
possession any firearms, or any specially prepared or
adapted objects that can be used against people's life and
health or for the purpose of causing material damage to
state or public organizations or citizens.

The ispolkom makes its decision known to the responsible individuals no later than five days before the beginning of the measure. The main thing is to implement the established judicial norms for purposes of developing and confirming democratic principles and the initiative and independence of the masses, but to do so on the basis of law and order and the protection of the interests of the state and the rights of the citizens.

I would like particularly to emphasize that state and public organizations, officials, and citizens do not have the right to hinder meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations if they are being conducted in accordance with the established procedure.

[Question] The Presidium of the KaSSR Supreme Soviet has defined the responsibility for violating the established procedure for organizing and conducting meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations. What is understood by the phrase "violation of the established procedure"?

[Answer] This should be understood as the conducting of them without the authorization of the ispolkom, on a day that has not been established, without regard for the beginning and ending time, at a place that has not been specified, with a different itinerary, or with the purpose of expressing anti-Soviet, antisocialist ideas.

[Question] The new Ukase prohibits the actions taken by the participants in these measures from encroaching on the rights and freedoms of other citizens or infringing on the interests of the state. But what responsibility is borne by the violators?

[Answer] The violation of the procedure for organizing or conducting meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations results in a warning or the imposition of a fine in an amount up to 300 rubles, and in instances when, in accordance with the circumstances of the situation and with a consideration of the identity of the violator, the application of these measures is deemed insufficient, it can result in administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days.

For committing such actions repeatedly within a year after the application of measures of administrative punishment, the penalty is a fine in an amount of up to 1000 rubles or corrective labor for a period of from one to two months, with the withholding of 20 percent of the person's earnings; or administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days. At such time a differentiation is made between the responsibility borne by the participants in the meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations, and that borne by their organizers, as well as on the basis of repeated actions.

[Question] Is provision made for increased responsibility borne by the organizers of actions if they have repeatedly committed violations?

[Answer] The organizers of actions after measures of administrative punishment have been applied to them, if they continue the same actions, are brought to criminal responsibility, and are punished by a fine of up to 2000 rubles or by corrective labor for a period of up to one year, or by incarceration for a period of up to six months.

[Question] Meetings, rallies, marches, and demonstrations can be conducted for various reasons. Do the actions of the Ukase apply to gatherings of believers?

[Answer] Such meetings must observe this Ukase completely. Their organizers are also required to apply to the ispolkom of the local soviet of people's deputies and they must gather at the strictly specified time and at the established place. Failure to observe the established procedure results in the same responsibility. Both the members of communal religious groups and their organizers are subject to the actions of the Ukase.

The Ukase defines the procedure for detaining the violator, the place for detaining him, the preparation of the administrative report concerning the infraction, and the review of such cases by a people's judge. The report concerning the infraction is prepared by a duly empowered official at the agency of internal affairs (militia) or ispolkom of a rayon, city, city-rayon, settlement, rural, or aul soviet. Such cases are considered within three days by a people's judge acting individually. When enforcing the decree governing the imposition of an administrative penalty, he has the right to require a violator who is not a resident of the particular locality to leave it.

[Question] Every year Alma-Ata has approximately a million tourists from various parts of our country and abroad. The downtown streets are crowded with transportation. How is it possible to conduct rallies, marches, or demonstrations there? What is your opinion about this?

[Answer] Inasmuch as there are a large number of people and a lot of traffic on the streets in oblast centers, and especially the republic's capital city, and a large number of tourists and guests in the squares and at the historic sites, the initiators should not raise the questions of conducting any measures in these places. If necessary, the ispolkoms should set aside definite places for these purposes.

[Question] Correspondents and photographic correspondents are supposed to be in the midst of events, but they are not always able to interview citizens or officials or to photograph them. Has this been stipulated by the representatives of the protection of public order?

[Answer] Even in critical situations, the proper conditions must be created to enable the journalists to throw light completely and objectively on the course of events. But it is frequently difficult for the workers in the militia and the internal affairs agencies to differentiate between representatives of the press and the participants in the

events. Therefore I would recommend issuing to journalists an identification card with an easily discernible designation of the appropriate mass information agency.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize that the Ukase that has been enacted will oppose everyone who encroaches upon the socialist way of life or perestroika. It must be understood that democracy without the observance of legality, and anarchy and permissiveness, are inadmissible under conditions of a law-oriented state.

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Ethnocentrism on Wane as Perestroika Opens up Nationality Workers' Potential

18300006a Tashkent SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
9 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by Rustam Nurullin, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "Relations between the Nations: Status and Problems"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee report to the 19th All-Union Party Conference presented by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev states the following: "One of socialism's greatest achievements has been the alliance forged in our country between equal nations and nationalities. Today this enables us to say with great conviction that henceforth also consistent implementation of Leninist national policy can be the only sound basis for our development

"Life has confirmed the correctness of the idea incorporated in the organization of our great alliance, namely, the constitution and combination of effort have enabled each nation and society as a whole to accelerate its advance sharply toward new frontiers of historical progress. Given all the difficulties that have been encountered along our path, we can state today that the alliance has withstood the test of time. It remains the decisive prerequisite for the further development of all our peoples."

During the 70 years that have elapsed since the October, national oppression, enmity and inequality of the peoples in all their manifestations have been eliminated once and for all in the USSR. Actual equality of the peoples and an upsurge in national self-awareness have been achieved. As a result of the successful struggle against the vestiges of great-power chauvinism and bourgeois nationalism and feudal-clerical ideology and consistent internationalist indoctrination of the masses, the ideas of internationalism and the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples, whose foundation is the common nature of the Soviet peoples' historical destiny, have been affirmed in the consciousness of tens of millions of people. Their brotherhood and kinship have undergone severest trials and have withstood the test of time.

Under present conditions an intensive process of internationalization of the way of life of the country's nations and nationalities is taking place, and this is an objective trend in social development, expressing the process of the growing unity of our peoples and the shaping in them of common social, economic, political, cultural, everyday and spiritual and psychological features in their life activity under the conditions of perestroika and socioeconomic acceleration. The growing internationalization of the foundation of the national and the international in social existence and the culture of the peoples reflects primarily general Soviet features.

Here, internationalization is taking place not along the path of leveling national features but through the increasingly complete use of everything positive in the legacy of each people. V.I. Lenin emphasized that "...unity is not destroyed in what is basic, radical and important, but is insured by diversity" (Complete Collected Works Vol 35, p 203). The interaction of the social and ethnic, the national and the international, the general and the specific has its own particular form of manifestation in the labor, sociopolitical, family-and-domestic and cultural-and-educational spheres of the way of life and in concrete kinds of activity.

In other words, the common nature and the unity of the way of life for the nations and nationalities of the USSR does not mean a leveling of national features in the various kinds and spheres of people's life activity. In economics, for example, national traditions and the skill and production experience gained over the centuries are preserved and utilized, due consideration is given to the natural and climatic conditions prevailing in the republics, and everyday tradition and custom, awareness and psychology inherited from the past are preserved. The international cohesion of the Soviet peoples is now not only one of the most urgent tasks of perestroika and of socioeconomic acceleration, but is also an important factor in guaranteeing them.

The historic achievements of the CPSU and the Soviet state in resolving the national question should not, however, create the impression that there are no problems in national processes or signify the complete and final removal of national problems from the agenda since the very fact of living together and cooperating within a single state made up of a multitude of nations and nationalities inevitably gives rise to new problems and tasks that must be taken into account in party theoretical and practical activity to perfect socialist society. In this connection the CPSU Central Committee report to the 19th All-Union Party Conference emphasizes that in the development of inter-nation relations "it is important to see the whole picture as it is—both the undoubted achievements and the obvious unfinished work, omissions and difficulties associated with the

failure to resolve specific socioeconomic questions, and also with the inability sometimes to link together national and all-union interests.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference paid great attention to questions concerning improvements in international relations; this can be seen from M.S. Gorbachev's report and from the statements made at the conference, and also by the conference's adoption of the special resolution "On Relations between the Nations." It can be said that the party conference marks an important milestone on the path of in-depth analysis, work on theoretical problems and defining practical tasks, and improving inter-nation relations at the present stage. Longer-term prospects in this direction will be outlined by a CPSU Central Committee plenum to be devoted specially to the question of developing inter-nation relations.

The party points out that today it is impossible to approach the analysis of national problems using the old yardsticks, on the principle of propaganda only for the successes in the national policy of the CPSU and Soviet state, or to adjust to real, multifaceted life in the sphere of inter-nation relations using the old abstract forms and schemes.

The fundamental, most significant features of Lenin's teaching on the national question and of Leninist national policy, which are of enduring significance, are exceptionally topical for any theoretical consideration of present-day national processes and practical resolution of the problems arising during the development of the multinational state. First, there is deep historicism—the ability to see the national question in the broad socio-historical context, relying on a knowledge of the fundamental law-governed patterns of social reality and regarding it in its close interconnection with the main trends in the development of the economy, politics and culture. Second, there is the class approach—evaluating progress in inter-nation relations from the standpoint of the struggle for socialism and communism and against social stagnation, conservatism and ethnocentrism. And third, there is principled humanism—orientation on the organic combination of specific interests and common interests, national features and the general human values of civilization and culture, and principled rejection of the ideology and psychology of national egoism, prejudice, and national isolation and exclusivity.

Inter-nation relations constitute a lively process involving the complex interaction of the national and the international, where the old is affirmed in constant struggle against the old, not discarding it in its entirety but renewing, preserving and enriching all that is valuable and positive. Contradictions are inherent in any development, and they are also inevitable in the sphere of inter-nation relations. It is important here to bear in mind that the contradictions persisting in the sphere of inter-nation relations are not antagonistic in nature and that under party leadership they are overcome on an

internationalist, truly democratic basis in the interests of the burgeoning of each nation and nationality and their further rapprochement in the interests of society as a whole; this was emphasized with new force at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

It should be borne in mind that the national problem does not exist in a pure form but includes a set of economic, social-class and spiritual relations that determine the interconnections between peoples. Perestroika in all spheres of the life of Soviet society is also producing profound changes in inter-nation relations. The party takes national factors strictly into account both in the implementation of broad socioeconomic and cultural transformations and in everyday practical activity.

The concept of acceleration assumes an increase in the economic and cultural potential of each nation and each republic and a greater actual contribution from each of them to the all-union wealth. The task is set thus by the party: the contribution of all the national republics and oblasts to progress in the country's unified national economic complex, which constitutes the material base for the friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet peoples and of their international unity and the general spiritual culture, should correspond to their maximum potential.

As a result of consistent implementation of the economic strategy of the party and the Soviet government, improvements in the disposition of production forces, regional specialization and cooperation, and the scheme for economic links and operations, by proceeding from the rational utilization of natural resources and manpower and the climatic features of the republics their economic potential is being built up and the contribution made by the fraternal republics to the all-union economy is increasing.

There are, however, still many unresolved problems and contradictions: parochialism, neglect of general state interests, viewing our economic development only or mainly from the standpoint of some particular republic or region, a low level of labor productivity in some republics, poor growth in the contribution being made by individual republics to the general national economy and so forth. These shortcomings are also seen in Uzbekistan. It was not happenstance that at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee 9th Plenum (January 1988) serious concern was voiced regarding the state of affairs in the republic's national economy, which, as was noted at the plenum, is extremely alarming and unsatisfactory. Results from 1987 showed that the Uzbek SSR is lagging seriously behind the changes taking place in the country. National income growth rates here are three times lower than the all-union level. The average annual growth rates for industrial output have fallen, the decline in the output-capital ratio has not been overcome, and the level of fulfillment of contractual obligations remains one of the lowest in the country. We cannot reconcile

ourselves to the fact that per capita commodity output is four times less than the average for the country. The braking mechanism that has been established in capital construction has not been overcome. The main indicator of the plan—the commissioning of fixed capital—is not being fulfilled, and the proportion of uncompleted construction is growing. And with regard to agriculture, whereas the country's average annual output has risen 9.3 percent as compared to the 11th Five-Year Plan, for us there has even been a decline. From 1970 to 1986 the equipment-worker ratio rose by a factor of 4.1 while gross output from the sector increased only by a factor of 1.5. As a result, the Uzbek SSR's contribution to the all-union economy is not in line with its potential and it is not fully fulfilling its international duty to the fraternal republics.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference pointed out the need for further development and optimization of the interrepublic economic and scientific and technical ties that have been established, more complete realization of the advantages on the all-union division of labor and cooperation in labor, and a scientifically based regional policy. The conference resolution "On Relations between the Nations" emphasizes the following: "One of the central tasks is to create conditions for greater independence for the regions and to implement the kinds of forms of cooperation in which each republic would be interested in improving the final results of its own economic activity as the basis for its own well-being and for increasing the general wealth and might of the Soviet state. Radical economic reform and the process of democratization are opening up broad vistas for combining in an optimal manner the interests both of the national-state formations and of the country as a whole."

One important socioeconomic task closely linked to increasing the contribution made by the Soviet republics to the country's unified national economic complex is active participation by the republics and regions, particularly those with excess manpower, in the opening up of new territories in the country. Some work in this direction is also being done in our republic. Increasing numbers of emissaries from Uzbekistan are taking part in the opening up of regions in Siberia and on the construction sites of the Nonchernozem zone and along the Baykal-Amur Main Railroad Line. In this five-year plan alone, 60,000 Uzbeks will be sent to all-union shock construction sites in the country. However, the contribution being made here by the republic, which has a population of more than 19 million, could be more significant.

At the present stage the CPSU is advancing as an urgent task in national policy equalization of the social structure of the nations and nationalities of the USSR, and to this end providing extensive training for skilled personnel belonging to the indigenous populations in those republics where demographic processes are taking place more rapidly and there is an excess of manpower, particularly in the countryside.

It should be noted that during the years of Soviet power significant results have been achieved in resolving this task. Whereas during the early stages of the building of socialism in the USSR there were nationalities made up mainly of peasants, the structure now mainly achieved for the country's nations and nationalities is more similar, with each having its own working class, kolkhoz peasantry and labor intelligentsia. A major leap forward in accomplishing social homogeneity for the fraternal republics has been achieved in these past decades, particular in regard to the working class—the main bearer of the ideas of internationalism. Whereas in 1939 workers made up 13.3 percent of the working population in Tajikistan, by 1979 the figure was 53.0 percent. Corresponding figures are 18.6 percent and 64.2 percent for Armenia, 20.8 percent and 55.6 percent for Georgia, 21.9 percent and 57.8 percent for Kirghizia, 22.8 percent and 55.8 percent for Belorussia, 26.2 percent and 44.2 percent for Turkmenia, 26.3 percent and 59.6 percent for Azerbaijan, and so forth.

This progressive process of improvement in society's social structure has also taken place intensively in Uzbekistan. During this same period the proportion of workers among the working population in the republic grew from 19.9 percent to 52.9 percent. According to the 1979 All-Union Census, 75.2 percent of the Uzbek SSR's population was made up of workers and employees, with 24.7 percent kolkhoz peasantry and cooperative handicraft workers, against corresponding figures of 32.2 percent and 64.9 percent in 1939.

Despite the considerable growth of the working class among the population, in terms of this indicator our republic lies in 13th place for the country. Uzbekistan is lagging particularly in terms of the proportion of national cadres in the working class, even though much has been done recently to resolve this problem. In the period 1973 through 1983 alone the numerical strength of workers of indigenous nationality (Uzbeks) employed was as follows: in industry, growing to 51.1 percent, in construction, to 46.5 percent, in transport, to 38.6 percent, in communications, to 40.8 percent. Notwithstanding, the proportion of workers of indigenous nationality among the industrial working class is significantly lower than the proportion of Uzbeks in the population, namely, 45.7 percent and 68.7 percent (1983 figures). In this connection the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee 5th Plenum (March 1987) noted that the process "of forming an industrial working class from persons of indigenous nationality" is taking place only slowly, and it outlined measures to expand training for national cadres of the working class, including training in vocational and technical schools in the RSFSR and the Ukraine. Several thousand young men and women from Uzbekistan are now mastering working professions there.

Reflecting more fully the international essence of Soviet statehood in the forms of its organization and function is numbered among the very important problems in further

improving inter-nation relations in the USSR. In his report to the 19th All-Union Party Conference M.S. Gorbachev noted that "we must also consider questions of inter-nation relations within the context of the present stage in the development of the Soviet multinational state. It is necessary to generalize the experience that we have gained and make use of all that is of value, and at the same time reveal what needs to be discarded."

During the time that it has existed the land of the soviets has gained enormous experience in creating and developing the national statehood of peoples and in organizing their life together, along with fraternal cooperation as part of a multinational all-union state.

The People's Commissariat for Nationalities was established as part of the first Soviet government to provide leadership in national processes. A similar body was formed in April 1918 as part of the government of the Turkestan Republic. Created in line with V.I. Lenin's idea, at the will of the people, the Soviet federation, based on voluntariness and equality, was able to embrace all the diversity of the everyday life, culture and economy of the different nations and nationalities in the country and it provided an opportunity for them to combine their national interests harmoniously with general state interests and establish peaceful fraternal cooperation between the Soviet peoples. The Soviet Federation has successfully withstood the test of time.

In step with the socioeconomic, political and cultural development of the national Soviet state formations, during the course of the building of socialism many of them were transformed from autonomous oblasts into autonomous republics, while autonomous republics became all-union republics. Thus, in line with the national state boundaries, in 1924 fraternal Tajikistan was an autonomous republic within the Uzbek SSR, and it became an all-union republic in 1929; Kirghizia was initially an autonomous oblast within the RSFSR and then in 1926 became an ASSR, and in 1936 an all-union republic; Kazakhstan was first proclaimed as an autonomous republic within the RSFSR in 1920 and became an all-union republic in 1936; in line with the national state boundaries for the Central Asian republics, Karakalpak came into being as an autonomous oblast within the Kazakh ASSR and then in 1932 became an autonomous republic within the RSFSR, and in 1936 as part of the Uzbek SSR.

During the Twenties great attention was paid to the representatives of nonindigenous nationalities living in the republics. When the national state boundaries were drawn a committee was set up under the Uzbek SSR Revolutionary Committee to handle the affairs of national minorities; following the constituent session of the Uzbek SSR soviets (Bukhara, February 1925) it was renamed the Central Commission for the Affairs of National Minorities, and it operated under the Uzbek SSR Central Executive Committee of the Soviets with the rights of a department. Together with other matters,

the competence of this body also covered "presenting its ideas to the Uzbek SSR Central Executive Committee on dividing regions with one predominant nationality as separate regions, with official matters handled in the native language of the majority population in any given region." With the active involvement of the commission in the spring of 1927 a total of 10 national regions and 240 minority rural soviets were set up.

The rich experience gained in the first years of Soviet power by the Uzbek SSR and by the country as a whole in national state development and in leading inter-nation processes is worth in-depth study and generalization with a view to its possible use, giving due consideration, of course, to the present level of political, socioeconomic and spiritual development in the national regions and the status of inter-nation relations.

During the period of the personality cult these and many other important measures in the field of national state development in general, implemented in Uzbekistan and the other multinational republics in the country, were buried in oblivion. Essentially their planned resolution through appropriate party and soviet organs exercising leadership in national processes was brought to naught. Even during the years of stagnation the state of affairs in the field of leadership of these processes did not improve. In its resolution "On Relations between the Nations" the 19th All-Union Party Conference noted that "the dynamism inherent in the initial stage in the formation of the multinational state of soviets was largely lost and undermined through deviation from Leninist principles in national policy, violations of legality during the period of personality cult, and the ideology and psychology of stagnation." In the recent past, both in the country and within the republic proper attention has not been paid to managing the processes of inter-nation interaction and there has been no well-devised and planned line in this field. For years and for decades the contradictions arising in the sphere of inter-nation relations have not been resolved. Recent events connected with inter-nation relations show that these questions must be held constantly in view by both republic and all-union organs, and that there must be timely intervention in the problems arising and becoming exacerbated in the sphere of inter-nation relations; they must be resolved in a carefully weighed and Leninist manner, without setting great hopes in letting things drift and without bringing issues to crisis situations. It was emphasized at the 19th All-Union Party Conference that "the associated problems must be resolved by relying on the will of the people and their mutual agreement, and taking into account the interests of all Soviet people."

Since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and the 27th CPSU Congress the party Central Committee and Soviet government have achieved a real turnabout in attitudes toward leadership in inter-nation processes. At the all-union level and in a number of the republics special subdivisions have been set up in the central committees, together with standing commissions

on questions of inter-nation relations. The 19th All-Union Party Conference deemed it advisable to set up within the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the supreme soviets of the all-union and autonomous republics, and in the local soviets as necessary, standing commissions on questions of inter-nation relations, and it also proposed an examination of the question of setting up a special state body to deal with nationality affairs and inter-nation relations.

As a result of the rapid development in integration processes the composition of the republics has become more multinational. In each of them, in addition to the nationality from which its name is taken, the representatives of dozens of other nations and nationalities live. According to figures from the 1979 All-Union Census, more than 50 million people, or almost 20 percent of Soviet citizens, are living in republics where the majority of the population is made up of people of other nationalities. In 8 of the 15 union republics the population of nonindigenous nationalities makes up more than one-fourth of the population, while in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia and most of the autonomous republics the nonindigenous population accounts for more than half of the inhabitants.

Thus, for example, according to the 1979 census figures, in Uzbekistan, in addition to Uzbeks, which make up 68.7 percent of the population, there are Karakalpaks (1.9 percent), Russians (10.8 percent), Tatars (4.2 percent), Kazakhs (4.0 percent), Tajiks (3.9 percent), Koreans (1.1 percent), and Kirghiz (0.9 percent). More than 20 percent of all Tajiks, about 40 percent of Koreans, about 10 percent of Kazakhs and more than 10 percent of Tatars, including most of the Crimean Tatars, live in the republic.

The party points out the need strictly to insure proper representation in party and state organs for all the nationalities living in the republic, and to take into account their specific needs in the field of language, literature and everyday life. These party demands were reiterated with particular force at the 19th All-Union Party Conference: "Within the framework of the structure put in place for the all-union state, maximum consideration must be given to the interests of each nation and nationality and of the entire community of Soviet peoples."

In Uzbekistan the line is being consistently pursued to improve inter-nation relations and give due consideration to national factors in party, soviet, economic, social and cultural development in Uzbekistan. These matters were discussed specially at the March and June 1988 meetings of the central committee bureau.

Strict steps are being taken to insure that the composition of leading cadres and of elected organs reflects the national structure in the republic. The schedule for the party committees includes representatives of 57 nationalities, and in 70 percent of the party committees the

first and second secretaries are people of different nationalities. The deputies to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet represent 19 nationalities, while the local soviets represent citizens of more than 50 nations and nationalities. The extent to which workers on non-Uzbek nationality are represented in the elected organs can be seen in the example of the Tajiks: 12 of them are deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet and more than 4,100 have been elected to local soviets of people's deputies. The schedule for the central committee contains 44 persons of Tajik nationality, while the schedules for the party obkoms and raykoms include 438 and 1,686 persons respectively.

The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and Uzbek government are doing a great deal to take into account to the maximum the specific spiritual needs of the peoples living in the republic. Teaching in schools in the republic is conducted in five or six languages, as are radio and television broadcasts and the newspapers. A new form of work to improve inter-nation relations has recently emerged in our region, whereby meetings are held with delegations from neighboring republics, headed by their leaders (for example, between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) in order to clarify existing problems in this sphere and devise ways to solve them jointly.

Despite the enormous achievements in developing and mutually enriching the socialist cultures of the country's nations and nationalities, in this field, too, by no means all opportunities are being utilized. The party sets the task of persistently revealing the new forms and work methods that most fully meet present-day requirements and make it possible to make the mutual enrichment of the national cultures even more fruitful, and to give all Soviet people even greater access to all that is best from the culture of each of our peoples. The party demands a solicitous attitude toward the cultural legacy of each people, and toward the national values of other peoples, respect for their traditions, language, national sentiments and customs, and that the best that has been created by each people during the process of its historical development be adopted.

It was emphasized at the CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum that "true internationalism and true friendship of the peoples are possible only given profound respect for the dignity, honor, culture, language and history of each people and through extensive dealings between them. We must promote in every possible way a further expansion of contacts between the national cultures and their mutual enrichment, upsurge and burgeoning."

A solicitous attitude toward the spiritual legacy of each people, however, has nothing in common either with sociohistorical and esthetic omnivorousness or even less with any attempt to claim that fragments of outdated bourgeois, feudal, tribal and patriarchal spiritual and

behavioral standards are "popular" or "national." Party documents tirelessly stress that a healthy interest in everything of value found in each national culture should not give rise to attempts to distract from the objective process of the interaction and rapprochement of the national cultures.

The significance of an in-depth knowledge of the Russian language, which has become an integral part of the Soviet way of life and serves as a powerful means for consolidating the inter-nation dealings of the country's peoples, is growing immeasurably in resolving the tasks of socioeconomic acceleration and the further burgeoning and rapprochement of the spiritual culture of the country's nations and nationalities. Bilingualism in the national and Russian languages is the main direction in linguistic development in the USSR, and this was emphasized with new force in the documents of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The resolution "On Relations between the Nations" points out that "all conditions should be created for national-Russian bilingualism to be developed harmoniously and naturally, giving due consideration to the special features of each region, and it should be free from formalism."

While noting the considerable achievements in Russian-language studies by citizens of non-Russian nationality, including in our republic, at the same time it must be said that there are still many shortcomings and unresolved problems in this important matter. The shortage of Russian-language teachers in the national schools is acutely felt; in many schools, particularly those located in rural areas, no serious knowledge is being imparted in this subject. As a result, a significant proportion of those graduating from the schools, particularly rural schools, show no in-depth knowledge of the Russian language, which adversely affects their subsequent training and production activity and their mastery of military matters when they do their service in the ranks of the Soviet Army.

Simultaneously with extensive study of Russian by citizens of non-Russian nationality it would be most desirable for the representatives of other nationalities, primarily children and young people, to gain in-depth knowledge of the language of the indigenous population in any given republic. While being an act of social justice, their knowledge of the language, history, culture and customs and traditions of the indigenous population at the same time improves interpersonal relations and helps in adaptation to the foreign ethnic environment. Unfortunately, work in study of the languages of the indigenous populations living in the republics, including our republic, by the representatives of other nationalities remains wretched.

As already noted, one outstanding achievement of the Soviet state in the field of resolving the national question is the growth in the national self-awareness of the peoples, which is never shaped by itself. Its development is predetermined by the socioeconomic conditions and the

moral and psychological climate in society. However, the growth of national self-awareness can under certain conditions, particularly when international indoctrination is weak, lead to the development of nationalistic trends. The 19th All-Union Party Conference noted that "the development of our multinational state is naturally accompanied by a growth in national self-awareness. This phenomenon is positive, but since proper attention is not always paid to the new demands that arise along with it, certain questions have started to become complicated and in a number of cases acquire a nationalistic coloring."

In the shaping of the socialist, internationalist way of life under the conditions prevailing in a multinational country or republic, special importance attaches to work with the creative intelligentsia, which is the bearer of the ideas of national self-awareness and exerts an active influence on its formation. The 19th All-Union Party Conference resolution "On Relations between the Nations" notes that "the general climate of inter-nation relations depends largely on its civic maturity and depth of understanding of the vital interests of its own nation and of society as a whole."

The party is calling for a consistent struggle to be waged against anything that interferes with the rapprochement of the nations and the internationalization of all aspects of life in Soviet society—any manifestations of parochialism, attempts to distract from the objective process of the interaction and rapprochement of the national cultures or the desire of individual scholars and men of letters to idealize the feudal past in their work or depict religious-nationalistic and religious vestiges in idyllic tones that are at variance with our Marxist-Leninist internationalist ideology and the socialist way of life—and for a principled struggle to be waged against national narrow-mindedness and arrogance and nationalism and chauvinism. The 19th All-Union Party Conference resolution "On Relations between the Nations" emphasizes that "any aspiration toward national seclusion can lead only to economic and spiritual impoverishment."

The greatest achievement of the socialist way of life is the internationalism of the Soviet people, which has been transformed from an ideal of communists into a profound conviction and the behavioral standard for millions of Soviet people. While noting the undoubted successes of the Soviet Union in the international indoctrination of the masses, at the same time they should not be excessively exaggerated for there are still many shortcomings and problems; which can be seen from the well-known events in Alma-Ata, the Baltic and Nagorno-Karabakh and neighborhood. The years of stagnation also favored the revival of vestiges and prejudices of a nationalistic kind. Vestiges of the past are particularly persistent and tenacious wherever the resolution of sociocultural problems is neglected, insufficient attention is paid to the social sphere, and work is weak in the international indoctrination of the masses.

National motives are sometimes exploited by various extremists. Abusing glasnost and democracy, they try to depict themselves as spokesmen for public opinion, defenders of the national dignity and guardians of the historical legacy, and even—in the spirit of the times—as fighters for perestroika. At the 19th All-Union Party Conference it was pointed out that trying to bring people of different nationalities into conflict and sow the seeds of discord and enmity between them means incurring a heavy liability to one's own people and to socialist society, not to mention the law. Any actions disuniting the nations and nationalities objectively hamper the process of democratization and the cause of perestroika and they should be regarded as morally intolerable and at variance with the interests of the Soviet state.

The party points to the need constantly to see the problems arising in the field of inter-nation relations and the aspects and boundaries of those relations, and thoughtfully to seek out new approaches and take immediate steps to find solutions for the questions that life poses. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Work of the Kazakh Republic Party Organization in the International and Patriotic Indoctrination of the Workers" emphasizes that "today, when the revolutionary processes of renewal are affecting all aspects of life in society, the prompt resolution of problems arising in the sphere of national relations is acquiring particularly great importance. Any manifestation of chauvinism or nationalism and of national seclusion or arrogance should be regarded as an infringement on the greatest gain of socialism—the fraternal friendship of the peoples and the international unity of Soviet society."

Epidemics of nationalism can be successfully opposed only by consistent and steadfast internationalism. In order to avoid nationalism and chauvinism it is essential to stand firmly on the class positions of the equality of workers of all nationalities and to think not just about one's own nation but place the interests of all of them above everything. National interests must be defended not from the positions of disuniting the peoples but on the contrary, from their international brotherhood. The firmest guarantee against any manifestations of nationalism is the consistent and complete socialist democracy with regard to relations between the country's people that lies at the basis of party national policy.

In his report to the 19th All-Union Party Conference M.S. Gorbachev emphasized the following: "We see socialism as a system of full equality for all nations and nationalities and their social and spiritual burgeoning and mutual enrichment, where there is no place for any kind of manifestation of discord between peoples or nationalist and chauvinist prejudices, where internationalism and the brotherhood of the peoples triumph."

Journal Cites Abortion Statistics, Costs, Need for Alternatives

18300012 Moscow *OGONEK* in Russian No 33,
13-20 Aug 88 pp 18-19

[Article by Candidate of Medical Sciences Andrey Popov, under the rubric "I Ask to Speak": "When There Is No Choice"]

[Text] When I was a student, while taking a course in obstetrics and gynecology I met an unusual woman in a Moscow gynecological hospital. It was in the abortion division, and she had come in for the performance of a manipulation colloquially known as "purging." The woman was wearing a white blouse and a Pioneer tie.

It was understandable that, having come for the first time to an "adult" institution, she was formally dressed. Later I learned that such cases were not unusual. In scientific terms they are referred to as the problem of the pregnancy of juveniles and teenagers, and they are an extremely acute problem in our present-day health care.

Let us look at the statistics: they do not know everything, but they know a great deal. For every 100 women from ages 15 to 20, there are 30 abortions, and by age 20, one in every six women has gone through at least one abortion. That is how things are in Moscow, and in general approximately 70 to 80 percent of all first pregnancies among urban women, and about 90 percent of all among rural women end in out-of-hospital abortions.

A second recollection, from student practice. A course in forensic medicine. In the course of a week, several infant corpses. The case happened in winter, and they had all been picked up somewhere in a park in Sokolniki or Izmaylovo. A woman would go out to walk with her baby and return home alone.

The problem of family planning—that is how scientists refer to what in the ordinary mind is linked only with abortions and searches for coils of the proper size. And sometimes with giving up children, infanticide, secondary postabortion infertility, fear of untimely pregnancy, extramarital childbirth, and a great deal else.

And now let us take a look at how the World Health Organization understands family planning. It is the activity of individuals and families aimed at giving birth only to the desired number of children and only at a time that is convenient for the parents. In short, it is a matter of responsible parenthood planned by the family (and only by it!). Naturally, such family planning also implies prevention of the birth of children who are unwanted at a given moment.

The right of parents freely and responsibly to decide the time of bearing children and the number of children in a family is specially stipulated in Art. 16 of the Declaration of the International Conference on Human Rights,

which the Soviet Union, among other countries, signed in 1968 in Teheran. In order to ensure this right, we pledged to provide the public with reliable information, birth-control devices and medical assistance in family planning. 20 years have passed. To all intents and purposes, the promised reliable information, birth-control devices and medical care come down solely to the performance of abortions. But no, not just to that. They also include the systematic and consistent frightening of women with the prospect of abortion and propaganda concerning the harmfulness of abortion.

Only what is the point of frightening them?! Our women are already afraid, as it is. But where is the alternative? Is it often that our women, even in popular articles and brochures, not to mention real life with its real pharmacies, uninformed district doctors and incompetent partners, are offered a decent alternative to the unquestionably harmful abortion? Do our women have a real opportunity to choose between the unquestionably harmful abortion and less harmful birth-control methods?

Here are the figures. According to estimates of the World Health Organization, every year about 30 million abortions are performed worldwide, of which nearly 8 million are in the USSR. So one in every four abortions in the world is ours, a Soviet abortion, although the USSR's share of the world population is only 5-6 percent.

The USSR has the world's highest abortion rate. It is two to four times as high as in the European socialist countries, and six to 10 times as high as in the economically developed capitalist countries. However, let us try to be precise: In actuality, we have far more abortions, if you count the out-of-hospital ones. To call them criminal is absurd; after all, it was correctly stated during debates in the GDR parliament about revoking the ban on abortions: "The law that makes nearly 900,000 women criminals every year is no law." So, according to specialists' conservative estimates, out-of-hospital abortions amount to 50 percent of registered abortions; according to maximum estimates, they amount to 80-100 percent. So if you take out-of-hospital abortions into account, it is not one in 10, but one in five of our women of childbearing age who has an abortion every year!

But that is still not an entirely truthful and accurate picture: at the least, it is incorrect to compare the figures for "our" and "their" abortions. In one case, they are primarily mini-abortions, invariably with anesthesia, which spare women the most. Our country's version is different—they are the widely used curettage or the process of suction followed by curettage, which is still being put into practice, but by no means necessarily with anesthesia. By no means everyone has sufficient anesthetics.

How did it all come about this way? The story began back in 1936, when at the same time the law banning abortions was adopted, all scientific and practical work

on disseminating birth-control devices in the country was virtually halted. The historical and social context of that decision is interesting and extremely instructive. The state desperately needed manpower and potential soldiers, and the birth rate had started to noticeably drop. A solution was found that was lying right "on the surface": to simultaneously ban abortions and, to all intents and purposes, birth-control devices. Incidentally, in the 1920s our country had been a world leader in the area of family planning.

Whereas abortions were once again permitted in 1956, birth-control devices have never yet had their legitimate rights restored, although strictly speaking no one every banned them.

How can one characterize the birth-control devices that we use today. Relatively ineffective, relatively unavailable, and harmful to the health of partners—80 percent of the population uses such methods and devices. Incidentally, in those respects they differ little from the ones that existed and were used in the 1930s, and they are even called traditional. So, as figures obtained in special research show, in the largest cities accidental pregnancies amount to 50 percent of all pregnancies. However, among women using traditional contraception, and they are in the majority, unwanted pregnancies amount to as much as 80 percent!

Naturally, people quickly grow disenchanted with such "effective" contraceptives. And here are the results: one in every four women in Moscow prefers the episodic bother of an abortion to the fear of untimely pregnancy and the inconvenience associated with the use of traditional birth-control methods and devices.

And where are modern, effective birth-control devices?

If you take the level of need of the RSFSR population as 100 percent, in 1980 this need was met by only 25 percent. That means that three of four women left pharmacies with an awareness of the difficulties of life but without any products. If one is to be more exact and not rely on indiscriminate averages, only 20 percent of the women customers were able to obtain male condoms, only 2 percent (this is not an error—two women in 100!) were able to obtain pastes and other chemical agents; 50 percent were able to obtain coils; and 20 percent were able to obtain birth-control pills. But that is an average, and in actuality the 25-percent level of satisfaction of the needs of the RSFSR's population breaks down into a 75-percent level in Moscow and a 5-percent level in Krasnoyarsk Kray. A truly Russian sweep, but with one qualification: there is no abundance in the more sparsely populated places, as folk wisdom would have it.

And here are even more impressive figures. If we calculate the number of birth-control devices sold in 1980-1982 per 100 women of childbearing age, we get a vivid and expressive illustration of the realities of our women's life. Throughout the RSFSR, on the average,

these 100 women customers of ours bought five packages of birth-control pills and three coils, and their partners had the opportunity to use 450 condoms. Let's figure it out: those five packages would have been just enough for one woman for six months, while the coils would have lasted two years, but only for three lucky owners. As for the condoms, according to rough but unquestionably scientific and verified figures, they would have sufficed for three to four partners for a year. In sum, we were able to satisfy the needs of somewhere around 10 women. And what, one wonders, were the remaining 90 women to do? We know the solution—abortions, premarital and extramarital childbirth, the giving up of children, unwanted and unloved children, infanticide and a great deal more that is unknown to the Ministry of Health but well known to the ministries of internal affairs and social security.

So we are coming to the conclusion that abortion is the basic means of family planning in our country, and in that sense our country is unique, even on a worldwide scale. And the claim concerning the optional nature of abortion and birth-control devices is a very lofty scientific abstraction that has little relation to the real life of our women.

However, fortunately, this problem in all of its dramatic grandeur is rarely recognized by our obstetrician-gynecologists. Fortunately, because physicians cannot always resist the temptation to cut through this knot of problems with a single stroke. That is what happened in the case of the ban on abortions.

That is what could happen right now—let us look at the article "I Pledge Not to Claim My Rights" (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 9 December 1986). A public concerned over the problem of the refusal of children turns to the RSFSR Ministry of Health for explanations. "The problem of 'refused' children is not just a moral but a medical problem," it is explained to them. "We talk about it a great deal, but so far the discussions have remained only discussions," complains A. G. Grachev, deputy minister for children. Unquestionably, you won't help the problem with discussions alone, but what are the doctors arguing in favor of? "We have petitioned the republic Ministry of Justice to include in its plan for the drafting of legislative acts a draft Ukase of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the mandatory examination of men and women who are to be married, medical and hygienic consultations, and the mandatory use of medical means to prevent the pregnancy of women who are alcoholics and drug addicts."

So that's how it is. Although the correspondent has a "dual" impression, "everyone understands the importance of the problem," and therefore, "we must address it without delay," but "so far little has been done in a practical sense," and therefore, "let us finally move from wishes to action."

Unquestionably, it is long past time to move on to actual deeds. But what deeds? I hope that what was being proposed was not sterilization elevated to the status of law? Not eugenics on a statewide scale?

I want very much to know whether officials at the Ministry of Health recognize that there are historical precedents for that sort of solution of such problems, and how dangerous they are. After all, such laws would bury what V. I. Lenin called the "elementary democratic rights of a male and female citizen," which he called on to be protected.

But what is the way out? Only the organization of a family-planning service under democratic public supervision by a Soviet Association of Family Planning. Only the prevention of unwanted pregnancies and abortions on the basis of the wide dissemination of modern, highly effective birth-control devices.

But there is a hitch here, too. Does everyone have an interest in such prevention? Maybe it does not sound entirely tactful, but one must not forget the fact that for many obstetrician-gynecologists the performance of abortions has traditionally been a stable and substantial form of supplementary earnings. And discussions of the ethics and medical ethics of the Soviet physician will not help matters here. Our women do not pay 50 to 100 rubles each for birth-control, especially primary birth-control, and not for their health and, especially, not for the public health. In that case women pay obstetrician-gynecologists for the procedures that are inescapable in a situation that those same obstetrician-gynecologists have shaped and are supporting today. And why not complain, in this connection, about the difficulties of life, the unreasonableness of the population, and the fact that "we tried"?

The obstetrician-gynecologists really did try and are trying to this day. A rare year passes without a meeting of the collegium and another order of the Ministry of Health regarding the continued and steadfast struggle against abortions.

Of course it is true that not all physicians make money on abortions. Most physicians are no less indignant and upset than you and I over the existing situation. Nonetheless, the ministry of Health has its own occupational, departmental interest. The problem is that, according to estimates known to specialists, nearly half of our obstetrician-gynecologists are employed solely in the performance of abortions. Nearly half of the 60,000-strong army of Soviet obstetrician-gynecologists, which incidentally is the largest in the world. Moreover, approximately one-third of all beds in obstetrical-gynecological hospitals are occupied solely for abortions (and this is in a situation where there is a shortage of beds for abortions!), and women's consultations regarding abortions account for about 50 percent of all visits! Imagine: on the average, each district gynecologist performs two to three abortions a day! Another fact: since outlays for

the performance of one abortion come to nearly 100 rubles, annual expenditures for abortions throughout the USSR as a whole can be estimated at nearly 1 billion rubles. Information for nonspecialists: this sum amounts to one-twentieth of the USSR's total annual health-care budget! So we spend one in every twenty medical rubles for abortions. Enough examples?

It now becomes understandable why, say, we occupy 50th place in the world in terms of our infant-mortality rate, and why our infant-mortality rate is three to four times as high as not just the European average but the average of all economically developed countries in the world. Everything turns out to be very simple. Our obstetrician-gynecologists have no time to concern themselves with other problems, and they don't have much money left either, after abortions.

This is precisely why it would be no exaggeration to claim that the Ministry of Health's obstetrical-gynecological service presently represents a well-organized and large-scale system for performing abortions and subsequently combating their consequences. And the problem by no means lies in the malfeasance of individual physicians. No, it is far more serious: This is a matter of the existing system for providing medical care to the public.

The idea of establishing a special family-planning service that would operate on the basis of cost accounting and would undertake the solution of a whole complex of problems—from informing the public about the possibilities and advantages of modern birth-control devices, to, say, inserting coils and prescribing birth-control pills—is not a new one. But so far the Ministry of Health has blocked the solution of this problem; after all, it is, to all intents and purposes, a question of an alternative and more effective system for providing medical care to the public. Where, one wonders, do you order the Ministry of Health after that to deploy its army of specialists?

But the establishment of a specialized, unified, self-financed family-planning service is inevitable. At the

same time, it is necessary to establish a Soviet Family-Planning Association, which would be a form of democratic public supervision of the activities of this family service and would prevent it from turning into a traditional Ministry of Health system for the performance of abortions. Such family-planning associations and services, incidentally, exist in every country in the world that pretends to a certain degree of civilization.

Of course, abortions would also be performed within the framework of such a service. Only, being organized according to the principles of a cost-accounting-based research and production association, such a service would perform them at its own expense, and not at the expense of the state budget. And if that was reflected in the doctors' earnings, such a service would be the only one in the Ministry of Health's system that had a real stake in preventing abortions.

Actually, we have everything: resources, personnel, money, organizational structures, and even prepared detailed draft plans for the service, and even a charter for the association. We need "only" to reorient the Ministry of Health's obstetrical-gynecological service from the performance of abortions to their prevention. But the whole problem lies in that "only."

There is much work ahead. The medical journals have been publishing editorials on restructuring in health care. One wishes very much that deeds would follow words, and the public would be given the real opportunity not just to have abortions performed but to utilize in the practice of family planning modern birth-control devices, information, and qualified medical care.

Only then will it be possible to speak of deliberate parenthood, and only then will pregnant teenagers, women who are infertile following abortions, and children cast to the whims of fate become things of the past.

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Organizers of Latvian Popular Front Defend Movement

18000066 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIA in Russian
6 Oct 88 p 2

[Round table discussion at LATINFORM by I. Bisher, doctor of juridical sciences; Professor E. Melkisis, doctor of juridical sciences; Ya. Shkapars, man of letters; and V. Steshenko, journalist: "The Main Goal Is Consolidation: There Is No Reasonable Alternative"]

[Text] The "round table" session at LATINFORM was devoted to problems associated with the creation of the Popular Front in the republic. Participating in the discussion were members of the organizing committee of the founding congress of the Latvian Popular Front (LPF)—I. Bisher, doctor of juridical science; Professor E. Melkisis, doctor of juridical sciences; Ya. Shkapars, man of letters; and V. Steshenko, journalist.

[V. Steshenko] Lately, I have had the chance to speak at labor collectives fairly often. I will say right out that the attitude towards the LPF is by no means not clear. There are apprehensions, will the Popular Front become another controlling organization, something like the people's control which has lost prestige? Or, as some people ask, is a new party being created under the guise of the LPF?

[I. Bisher] I have also had occasion to hear such an opinion. Some even claimed that those who joined the Popular Front had to leave the Communist Party. But here we are, four communists who have gathered together, concerned about how to help our party and perestroika and to clear it of conservative forces, or at least of their influence. The LPF does not claim the role of a party. And if we talk about our candidates in elections, this is not at all to put them against the candidates nominated by party bodies and other social organizations. We will support all honest people who are capable and willing to express the will of the people.

[E. Melkisis] The people today support the party policy. Here is where they have doubts: there are many words, but not many deeds. Although I do not want to say that nothing has been done. The political system is being restructured; but in the economy, at the store counters, the changes are not those we are expecting.

Perestroika began from the top, and it must be supported from the bottom. The masses must be involved in the practical activities. This will also be one of the tasks of the LPF.

The question is raised: Will the Popular Front add even 1 kilogram of meat? The question is very important, but hardly must be stated in this way. We know that up to one-third of all agricultural products perish. An example was cited that over the course of 2 years, 25,000 tons of meat products spoiled. Perhaps under these conditions we can task the peasants: Give us more meat! We must

bring about order, and if the management apparatus is unable to do this, the people must look for new organizational forms. The Popular Front, as a large uniting force, could concentrate popular initiative so perestroika proceeds more quickly, more decisively, and affects all levels of management.

There is a braking mechanism. And we must take this into account and mobilize everyone to eliminate shortcomings. In my opinion, one of the most principal methods of the Popular Front is glasnost, glasnost, and glasnost—so the people can judge everything that is being done in the name of the people. Then the bureaucrats will look at things differently, because glasnost is a very sharp weapon.

[Ya. Shkapars] I agree with you. The Popular Front is pressure from below. If the masses will step up their activities, there will be greater changes. The Popular Front is being created so that restructuring is done radically and consistently. We have already had enough reorganizations. And they all have died away. They died away because they all became lost in a bunch of words, phrases, and slogans. If we really do not make some radical, consistent changes now, the people will lose hope and faith. We need radical changes. Otherwise we will perish simply as a state, as a system. If we do not use this last chance, then it will be very difficult for us in the future.

I believe that economic changes are impossible without consistent democratic changes. All the fears that the LPF will confront the party have no grounds whatsoever.

[E. Melkisis] Our greatest shortcoming is the separation between words and deeds. The ideals were splendid, and the people supported them. The fought for them. But the gap continued to increase between the state and the people, between the apparatus and the masses. And here the Popular Front could now become the link between ideals and the popular masses who are drawn into this movement.

[I. Bisher] This gap gave to great apathy on the part of the popular masses. Perestroika is an attempt to get the people involved in government by the people and to use all the levers of democracy which we had created but, unfortunately, operated formally and were replaced by illusory conformity of ideas. But behind their back and at home, the people said just the opposite.

[E. Melkisis] Indeed, it is written in our Constitution that the power belongs to the people. But how has it actually turned out? The power sort of spoke on behalf of the people and in the interests of the people, but the people themselves participated in this conditionally.

[V. Steshenko] That is to say, the people were alienated from power.

[E. Melkisis] The Popular Front is one form of direct democracy, involving people in solving social and state matters. The 27th CPSU Congress emphasized that we must also develop direct democracy.

[Ya. Shkapars] We must actually set our state on its feet. You see, earlier we proceeded from what instructions we received from above. And very often they did not know the pain of the people and did not react to it. It seemed too small compared to the large-scale decisions of the "top." Now we must turn to the very complex, difficult and actually critical problems of the people.

[V. Steshenko] Among others, they ask this tricky question: Will you yourselves ride in black Volgas? Will the Popular Front become a bureaucratic organization of talkers?

[E. Melkisis] This is a very important question. When we were working on the draft charter and program, we gave much thought to how to avoid this danger. We tried to put into the charter those principles which would not make it possible for us to become bureaucrats. Thus, all decisions are made by a two-thirds vote. The governing apparatus works on a voluntary basis; no officials will be exempt, only a small number of technical personnel. The duma [representative assembly] and board are re-elected at each congress. Whereas now there is a 10-year term for an elected position according to state and party policy, in the Popular Front it is a 2-year term. In addition, the board will not have a permanent chairman. In my view, these principles protect us to the maximum against the possibility of becoming a bureaucratic organization.

[Ya. Shkapars] There is another aspect: There must be criticism from below so the entire Popular Front thinks about how to solve existing problems. If people in the localities feel that some questions are not being resolved, even individual members of the Popular Front could raise them before the duma and board.

The various work forms of the LPF are defined in the draft charter. We think that the main path for carrying out the tasks of the LPF is through the deputies which, supporting the policy of the Popular Front, will monitor the work of the apparatus which has actually operated without monitoring up to the present time. We will offer our assistance to any deputy, providing our conclusions, expert assessments and suggestions.

[V. Steshenko] Today there are quite a few monitoring institutions, and the doubts of people who hope that the front will lead the people to concrete deeds are understandable. People today have become tired of talk and, to put it mildly, tired of the disorder in production and in agriculture.

[Ya. Shkapars] The LPF must not take the administrative path. The people have a great creative potential, which up to now we have not used. Here is a specific example. The draft of social and economic development

of the republic to the year 2005 was recently published. This was the government's proposal. As a result of the initiative of the popular masses, several alternative drafts emerged. It seems to me that developing alternative solutions for the most important questions makes it possible for the Supreme Soviet to work up an optimal solution.

[V. Steshenko] The charters of similar fronts in socialist countries recognize the leading role of the party. Workers ask: Why do your documents not assign this role to the party which has begun perestroika? Some groups allegedly even declare opposition to the party.

[E. Melkisis] The leading role of the party is recorded. There is no doubts about this, and this is reflected in the first paragraph of the draft charter and in the draft program: The LPF structures its work based on the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference. But this does not mean that every party worker and every party organization can lead the Popular Front. You see, it was also stated at the conference that a number of party organizations had lagged behind life and are out of step with perestroika. We are all communists and have joined the Popular Front in order to defend the party policy and perestroika. The documents also state that we are working within the framework of the Constitution, where the role of the party is recorded. But if we write, as some suggest, "under the leadership of party organizations," what would we do in those real cases in which some party organization secretaries relate to the Popular Front with distrust? Some have even suggested expelling from the party those who have joined the Popular Front.

[V. Steshenko] I think that those sentiments will diminish after the well-known decision of the LaSSR Communist Party Central Committee Buro, which criticized such positions.

[Ya. Shkapars] We must take into consideration the fact that there is a braking mechanism, bureaucratic manifestations which have not gone past party bodies and a number of party workers. But since we set the task to implement the decisions of the 19th Party Conference and not to manipulate democracy, there probably will be conflict situations with some party organizations whose activities contradict perestroika.

[V. Steshenko] The Latvian intelligentsia became the author of the draft program and charter. As a result of an increase in national self-consciousness, perestroika has sort of been given an additional catalyst. But this has met with a cautious attitude of many Russians and representatives of other nationalities living in the republic. There is no need to rush to condemn them for this. You see, indeed, the specific interests of the Latvian people, naturally, are embodied most vividly in the documents. The interests of other peoples do not have such thorough elaboration. Neither those nor other interests have antagonistic contradictions. This balancing is absolutely necessary. Otherwise the system can any way it wants.

The republic's Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has shown an example of how this balancing can be accomplished. This involves the status of the Latvian language. I had the opportunity to become familiar with the proposals of a working group. They contained nothing reprehensible, but because the group was practically made up of Latvians, they basically reflected their own just interests. The Baltic Slavic Society of Cultural Development and Cooperation addressed the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in an open letter in which it supported the idea of the status of state language, but also made suggestions aimed at simultaneous state protection of other languages. I will not exaggerate the importance of this letter, but those documents with which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has familiarized us and the way of making decisions after discussion by the people, I think, suit sensible people.

[Ya. Shkapars] There are several reasons why the Latvian portion of the population became active earlier. The social and economic stagnation was multiplied by national stagnation, which was aggravated in 1959 when great distortions in national policy began. The intensification of the Latvian population is now proceeding swiftly. I believe that if we use this intensification, it can become a large reserve for perestroika, like during the first revolution.

Obviously, it is this rapid development of the Latvian people's activeness that is causing some perplexity among the Russian-speaking population: Will the interests of non-Latvians suffer? Obviously, the Popular Front must thoroughly examine this question and search for ways so that one nationality does not build its happiness at the expense of another. We are living under one roof here and must find a model which will make people of all nationalities feel equally well. We cannot solve the nationalities question without doing this. The Popular Front must search for a model jointly with Latvians, Russians, White Russians, and other peoples. There is no reasonable alternative to consolidation of the Latvian- and Russian-speaking population. Any other path can lead to a tragic impasse.

One of the most complex aspects of the nationalities question, obviously, is migration, which evokes apprehension among Latvians. Some even say that the Latvians favor "driving out" all non-Latvians. Nothing of the sort. I think that the Russians, White Russians, Ukrainians and others suffer equally from migration. The huge number of people who come and go annually only squander the riches of the republic.

[I. Bisher] Migration is equally disastrous for Latvians as it is for people of all other nationalities. One of the most effective methods of reducing migration is to intensify the economy. We are ruining our state, proclaiming intensification, but actually continuing using the old, extensive methods. New jobs cannot be created. Recruiting unqualified manpower demoralizes the ethnic and professional situation in the republic.

[E. Melkisis] It seems to me that the fact that the Russian-speaking population is less involved in the Popular Front movement can be explained also by how well informed they are. Russian-language newspapers do not provide the information about these processes that is published in the Latvian language. This gives rise to falsehoods, rumors and, of course, suspiciousness. Unfortunately, this is also happening now. The Latvian-language press raises more critical, fundamental questions which disturb all the people. And there is another aspect. Some newspapers pay more attention not to fundamental, profound questions, but concentrate on who said what and how. And there are arguments about this, entire controversies, but the profound issues pass by. Obviously, the Russian-speaking population also has very critical issues. They must be given the opportunity to express them and to discuss them jointly, not scrape away at trivia.

[V. Steshenko] A narrow-minded environment will always feed this process with some negative aspects from both sides. If we sink to this narrow-minded level, we will find nothing constructive. I get the impression that there are certain forces which benefit from this. I do not think they are organized. They simply promote their interests. I know people who have a good command of Latvian and read the Latvian press, but nevertheless they have not stood for the positions about which they talk. You correctly said that the main thing is the profound interest. V. Bossert once said on television that we now have a dictatorship of trade. This perhaps was very sharply stated, but he probably did not have in mind the girl behind the counter, but there is a good amount of truth in this. The fat cats, let us call them, do not want to lose what they had before, and they see perestroika as a definite threat—a threat to their prosperous existence. For the mafia, corrupted businessmen, and so forth, a conflict on nationality grounds is manna from heaven. In their environment, the attitude towards perestroika does not at all reflect the nationality, although they shout: "Help! Our people are being treated badly."

[I. Bisher] We still have very many workers of all nationalities who sit in various institutions, sift through papers, and support perestroika in words, but they themselves are afraid that any political changes can put an end to their pleasant existence.

[Ya. Shkapars] I would like to return to the question about the mafia. We must not deflate the danger of this phenomenon. The danger of the mafia is very great. The mafia always works in harmony with the bureaucracy. This is a unified process. I think that we underestimate it in the republic.

[I. Bisher] Another thing concerning the attitude of the Russian-speaking population towards the Popular Front. They also are not united; there are also different sections, different ideas there. Of course, I agree with that the Russian-speaking population does not receive enough information. I would also like for the Russian-speaking

population, which also supports perestroika, to have broader representation in drawing up the documents of the LPF. Of course, we tried to express their ideas and tried to formulate them somehow, but perhaps we were unable to do everything because it must be a person who realizes completely the pain of his people. We did not close the door to anyone.

[V. Steshenko] Lately I have become concerned about the ethical aspect of a number of publications. I am convinced, for example, that it would be tactless on my part without invitation to get into another's conversation about nationality symbols, about particularly internal nationality problems. I agree completely with Lenin: A Russian communist must gain an understanding of great-power chauvinism, and it is more convenient for the Latvian communist to distinguish nationalism from nationality.

We approach this topic which disturbs everyone today who is discussing the LPF program. As we already said, this is the lack of knowledge of the Latvian language by many non-Latvians. Now ways are being outlined on how to make the Latvian language a language of communication between nationalities. Then many problems will be removed. Although I would immediately make the reservation that I am not exaggerating the importance of the language question, since the roots of all the aggravations are in the economy, and the fate of the republic is being decided in the labor collectives.

So, in the worker audiences the question is often asked about citizenship, about the priority of development of the Latvian nation, accompanied by apprehension: "Do they want to make us non-Latvians second-class citizens?"

[E. Melkisis] There is nothing of the sort in the draft program of the LPF. This involves only the right to exist on the land of one's ancestors, and the fear is expressed because Latvians remain in the minority in that land.

[Ya. Shkapars] One cannot talk about the privileges and the priority of one nationality. It involves something else. For Latvians, Latvia is the homeland, the only place where the Latvian people can survive and develop in their natural and usual environment.

In addition, during the past decades many questions concerning the lives of Latvians have been neglected—economic, social, and nationality questions. Due to the decision of 1959 and the bugbear of bourgeois nationalism, the people ended up deprived of many national values. Today, when the Latvian people are rising to return these values, this is causing apprehension in others. But you see, there is no danger for the Russian language.

[I. Bisher] The Latvians remain internationalists, and they are not demanding privileges. But we also are striving not to lose the Latvian culture.

[E. Melkisis] Really, is there some danger for the Russians or Estonians if we were given back the Ligo holiday?

[V. Steshenko] That is all true. It is simply necessary to outline everything in the program so there is no ambiguity, so each provision is interpreted the same by different people. After the speech A. Bels, a writer whom I sincerely respect, at a meeting with A.N. Yakovlev, where he talked about citizenship, almost half of the population of the republic felt a certain discomfort. Different paths led people to this land. The majority of them sincerely came to love it, link their future to it, and suddenly there is a danger that they will sort of stop being a full-fledged person.

As we know, law has no retroactiveness. We also cannot violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, if we want to be a legal state.

[I. Bisher] The LPF believes that this question must be resolved, but it has not yet studied it enough to come out with recommendations. It must be resolved in a very balanced manner. You see, the Russian culture also must be protected against migration. V. Rasputin demonstrated the threat to it very well. Of course, there cannot be discrimination, but the personal attitude of those newly arrived in the republic is also important, important for them to want to become citizens of it.

[E. Melkisis] The category "citizenship" is one of the "blank spaces" in jurisprudence. The USSR and LaSSR constitutions talk about citizenship, but a statute on it has not been drawn up.

[Ya. Shkapars] Drafting of this legislation should not be dragged out, but it must be passed after nationwide discussion. Incidentally, we must not confuse the speeches of individual members of the LPF with the front's stand. Both Bels and Boyars stated precisely their point of view.

[V. Steshenko] Well, in concluding the discussion, I would like to touch upon the problem of dialogue and, as a part of it, the search for a compromise. I will say frankly that it is difficult for me to imagine how to try to find a mutual understanding with people who at their meetings allow and applaud the expression of racist, misanthropic views preparing groups of violence, about which V. Turnis spoke. He himself is leaving, but what are we to do with the stormtroopers he leaves behind? How can we talk calmly with one of the Black Hundreds who insult national dignity? All this cannot be tolerated in any civilized country. And a person must find protection. Will he find it in the LPF? I believe that the LPF is obligated to defend a person's honor and dignity, regardless of his nationality. Indeed, those who assert that a compromise must have borders are probably right. But we also will not forget that in the process of perestroika there is a reassessment of values, and we must use this opportunity to reconvince the opponent.

We will hope that the LPF and its program, based on the decisions of the 19th Party Conference and which has absorbed many of the provisions of the resolution of the plenum of creative unions, will become a platform for consolidating all constructive forces in the republic.

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Supporters of Latvian Popular Front Speak Out
18000068a Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 23 Sep 88 p 1

[Article by Olga Avdevich entitled "We are for a Front of Thinkers and Doers" under the rubric: "The Popular Front: Discussion Continued."]

[Text] A group supporting the Latvian Popular Front has been founded at the Riga Red Banner Civil Aviation Engineering Institute. During its very first day more than 200 of the institute's instructors, staff-members, enrolled in this group.

...OPINIONS, views, and evaluations are most diverse. Nobody is taking to the rostrum for a speech. Today both initiatives and speeches are being made from the seats.

Docent Ye. Kheyfets:

"I think that many people saw in the program entitled 'A View' the subject of a Sochi leader. If the television journalists had not gone after him, he would have continued on in that way.... We need such a 'view' everywhere. Our republic needs such a 'view' also. If the NFL [Latvian Popular Front] comes into being here, we need to support such a Popular Front. Most of us are not pleased with everything in the Draft Charter and Program. How should we see to it that these particular provisions are not in the final variant? Only by persuading people, only by joining the Popular Front ourselves!"

Professor R. Vinogradov:

"I'd like to say something specific about the draft documents. Paragraph 4, Section 9 of the Draft Program provides for a transition to be made in time to Latvian as a language of international communication. I can agree that Latvian should be recognized as a state language, but just imagine what would happen if all 15 republics refused to utilize Russian for international communication!... It would be like the Tower of Babel!

"Moreover, Paragraph 3, Section 2 of the Program states that 'the NFL will struggle to provide state sovereignty, as proclaimed by the Constitution of the Latvian SSR, and the revival of the Leninist principles of federalism.' Furthermore, the Charter states that the NFL must strive to 'implement complete sovereignty for this republic.' As

you know, complete sovereignty, according to international law, provides for the full independence and self-determination of the given state in domestic and foreign affairs. The struggle for complete sovereignty would be a struggle to secede from the USSR...."

Ye. Kheyfets:

"A similar organization is also being founded in Moscow. So does that mean that Moscow wants to secede...?"

Docent V. Tseytlin:

"These are all keystones. But what if we simply let such stones lie there? We need an international front!"

Docent V. Stepanov:

"In Latvia it would be difficult, perhaps, to find a more international collective than our institute. Who, if not we, should struggle for internationalism?! This is already the fourth year of perestroika, and no particular results have yet to be seen. If our public institutions cannot cope, we must create new ones. The NFL is one of the ways to enhance civic-mindedness and social activism. Although, of course, the possibility is not excluded that all of this may boil down to a kind of 'blabology.' If we see that the NFL will not be the militant organization that we're hoping for, we'll simply leave it."

Prorector A. Belaychuk:

"During the years of the Revolution the people's participation in running the state was conceived via the form of a direct democracy and not merely via the party. Later all this disappeared. The NFL is the very thing that could become a form of direct democracy. To those who see nationalism everywhere, I'd like to say the following: if a people (nation) is spiritually healthy, then it is international. Individual elements can be nationalists, but the people as a whole cannot. The question is not what the front will be called—popular, national, or international. The question is whether it will be a society of demagogues and blabbers or a front of people who are thinkers and doers."

...SPEECH after speech, response after response. In the form of an amphitheater, the VUZ's large auditorium is packed tightly full. The most motivated discussion imaginable is going on. The Draft Charter and Program of the Popular Front are not simple documents; they have multiple layers of meaning. And the time period for discussion is extremely tight. But perhaps this is for the best: for many, long years we have become too accustomed to wasting time on vacuous discussions. It's high time that we acted.

Zhanna SPURE, editor of the newspaper INZHENER AEROFLOTA.

* * *

When this material was being prepared for printing, Docent V. BEREZHNOV, a member of the RKIIGA [Riga Red Banner Civil Aviation Engineering Institute] group supporting the NFL, addressed to the editors the following specific proposal for the Popular Front.

Break Through the Defenses of the Prestigious House!

What we have in mind is Apartment House No 76, Gorkiy Street, Riga. On 19 September in an article entitled "A Prestigious House Maintains Its Defenses," the newspaper IZVESTIYA returned to its discussion of the very gross violations of the principle of social justice and equity in the allocation of apartments in this house. It was here that persons occupying high positions in this republic obtained apartments illegally.

"We are outraged by the passive stance taken by the republic's Council of Ministers, which has been in no hurry to interfere and restore justice," stated V. Berezhnov. "We propose to appeal to the ispolkom to resolve this matter; and we also plan to conduct a demonstration and picketing in front of the Council of Ministers building and in front of Apartment House No 76, Gorkiy Street. We demand that the violators of the housing legislation be held responsible for their actions. We also propose to express our lack of trust in those inhabitants who have illegally obtained apartments in this prestigious house, and who are also deputies to the Soviets. And—above all—to V. Kireyev, the general director of the Latrybprom Production Association. We consider that, after everything which has been revealed, such a person should not remain a candidate member on the Latvian Communist Party's Central Committee and a deputy to this republic's Supreme Soviet. For such deputies, who, taking advantage of the people's trust, step out of line and butt in to obtain a good thing at someone else's expense, there is no place in the Soviets. We likewise doubt that E. Kalntsiems, who illegally obtained an apartment in House No 76, can be chairman of the Riga Rayispolkom.

Our institute's collective is prepared to take part in such a campaign. We think that we have the support of many Rigans.

The discussion which heated up around the topic of the Draft Program and Charter of the Latvian Popular Front is still continuing. Frank, pointed arguments and disputes, as well as the exchange of opinions, are undoubtedly useful. But I think that it is high time that we made the transition to specific, albeit modest, practical steps.

Popular Front Prepares for Conference

Program Announced

1800068b Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 30 Sep 88 p 1

[Under rubric: "On the Eve of the Congress" three brief announcements: "Steps of the Popular Front," "Proposals," and "Attention!"]

[Text]

Steps of the Popular Front

Yesterday in Riga a press conference was held which was participated in by members of the Coordinating Center of the Latvian Popular Front, journalists of this republic's mass news media organs, and other concerned persons. One of the principal matters discussed was the problem of preparing and conducting the Constituent Congress of the NFL [Latvian Popular Front].

After the publication of the Draft Program and the Draft Charter of the Popular Front, an enormous number of letters came pouring in to the organizing committee of the upcoming congress. Nor did the telephones stop ringing. A large number of people expressed the desire to participate in the organizational work. As of today (according to the computer data), the NFL includes more than 85,000 inhabitants of the republic (43,600 of which are Rigans). This encompasses approximately 2,300 initiative groups. But the influx of persons desiring to become members of the NFL continues.

On the eve of the congress, on 7 October at 1500 hours a popular demonstration will be held around the Large Stage of the Park of Culture and Rest in Mezhapark. This demonstration will be entitled "For a Legitimate State in Latvia," and will be participated in by about 70,000 inhabitants of this republic.

At 0900 hours on that same day registration of the congress delegates will begin in the House of Political Education.

On 9 October a divine service of worship will take place in the Cathedral for the first time in 29 years. It is dedicated to the Constituent Congress of the Latvian Popular Front and will begin at 0730 hours.

The congress itself will last for two days—8 and 9 October; its work will be elucidated by journalists from republic and All-Union publications, as well as correspondents from foreign newspapers and journals. Plans are to show it live on republic-wide television.

The Organizing Committee requests all those persons desiring to render voluntary aid to organizing and conducting the NFL Constituent Congress (particularly those persons agreeing to help foreign journalists as translators) to call the following telephone number: 287420.

Yevgeniy ShUM.

Call for Participants, Translators

18000068b Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in
Russian 30 Sep 88 p 1

[Under rubric: "On the Eve of the Congress" three brief announcements: "Steps of the Popular Front," "Proposals," and "Attention!"]

[Text]

Proposal of the Coordinating Center of the Constituent Congress of the Latvian Popular Front and the newspapers SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH and PADOMYU YAUNATNE

It is probably true that we would all unanimously agree that it would not be right if the work of the Popular Front Congress were not to be participated in by persons who are well-known and respected in Latvia, but who, for various reasons, will not be elected as delegates. These are persons whose participation in the NFL Congress, in the people's opinion, is absolutely necessary.

Therefore, we propose the following:

On 3 October from 1000 hours to 1900 hours call these telephone numbers:

—466185, 466036, 466076—PADOMYU YAU-
NATNE,

—468383, 467580—SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH,

—333192—Latvian Komsomol Central Committee,

—332929—Committee of Latvian SSR Youth Organi-
zations.

Call up and name those persons who, in your opinion, should certainly take part in the work of the NFL Congress. Be brief in your conversation, but do not forget to give the first and last name, as well as the occupation of the person being proposed by you. Also give your own first and last names, place of work, and residential address. As always, anonymous calls will not be considered.

You may send telegrams or, prior to 3 October, drop postcards into the mailboxes of the newspapers PADOMYU YAUNATNE and SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in the entranceway of the Press House.

Attention!

The press group of the Constituent Congress of the Latvian Popular Front announces that, from 3 to 9 October, by calling telephone number 287240, journalists will be able to obtain information about the progress being made in preparing for the congress, its work, and other matters.

At the same time we invite those journalists who will not be accredited to the congress to voluntarily and unselfishly take part in the work of this press group. Call telephone number 287240 concerning your participation.

Press Group of the NFL Constituent Congress.

* * *

The Coordinating Center of the Latvian Popular Front proposes to enterprises, institutions, and private individuals that they donate or sell for the NFL a private residence in Riga for the needs of the coordinating center, the support groups, and the members of the NFL.

We ask for a response by language specialists in English, German, and French who would be able to help with translating the congress's materials, to work during the congress and at meetings.

Send your proposals to the following address: 226011, Riga, Kr. Baron Street, 12, or telephone the following number: 284735.

NFL Coordinating Center.

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Yakovlev Question-Answer Session with Latvian Ideology Aktiv Participants

18000029a Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
20 Aug 88 p 3

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee Secretary A. N. Yakovlev: "The Things That Pain the Soul"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] CPSU Central Committee Secretary A. N. Yakovlev, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, spent 4 days in our republic, devoting most of his attention to meetings with the public—at the Marupe agricultural concern, the Straume production association, the premises of the Stage Actors' Union, the television broadcasting center and the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee's House of Political Education. In these meetings, kolkhoz farmers, laborers, cultural and scientific workers, journalists, and party and soviet workers spoke openly about the pressing problems of the republic in the country. In his appearances before each audience the CPSU Central Committee secretary addressed chiefly those problems that were raised by

participants of the meetings. Nonetheless additional questions always came up at the conclusion of each interview. It was obvious that in these meetings the people were getting more and more anxious about the success of perestroika and about the contribution each individual could make to confirming the new ideas; it was also obvious that perestroika concerned not only the economy and policy, but also ethics and morality. All of this has already been reported in depth in articles on the meetings published in the press. Considering the tremendous interest of the readers, today we publish A. N. Yakovlev's answers to questions from participants of a meeting of the republic's party, soviet and ideological aktiv.

[Question]: Would it be suitable to conduct elections to higher soviets prior to elections to local soviets?

[Answer]: First of all, that's what the constitution calls for: The terms are coming to an end, and we would not want to violate the law. But there is a second reason. We do, after all, need to adopt a law on local elections. And this can be done only by the supreme organ of government.

[Question]: Will the draft of the law on election procedures be made available to the people with ample time for discussion?

[Answer]: It will be made available, but it would be hard to judge whether the time for discussion will be ample or not, because everyone reckons time in his own way. (A murmur spreads through the audience).

[Question]: Why did the Central Committee Plenum offer no explanations concerning the four bribe-taking delegates OGONEK wrote about?

[Answer]: Whoever said they took bribes? OGONEK said that, and the examining magistrate. Does an examining magistrate have the right to determine whether a person is a criminal or not? No. Only the courts can declare a person to be a criminal. This was a most serious error by Gdlyan, who announced that they were bribe-takers. The KPK [Party Control Committee] is presently handling this case. So far it has been examining the case of one of the individuals. It turns out that the only testimony in his case comes from a person who has been in prison for a long time now, and who knows little about the person in relation to whom he gave evidence—not even his name. He has now offered new testimony, but this time against the examining magistrate.

We must be very careful when we accuse people. And when we talk about a state built on justice, dear comrades, this justice must be real, so that none of us could ever indict anyone else for a crime until the courts have had their say. Turn the matter over to the courts, and let them decide.

As you know, the conference assigned the case to the Committee for Party Control. A thorough investigation will be conducted. Someone will have to pay: Either those who are indicted as bribe-takers by the court, if this is so, or by those who slandered them.

[Question]: Why is the Central Committee being so obstinate in regard to removing Zhdanov's name from cities, universities and so on?

[Answer]: I would like to explain to you the psychological side of this. The society is a society, it consists of different kinds of people. We are now concerned with rehabilitation. It is a very serious matter. I'm a member of this rehabilitation committee, and we hold meetings, and read enormous piles of documents.

Just this central commission alone, which was created by the Politburo, has to examine around 73 so-called "files." Things are especially difficult with rehabilitating those in regard to whom there is no paperwork at all, and so we are forced to resort to guesswork: Either the files were lost, or they never existed—we might have nothing to go on but a certificate of execution. And on the other hand we have files pertaining to groups that no one knows what they are. And so we spend time digging through and shuffling these documents, because we need to conclusively decide, and honestly decide, we need to fulfill this party and humanitarian duty in order to leave no more doubts in the people, in the party, in anyone.

Everything has its own rhythm. Things need to be resolved gradually. Just like with even the tiniest boat, the ship of state has limits as to the kind of storm it can weather. There is danger in exposing it to too much weather. We need to reckon with the social consciousness.

[Question]: It has now been several times that Comrade Pugo has submitted a proposal to the CPSU Central Committee to reexamine the 1941-1949 deportation decrees and recognize their unlawfulness. When are we going to get an answer to this?

[Answer]: I believe that what I said in response to the previous question holds here as well. First we need to consider the matter very carefully. There are certain difficulties, particularly with documents.

[Question]: When will N. S. Khrushchev's speech to the 20th CPSU Congress be published?

[Answer]: I'm sure that it will be published. Allow us think about it a little. Incidentally, you can now get much more information in our materials and in the press than what was said at the 20th Congress. A decision has been made to publish all of the shorthand records of the congresses and plenums. And I assure you that you will

be reading the materials of some plenums—for example the materials of the April 1929 plenum, with more interest than anything else, even the materials of the 20th Congress.

[Question]: How do you feel about the Popular Front in Support of Perestroika, created in Estonia, Leningrad and elsewhere? Why is the central press afraid to analyze this new phenomenon?

[Answer]: I don't know why it is not analyzing it. How do I feel about it? If it is in fact formed in support of perestroika, then I am certainly in favor of it. You must understand that recently over 4,000 organizations have come into being in our country, and perhaps all, with a few exceptions, support perestroika—all. But as soon as the discussion gets going, everyone defines perestroika in his own way. To one person it's a way to get rid of a local chief, a rayon committee secretary or a rayon executive committee chairman. That's all perestroika means to him. To another it's something else, and to a third it's something else again. Consequently, comrades, we need to consider these organizations in terms of content, orientation, goals and actions. If they suggest positive steps and work together with us, then they should be applauded, and we should thank them. If we were to take the easiest way, we would summarily sweep up the old and throw it out. But we need to approach things carefully, with some understanding. After all, we are talking about our own people, Soviet people, and communists at that. We need to sit down and figure things out together. We also need to reject presumption of guilt. On the other hand if we come across something that is against perestroika, we will fight it. In this case there can be no compromise. But we need to fight by political methods. I repeat, by political methods, if certain actions fall outside the law.

[Question]: There is much debate in our country today about bourgeois or popular symbols. What are your thoughts in regard to this issue?

[Answer]: First you need to decide what kind of symbols you're talking about. (Applause). Some say that it all began with the 13th century, while others say that this is not so. Get together, talk things out, see who is pro and con, argue the points, and see who persuades whom.

[Question]: It is often said that we are now working more but receiving less. What is going on here?

[Answer]: What you say is true. In former times we got a little, but we didn't work at all for it. Now we need to work for the same thing.

The trend today is such that we have to work for our money. Otherwise things will never go right. But what you have earned, you will receive. With no restrictions. The whole misfortune, comrade, is that we have made people forget how to work.

[Question]: One of the greatest impediments to perestroika is the falsehood which is flourishing beneath the slogans of democracy. People of good intentions sometimes drown in this filthy current. How and when will this impediment be taken away? It has even managed to make itself known from the podium of the 19th party conference.

[Answer]: Falsehood is in fact a barrier and an impediment. Even apart from the conference and perestroika, we should not lie. How and when will this impediment be taken away? Well, how do we take it away? We need to sit down together and reach some agreement on this—we need to not lie to each other. (A murmur spreads through the audience). Perhaps this is a process that concerns morality and education. Falsehood beneath the slogans of democracy? But if we shut the door to democracy, does this mean that people will stop lying? Not at all, they will continue to do so even more. Democracy is in fact the best way to fight the lying. But it is a difficult habit to break—it has already been described well in the world literature. (A murmur spreads through the audience). It's not something exclusive to us alone. When it comes to lying, we, thank God, are not first.

[Question]: What was your impression of your meeting with the leaders of the creative intelligentsia?

[Answer]: A very good one. They are the reasoning, thinking part of your society. That is my impression, comrades. (Applause).

[Question]: Sometimes people in our country, including party members, say that our republic's leadership is oriented strongly on orders from Moscow in operational matters, in contrast to neighboring republics. What is your opinion?

[Answer]: I would be extremely reluctant to assess the activities of the republic's leadership in general. I do not wish to appropriate that right. And for that matter, we need to get out of this habit—coming here, standing up wearing the "shoulder boards" of a VIP and handing out candy and cookies or, on the other hand, reprimands to an entire party organization and its leadership. I am not about to do so. (Prolonged applause). And second, to be able to assess something, you need to know something about it. I don't know enough.

[Question]: Will the law on the press that is presently being drafted grant the right to informal organizations and clubs to publish their own bulletins, newspapers and journals—a right which is guaranteed by the constitution but is actually prohibited here by the Council of Ministers' Decision No 29 dated 29 January 1988?

[Answer]: I read the draft of the law on the press, and there is nothing in there about it. And anyway, do you really think, comrades, that the existing press is not producing enough? In my opinion we are now discussing all of our problems in a manner unseen in any other state

in the world. Now when visitors come from abroad, they are astounded that we go so far (!): So what if there are still some things that are forbidden, some things that we cannot do? Let's consider the public's need. I for example am pleased with our press. I experience no desire to read anything more. And sometimes our press carries so much that it makes the head spin and ache.

[Question]: Honorable Aleksandr Nikolayevich, please tell us who in the Central Committee Politburo besides you concerns himself with ideology, or as it is also sometimes said, administers to the press and television....

[Answer]: I am quite aware of what this question alludes to. It came up during the party conference as well. The sentiment behind it is this: Let he who administers also answer for the outrages being perpetrated in the press. And that means me. But exactly why should I be responsible for the articles that are published in PRAVDA, in IZVESTIYA, in OGONEK, in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and in TRUD? Aren't you making too big a thing of it? And furthermore, I'm very wary of judging things by personal likes and dislikes. What I like and dislike is beside the point. These are not political criteria, comrades. These are criteria for the kitchen, for conversations with my wife. If I don't like a certain novel, that's fine. But we should not make such evaluations at the political level. Because as a rule we err in our evaluations. So it happens that for 5 years we don't like something, and then on the sixth we suddenly like it, and even give the author the Lenin Prize. (Applause).

Once before I had an experience with motion pictures. I watched some films that had lain on the shelf for a long time. We went ahead and released them all, and as you might imagine, our entire ideological system did not collapse. Who among us can say that viewing a film has caused him to reexamine his views on the Soviet government? These are harmless films, comrades. It is easy for us to say that now. But how do you think the artist feels? To him, the film he created was like his own child, he worried and suffered over it, he devoted his life to it, he labored on it from morning till night, and then suddenly his child is taken away from him for 20 years. This cannot be! All the more so it was taken away from him without grounds. This cannot be.

[Question]: What do you think will be the result of the cultural separation that is being brought on as a result of creating different centers and societies based on national characteristics?

[Answer]: I think that development of language, national cultures and traditions could never cause divisions. It is my personal conviction that this would lead to unification, because it leads to knowledge, to knowledge of one another, and knowledge always leads to unification, while disrespect leads to repulsion, to division. Knowledge always produces positive results in the end, despite

all difficulties. This is why it is a very good thing to create organizations of this sort, if they are in fact related to language, culture and traditions.

But there are some grounds for concern if such centers limit themselves nationally. Why for example shouldn't a Latvian be able to commune with Russian culture, why should it be left just to the Russians? And the same can be said for any other nation.

[Question]: The fastest possible solution of a large number of problems in international relations is inseparably associated with the practical reaction of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to proposals from the republic concerning expansion of its independence and chiefly its economic independence. We are aware of the support being given by the CPSU Central Committee. But when can we expect the USSR Council of Ministers to take practical steps in this direction?

[Answer]: When? All of these problems are now being addressed. Instructions have been issued, and economic and legal groups have been created. First we need to resolve the fundamental issues of the constitution, and formulate the status of the republics, autonomous republics and other national formations in a new way. Recently we convened our lawyers. Some told us what Lenin thought about this, while others told us the way Stalin handled it. I think that this is not a very productive way to go. I think that we need to start with the realities. We need a new look at the republic's position—economic, national economic, political and so on and so forth.

[Question]: The principles of full cost accounting are becoming totally distorted as they are introduced into the enterprises. To be more precise, they are simply covering up for old institutions. State plans have now become state orders. Internal economic independence is limited. Does the leadership of the country know this, and if it does, then why is it not being more critical of ministry leaders?

[Answer]: From your question, comrade, I would almost believe that you've sat in on Politburo meetings. We have discussed this issue several times already. The ministries complain very strongly to us that we are much too critical of them. They try to frighten us by suggesting that we would lose control, and everything would fall apart, everything would perish, while we tell them that their presence is not always all that important. This is the kind of debate we have been having on this subject. But you are entirely right. Certain ministries, or certain people at various levels in them, are constantly trying to build old principles into perestroika, to evade it in one way or another, to add something to it. Such was the case with the state order. You may recall reading that Mikhail Sergeyevich criticized the practice of such state orders at the last plenum.

But the problem does not lie just with the ministries; it is associated with the general economic situation, comrades, with the economy's imbalance, with the financial system's imbalance. And what we probably need is measures more serious than just eliminating or forming a dozen ministries.

From the Editor

So ended the answers given by the CPSU Central Committee secretary to questions at a meeting of the republic's party, soviet and ideological aktiv. The bulk of them were transcribed here from a condensed short-hand report. The question of limiting subscriptions to periodicals was raised several times: Is this not an attack on glasnost? Exhaustive answers have been given to this question in previous publications. Can the army be criticized? The army is sacred to all of us. It is impermissible to write about the army incompetently, as is true of any subject in general. But anyone and anything, even the army, can be criticized for specific things. All that troubles people today—the problems of ecology, shortages, the monopoly enjoyed by producers—was discussed. We would have to agree with the evaluation offered by Latvian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary B. K. Pugo, who emphasized in his summary of the assembly of the aktiv that this important meeting motivated people to do better work.

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Historians Assess Events Leading to Incorporation of Baltic States into USSR

18000029b Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
20 Aug 88 pp 3-4

[Interview with Latvian scholars Academician A. Drizul and Candidate of Historical Sciences E. Zhagars, Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member R. Sharmaytis, and from Estonia, Doctor of Historical Sciences O. Kuuli: "The Vote Went in Favor of Soviet Rule"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Tremendous interest is being shown in events that occurred on the Baltic shore since the late 1930s and in the subsequent circumstances surrounding establishment of Soviet rule in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1940. The political changes that occurred after the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 was signed are viewed by most Soviet historians as peaceful socialist revolutions. At the same time, those in the West prefer to say that the Baltic republics had been forcibly incorporated into the USSR.

The situation that existed in those times is presently being discussed by Latvian scholars Academician A. Drizul and Candidate of Historical Sciences E. Zhagars, Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member R. Sharmaytis, and Doctor of Historical Sciences O.

Kuuli from Estonia, who consented to answer some questions from correspondents representing news agencies of the three Baltic republics.

[Question]: In contrast to the point of view accepted in Soviet historiography, the opinion is sometimes suggested that a revolutionary situation did not exist in the Baltic states prior to the war. Could you assess the general political situation that existed then in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia?

[A. Drizul]: For more than 40 years, Western bourgeois propaganda and, with special zeal, the various radio voices have been trying to implant in the consciousness of our people the myth that Soviet rule was established at bayonet point by the Red Army, that the 1940 socialist revolution never occurred, and that Latvia had been occupied by foreign troops. This is the main premise of the doctrine which is being spread so widely, by all available means, and which remains so important even today.

What is this myth based on? First of all on an incorrect, antiscientific premise encouraging examination of historical phenomena exclusively from one aspect, from only one side. And namely from the point of view of foreign political relations and diplomatic actions. It is no accident that those who are spreading this myth remain silent about the presence of a revolutionary situation, about the demonstrations conducted by the popular masses of Latvia, about the activities of the Communist Party, the Latvian Socialist Workers and Peasants Party and the youth organization, and so on.

Following the state revolution of 15 May 1934, as a result of which Ulmanis came to power in Latvia, the latter disbanded all political parties and the parliament, and in 1936 he combined two posts—head of government and head of state—and became dictator. Under the conditions of the authoritarian regime, practically speaking Ulmanis' regime was fought only by the Communist Party. The latter had been in existence illegally for about 20 years in bourgeois Latvia; it was formed following the revolution out of left-wing Social Democrats, the Latvian Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party, which became an ally of the Communist Party, and finally, a revolutionary youth organization—an association of socialist and communist youth formed in 1936 and called the Union of Latvian Labor Youth. These three organizations were then the core of the future Popular Front, which in the end mobilized the masses about itself and overthrew Ulmanis' regime.

On 5 October 1939, before the mutual assistance pact was signed between the USSR and Latvia, in its 26th Conference held in February 1939, the Latvian Communist Party adopted the platform of the Popular Front as a program of struggle by the republic's laborers, with the consent and approval of the other parties and the Popular Front. This platform presented a large number of economic and political demands. I wish to emphasize

that it was back then that the question of convening the parliament on the basis of democratic elections and widely introducing the elements of democracy into the state following the overthrow of Ulmanis' regime was raised.

[R. Sharmaytis]: The socioeconomic and political processes that occurred in the three Baltic republics in the period between the world wars were similar to some extent. Significant differences existed as well. Prewar Lithuania was an economically backward land. Prior to establishment of Soviet rule, around 100,000 persons were forced to emigrate in search of bread, chiefly to North and South America. The peasantry grew steadily poorer, and there were 70,000 unemployed in the cities of our small country in early 1940. Dissatisfaction with the regime, which had been established following the fascist revolution in 1926, when the Tautininkay (Nationalist) Party came into power, grew among the popular masses. The parliament was dissolved, to subsequently remain idle for a decade, and the leaders of the workers movement were shot. Popular upheavals shook Lithuania: A peasant strike rolled across the land in 1935 with sacrifices in human life. A year later a general political workers strike was conducted in Kaunas, which was then the temporary capital. The republic's historians established from archival materials that from 1920 to mid-1940, 1,120 strikes were held, in which a sum total of 130,000 workers participated. In these years around 10,000 persons were put on trial or punished administratively for revolutionary and antifascist activities. The situation grew more and more tense, moving toward revolution.

General Stasis Rashtikis, a former troop commander and a prominent representative of the previous regime, was forced to recognize this. In his memoirs, which were published in the West following the war, he wrote that most of the people were hostile to the regime. Striving to hold onto power, the ruling circles were compelled to resort to police measures, and the regime descended more and more to a police state.

[O. Kuuli]: The situation that evolved in the Baltic region, including in Estonia, in the late 1930s was rather strange: On one hand these states had a profascist orientation, while on the other they were signing mutual assistance pacts with the USSR and allowing Soviet troops into their territory. Despite the apparent paradox, the situation was a fully logical consequence of the disposition of forces and world political events. Prior to the mid-1930s Estonia's foreign policy was oriented toward England. Then began a convergence with Germany, such that the Estonian republic found itself entirely within its sphere of influence in 1938-1939. And it was not that the ruling grouping had changed its orientation. Recall the late 1930s. The West was vigorously prodding Hitler on toward the East, directing his expansion chiefly against the Soviet Union. The government of Estonia had one of two choices: to go with the USSR against Germany, or to go with Germany against

the USSR. Preference was given to the latter. But then another abrupt turn of events occurred—the pact signed on 23 August 1939 between the USSR and Germany. The government of Estonia was thrown into confusion. But now there were no formal arguments against signing a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR. Soviet military bases appeared on Estonian territory. All of this should not be interpreted as change in the government's foreign policy course. The leaders of the Baltic states unanimously concluded that the pact between the USSR and Germany was a transitory matter. They felt that the conflict between the parties to the treaty would begin as early as in September 1940, and they made preparations for this. The foreign affairs ministers and military leaders of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia conferred several times in late 1939 and in the first half of 1940 in order to coordinate their actions in the event of war between the USSR and Germany.

A pro-German orientation was not supported by the majority of the population, inasmuch as historical antipathy toward German barons who had ruled the Baltic region for centuries, and the fear and revulsion elicited by Hitler's claims upon world domination and his racist policy, had their effect. A movement supporting a mutual assistance pact between the USSR and Estonia grew ever wider. In turn, Estonian communists came to recognize the significance of reinforcing cooperation with the USSR in order to attain their goal—a socialist revolution.

[Question]: Analyzing the events of those years, many researchers in the West are prone to understate the domestic sociopolitical situation while concurrently asserting time that the numerous communist parties would have been unable to effect a revolution without strong interference by the USSR, and consequently that occupation was a factor that must be addressed.

[A. Drizul]: I was given the opportunity to work in the archives of the political directorate of bourgeois Latvia, and to read the documents and digests on the political situation in the country that had been provided to Ulmanis. Growing concern for the increasingly revolutionary mood of the people, especially the working class, was a constant theme in these digests, especially in 1939 and 1940.

Assessing the situation and the mood of the workers of Riga plants and factories, the secret police reported to Ulmanis, as president of the state, that judging from these moods, sooner or later the workers would assume the path of revolution. The secret police recognized that a revolutionary situation was ripening in the country.

Displeasure with the existing regime was explained chiefly by the fact that the Latvian economy found itself in an extremely grave position at the beginning of World War II. The blockade of the Baltic Sea cut off the natural channels through which raw materials, fuel and the

materials needed by industry could be obtained. Enterprises began to close down, and some of them began operating part time. Ulmanis adopted a law that work could be obtained henceforth only with the consent of a specially organized organ, the so-called Latvijas Darba Tsentrale—the Latvian Labor Center. Concurrently a law was adopted sending the unemployed, especially the young, to peat fields and logging enterprises for compulsory labor, and for work to kulak farms. This caused extreme aggravation of the domestic situation in Latvia. Unemployment grew. While according to official data 4,000 unemployed were registered in late 1939, according to data of the Latvian Labor Center the number of unemployed in March 1940 was as much as 44,000. This growth in the misfortune of the popular masses naturally elicited displeasure with both the domestic and foreign policy of Ulmanis.

Sensing its powerlessness in suppressing the growing revolutionary movement, in April 1940 Ulmanis' secret police resorted to mass arrests of participants of the popular antifascist front, members of the Communist Party, socialists and youth organizations. Their central committees were arrested almost in their entirety. But comrades who remained free, and chiefly communists, continued to organize the masses after creating a temporary organizational committee headed by Central Committee candidate member Iyeva Vinkhold. In the morning of 1 May 1940, buses bearing posters on their back walls appeared quite unexpectedly to many on the streets of Riga. These posters read "Long Live Soviet Latvia!" and "Down with Ulmanis!" The organizers of this action were members of the Riga organization of the Latvian Labor Youth Union.

These examples demonstrate the growth of the revolutionary situation and of demonstrations by popular masses unwilling to condone Ulmanis' domestic and foreign policy.

[E. Zhagars]: Here is what Soviet historians and our public felt about this era: The year 1940 was a time of socialist revolutions in the Baltic. But given all of the similarities in economic, social and historical development of the three republics, these events were not part of the same phenomenon. You cannot talk about Estonia and say that what happened there was exactly the same as in Latvia or Lithuania. But unfortunately this is the approach taken in many studies in the West, and sometimes even in the Soviet Union.

Were the events of 1940 those of an occupation, together with all facts and materials typical of such occupation? The answer to this question must be given in regard to several different directions. First of all the direction of international law. All European states and other countries maintaining representatives in Riga recognized the legality of the Kirshenshteyn government. Not one of them declared that Latvia was occupied after Red Army

units entered into Latvian territory. All foreign ambassadors of the former government recognized the legality of the new government, and not one of them appealed to international opinion or asserted that Latvia was occupied.

It is believed in the West that 17 June—the day on which the Red Army entered Latvia—was the beginning of its occupation. But who was exercising power in the country in the 4 days following? The former regime, the former government. It would not stop at introducing a state of siege, arrests of its political enemies, and dispersal of demonstrations against the government. It exercised full juridical power in its country. The change in government occurred with the sanction of President Ulmanis, who had been the fascist dictator of Latvia since 1934, and he himself remained at his post until the parliament was convened in Latvia, until its first session. Ulmanis ended his career with a request of his political opponents—communists—for a pension. This is a curious fact of history, but it characterizes the politics of the ruling circles. No one raised a hand against the new government. This would have been the time for these people to stand up before world public opinion and say: We yielded our power to our political opponents—communists—without a single shot, without resistance. We gave our consent, we signed the papers ourselves. But this has never happened. It is advantageous to them to declare that the change in government was the result of occupation, of the pact of 23 August 1939.

When Red Army units entered, did a reign of terror and occupation overtake Latvia? Were there mass arrests, was there persecution of those who thought differently, of political opponents? No. Several arrests were made of course on 8 July, of people who started an active struggle against the new government: They were even in opposition to the former dictatorship of Ulmanis.

The events of those days were ambiguous, complex and to some degree contradictory. But they all show that the overwhelming majority of Latvia's population made a historical choice in those June and July days of 1940. The Soviet Union and a new structure, or Hitler's occupation, enslavement and annihilation of the Latvian people—that was the question. Moreover a choice was not even available as such. The Germans would not allow one. The Nazi leadership believed the peoples of the Baltic to be racially inferior people, and they were threatened not so much by Germanization, but even by expulsion and by complete liquidation of the national culture.

[R. Sharmaytis]: Basing themselves on documents and on their analysis, historians have come to the conclusion that a growing social conflict was dominant in the life of the Baltic republics in 1939-1940. Under these circumstances the camp of antifascist forces, which represented the majority of the population, was able to take power into its own hands in summer 1940, when the revolutionary situation transformed into a social revolution.

President Antanas Smetona fled to Germany on 15 June 1940. The moral grounds for any further activities by the Nationalist Party and the state apparatus were gone. The army went over to the side of the laboring people together with its commander, General Vintas Vitkauskas. The police went on with their attempts at suppressing the mass meetings conducted in those days. But the laboring people had become the real masters of the situation. A peoples government enjoying universal trust and approval was formed. It was headed by a well known journalist and public official, Yustas Paletskis. Professor Vintas Kreve-Mitskyavichyus, a classic of Lithuanian literature, and other progressive representative of the intelligentsia joined the government. Not all members of the cabinet were new to government circles. General Vintas Vitkauskas, a member of the former cabinet under Ernestas Galvanauskas, took a position in the peoples government. In a radio broadcast the new premier spelled out the program of the peoples government. Its goal was to ensure the political rights and liberties of the people, raise their material and cultural level and dissolve antipopular organizations.

[O. Kuuli]: Following the heavy losses of the 1920s and 1930s, the Estonian Communist Party witnessed the coming of these events with a membership of barely a hundred and a half. But the wrong conclusions are made from this, because the circumstances which I have already discussed are not taken into account. First of all there was the attitude of rather extensive masses toward the government's political orientation, there was displeasure with its economic policy and the economic situation, and there were the successes and accomplishments of the USSR. This is precisely what allowed the Estonian Communist Party to place its reliance on numerous activists who were not party members but who had an influence on most of the legal workers' organizations.

Former left-wing socialists and young socialists were very active. They shared a common goal with communists—overthrowing the Pats government and creating a socialist Estonia. That anti-Pats forces were growing stronger could be seen from their successes in elections to local and central government organs in 1939 and 1940.

[Question]: The diplomacy of that period, and the documents associated with it, invite many interpretations. Consider in particular the notes sent by the Soviet government to the governments of the Baltic republics, and the pact between the USSR and Germany, which itself is believed to possibly involve some unexplained issues. There has also been much discussion about the arrival of Red Army units, which were introduced in compliance with an agreement with the governments of the Baltic countries. What does historical science have to say about this?

[A. Drizul]: Obviously the reference is primarily to the so-called secret Molotov-Ribbentrop protocols of 1939. I believe that it is necessary to publish these protocols,

together with the appropriate explanations, or if these protocols do not exist, as some associates of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs assert, to provide documented, authoritative evidence that these protocols do not exist. I am stating my own personal opinion here, and I believe it fully possible that these protocols exist, and that they were signed.

The fact is that besides the 23 August 1939 pact, which is well known—the nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, there existed a second pact which was concluded under pressure from Stalin, if the truth is to be known. This was the 28 September 1939 German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty. It established the western border of the Soviet Union after the fall of the landowner government of Poland. It must be said that in my opinion this treaty was the grossest political error, one which set our party and the Soviet Union at variance with the communist parties of West Europe. Unfortunately you will not find any references to this treaty in the special works, with the exception of just one that was published in 1962—that is, in a time during which the decisions of the 22d Party Congress were having their effect.

Presence of Soviet troops in Latvia was doubtlessly a factor that made it impossible for bourgeois Latvia to initiate civil war all that easily in the event of active opposition by the proletariat, or to count on the assistance of foreign imperialists, as had been possible in 1919. But what is remarkable is that not a single Western publication contains any assertions that Soviet troops interfered in the domestic affairs of the republic, which were especially tumultuous in June-July 1940.

[O. Kuuli]: The style of the documents which Lithuania received on 14 June and which Latvia and Estonia received on 16 June was far from that of diplomatic canons. But the claims spelled out in them were to a certain extent justified. As I mentioned earlier, the ruling circles of Estonia did in fact maintain an anti-Soviet stance. The Soviet Union probably decided to take steps to ensure its own safety before Germany was able to untie its hands in the West (this was the time of the invasion of France by way of Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg which led to the fall of Paris on 14 June, and of the surrender of France on 20 June). The note sent to Estonia contained the demand to form a new government which would honorably fulfill the terms of the mutual assistance pact and which would allow additional formations on the republic's territory. The exact figures are unknown as yet, but 80,000-90,000 men were added to the 25,000 already at the bases.

For practical purposes these notes and introduction of large contingents of Soviet soldiers paralyzed the bourgeois government of Estonia and created favorable conditions for active demonstrations by revolutionary forces. Labor collectives sent demands to Pats to create a government enjoying the trust of the laborers. VKP(b)

Central Committee Secretary Andrey Zhdanov, a member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, arrived in Tallinn on 19 June. He conducted negotiations with President Pats on forming a new government and simultaneously met with the leading officials of the united labor front in order to discuss the composition of this government.

In the meantime the laborers continued with their demonstrations. A meeting attended by almost a thousand persons was held in Tallinn on 20 June. The Communist Party and its allies decided to conduct mass demonstrations on 21 June. Thanks to the efforts of large numbers of trade union activists, they were able to prepare these demonstrations in 12 cities and population centers within a few hours. Yielding to the demand of the Soviet government and the pressure of the masses, Pats confirmed a new government in Estonia, headed by the poet Iokhannes Vares-Barbarus, who was not a party member. Thus it can be doubtlessly said that the note from the Soviet government, its pressure and introduction of an additional contingent of Soviet troops played a major role in the June revolution. But no one can discount the unpopularity of the government headed by Pats, Uluots (prime minister at that time) and Laydoner (the Estonian foreign minister at that time) among the laborers, the support shown by the majority of the working people of Estonia for socialism, the active role played by the intelligentsia and the organizational activities of Estonian communists.

[R. Sharmaytis]: It was back in 1920 that Poland seized the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, and it was in 1939 that Hitler's Germany took the sole port of Klaipeda. The Reich advertised plans to annex all of Lithuania as well. The sole power that could defend our land was the Soviet Union, which consistently argued for a just solution to the Vilnius question at international forums. Anti-German and antifascist attitudes increased in this situation. On the other hand those powers which were oriented toward Hitler's Germany were supported by only 0.7 percent of the population—chiefly representatives of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. Given this correlation of forces in the society, the government was compelled to sign the pact of nonaggression and mutual assistance proposed by the Soviet Union and directed at restraining Germany from adventures. Following the fall of Poland and the signing of the pact, the USSR transferred Vilnius, which had been liberated by Soviet troops, to Lithuania, and by the end of the Second World War it gave Klaipeda back to it. For the first time in many centuries all Lithuanian ethnic lands were reunited—from Vilnius to Klaipeda.

[Question]: We could thus conclude that despite differences, an explosive situation created by internal and external causes evolved under the bourgeois governments of those times. What did they do in response?

[A. Drizul]: This is the way it was. When Red Army tanks appeared at Station Plaza, they were met by a large number of demonstrators. On 17 June the Latvian

Communist Party managed to get around 70,000 persons out into the streets. The demonstrators declared that the government of Ulmanis had to be overthrown, and that the power of the Popular Front had to be established.

What was Ulmanis' response to this demonstration? The police and members of the ayzsarg began dispersing it. Two persons died of their wounds in hospitals—Kirsh and Tikhomirov; 27 persons were wounded, and over a hundred were taken to police stations and beaten. In the evening of 17 June Ulmanis made an appeal to the people, in which he announced that additional units of Soviet troops had crossed the border into Latvia early in the morning with the consent of his government and in compliance with the agreement between authorized representatives of the Latvian government and the Soviet government.

But in this same speech, if one were to read it attentively, Ulmanis throws out an unveiled threat toward what he called the excessively curious who went out to meet the Red Army. He said that measures of even greater severity than the reprisals witnessed at Station Plaza would be implemented against the excessively curious.

These measures were implemented by introducing a state of emergency in Riga on 17 June, and on the 19th this status was extended to all of Latvia's territory. Ulmanis was attempting to hold onto his power.

At this moment a group of bourgeois politicians who had previously supported Ulmanis' government and then were dismissed from it also attempted to intrude into this game. And strange as it may seem, they found support from Vyshinskiy. Perhaps, as we believe today, because Vyshinskiy and Stalin, his boss, did not trust the Latvian Communist Party.

According to the testimony of Atis Keninsh, who was the minister of justice and the minister of education in 1931-1933 under the bourgeois government, he had personally talked with Vyshinskiy about setting up a bourgeois cabinet of ministers, and Vyshinskiy supported him, since he did not trust the Communist Party.

But intervention by the Communist Party and its reliance upon the revolutionary movement that had already begun—recall the events that unfolded during these days in Liepaja, where workers seized the ayzsarg club, the Kurzemes Vards printing office and the editor's office and composed the first legal number of the communist newspaper KOMMUNIST—was what compelled Ulmanis and Vyshinskiy, who supported bourgeois policy, to agree under these conditions to the cabinet of ministers proposed by the Popular Front movement. This cabinet was headed by Professor Kirkhenshteyn. But there were only four communists in this cabinet at that time.

Such was the state of affairs on 17 June, the day that marked the beginning of the socialist revolution in Latvia. I think that to discount the revolutionary movement and the activities of the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers and Peasants Party of Latvia, to discount the movement of the popular masses themselves, which expressed themselves so clearly in the revolutionary situation of those June and July days, means to refuse the people the right to create their own history, to refuse the people the right to decide their own historical destiny.

[O. Kuuli]: There was not a single communist in the Vares-Barbarus government; nonetheless from the very first day of its existence the activities of this government were directed by the Communist Party. Many new ministers were from among left-wing socialists who had long been cooperating with the Communist Party; the position of the communists was also supported by government members of the intelligentsia who were not party members—Vares himself, Iokhannes Semper and Neeme Ruus. In July-August 1940 eight of 11 ministers became members of the Estonian Communist Party.

Decrees appointing proponents of the government of the laborers to the most important state posts and barring the most brazenly counterrevolutionary organizations and so on were signed by President Pats. What was this, a political rebirth? It is sometimes asserted that Pats actively promoted establishment of Soviet rule. The fact is that not one of these documents was written on Pats' initiative. He only signed them. But why? There are grounds for suggesting that Pats hoped to hold onto power and win time by being obedient to the new government. As his office chief E. Tambek wrote in memoirs published in Canada, in summer 1940 Pats was still certain that German troops would be in Estonia by early November.

Doubt is being cast on how democratic the elections to the state parliament on 14-15 July were, when district election committees consisting of laborers crossed out 57 of the 78 names of parliamentary deputy candidates opposing the electoral slate headed by the Communist Party. Recently in a meeting of historians and veterans of the revolutionary movement, Arnold Tolk—himself a historian and a veteran—said, and everyone agreed with him, that there was actually no need for such a step. The mood of the masses raised no doubts as to the result of the elections, and even if a few candidates of bourgeois parties made it into parliament, they would not have been able to change anything.

[Question]: Bourgeois historians often assert that the communist parties of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia did what the Comintern told them to do. Was this so? And why are there differences in interpreting the events that preceded Hitler's invasion of the USSR?

[R. Sharmaytis]: The fall of the bourgeois regime was met with the approval of the popular masses. Elections to the peoples parliament were open to all. Mass meetings were held in the cities and towns just prior to the meeting of the peoples parliament. In them, support for the government and the parliament was voiced, and proposals to establish Soviet rule in Lithuania and to admit the republic into the USSR were made and approved. Responding to the dictates of the Lithuanian people, the parliament proclaimed formation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and its entry into the USSR. On 3 August 1940, at an extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Lithuania was admitted as an equal member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Favorable prospects for development and for fundamental socioeconomic transformations opened up for our country. Unfortunately the initial period of existence of reborn Soviet Lithuania coincided with the violence of Stalinism—illegal arrests, and exile of people to remote regions. Improprieties occurred in the course of development of socialism.

[O. Kuuli]: From the beginning of 1938 to summer 1940, the Estonian Communist Party did not have any ties at all with either the Comintern or the VKP(b). These ties were created with the arrival of A. Zhdanov, who met with party officials and with members of the popular government. No written records of these meetings survive, such that I am unaware of what was discussed in them, and what recommendations Zhdanov offered. Judging from some memoirs he was not very well versed with what was happening in Estonia. But I do recall that the issue had to do with something else: the extent to which Stalin's cult of personality and everything associated with it reflected upon the events of 1940 in Estonia. To be honest this issue has not yet been studied much by our historians. After all, perestroika is still young. I can only offer a few marginal notes: Of course, Stalin's cult of personality did have an effect on the revolutionary events of 1940 in Estonia; it manifested itself in the words of welcome directed to him in meetings and assemblies, in the certain primitiveness of ideological work, in the manner of revolutionary transformations. But he was not the factor that determined the course of events. It was determined by the mood of the masses, their activities, and their desire for a society of greater justice.

If we look at Estonian newspapers published in those years, we would find little information on the crimes of the Stalinist clique that are widely known today—the mass repressions, the spy-mania, the extermination of the “enemies of the people.” The death of the leaders of Estonian bolsheviks in the Soviet Union is no longer a secret to the Estonian people, including communists in Estonia.

I had the opportunity to interview many participants of the events of those years. They all agree that all of this brought on disbelief and alarm. It was difficult to believe

that Yan Anvelt, Khans Pegelman and like-minded individuals had transformed from zealous revolutionaries into enemies of the people. It was felt that this was a fatal misunderstanding, a mistake. But nonetheless, there was no distinct impression in Estonia of the real scale of what Stalin and his associates did. On the other hand it was impossible to ignore the tremendous successes in industrialization, elimination of unemployment and wide access to education. One of the trade union activists of the late 1930s put it this way: "We saw the USSR chiefly as the bulwark of the revolutionary workers movement. We wanted to believe mainly that which was good, and our subconscious pushed everything bad to the background."

[Question]: It is obvious from this discussion that our historical science, which maintains firm conceptions concerning the basic approaches to assessing the objective situation of 1939-1940, is also seeking answers to questions for which it has not yet received adequate answers. In this connection it would be interesting to consider the conclusions offered by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Falin, a well known expert in German studies and chairman of the governing board of the Novosti Press Agency.

[V. Falin]: Basing ourselves on the documents, we can name the exact date when Hitler's Germany assumed a consistent course toward war—1937—and explain why it assumed this course. Hitler declared that Germany would have sufficient military superiority in 1940 to resolve all of its problems from a position of strength, and that beginning in 1943, the correlation of forces would change not in favor of Germany but in favor of its adversaries, and therefore there could be no delay in going over to a military solution. Were we to analyze the situation evolving in Europe from this point of view, we would come to the conclusion that many of the decisions of 1937-1939, in particular the signing of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact on 23 August 1939, should be understood as decisions adopted as the world was sliding into World War II, as decisions dictated by extraordinary circumstances, as decisions which often rested on the question: To be or not to be?

The Soviet Union was in an especially difficult situation, in an especially vulnerable and threatened position, as most foreign historians admit.

I feel it necessary to note that in 1933-1934 the Soviet Union persistently argued in behalf of the need for creating a system of collective security in Europe, one which in the USSR's opinion could and should have solved the problems of stability and security on the continent. Unfortunately this idea was not met with support from the West at the official level.

How were one's own interests, and the interests of peace in Europe to be defended, what had to be done to avert the calamity, to keep Europe, and together with it all of the world, from slipping into the most devastating of

Wars? These are questions to which we naturally cannot provide an exhaustive answer, inasmuch as things did not depend only on us, and perhaps not so much on us.

As we know, beginning in fall 1937 Hitler very persistently suggested the notion that the future of Germany lay not so much in westward expansion as expansion "into the Baltic region and Russian space." He declared: "It would be better to commit another couple of million people to the war in order to attain territorial and political breathing space in the end." This was the main direction of German expansion; it was constantly present in official and unofficial contacts of Nazi leaders. These plans came to be known to the Soviet Union in one way or another, and they were correspondingly accounted for in the selection of a particular decision. Unfortunately I would have to assert that far from all of us had such a choice.

Today it is easier for us to judge the past; we know many things now that were unknown then. But we cannot reshape history. We must learn to adequately read the facts, without adding undue emphasis to that which appears more important today in light of commonly accepted views, and without covering in darkness the events which played the decisive role in the conditions of those years, and which had primary significance.

Replying to the question concerning the photocopies and typed copies of documents referred to as the "secret protocols" to the 23 August 1939 pact, which appear from time to time in publications of the Western press, I would like to note that attempts to reveal their originals have never been undertaken either in the West or in our country. It must be said that efforts have been made in the Soviet Union, and are presently being made very intensively but fruitlessly for the moment, to reveal the originals of these documents in the archives. And if they are found, they will be assessed appropriately.

And so, do the originals exist or not? The answer to this question is not as straight-forward as is often believed. History requires a weighted and not a speculative attitude, it requires unbiased reading of that which was, and not references to documents that are not known certainly to be authentic.

11004

Return of Estonian Archives From FRG Anticipated

18000055 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Sep 88 p 6

[Interview with Doctor of Historical Sciences R. Pullat, director of the ESSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of History, conducted by IZVESTIYA staff correspondent L. Levitskiy, under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "Return Archives to Tallinn"; first paragraph is unattributed source introduction]

[Text] In June 1944, in the face of the fascist troops' retreat, the occupation administration's special service-

transported out of Tallinn 175 boxes of extremely valuable materials encompassing nearly seven centuries of the city's life, from the 13th through 19th centuries. To this day the Tallinn archives are in the FRG. Doctor of Historical Sciences R. Pullat, director of the ESSR Institute of History, tells about its fate.

[Question] Raymo Nikolayevich, lately reports have appeared in the press to the effect that official FRG agencies have changed their stand and are looking with understanding on the demands of Estonia's public and scholars and other organizations in our country that the extremely valuable documents of the past be returned to Tallinn.

[Answer] Yes, it seems that there has been a turn for the better. F. Vaganov, director of the USSR Council of Ministers' Chief Archives Administration, has met with representatives of the FRG Ministry of the Interior, to which the archival service is subordinate, and has reached a preliminary agreement on the establishment of a group of Soviet and Western experts. Specialists from both states are supposed to work out procedures for returning the archives.

Since 1956, following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG, our country has persistently worked to achieve the return of the historic documents. K. Rebane, president of the ESSR Academy of Sciences, Kh. Lumi, chairman of the Tallinn Gorispolkom, the writer L. Meri and I asked the FRG Embassy in Moscow last year to help us meet with Mr. von Weizsacker, federal president of the republic, during his official visit to the USSR. But we were refused. Then we sent the federal president a letter setting forth the essence of the problem. Alas, there was still no answer. And now, it seems, there have been changes for the better.

[Question] What sort of documents were taken out of Tallinn?

[Answer] What is impressive, first of all, is their very quantity—175 boxes. They contained 1,700 ancient documents and 187 running meters (and there is such a standard of measurement) of acts and books. They are of tremendous value both for the study of national culture and for the development of historical scholarship. When I saw this collection for the first time in Gottingen, I was beside myself. From inventories and prewar catalogues, I knew what was concentrated in the collection. But it was something entirely different to see it with my own eyes.

One of the most valuable things here is Estonia's ancient documents. The oldest of them was published in 1237. Collections of legal documents, merchants' account books and a great deal else—basic reliable sources for the economic history of the republic. They are also important for the understanding of social problems and the study of medieval culture. They include practically all the commercial books of Tallinn firms up to modern times. Various port books—how can one imagine relations and the history of trade with European cities

without them?! Records of the proceedings of the city council from the 16th through 19th centuries. After all, this is extremely valuable information concerning the socioeconomic, administrative and cultural activities of city services. Also of tremendous interest is correspondence between Tallinn and other cities in Russia and cities, municipalities and governments of Europe. The carefully collected and preserved chronicle of international contacts. Inventory books—the authentic picture of life of all strata of the population: what funds they had, what property they held, and how they ate. The study of the everyday life of our predecessors is an extremely important area in scholarly research conducted by the historians of many European countries. Lists of books telling about home libraries and the literary predilections of various generations of Tallinn citizens. I should also mention the books of the Tallinn Great Guild, the Guild of St. Canute and the Domskeya Guild, and the books of the "Schwarzhaupter House." I discovered the latter collection while working in the Hamburg archives. It is separate from the rest of the collection that is concentrated in Coblenz (the Schwarzhaupter were a union of young noblemen of German nationality).

Tallinn was always a multinational city. From the Middle Ages right up until the end of the 1930s, a good many emigrants from Germany lived in it. Therefore, the interest in it and attention given to it by scholars from both the FRG and GDR are understandable. They have done a good many serious studies, monographs and other books. I have also encountered opinions of the following sort: the archives contain a good many documents concerning the activities of German colonists, and therefore it should remain in the FRG. An absolutely absurd claim. The political map of Europe has been redrawn many times. What was and remains unchanging are the lands and the peoples living on them. The Estonians should not be deprived of the right to their history because they were under the yoke of German colonizers for a certain time.

[Question] That is probably the main argument because of which Estonia's capital has not yet gotten back the collection of its historic relics, isn't it?

[Answer] Unfortunately, there are many such arguments, but none has any relation either to scholarship or to history, or even to international law. Cold political winds of the past froze the fate of the archives. Political rubbish also usually piles up around real complexities. For the sake of objectivity, since I am a person with a very great stake in the return of the archives, I shall cite arguments given in an article in the magazine DER SPIEGEL. It was published in 1979. The article's title and subtitle are characteristic: "Unresolved. Moscow Demands the Rest of the Loot the Nazis Dragged Off: Archives from the Baltic Region. Bonn Refuses."

Let me note right off: Not just Moscow. The Estonian people is demanding what rightfully belongs to it. The

article goes on to express doubts, citing emigrant circles: the archives will hardly end up in Tallinn; they will remain in Moscow.

The author also gives more "weighty" arguments: the return of the documents would supposedly mean de facto consent to "Soviet domination" in the Baltic region. I want to quote a literal translation: "An investigation by the Ministry of the Interior has shown that the archival materials were formally turned over to German occupiers during their retreat by the municipal administration of Revel (that was what Tallinn was called) in order, as Helmut [Weis], former German representative of the Revel General Commissariat, recalls, to protect them from the approaching Red Army."

[Question] Excuse me, but that isn't the same Helmut [Weis], the Baltic German, who left Tallinn for Germany in 1940 and reappeared in the city a year later as director of the department of culture and policy under the Hitlerite commissar for Estonia?

[Answer] Yes, that is the one. He was one of those who demanded and organized the shipment of the documents out. And he is the one who is now being cited as proof of the "voluntary" nature of the removal of the materials. These attempts are devoid of all logic. The occupational authorities forcibly (that is confirmed by documents) removed items of scientific, cultural and artistic value from the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic republics, and from all the captured territories. Their removal was carried out by Rosenberg's service strictly according to plan and a schedule monitored by agents from Riga, where the Ostland Reichskommissariat was stationed. Evidence to this effect has been published by the world press. One of the documents prescribed: remove what is most valuable. For example, from Riga—the city and state archives, from Tallinn—the city archives, the collections of the Estonian literary society and the collections of the Schwarzhaupt House, the city hall, the Lutheran consistory and the Church of St. Nicholas; from Tartu—the university library and the collections of a number of Estonian landed estates. Everything was written down, but the plan did not succeed—the rapid advance of the Red Army prevented it. Therefore, there is no reason to cast a shadow on Estonian scholars and archivists. With risk to themselves, they delayed the sending off of the collections and hid part of them, deceiving the authorities. R. Kenkmaa, director of the archives, and his colleague E. Siymo did everything they could to delay the gathering up process. In a letter to the reichskommissariat they wrote straightforwardly: "It is desired to take the archives out to Germany. That surprises us. They can be hidden from the approaching front in Estonian settlements. Why is it desired to liquidate the archives? That humiliates us." And even at the very last moment they insisted on drawing up an act of transfer. It included the following clause: "The evacuation does not affect the issue of the right of ownership, and the archival materials that have been turned over should be delivered to Tallinn no later than the end of the present war."

So the archives already has a special chapter—the chapter concerning its delayed deportation.

[Question] How do scholars and archivists in the Federal Republic of Germany regard the problem?

[Answer] Their view, in any case the view of the majority of the scholars, coincides with ours: the archives should be located where they were born and collected. They have repeatedly expressed it in the FRG and Estonian press. And we are very grateful to them for that. Especially to Prof. [G. Booms], president of the federal archives. Practically the whole Tallinn collection is concentrated in the federal archives in the city of Coblenz. He is a supporter of returning the items of historical value, and he has done everything possible to facilitate their study by Estonian scholars.

Granted, there are also doubts among some West German scholars. They are afraid as to whether they will have access to the materials in Tallinn. Unquestionably. Even today researchers from the FRG, Finland and other countries are working in the republic's archives and libraries, and we will further develop mutually enriching contacts with our foreign colleagues.

The most serious obstacle today is the fact that the return of the Tallinn archives is being made directly dependent on the turning over to the FRG of the archives of the former Hanseatic cities. Collections of documents of Lubeck, Bremen and Hamburg were rescued from the ruins during street battles in 1945. I think it does makes no sense to draw a direct commercial parallel: we give you yours, and you give us ours. As a scholar I am convinced that every archive should be in its own homeland. And I am very glad that official Soviet agencies have confirmed their readiness to return the rescued relics to the FRG. And there is no reason to complicate already complicated problems. Their sober solution in a spirit of goodwill will contribute to the strengthening of friendship and mutual understanding between countries.

8756

Lithuanian Academician Examines Issue of Republic Sovereignty, Restructuring Movement
18000024a Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
10 Aug 88 p 3

[Interview with I. Minkyavichyus by V. Yanov: "Lithuania's Sovereignty: Past and Present—A Discussion with Professor I. Minkyavichyus, Corresponding Member, LiSSR Academy of Sciences"]

[Text] [Question] Professor, you participated in the restoration of the Soviet authority in Lithuania. What do you remember about the events of the summer of 1940?

[Answer] I saw the sessions of the People's Diet with my own eyes. At that time I was 19 years old and had just recently entered the Komsomol. We were brought as a group of Komsomol members from Shyaulay to Kaunas so that we could see how the diet operated. Even then we realized that this was a historic, pivotal event. For that level of awareness, it was simply fabulous. And I mean fabulous without any exaggeration. For three days my friends and I stood near the wall, listening to reports that substantiated the necessity for Soviet authority in Lithuania. And, in the same place, we listened with no less attention, during the diet sessions, to poets reading their verses. It was then that I saw A. Snechkus, Yu. Paletskis, and M. Gedvilas for the first time.

The spiritual upsurge in the summer of 1940 actually was natural and frank. And the affectionate feelings toward the USSR were also frank. The Soviet Union seemed to be an ideal country, an ideal society, and Stalin seemed to be a symbol of justice. As to what was actually occurring in that country, we did not know or even guess. The Communists were a bit older, and they probably had already understood a few things and had heard a few things from their comrades in arms.

A political philosophy of the world, if it is not supported by facts, does not know reality. As a rule, that philosophy is formed on the basis of a faith which, with the passage of time, turns into political fanaticism. The socialist ideology of that time was a myth that everyone believed in unconditionally. Enemies of the people were actually enemies of the people, and they deserved harsh punishment. Just ask people who are a bit older, people who will not lie to you: almost everyone believed...

However, let us return to those times. For almost a year after the diet, the republic lived calmly. New relations were developing, and the Soviet authority, for which, in the villages of the landless peasants and the poor, there was no special need to agitate, was becoming stronger. The best agitation was the partitioning of the land. I participated in one of the land commissions in Kurshenskaya Volost, Shyaulay Uyezd, where there was a large number of farm workers for whom the Soviet authority, of course, had performed a miracle—it had given them land. For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that there were also people with a hostile frame of mind, but their actions during that first year of the restored Soviet authority were not significant.

Misfortune came to Lithuania in 1941. Not on 22 June, but slightly earlier. On 14 June, literally overnight, according to officially published data, more than 12,000 persons were exiled. The persons who were formally exiled were former members of bourgeois parties that had already been disbanded, various officials, and persons with large amounts of property, but, in my opinion, this was a stab in the back of the nation—specifically the nation as a living organism. And it is here that we are

getting to the roots that feed the present-day passions, including the nationalistic ones. Because, even a half-century later, those wounds are not healing. The fact of the matter is that, despite the Stalinist thesis concerning the intensification of the class struggle, that action was perceived not as a class action, but a national one, inasmuch as Russians (the overwhelming majority of the workers in the pertinent agencies were Russian) had exiled Lithuanians (the overwhelming majority of those exiled were, naturally, Lithuanians). The man in the street, unfamiliar with the principles of Marxism, perceived this in precisely this way, and the genuinely affectionate feelings for the Russians in 1940 were replaced by animosity in 1941. But that nationalism was extremely fastidious: the hostility manifested itself only with respect to the Russian newcomers, but the Lithuanian villages lived peacefully and amicably with the entire villages of Old Believers.

We also poured a lot of oil into the flames after Lithuania's liberation from the German fascists. Intimidated by those Germans, the people fled into the forest from everything—from induction into the army, from grain procurements, from loans, from collectivization. Of course, all these actions led to excesses. I myself agitated in Alitusskiy Uyezd for kolkhozes and I remember well the excesses committed during collectivization. Everything, I repeat, at that time was constructed basically on blind, fanatical faith...

After a long silence it is now necessary for us to reconsider the former misunderstandings and obvious errors. And it is necessary first of all to analyze in detail the interethnic relations and to admit the mistakes that were made. In my opinion, the very act alone of making a complete and public admission of them will help considerably to normalize the situation. However, of course, that is not enough...

[Question] The day before our conversation I read the article "The Land and Us" by V. Palma, a professor at Tartu University (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 23 March 1988), in which, it seems to me, the author made a successful attempt to analyze the interethnic relations. He writes that there is no hope in analyzing the national question without going beyond its confines, inasmuch as the roots that feed it are situated in other soil, and not only in the past. Following the ancient Romans' principle of asking "to whose advantage?", let us ask the question: to whose advantage is it to support and incite the tension in the relations between Lithuanians and Russians? In whose interests is it to oppose to one another the people of various nationalities who are living on Lithuanian land? Because the Russians, certainly no less than the Lithuanians, want to breathe clean air and drink pure water, and the Lithuanians, no less than the Russians, want to work at the height of their capacities and to be paid on the basis of their labor. Everyone—Lithuanians, Russians, Poles, Belorussians, and Jews—have a self-interest in improving medical services, in reducing the number of alcoholics and drug addicts, in lowering the crime level, etc.—in a word,

the basic interests of everyone living in Lithuania coincide. To whom, then, is it advantageous to oppose them to one another? It is here that the so-called national question spills out of its confines and enters the area of the relations among various social groups and segments. The resolution of the national question rests, then, upon those forces that can resolve it, that can considerably lessen the tension, but this is not advantageous for them. Because the harmonizing of national relations promises the success of perestroika, which success, for those forces, is mortal...

[Answer] I agree with that posing of the question. Moreover, I feel that it should be viewed in a broader context. The forces that you mentioned are operating, if one may express it this way, in a comprehensive manner: they are retarding not only the solution of the national question, but also the development of the economy, are limiting glasnost, hushing up the ecological problems, etc. They want to leave everything the way it was, because, actually, perestroika is not advantageous for them. It contradicts their interests.

The movement for perestroika in Lithuania, in which movement I am a member of the organizing group, sets itself the task of fighting against that inhibiting mechanism. At the present time a large number of different interpretations are being given to this movement. I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to clarify certain questions.

First. The movement is often called national, and sometimes even nationalistic (unfortunately, the basis for this was provided by certain incorrect slogans on posters and certain statements that were made at rallies and that are incompatible with the principles of the movement). Nationalistic scum like this does not have anything in common with the movement for perestroika and only hampers its normal development. It is a pity that, in this instance, appearance does not coincide with the essence, but distorts it. Our movement is not exclusively a Lithuanian one. It is a nationwide, patriotic, republic movement. It is territorial, that is, it defends the interests of all the people who are living on Lithuanian land. For the time being, of course, we have not been entirely successful, but we are striving toward this. Obviously, the persons who are most active in the movement for perestroika are the Lithuanians, since, first of all, they are the majority in the republic, and, secondly, this is, needless to say, the land of their forefathers...

Second. The sole fundamental confrontation that is carried out by the movement for perestroika is the confrontation with bureaucratism, with everything that is hindering our forward movement. The movement opposes those officials and institutions whose activities it considers to be incompetent and contradictory to the ideas of perestroika or that hinder the implementation of those ideas.

And now a slight digression. Once I received a telephone call from an old friend. We had worked together at one time as secretaries at a party gorkom. She asked me outright, "What do you want to do? Seize the power?" If such questions arise, it is, once again, necessary to explain that the movement for perestroika is not a political organization. It is actually an informal movement that by no means sets as its goal the seizure of power, but rather the striving for glasnost and democracy, the striving for the real sovereignty of the republic as part of the USSR, the striving for the observance of civil rights and socialist legality through the agencies of the Soviet authority (and I emphasize, precisely the Soviet authority), and through social organizations and labor collectives.

Unfortunately, the republic press has not yet published a sufficient amount of completely reliable information about our movement.

[Question] What, then, does the sovereignty of Lithuanian SSR mean for the movement for perestroika?

[Answer] First of all, the republic's greater responsibility in resolving all kinds of problems—economic (cost accountability in the republic), political, national, cultural, social, ecological, and others—that express the real interests of the inhabitants of Lithuanian nationality and the other nationalities in the republic. The movement will do everything to promote the creation of a law-oriented state in Soviet Lithuania, on the basis of the equal rights of a state that is part of the USSR, where the will of the people will be realistically represented in all the published laws and in the agencies of executive and legal authority.

It is very important to attempt to dispel the various myths that have been aggravating the interethnic relations. For example, I have frequently heard that Lithuania feeds all of Russia. And, conversely, that Russia has been investing millions in Lithuania, sends Lithuania machinery and machine tools, and receives nothing in exchange. In my opinion there has not been a shortage of items in the newspapers and magazines that dispel these rumors. However, opinions such as this keep springing up again and again. If the time for republic-level cost accountability comes, it will immediately become clear who is feeding whom and who is giving what to whom. At least no one will be insulted by unfounded rumors...

As far as the sovereignty of Lithuanian SSR is concerned, our republic, in my opinion, has not yet made sufficient use of its sovereign rights, as declared in the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR and the USSR Constitution. And the very word "sovereignty" itself, which, for some reason, is so embarrassing for those who could be called "believers in stagnation," has been taken out of the Constitution. They, incidentally, define more accurately the essence of our aspirations than the expression that

narrows the problem—"republic-level cost accountability." All one has to do is to reread attentively the articles in the USSR Constitution concerning the status of the union republic, in order to understand that even within the confines of our Basic Law, which was enacted during the so-called years of stagnation, it is possible to improve much in the life of Lithuania. The only thing with which, in my opinion, one cannot agree today is that the section of Article 73 that states, "Under the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the person of its superior agencies of state authority and administration are... 7) The management of the branches of the national economy, associations and enterprises of union subordination, the overall management of the branches of union-republic subordination..." It is behind that article and its broad interpretation that there is concealed, in my opinion, the possibility of the economic *diktat*, which possibility, at this moment, is being used successfully by the central ministries and departments. The problems of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Kurshskaya Kosa, and the pollution of the air by the chemical giants have been aggravated specifically because paragraph 7 of Article 73 of the USSR, "because of higher considerations," limits the sovereignty of our republic and the influence exerted by the people living in Lithuanian upon the processes that are occurring here. The movement for perestroika cannot and does not want to reconcile itself to this state of affairs, because one of its chief principles is the striving for the sovereignty of Lithuanian SSR as part of the USSR. The striving to assure that the opinion of the nation that lives on our ancient and beautiful land is decisive.

Editorial note: As a result of various circumstances, in the awareness and understanding of many people who have sent concerned letters to the editor with regard to the purposes and tasks of the movement for perestroika there has been formed a view that differs somewhat from Professor I. Minkyavichyus' opinion concerning certain actions being carried out by the initiators of this movement, which attest to the increasingly frequent discrepancies that arise between intentions and execution, between "desire" and reality. Stating it outright, the overwhelming majority of the authors of these letters are representatives of non-Lithuanian nationality. At the same time, these people, as a rule, are persons who were born on Lithuanian land or have lived here for many years. The fathers and grandfathers of many of them are buried here, on this land. That is, the authors of the letters consider themselves to have the right to call themselves indigenous inhabitants, for whom this land is their Homeland, and that, we daresay, says it all. And one can understand their pain and their offense, just as we can understand the offense felt by the republic's inhabitants and guests for whom the Lithuanian language is not their native language, when they see, on posters that were raised during rallies conducted under the aegis of the movement, insulting and unjustified words directed at them. And if, as I. Minkyavichyus asserts, the principles of the movement for perestroika do not have anything in common with such nationalistic

scum, we can rightfully hope that its organizing group will provide a precise definition in this question, and will succeed in calling to order those who have been compromising the movement itself. Unfortunately, we do not yet see any efforts on the part of the movement leaders to give that movement not a narrowly national nature, but a generally patriotic one.

Nor can the editorial office agree with the professor's assertion to the effect that bourgeois nationalism manifested itself in 1941 as a kind of protest to the mass exiling of 12,000 persons that was carried out during that year, and to an even greater extent cannot agree with his thesis concerning the "fastidiousness" of the nationalism of that period. Because selective nationalism cannot exist at all. But, without engaging in a broad discussion, we would like to cite an excerpt from a letter writing by a person born in Lithuania—I. Sinyakov, who had been a witness to those remote events:

"The year 1941 came. The war had not yet begun, and the white-armbanders with weapons in their hands were still operating. When our troops left, many completely innocent young men and fathers of Russian families were seized by the white-armbanders, taken away, and shot. At that time 30 people were shot to death in our village of Lebenishkyay, in Birzhayskiy Rayon, and that village contains only 80 households. So what are we to believe? That the personality cult also exerted an influence on that execution? And I am mentioning only one village...

"Currently many people write that banditry sprang up in the republic as a result of the excesses, as a consequence of the Stalinist cult. In my own Birzhayskiy Rayon in September 1944, I hand-carried to all the homes notifications of induction into the Soviet Army. None of the rich home-owners accepted the notifications, and many of the members of those families left to join a bandit gang. That is, they made their own choice, their class choice... But the circumstances are not pertinent here..."

I. Minkyavichyus remarks, completely justifiably, that many interpretations have arisen around the movement for perestroika and that certain people see in it the aspiration of a definite group of people to enter the agencies of administration, others consider it to be nationalistic, still others consider it to be anti-Soviet... As is well known, different interpretations arise wherever precise information and the clarity of the program are replaced by emotional outbursts, where specific deeds are overshadowed by high-sounding words. Promoting perestroika is primarily an action that has a specific object for the application of efforts. And, to be completely honest, it is high time to use effectively the accumulated efforts. The time for throwing stones has passed. Now it is time to collect them.

Azeri Critic Berates Conationals for Failure to Promote National Interests

18300313 Baku MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA in Russian 11 Jun 88 p 2

[Interview with Aydyn Mamedov by A. Aliyev: "We Must Not Take a Rest"; date, place, occasion not specified; first two paragraphs are MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA introduction]

[Text] Recent events have afforded us many trials and anxieties, but at the same time have provided good experience. These events may be analyzed from various points of view—political, ideological, economic. But an analysis of them must take into account one thing: they have provided the impetus for the national self-awareness of a people.

How can we utilize this stirring national self-awareness in the genuine interests of the people? How can we use the fruits of its flourishing in the brotherhood of the peoples of the USSR and in the interests of restructuring? Our conversation with literary critic Aydyn Mamedov, first deputy to the chief editor of the USSR journal SOVETSKAYA TYURKOLOGIYA [Soviet Turkology] deals with this main issue.

[Mamedov] In my opinion, we Azeris—forgive my using such a categorical reference—must, in the interests of development, restructure the entirety of our national thinking.

Let me share my ideas with you. The influence of inertia and stagnation has been felt more noticeably in our republic than in any other. The traditional Eastern way of thinking, with its conservative, non-progressive qualities, strongly predominates here. A role has also been played here, apparently, by those national traits of ours which were relentlessly excoriated by Mirza Dzhahil and A. Akhverdiyev and ridiculed by Sabir and U. Gadzhibekov. In spite of the fact that we Azeris are, as we always say, one of the oldest and most cultured peoples in the world, such traits to this very day are unfortunately right by our side. Sometimes they even flourish. Today in order to effectively stand alongside the most developed peoples of the world, we must unite our entire historical experience and our national resources with the progressive forms of modern European thinking.

[Question] Could you not give us specifics with regard to your concept—let us say, using an example from history which is currently drawing a lot of interest?

[Answer] Certainly. Especially since the state of affairs in this regard provides the best confirmation of what I have said—to this very day the history of Azerbaydzhana, the ethnogenesis of its people, and the history of its language and literature remain unstudied.

There are certainly objective causes for this as well, the most important of these being the fact that we lost an entire generation of scholars and scientists in the 1930's—talented, democratically oriented people. Then there was a vacuum. A new generation of scholars appeared later on under the intimidation of Stalinism. Adapting to the surrounding environment, it began studying not the objective course of history, raising not those questions which needed to be raised, but bringing up only those issues which could be resolved. Science was an absolute slave to directives "from above." Such a devastating trend as this for any science has, by the way, still to this day not been eliminated from our republic.

Now to proceed to the subjective reasons. We have many scholars in this sphere of science—historians, ethnographers, mythologists, etc. But I see in their research—with some slight exceptions—that Eastern-ness of our thinking. I would even call it a "fairy-tale" quality, the striving for outward magnificence. When our scholars speak of the history of our people, its language and literature, they use lofty words, facts not completely checked out, hasty conclusions and all kinds of epithets. Do you remember Sabir saying: "We are raising our pant legs before we reach the river"? And what does European science say? Its basis is comprised of a line of reasoning, simplicity, non-contradiction, soundness and logic to conclusion. Last year the article by I. Tsirtautas about one of the "Manas" performers was published in our magazine. The fellow lives in America. Still he knows "Manas" quite well, has mastered the Kirghiz language and knows ancient Turkic cultural monuments.

When a European scholar sets his sights on the study of some people, he first strives to know the people through knowledge of their language, culture, customs, etc. And what do we do? We study their history directly, usually not knowing Farsi nor Arabic, not even knowing those cultural monuments which existed and which exist today on the territory of Azerbaydzhana, not knowing what ancient scholars wrote about Azerbaydzhana—in short, without having assimilated the necessary body of knowledge which in one way or another affects the history of our people. It must be said, all the same, that the young generation of scholars is better in this regard than its predecessors. Quite a number of these are talented and knowledgeable, and are working to meet these demands.

[Question] Not long ago you said at a plenary session of the board of directors of the Azerbaydzhana Writers' Union dedicated to the problems of young men of letters that it was not enough to be talented and knowledgeable, that our young people must attain a high level of political culture and facilitate the strengthening of the self-preservation and development of our people within the family of peoples of the USSR.

[Answer] The ethnocultural environment exerts an influence on all peoples—on the "great" ones and "lesser" ones. Granted, such influence does not disturb anyone, but development is impossible without it. In order not to

lose originality we must show a solid force of self-preservation as well. This force depends on the extent of a people's spiritual riches and cultural development, on their economic potential and the strength of their unity as a people.

The self-preservation force of the Azeri people is slight. We are fighting a losing battle in comparison to many other peoples—and we can say this is true in every sphere. We are losing in linguistic policies, ecological matters, and in questions of economic and cultural development. We are also losing from the point of view of the impact of our voice.

Let us look at one simple fact: do our writers and scholars—and I include myself here—often appear in the central press? The excuses are many. All the same, do we write the things which cannot be printed but are impossible not to print?

The voice of Azerbaydzhan is almost unheard in the life of the USSR. Events in Nagorno Karabakh and the surrounding area once again confirm this. Just think—here we have unfounded territorial claims presented against us, resulting in harm being inflicted on the good neighborly relations which have developed historically between two peoples. And the final result, judging from material published in the central press and presented over centrally broadcast television, is that the guilty party is being sought among us. Why? I think it is because we have not achieved the requisite authority—as a people, not specific individuals. We are always waiting for someone else to resolve an issue in our place, waiting for a directive to be issued from above. And what will our nation itself resolve? Today everyone must be able to defend his opinion, and our people as a whole must be able to defend the truth—through the skill of reasoned argument, through honesty in orientation and policy. For we are constantly seeing ourselves in the role of a man who doesn't know whether or not he is right. Someone has to prove to us that we are right, and then we begin to shout: "Look—you see we are right!"

It seems to me our problem is that we don't think in terms of the big picture.

[Question] What do you mean?

[Answer] Imagine, for example, that the Japanese have some extra capital. What do they do with it? Most likely they invest it in the development of the electronics industry or in some other sphere of the economy which is today shaping scientific and technological progress. We would use this money, figuratively speaking, to buy ourselves a toy, then amuse ourselves, engaging in self-deception.

Let me cite a more specific example. A net of cooperatives has been established in the country, development of which is related to resolving a number of national economic issues. Estonian cooperative managers are

making an ever increasing contribution to strengthening the economic potential of their republic. We understand the cooperative only as an opportunity to earn an extra ruble. We do not show the kind of thinking that would result in utilizing its capabilities to eliminate weak areas. We therefore have our share of cooperative cafes and restaurants, but in the spheres of providing services, scientific endeavor and agriculture their numbers are insignificant.

[Question] But thinking in terms of the "big picture" must be accomplished first and foremost by the people who determine policy—not necessarily on the level of city, rayon and republic, but rather of scientific research institute, plant and department... i.e., cadre once again.

[Answer] In our republic it is rare that a job position falls into the hands of an individual worthy of it. It is as if there is some kind of conscious reshuffling of cadre taking place. The person who is good in production becomes the head of some cultural institution. One who could make a contribution in the culture sphere is appointed, let us say, in the construction field. We do not ask ourselves the question—who in a given sphere can make the most beneficial public contribution, regardless of party membership, age or sex? It is other questions that interest us—what rayon and village is he from, to whom is he related, whose daughter did he marry... This too is an indicator of our level of thinking.

Today like never before our nation needs people who will, like a tugboat, pull along behind them our national self-consciousness. Do we have many such people in our republic? No. And in my view they are few even among our party and Komsomol leadership, because we have not raised them right. We have not planted them in fertile soil or charged them intellectually. We have failed to inculcate a sense that the interests of the people must occupy a higher position than the interests of family, village or region.

Nepotism and locale influence are the tragedy of our people. They are signs of the "herd" psychology—if only my family, my people, my group can be strong; it is of no consequence that this will result in fragmenting the people and do harm to the interests of the republic and the country. Today under conditions of democracy and glasnost, many talented, cultured and educated people have appeared among us, chiefly 25-30 year-olds, and they are increasing the pressure on incompetents. In the face of such pressure these incompetents try to gather together in their "herd" and cling to one another, thus effecting resistance. But it is one thing when the people unite for development, and another when incompetents, bribe takers and influence peddlers do so in order to preserve their regalia, job positions and privileges.

It is probably for precisely this reason that resistance to restructuring is so strong in our republic. From all appearances this contradiction between people who are

living the interests of their republic and country, adherents of democracy and glasnost, and people living the interests of their "herd," will grow in the near future. There can be no reconciliation here—because the psychology of the "herd" is an echo of the past, of Stalinism, stagnation.

[Question] It seems to me no coincidence that you utter these words one after another...

[Answer] In my opinion, stagnation is in its own way the continuation of Stalinism—only the forms of repression have changed. The repressive forces are no weaker than those of Stalinism. You do not necessarily have to destroy a person physically—you can do it morally as well. How many 50 year-olds departed this life in the 70's due to heart attack? When you remove a good specialist from his specialty—isn't that repression as far as he is concerned? When you entrust a major agricultural region to an individual who understands nothing about agriculture—isn't that repression with respect to the land and the peasant? When under various pretexts you fail to provide certain scientists the opportunity to participate in selecting the director of the Linguistics Institute of the Azerbaydzhan Academy of Sciences—isn't that repression with respect to the scientist? Or consider the fact that the role of the Azeri language in technological institutes has plunged to zero—isn't that repression with respect to our native language? Affording privileges to people of one region while denying them to people of another, and making this standard practice—isn't that repression regarding national cadre?

We say that the literature of the 1930's facilitated the inception and strengthening of Stalinism—those ecstatic novels about collectivization, odes to Stalin... This is true. But did not this trend towards adaptation devices continue during the years of stagnation? Of course it did. Even our most democratic writers could not avoid the temptation of extolling our insignificant successes. Every lie was rewarded in suitable fashion. Otherwise it was impossible to break through to the rewards, ranks and blessings bestowed by "the highest levels." And many hands stretched up there which had forgotten what true civic responsibility meant. On every street corner we shouted: "If you want to see paradise, come to Azerbaydzhan." What—is life in Azerbaydzhan paradise? Could ecological conditions in Baku and Sumgayit, the state of agriculture and education, the fact that the republic has lost its age-old way of life and that the people of certain regions live in poverty—could all this be paradise? Did we not see all of this? We saw it but, unfortunately, said nothing. Were we afraid? Yes—and it was agreeable to live that way.

We should study this period in our life in detail—openly, holding nothing back—because the repressive forces of the period of stagnation exist even today, continuing to do their work. I am not saying that the 70's were one continuous period of stagnation. We had our successes, especially in literary and cultural life. Our people were

always working, always performing creatively. But our losses were tremendous at the same time, and in this we are all at fault—I too. I too applauded, my hair also stood on end in ecstasy when they told me I was the hub of the universe, that I was a representative of the most developed and most cultured people. Today we have begun to understand, to analyze, to criticize. We must speak the truth—and not only speak, but be truthful in our actions. The truth and only the truth—this is our medicine and our weapon.

[Question] But in order to speak the truth it is not enough just to know it. All day long a censor sitting inside each of our heads corrects our thoughts. Only a free man can speak the truth. Perhaps the root of those evils you speak of is not to be found so much in that we have few intelligent people, as much as in that we have few free people. It is therefore very important today to instill this quality in our people and remove those feelings of fear and dread...

[Answer] To this day we see little Stalins occupying many leadership positions. Well, what do we mean by Stalin? We mean an idol of country-wide proportions. Then you have the republic "idols": idol-secretaries, idol-ministers, idol-managers, etc. And when you begin to criticize the idol who stands below, the one above him immediately comes to his defense, seeing his own future in the man's case. This is purely and simply a vertical "herd." It crushes people, instills fear in them and attempts to subordinate the individual to itself. When a young man arrives, let us say, at the academy of sciences to get settled in his job, a little "idol" says to him: "Look, you know yourself how difficult it is to get into the academy, but thanks to your uncle who phoned me, I'm arranging it." And you start from there. And this young man who received the "gift" of employment from the "idol" falls like a five-kopek piece into the man's piggy bank, losing his freedom for the rest of his life. It is already too late to ever be able to criticize him or vote against him at elections. He will not even be able to express an opinion which contradicts that of his "benefactor." We "noticed" you, brought you into our "active membership," expressed "confidence" in you—be so kind as to observe the laws of the "herd." Otherwise...

This is the psychology we must destroy.

I tell you—you won't destroy this with your intellect. It will require an effective, revolutionary transformation of our society. We have to rid ourselves of that ever constant "gratitude" towards one another. The most frightening thing is that those rare individuals who have achieved everything through their own efforts still feel grateful to everyone, because all around are saying: "Well, what's your story? What do you deserve? There's nobody standing at your back."

A man can never be free in society if he is not free from the bureaucrats. It is elementary—if I need to put my child into the hospital, I first must find a way to

approach the head doctor to insure the child will be treated suitably. And from then on we will not even say hello except through an intermediary. Can a nation develop freely under such conditions? Can a person be free?

If some intelligent person from "below" gets appointed to a position, we all express immediate amazement: "What a miracle! How did he get there?" And we begin to look for kinship channels which would connect this individual with "the top." This is the kind of slavish psychology which crushes freedom.

I presently have to look for a building for our magazine. I'd like it to be in Icheri Shekher—after all, the magazine has an Eastern slant. And I know that if I succeed in doing this, I will then be able to establish a center where, from time to time, leading Eastern specialists will gather from all countries in the world, through whom we will be able to reach the peoples of the world with perhaps just a particle of our national essence. But how difficult it is to accomplish this! And I don't know how many more trips I'll make requesting it. Most likely everyone has such problems. But then we still say: "What's happened with us? Why aren't we standing tall? Who is to blame here for the fact that our voice, the voice of Azerbaydzhani, is heard nowhere?"

[Question] This last issue is in my opinion very important—because the development of national self-consciousness is not only a mental process. It is a practical activity directed towards destroying obstacles on the path of a people's achievements and their great successes within the family of peoples of our country. Sometimes we look for these obstacles where it pleases us, not around ourselves or within ourselves.

[Answer] Let me relate a story.

Discussions have been taking place for over ten years with regard to the need to publish in Moscow the folklore version of "Kerogly," a masterpiece of Azeri literature. Over this period of time, Turkmen and Tajik versions of "Kerogly" have come out in the capital and others are presently being published. But our men of letters are unable to this day to prepare their version because they cannot agree among themselves—each one is going off in his own direction. But in the final analysis it is possible to prepare a collective variant. Damn—they shouldn't be doing this for us in Moscow. So what we've got is a situation where we are ourselves artificially impeding our own work.

Or consider our policy in the scientific sphere—if we can go so far as to call it a policy.

You know—an interesting thing is happening here. We select an individual, not very talented more often than not, but energetic and aggressive, and we carry him through all the stages, up to academician, although his name doesn't sound at all on the all-union level. Instead

of a single academician slot, we could have opened up two associate member slots, could have made two talented doctors of science associate members of the republic's academy of sciences. Then there would be a competition and someone to choose from.

That is the way they did it in Georgia—academician Gamkrelidze, the product of a Georgian school, is an acknowledged linguist throughout the country and has been awarded the Lenin Prize. That's what I would call success. That's what I would call a real national policy in the scientific sphere. But you say that to someone and he will reply: "We have our own way of doing it." But what kind of a way is it, if it leads nowhere?

In our academies and institutions of higher learning we often see instances where an individual is defending a dissertation everyone knows was written for him by someone else, also sitting in the room. When the individual is asked a question, he cannot even open his mouth and an answer is provided for him by the true author. Everyone laughs, and everyone votes "yes." Who is more guilty—the High Degree Commission which neglects to get involved in all the details and confirms this dissertation, or we who vote for it thinking of personal benefit instead of benefit to the nation? We, of course.

Today we say a great deal about our own native language. One individual gets up on the podium and states: "The Azeri language is being forgotten. We must not let this happen." Everyone applauds. He comes down from the podium. Then you begin to speak with him and you see that he hasn't mastered the language particularly well himself.

An educated Azeri is a person who has brilliant mastery of his own and the Russian language. In order to be a moving force behind our national thinking, to carry the message of our people into country-wide orbit, one must first have a splendid knowledge of Russian, not just on the level of communications but with the intellectual ferment that is so much a part of this language. The Russian language is so dynamic—it can be used in all spheres of human activity. But we must make the Azeri language as developed as Russian—and to do this we have to work on it. The Azeri language is a poetic language. But today it must also become the language of economics, diplomacy, technical information... And in order to effect this, the language must be approved in all these spheres. Who must approve it? The individual who works in a given sphere. And he does not want to cut his own throat. You have books in Russian with ready-made terms and cliches which can be copied. And he writes in Russian. Then when he reaches the podium he shouts: "We must save the Azeri language."

And why does he not develop language in his own sphere? Because that requires a person to expend intellectual effort; it demands assiduousness, time. But he doesn't have the time—he must swiftly attract public

attention to himself, become "father of the people." We therefore have many "fathers" of the people, many party and Komsomol personnel, many directors, many ministers and deputies—but few hard workers. And it is these who are so very, very necessary to us today.

Our people truly have something to be proud of. But we have been working on this so long and hard that little strength remains for development. And while others have gone forward, we have been giving speeches—more easily accomplished while standing, since you don't have enough breath for giving speeches on the march.

Today we need people who will work all out, spend time in the archives and libraries, who will make a nation—not just live in it—and remake it anew, who will restructure its thinking into the "form and likeness" of the most progressive peoples in the world. We must therefore not allow one another to rest. We must extract all capabilities out of each other, not speak in the name of the people but perform for the people. We must learn and work, learn from everyone starting from our closest neighbors and extending to the farthest reaches of the planet. We must begin, of course, with the specific situation in our republic—economic, historical and cultural, without flattery and self-adulation. The finest flattery is work—but work in which every effort has its judge.

[Question] The judge must be the people themselves. For in the final analysis it is we who select the judges. The party's course towards restructuring is also related to the democratization of Soviet society, with a confirmation of socialist self-government by the people.

[Answer] The foundation of democracy is elections—we should turn these into the basic law of our life in every sphere, primarily in party and soviet work. To do this we need to reform the political system of Soviet society, a need which was expressed in the CC CPSU Theses of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

I am first of all an adherent of the policy which holds that all leading party officials in the republic should be selected by the people themselves. Why, for example, should not the candidacy for the post of central committee secretary for agriculture be discussed by the residents of the agricultural regions? Let the people themselves decide who can deliver to them the maximum benefit by serving in this post.

Once again let us take a look at why an individual who has completed work in the history department, done his Komsomol work, etc., suddenly finds himself overseeing medicine on the republic level. Or with us in the academic system, in the institute, when the least effective scholar suddenly becomes party committee secretary. Will he be able tomorrow to give an authoritative opinion during some scientific debate? Clearly the answer is no. And we are talking here about the authority of the party. You know, when I go out to the rayons, I get

the feeling from some first secretaries that they are in a position of "master" or "landlord." This is before they are removed from office. When they are removed, it turns out they were tyrants, had no understanding of management, etc. The question then arises as to how they were able to fool the population of an entire rayon as well as their own directorates, while receiving medals and gratitude. But had there been a good official of local authority standing alongside such a secretary, deputies competent if only to the extent of being able to know their rights and obligations, then I believe these things would not happen. But ispolkom chairmen today are in that very predicament that was described in novels of the 30's—always negative heroes, and the deputies are people who don't understand a thing, whether it be in economics or politics. Many ispolkom chairmen cannot even assign quarters in their own rayons without direct instruction from the first secretary. I have seen deputies, pretty ladies with hands so white it would seem they never engaged in labor, and these people, it turns out, are the outstanding production personnel. Really—what can they decide? What can they vote for? There was a time when this was beneficial—for those who ruled. That is how they roused a mandate—Bukharin turned out to be an enemy of the people, and Stalin and Beria—"fathers." We raised our hands—and a man who served in the war as a colonel became recipient of the "Victory" medal. It is a different matter today. Today the party itself summons us to political activity. Under such conditions there must be a strong counter-movement. And this requires deputies to be individuals who know the needs of the people and who are capable of solving their problems—with no delineation regarding young or old, man or woman, worker or scholar. The qualification must be one and the same—one hundred percent clever and understanding.

Secondly, we must resurrect the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" and fight for it if necessary. But not behind barricades with weapons in our hands—rather with the force of ideas. I am even confident that a powerful social movement of restructuring adherents will soon begin in our republic. We have, for example, many honest and decent, thinking individuals who are not party members. I know that their mood is to unite and assist the restructuring effort. It is truly difficult to accomplish anything at all without organization. This is our weak point for the time being. We use our utmost strength and are not accustomed to using our human intellect to benefit society.

[Question] Let me use this opportunity to ask a final question on Pan-Turkism. I will explain why this subject relates to our discussion.

The fact of the matter is that this term has come up frequently in connection with NKAO [expansion unknown] and surrounding events. At the same time, many readers write us to ask what it is. To whom should I address such a question if not to a Turkologist?

[Answer] Pan-Turkism, as it has emerged in Turkey, is a bourgeois-nationalistic ideology which has as its final aim the unification of all Turkic-speaking peoples under the aegis of Turkey. But what happens in Turkey is Turkey's affair—we will talk about ourselves.

Why has the term "Pan-Turkism" become so popular and been comprehended so aggressively in our country? In order to answer this question, let us look at exactly what circumstances have brought about its circulation.

The Turkic-speaking peoples of the USSR occupy a huge region extending from the shores of the Pacific to Moldavia. There was a time when we did not want to awaken the "genesis memory" of the Gagauz, Azeri, Kazakh, Kirgiz or Yakut peoples and therefore the term "Pan-Turkism" was always used in everyday life so as to be able to once again "repulse" that awakening memory at the right time and the right level.

In addition, this term always surfaced when regional conflicts arose between peoples of the USSR. And when, in an argument, there is a lack of intellect and sound reasoning, you see the labels being hung—you are a Pan-Turkist, and you are a Pan-Iranian.

The word "Pan-Turkism" was especially fashionable in the 30's and 40's. It is "thanks" to this word that then Turkic-speaking peoples, including the Azeri people, lost their best sons, and certain peoples even lost territories historically theirs. Thus the term "Pan-Turkism" splendidly fulfilled the unpleasant mission it was assigned during the Stalin era—and in the years to come as well. Many Turkology departments in our country are to this day developing quite weakly. Scholars must always be looking around the periphery and thinking like the "man in the case,"—"no matter what turns up." If one seeks truth instead of laurels—Heaven forbid!—he will earn as well the label "Pan-Turkist"...

In whose hands was this a weapon? In those of the same "idols," big and small, of the tyrants and incompetents. A talented, democratic individual will never accuse another using empty words. Distinguished individuals have always refrained from hanging labels—they have more often been the victims of such. Yet poorly educated, poorly refined individuals continue to this day to use the term "Pan-Turkism" to settle scores with more powerful opponents. Use of the term "Pan-Slavism" is analagous, by the way. The wonderful celebration of Slavic writings and one-thousandth anniversary of the Christianization of Russia are taking place, and already some people are rushing to use the "Pan-Slavism" label.

Let us consider, for example, the situation in our republic. We say that our history has not been studied, that the language situation of the past has not been brought to light, that we have not seen a solution to many problems. But what is necessary to resolve them? I quote from the conference theses: "We need a continuously acting mechanism for comparing and contrasting views, for

criticism and self-criticism." The truth becomes known in scientific discussions. And I only call scientific those discussions which are based on fact, founded on a strong scientific methodology. But what do we have?

Let us say that the facts I have at my disposal enable me to advance the hypothesis that the history of Turkish ethnicity has deeper roots than previously thought. This hypothesis can be refuted only on the basis of accurate scientific data. But my opponent neither has such information nor the desire to get hold of it. And he starts shouting: "This is a continuation of Pan-Turkist ideas!" The most frightening thing is that there are people who listen to him. Pan-Turkism is the most harmful term which can be used in a full-blooded study of the past of Turkic-speaking peoples, for it is this term which has constantly held our minds in fear, a shameful relic of the past that we must get rid of once and for all. All peoples should receive what is their due, including the Turkic-speaking peoples, who created one of the most ancient and richest cultures of the world. They are not only the creators of their own unique culture, but the disseminators as well, the conductors of the cultural traditions of many other peoples who were constantly moving. So what you got was a blend of various cultures—and any blend, in the words of the academician Likhachev, is strong and solid. In this sense these people played as great a role in the development of world culture as the Indo-European peoples, and others. They deserve respect and thorough study—not some kind of label. But what is in fact the state of affairs? If you start a conversation about Khatai, people will reply: "This smells somewhat of Pan-Turkism." If you ask about restoring to Kirovabad its name from ancient times, again—Pan-Turkism.

We must always bring our historical memory to bear—not to harm, but rather to benefit relations among our peoples, to foster friendship. Our strength and the guarantee that we will flourish—both as a country in general as well as each individual nation and people—lie in unity and solidarity. The development of each people as an individual entity is the development of our entire multinational country.

It is a goal worthy of implementation.

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Public Meeting on Zaporozhye Pollution Issues Viewed as Success

18300416a Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
11 Jun 88 p 3

[Article by A. Rekubratskiy, PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent: "Everyone Could Speak at Meeting on Zaporozhye Ecological Problems"]

[Text] There are a number of rumors circulating about the meeting that dealt with the problems of protecting the surrounding environment of Zaporozhye. The city

authorities granted permission to hold this meeting without particular enthusiasm, yet emotions had begun to seethe even earlier. It started with a letter, in which an unknown author tried to sum up the situation with the city's surrounding environment. The fact itself that the letter had been passed off along many hands gave rise to conjectures, until the oblast youth newspaper published it with an appropriate commentary. Keen discussions were held on the eve of and at the meeting between party, soviet, nature-preservation organization and industrial enterprise leaders and city residents at the House of Political Education. Moreover, the expanded meeting of the party gorkom buro, after examining the course of fulfillment of the "Biosphere" program, acknowledged that work in this area is unsatisfactory.

Meanwhile, the unfortunate ecological situation in Zaporozhye has been building up for years. Pursuit of the plan at any cost shoved concern for the people's health into the background. Although the state has regularly allocated considerable funds for the construction of nature-preservation projects, the funds have been poorly assimilated—of the 305 million rubles allocated annually, only 145 million went into the work. Yet, how could it be otherwise, if Glavzaporozhstroy is in simply no condition to ensure the planned amount of work, because of its low work capacity?

Zaporozhye is third in the republic in terms of industrial potential. This is both good and bad: the plants and factories release 287.1 thousand tons of dust into the air annually. Add to this the more than 100,000 tons of pollution from motor vehicles and the 116 million cubic meters of insufficiently cleaned household, business and industrial sewage, which is dumped into the Dnepr. The matter has gone to the point that the sanitation and epidemic center recommended this summer that vacationers not swim in the Dnepr below the so-called "red water."

However, nonetheless some things have been done to preserve nature. When it became necessary to show verbal "concern" for the working people, it was stated from high rostrums that 74.6 percent of harmful substances are now being caught and rendered harmless and that the construction of pre-cleaning installations for the second water intake station is being completed. In this regard, however, the fact that, according to laboratory data, the contents of harmful substances in the air exceeds permissible norms by a factor of 3-8 and, under poor meteorological conditions—by a factor of 15-20, was diffidently overlooked.

This was fully expressed at the meeting, which lasted more than 4 hours. Most of the speakers fully understood that all of the problems cannot be solved immediately. However, how should the main direction of the work be determined? What should take first priority? Who caused this situation? The city residents offered about 700 specific suggestions, which are now being studied very closely.

The conversation followed the necessary course. The most urgent questions concerned the emission of carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide by "Zaporozhstal," of silicon carbide by furnaces at the abrasives combine, pollution from the "Dneprospetsstal" aeration lanterns, and emissions from aluminum and coal-tar chemical plants.

Zaporozhye residents indicated that USSR Minchermet is the primary atmospheric polluter. The ministry is beginning to realize this as well: this year, financing for nature-protecting measures has radically increased. The city authorities are addressing the problem. The party gorkom has decided to regularly present the population with data on the status of nature-preservation work in the city, to require that any new project be constructed with cleaning installations, to introduce only harmless technologies and to expand the technical possibilities for implementing nature-protecting measures. The "Biosphere" Program will be subject to review.

Of course, one cannot avoid long-winded speeches and redundancy when anyone who wants to can use the microphones, which were provided by the Komsomol gorkom. However, the Zaporozhye meeting was a lesson in real democracy and was held in an organized fashion.

What were the impressions of its participants? Did hope appear for improvement in the ecological situation? It was noted that if the city council for preserving the surrounding environment works just as actively as it has over the last 2 years, there will be full grounds to expect changes for the better. It is also pleasant to realize that direct and frank expression is becoming the norm for relations between simple people and leaders of various ranks.

It should also be noted that Zaporozhye residents are striving to make their own personal contributions to the common problem and are condemning those who maintain the fault-finder's stance. The idea of creating a special fund of people's contributions for awarding to enthusiasts who propose and introduce a worthy idea, aimed at improving the ecological situation, received support. In a word, after stormy debates, we need constructive action.

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Zalygin on Own Role in, Hopes for Ecology Movement

18300416b Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Jun 88 p 3

[Interview by V. Pigalev with writer Sergey Zalygin: "A Writer's Opinion: Culture Solves a Great Deal." Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] Our correspondent V. Pigalev talks to writer Sergey Zalygin.

[Question] Sergey Pavlovich, in one of your articles you said that any mistake we make works against democracy. Could you please comment on this thought?

[Answer] I am certain that the opponents of restructuring and democratization are only waiting for us to stumble and permit a gross error—not just one error, but somewhat more. Then they will have reason to gloat and hurl accusations at us: you are done with playing democracy, they will say. We should act knowledgeably and circumspectly. It goes without saying that this does not mean we should act timidly and overcautiously...

[Question] Why do you often speak on ecological problems?

[Answer] These problems have troubled me for a long time. The discussions, it would seem, have already raised a ruckus about the so-called "project of the century," and the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers have issued a decree to halt work on redirecting part of the flows of Northern and Siberian rivers. However, can we say with full certainty that common sense has prevailed? Hardly.

In fact, let us examine how they are "halting" the redirection work. In the northern part of the Union, in the basin of the Sukhona and other rivers, it would seem like everything has quieted down. However, the "northern" work comprises only 7 percent of the project's cost: the rest is in the southern part, primarily Volgograd Oblast. Here, the "transformation of nature" is being carried out at ever-increasing rates.

No one has ever proven the need to build a second Volga-Don canal. It had always been considered the main project in the redirection work. However, Minvodka, Gosplan and the Volgograd CPSU Obkom First Secretary, former RSFSR minister of land reclamation and water resources, Comrade Kalashnikov, declared that the canal is independent of the overall project. On this basis, it is being built. Being built at an accelerated pace...

I think that the Volga-Don Canal (second) is entirely unnecessary: the planned amount of water can be redirected using existing installations. This hydrotechnical monster is essentially being created for its own sake. The capital withdrawn from circulation consists of approximately 2.5 billion rubles. Incidentally, the oblast kolchozes and sovkhozes already owe the state 3 billion rubles.

Alas, this is not the only such Minvodka project.

No one can deny that, in principle, we need land reclamation. After all, one third of reclaimed land does provide the planned crop yields. However, can this really be considered satisfactory work?

Minvodka claims that there is not enough water, which means that redirection is necessary! Moreover, this problem is interpreted as follows: the RSFSR does not want, they say, to give water to Uzbekistan, where people have nothing to drink...

However, if there is not enough water, how come there is now swampland in the Karakalpak ASSR? The Karakalpak drama is essentially comparable to Chernobyl: it is already almost impossible to live there. The swamp-making process is continuing, and irrigation norms exceed permissible norms several times over.

It is impossible to artificially connect the redirection question to the community water supply problem.

[Question] What stance does scientific thought take?

[Answer] How scientific thought is working, for instance, at the Institute of Water Problems, and what direction it is taking can be seen from the following facts:

In 1986, the institute claimed that water consumption in the USSR would be reduced more than 17 percent by the year 2000, due to the application of new equipment and recycling systems. This is the real figure. In 1987, however, the very same institute changed its opinion: it turns out that water consumption will increase 21 percent by the year 2000.

Why? It was necessary to prove the existence of a water shortage in a number of regions in the country. Once there is a shortage, redirection becomes necessary. Except now it will be called "territorial flow redistribution" and made part of a "Water Supply Program." Under the pretext of "redistribution," a second academic Institute of Water and Ecological Problems is being created in Siberia.

Three USSR Academy of Sciences departments have accused the Institute of Water Problems of falsification and the newspapers are writing about criminal irresponsibility (the same Karakalpak story), but...

A strange situation is shaping: the government understands the public well, and the public—the government. However, the department is interfering, and this mutual understanding is not yielding any results at all.

[Question] Speaking of problems with ecology and the utilization of nature, as a rule, you stress attention on the economic aspect of the matter. However, would you agree, Sergey Pavlovich, that the problem is also very closely related to cultural...

[Answer] Yes, this is so. It is also true that I emphasize the economic aspect of the problem. To be honest, I do this consciously. After all, some bureaucrats in various departments often understand only the language of figures. Moral problems and the questions of preserving

cultural monuments are of little interest to them: these are clever, intellectual fantasies, they say. Therefore one must give preference to other arguments and study the arithmetic.

[Question] Nevertheless, how important, in your opinion, are the cultural aspects of this issue?

[Answer] Of course, they are important. And very! It would not be easy to say that more than 400 monuments should perish in the northern part of our country as a result of flooding in a number of rayons. Is this the only point? After all, each family, nationality or nation is formed under certain geographical, natural and climatic conditions. This has impressions on both the people's traditions, their everyday life and their culture. In other words, the ecology of the human spirit is formed by the centuries. Therefore, any gross interference in the people's habitat is a destruction of culture in the broad meaning of the term.

[Question] Including, apparently, the destruction of the culture of ecological thinking as well?

[Answer] Unquestionably. And there is something else that I would like to say here. We should all seriously think about raising the level of culture. I am referring not only to theaters, museums and books... It is a question of the culture of thinking and of everyday life and interaction. In particular, it is a question of the culture of labor. After all, for example, a peasant who has no inner professional culture or dignity would hardly in good will maintain, let us say, a poultry farm or kolkhoz cattle yard in cleanliness and good order. The same can also be said for the attitude of a worker, builder, engineer, doctor...

[Question] Will beauty save the world?

[Answer] How should we interpret this phrase? After all, beauty in itself is a fairly widespread phenomena. It

exists throughout the world around us. However, the point here is that we are ourselves frequently destroy this beauty. Why? Because of the shortage of inner culture, because of the lack of true ecological thinking. Without the culture of man's spirit, beauty in and of itself, one could say, is dead or in any event inactive and vulnerable. Sometimes we remember too late.

[Question] However, after all, new thinking and the growth of man's inner culture are no simple matter. Obviously, this problem will not be solved in a year or two.

[Answer] This is also true. In general, after all, restructuring is not only economic. Democratization and glasnost are related to the rebirth of human dignity and to possibilities for creative thinking. This opens up prospects for more dynamic spiritual growth. Moreover, restructuring is a struggle against melancholy grayness, militant mediocrity, bureaucratism and official voluntarism, a struggle against the falsification of our history.

[Question] Unquestionably, the bans which have existed in our literature, theater, youth music, in the social sciences and so on have inflicted great damage on our culture. In addition, many are interpreting the lifting of bans and the flow of historically reliable information in an unhealthy manner.

[Answer] This is natural. It is far more difficult to change a stereotype in one's thinking than it is to change one's tie or gloves. I do not deny that for many people this involves some psychological stress. Profound suffering, disillusionment and even tragic moments are also possible. Yet there is no other way: we can no longer lie to ourselves for the sake of our own complacency. The truth, bitter though it may be, should triumph.

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